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i 4 SEP 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Management Staff, DDO
STATINTL FROM
Chief, Classi cation Review Group, ISAS/DDA
SUBJECT Records of CTA Predecessor Organizations
1. Attached is the draft "Guidelines for Classification Review
of CIA Predecessor Records and Information Between 1941-1946". These
guidelines are for use in reviewing the records of the Coordinator of
Information (COT), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the
Strategic Services Unit (SSU), all predecessor organizations of the
CIA. -The draft was prepared in coordination with the OSS Review Group
and includes .their ideas and suggestions. Any additional comments or
suggestions you-may have on this draft would be most welcome.
2. If this draft meets with your approval, it can_,~r~ce as the
basis for ar.~,.4r~_of ,~_~GOrd~ Control Sche ucf~~ for-these
predecess ..,.~cgan.iza_~iQn--a^ec~ls? As you know, the National Archives
and ecords Service (NARS) previously determined all such records as
permanent.. Given a Records Control Schedule and the knowledge gained
by the NABS appraisor, it is anticipated that many of these records
will be appraised as temporary and not have to be systematically
reviewed for declassification.
STATINTL
Attachment: a/s
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GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF
CIA PREDECESSOR RECORDS AND INFORMATION
BETWEEN 1941-1946
These guidelines are far use in reviewing the classification of
permanent records of the Coordinator of Information (COI}, (in existence
from July 1941 to June 1942); the Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
(June 1942 to September 1945); and the Strategic Services Unit (SSU),
(October 1945 to October 1946) for which the Director of the CIA has
responsibility. Executive Order 12065 requires ghat classified infor-
mation constituting permanently valuable records of the government, as
defined by 44 U.S.C. 2103, shall be reviewed for declassification as it
becomes twenty years old or thirty years in the case of foreign govern-
ment information. The Order further requires that guidelines for system-
atic review for declassification shall be issued and state specific
limited categories of information which, because of their national
security sensitivity, should not be declassified automatically but should
be reviewed item-by-item to determine whether continued protection is
needed.
A document can only be exempted from declassification if information
contained therein is exempt by statute from declassification or meets a
two-step test:
1. It concerns one or more of the classification requirements
set forth in Section 1-301 of Order:
(a) military plans, weapons, or operations;
(b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities, sources or methods;
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the
United States;
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters
relating to the national security;
(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding
nuclear materials or facilities; or
(g) other categories of information which are related
to national security and which require protection
against unauthorized disclosure as determined by
the President, by a person designated by the
President pursuant to Section 1-201, ar by an agency
head; and
2. Its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected. to
cause at least identifieable damage to the national security because of
the nature or substance of the information itself or the fact of its
possession by the United States Government.
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Decisions to exempt a document from declassification must balance
the need to safeguard U.S. national security interests against the
public's right to know. If classified information or documents from
ether U.S. Government agencies are found among these records, they will
be reviewed under the originating agency`s classification review guide-
lines ar be referred to the originating agency for its review as
appropriate.
The major concern in the review of the records of the COI, OSS and
SSU is to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods. The
Director of the CIA has statutory responsibility to protect intelligence
sources and methods.
An intelligence source is a person, organization, group, technical
system, mechanism, device ar any other means or instrument that has
provided or is being developed to provide foreign intelligence or foreign
counterintelligence and which, if its identity ar capability is disclosed,
could be vulnerable to counteraction which may nullify or significantly
reduce its effectiveness in providing foreign intelligence or foreign
counterintelligence to the United States. The premature disclosure of
the identities of souces who cooperated in confidence will undoubtedly
have an adverse impact on an intelligence agency's ability to obtain
new sources out of the fear of ultimate compromise. Ideally, source
identities should never be disclosed but at a minimum they should not
be revealed for at least 75 years to afford a basic level of protection
to the sources and their immediate families.
A present, past or prospective intelligence method is a procedure,
mode, technique, or requirement used or being developed to acquire,
transmit, analyze, evaluate, or process foreign intelligence or foreign
counterintelligence ar which supports an intelligence source or operation
and if disclosed, is vulnerable to counteraction that could nullify or
signi'fi'cantly reduce its effectiveness in supporting the foreign inte1-
ligencldore~sanablycleadetontheld~sciosure1oftansintellegenceedsourceeor
or cou
operation.
All classified documents and other materials orginated by COI, OSS,
or the SSU, ar for which they had responsibility, may be declassified
except those which, after review under these general guidelines, contain
information judged to be still sensitive and which, if declassified,
reasonably could be expected to:
1. Identify personnel who were assigned under non-official
cover ar would reveal a non-official cover arrangement.
2. Identify personnel under official cover or official cover
arrangements only where the situation was politically sensitive because
of governmental relationships which still could be adversely affected
by disclosure, and where there was a unique quality to the cover arrange-
rs~ent which has more than a strictly wartime application.
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
22 September
C/Classification Review Group ISAS/DI~A
ROOM N0. BUILDING
GG-14
The attached guidelines appear
to be complete and comprehensive.
However, as I believe ~ has
discussed with you, we e ie a
separate paragraph should be developed
defining "intelligence activities"
and stating the conditions for their
declassification.
FROM: Chief, DO/ formation Management
ROOM NO. BUILDING IXTENSION
i 1D4124
FHB 55'241 WHICHCMAY~ E US 0.
STATINTL
STATINTL
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