THE PURGE OF L. P. BERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200320009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 10, 1953
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OCI No. 4514 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No.7 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
10 JULY 1953
THE PURGE OF L. P. BERIA
Moscow Radio and the Soviet press have announced that
L. P. Beria has been ousted from the Communist Party and
from his government positions as first deputy premier and
MVD minister, has been jailed, and will be tried by the
Soviet Supreme Court as a traitor. "A few days ago" Malenkov
gave a report from the Party Presidium to a plenary meeting
of the Central Committee which discussed Beria's criminal,
antiparty and antistate activities.
According to Pravda, Beria has been accused of:
(1) trying to undermine the Soviet state in the
interests of foreign capital by treacherous
"attempts to place the MVD above the USSR govern-
ment and party;"
(2) machinating to seize power by using the MVD organs
against the party and its leadership and against
the government "by selecting MVD personnel on the
basis of loyalty to himself;"
(3) "impeding decisions, under various invented pre-
texts, on most important and urgent agricultural
problems with.a view to undermining the collective
farms and creating difficulties in the food supply;"
(4) trying to undermine "with various crafty schemes"
the friendship of the USSR peoples, to disseminate
hostility among them and "to achieve bourgeois
nationalism in union republics;"
impeding and distorting Central Committee and
governmental orders regarding the strengthening
of Soviet legislation and the liquidation of law-
lessness and arbitrary action;
becoming a "bourgeois renegade," an "agent of
international imperialism" and hatching plans to
seize power with the aim of destroying the party
and changing the party's policy to a "capitulatory
policy which would have brought about ultimately
the restoration of capitalism".
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US ambassador Bohlen on 6 July reported rumors circu-
lating in Moscow that Beria was in difficulty if not in
disgrace because of the recent disturbances in East Germany.
While Beria's absence from the opera on 27 June may
indicate that he was under arrest on that date, it is also
possible that he was in Germany, personally supervising the
restoration of order. It would appear to have been almost
impossible to make the necessary arrangements for his arrest
while he was still in Moscow because of the intelligence
sources and police power at his disposal. There is some indi-
cation he may have been in Berlin on 17 June, the day follow-
ing the outbreak of the East German demonstrations.
Other recently noted evidence that Beria might have
been in trouble was the continued postponement of the
Georgian party congress originally scheduled for 25 May.
This meeting presumably would have confirmed that republic's
April purges which had generally been credited to Beria's
influence.
The appointment of S. K. Kruglov to succeed Beria as
MVD minister is an illustration of the lack of loyalty
among top Soviet bureaucrats. Kruglov was Beria's deputy
police chief from 1939 and succeeded him as chief of MVD in
1946 when Beria relinquished his ministerial duties and
became a full member of the Politburo. The following
description has been made of Kruglov: "a baby-faced
leviathan of six feet, two inches and 245 pounds, he looks
like a cop and is one. At Potsdam he chain smoked, enthusi-
astically bummed chewing gum from every Yank he met, and
consumed vast quantities of food and vodka, keeping his
belly shaking with laughter between mouthfuls. Truman liked
Kruglov well enough to give him an autographed picture and
a Legion of Merit."
Although Beria in addition to his police responsibilities
was generally considered to have run the Soviet atomic energy
program, it is quite unlikely that Kruglov will have greater
than security responsibilities in this field. There is also
no reason to believe at present that Beria's removal will
change the USSR's emphasis on this program.
With respect to the foreign policy implications of
Beria's arrest, the Pravda editorial again pointed out
that the Soviet government has "stated more than once that
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all unsolved international questions under dispute can be
solved by negotiations between the interested countries,"
and that "the new peaceful initiative demonstrated by the
Soviet government has brought about the further strengthen-
ing of the international position of the Soviet Union and
the growth of the authority of our country." On the other
hand, there are significant allusions to "the general
intensification of the undermining anti-Soviet activities
of international reactionary. forces," to the fact that
"international imperialism is becoming increasingly active,"
and Beria is charged with "a policy of capitulation." All
of these may well foreshadow a new "vigilance campaign"
like that evoked by the first announcement of the "doctors'
plot."
The desire of the governing Kremlin faction to consoli-
date its power should continue to provide motivation for
attempts to reduce international tension. The probability
of further purges, their influence on Soviet prestige
throughout the Orbit, and the possible weakening of the
police apparatus of control would also contribute to a
desire to obtain an easing of Western pressure or inter-
ference within the Orbit. It would, however, only be under
circumstances that war with the West or revolutions within
the Orbit appeared imminent to a weakened regime that the
Soviet leaders would consider it necessary to make major con-
cessions to the West.
The internal power situation does not appear to have
been the determining factor in the Kremlin's attitude toward
foreign issues. Molotov's position in the triumvirate
probably rested mainly on his seniority and prestige as
one of the old revolutionaries and on his long experience
in foreign affairs, and not on his control of a vast bureau-
cratic machine which he could throw into a struggle for
personal aggrandizement. In this case, Molotov would not
have been in any position to make a play for supreme power
against either Malenkov or Beria, both of whom controlled
the more formidable machines of the party and police. It
would seem that the fundamental issues which affect the
USSR's vital interests and power position in international
politics were not drawn into the struggle.
In relation to the new conciliatory policy inside the
Soviet Union the Pravda editorial appeared non-committal,
used ambiguous language and in some cases appeared contra-
dictory. With regard to the. post-Stalin emphasis on
increasing the production and availability of consumer goods,
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the early part of the editorial seemed to emphasize heavy
industry, "the very basis of the Socialist economy," machine
building, technology and science adding that "our light
industry and our food industries have achieved a high
level....they are able at present to satisfy the growing
demands of the urban and rural population on the basis of
the policy of price reductions carried out by the party."
However, the emphasis on consumer goods was somewhat greater
toward the end when the editorial stressed that the party's
task is "to consider with profound feeling workers' demands,
to care daily for an all-around improvement of the living
standard of workers and collective farmers, intelligentsia,
and all Soviet peoples." It is not clear whether Pravda
was modifying its 8 July announcement that this year "addi-
tional reserves have been found for an increased output of
consumer goods amounting to over twenty billion rubles in
excess of the envisaged annual plan for consumer goods turn-
over." On the whole, the renewed emphasis on heavy industry,
on "the strengthening of the economic and defensive might of
our motherland," and "the tasks set by the 19th Party Congress"
would indicate that the benefits to the people promised by
Pravda inits 8 July editorial would not be at the expense
of t e Five Year Plan.
With regard to the anti-Russification policy, another
important factor of the new "liberal" policy, Pravda was
also unclear. Beria was accused of trying "to undermine
the friendship of the USSR peoples -- the very basis of the
multi-national socialist state and the main conditions for
the successes of the fraternal Soviet republics -- to dis-
seminate hostility among the USSR peoples and to achieve
bourgeois national elements in union republics." This
language is generally similar to the recent criticism in
the Georgian and Ukrainian republics which launched the anti-
Russification drive in propaganda. However, the inclusion
of the phrase "bourgeois nationalism" suggests that Beria
may be accused of encouraging local nationalism to the
detriment of Soviet patriotism which would seem to indicate
a return to Russification. It is possible that Pravda is
here cautioning the people not to overinterprettH anti-
Russification propaganda or take too literally the propaganda
line that the minority republics are "equals among equals"
with the Great Russians.
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In any event, the editorial emphatically reaffirmed
the party's dominance over all Soviet institutions, par-
ticularly the MVD, in stating: "Every worker, in whatever
post, must be under the constant control of the party.
The party organizations must systematically check the work
of all organizations and the administrative activity of all
leading workers. It is necessary to check systematically
and unremittingly the activity of the USSR Ministry of
Internal Affairs. This is not only the right but the
direct duty of the party organizations."
With regard to the danger of reversing the present
liberal trend Ambassador Bohlen recently reported that it
might be radically changed as a result of top level dissension.
However, in his estimation a reversion to the state of terror
characteristic under Stalin would come as a shock to the
population and would severely strain the system.
The captive peoples of Eastern Europe will receive the
downfall of Beria and the clear implication of dissension
within the Communist regime with great satisfaction,, and
unrest will be encouraged. The more violently anticommunist
elements in Eastern Europe may be stimulated by this sign
of weakness to participate in underground resistance work,
at least for the time being. However, riots or other violent
demonstrations can be prevented or controlled unless the
Soviet security system is so disorganized by the coming purge
that local operating units of the Satellite security systems
also are involved.
Certain individuals in these police organizations,
which in varying degrees are coordinated with and controlled
by the Soviet security system, are certain to be affected.
Consequently, it is expected that there will be some con-
fusion in the Satellite security ministries and headquarters,
but it probably will not seriously disorganize the operating
units.
There is no firm evidence that any specific Satellite
leaders have been dependent on the support of Beria. However,
a large-scale communist purge can be completely irrational
and indiscriminate in its choice of victims. For this reason,
it is expected that there is considerable uneasiness among
the Satellite leaders. A large-scale purge within the USSR
will undoubtedly involve some of them, who will be victimized
for real or imagined association with Beria and his alleged
ambitions.
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The purge of Beria has cut across the manifestations
of more liberal economic programs which have been appearing
in East Germany, Hungary, and to a lesser extent in Albania
and Rumania. The reforms which have been made or promised
appear calculated to cope with long-standing problems that
the policies of the Stalin regime had failed to solve.
These problems, shortages of food and consumer goods, labor
apathy, peasant resistance and general discontent, are as
serious as ever. It seems logical to assume that the
reforms will therefore continue in force for the time being,
in order to eliminate as much as possible these internal
weaknesses. But the accusation that Beria was aiming at
"replacing the policy pursued by the party for many years
with a capitulatory policy which would have brought about
the restoration of capitalism" suggests that the economic
reform program may be re-examined.
In this connection, the accusation that Beria "under
various invented pretexts, has in many ways impeded decisions
on most important and urgent problems in the field of agri-
culture.... with a view to undermine the collective farms
and create difficulties in the country's food supply" may
portend a resumption of the collectivization drive in the
Satellites.
Malenkov and his colleagues may have seized upon the
recent riots in East Germany as an excuse for the final
move against Beria but Beria's ousting appears to have
resulted from deeper considerations than the need to provide
a scapegoat for disturbances in the Orbit.
Beria's arrest would seem almost certainly to have
been the result of a struggle for power. Judging by the
nature of the accusations against him, the other Soviet
leaders suspected that he was wielding his power as police
chief too arbitrarily with an eye to increasing his role
in the regime. It is also possible that these accusations
are false and that Malenkov and his supporters took their
first opportunity to arrange a colleague's removal.
Certainly this move would seem to have been made at
an extremely inopportune time from the viewpoint of the
Kremlin's presenting the world with at least a facade of
strong, unified leadership. With the recent developments
in East Germany, the comparatively high degree of unrest
in the Eastern European Satellites and the prestige which
Mao enjoys as a Communist leader, Malenkov's arrest of the
number two figure in the regime seems to be an overly bold
and even :illconsidered move in a struggle for power.
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Some measure of the gravity with which the remaining
leaders faced this action emerges from the accompanying
announcements that local Party central committeesin Moscow,
Kiev and "other places" had been convened and that they
unanimously supported the decision.
How extensive a purge will now be necessary to remove
Beria's previous supporters and create a new power balance
is not yet clear. It seems likely that at least five
republic MVD ministers who appear to be Beria appointees
will be, or perhaps even have been, replaced. Beria's trial
may implicate other figures, perhaps on the Presidium level.
However, the remaining leaders must be aware that their
rule, to outside eyes, will appear weaker and more confused
in direct relation to the size of the purge. Unless the
situation deteriorates to a point where one faction, in an
effort to vanquish another, directly depends on the military
power of the army, it is unlikely that the latter, permeated
with police and party controls, will play a significant
political role. The calling of the army into such a struggle
would be a dangerous, last resort move in that it would
facilitate what has been carefully guarded against for
thirty-five years -- a coup by the military over the
political leaders.
The decision to try Beria, apparently publicly, in
the Supreme Court is reminiscent of the great show trials
of the 1930's, when the victims were sentenced by the
military collegium of that "highest judicial organ" of the
USSR. While most of this court's work is concerned with
the review of decisions of lower courts, it does act as a
court of original jurisdiction in cases of high treason of
exceptional importance.
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