JPRS ID: 8486 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100050057-3
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• Sequence Number: 57
• Content Type: REPORTS

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, JPRS L/8486
3A May 1.979
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TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 22/79)
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~ J1?RS L/8486
. 3 A May 1.9 7.9
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TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTN AFRICA
(FOUO 22/79)
CONTENTS PAGE -
EGYPT
Problems Created by Arab Financial BoycoCt Reviewed .
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 13-19 Apr 79) 1
Severe Opposition to Treaty, al-Sada~'s Incompetence
Uc~derscored ~
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 13-19 Apr 79) 10
Ik~me~tic Opposition to Peace Drive Detailed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABY, 30 Mar-5 Apr 79) 16
?
IRAN ~
Disparate Tendencies Seen in Groups Opposed to Khomeyni
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 25 Apr 19) 21
Japan Asked~To Review T~heran's Traff ic System
(Kanishi; IJIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, 14 May 79)............ 23
MAURITANIA �
Briefs '
Committee Views Algeria, Polisario 24
'AFP' Correspondent Expelled 24
~ MOROCCO
Use of American Arms Criticized
(Daniel Volman; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 30 Apr-13 May 79)....... 25
Development of Dom~~stic and Foreign Policies Discussed '
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 Apr 79)...... 27
- a- [III - N~ F~ A- 121 FOUO)
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BGYPT
PROBLBM~ CRBATED BY ARAB FINANCIAL BOYCOTT RSVISWSD ~
Paris AL-WArAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 Apr 79 pp 16-20
'/Article: "Cover: A Rapor~, Backed by Figures, on the gffect of Arab
Econanic Panaltias againet the Sgyptian Ragime: al-Sadat on the Blacklist_'/
/Text/ The re8olutions of the Baghdad confarence on penalries wera clear
' and frank: the withdrawsl of ambassadors, tha cutoff of politic~l and diplo-
matic ralations, the auspenaion of Bggrpt's membership in the League of Arab
States, the transfar of headquartera of th~ lnague and moet Arab fedaral or-
' ganizations and authorities from Cairo, and th,e affort t~ have tha headr
quarters of international and reg~onal authorities, insti:ution~ and agan-
cies tranaferred from Cairo as vall.
' However, it ia the economic and financial penalties which will have a
direct effect, no~ that the Araba have put al-Sedat's regime on the black- _
list.
The Arab penaltiea call for the suspeneion of all loans, depoaits, guaran-
tees, banking facilities, contributions, financial aid and aid in kind to
the Bgyptian government and ita inatitutioas.
In addition, they prohibit the granting of economic aid from Arab financial
organizations and funda astablished in the contest of the Arab Leagua and
Hutual Arab cooparation and call for abstinence fram the purchass of bonda,
stocke, ordera and general indebtednesa loana issued by the Sgyptian govern-
ment and its financial institutioas.
~ The resolutiona then prohibit trade rrith Bgyptian gavernment and private
organizations dealing vith Iarael, on vhich the pravi~ions of the Arab boy-
cott vill be imQosed.
It haa been AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI'8 deaire to provide a raport on Arab a~d on
the economic aad financial level8. This ie the firat jouraalistic study
of its kind to tranalate the act~ona of the Baghdad conferaace resolutions
into the language of figures.
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AL-WA'TAN AL-'A1tABI ia not aiming, hereby, Co eetabliah proof Chat the
Egyptian regime alons ie materially~ morally and athically the loser as a
conaequence of the Arab penalties; ultimately the lose belonge Co all--all
Arabs including Egypt. Rather, it wi~hes to ahow~ by figures, that Che '
Begin-al�~5adat agreement will deNri~re Egypt of Arab aid and gifte totalling
$2.5 billion a year at e time wheu it is in utmoat need of every piaeter
and millieme. It also wante to show that American, Suropean and Japaneee
aid and gifta--if provided--wiil not equal what tha Araba have offnred, and
have been supposed to have off ered. Thus, what al-Sadat's regime hae em-
barked upon will not compensate for the offer of proaperity and welfare for
40.5 million Egy;~tian Arabe in compen8ation for the degradation anci ab~ect-
ne~s of surrender.
It is not easy to imagine how effective the boycott of economic relat~ons
on the Egyptian economy will be. In the past 30 yeare Chat Egypt has been
gravitating toward the Arabs, when 3ama1 'Abd-a1~Naeir placed Egypt at the
heart of the Arab nation and its basic causea, these relatione have grown
stronger.
The Araba became wholly oriented toward Egypt following the oil bonanza~
and Egypt was the main beneficiary of these relationa, wh~ther they to~k
the form of trade, loans an3 financial aid, joint inveetmente and projects,
or the admieaion of hundreds of thousands of E3YPtiane to ~oba in the east-
ern and western Arab world.
When al-5adat's improvised liberalization policy in the aeventiea led to
economic constrictions and political jolta and dieturbancea~ as happened
in the Cairo disturbances of January 1977, the only thinga which saved his
regime from economic ruin were Arab financial aid and gifts, end he relied
on them to pay presaing debta which were due.
~
Trade: Oil Ia a Great Loss
It is unfortunate that trade relatione did not davelop as quickly as joint
investments, for example. Perhape today official Arab policymakere, rea-
lize that trade ia an important political factor. Had Egypt been bound to
the Arab warld by etrong bonda of trade, a1-Sadat would have Chought about
the conaequences of the Arab boycott more than once. Today the Araba ac-
count for no more than 6 percent of Egypt's :otal foreign trade. Therefore
trade plays a large role in economic integration and in eupporting Arab
solidarity and united political deciaiona.
- However, one muat point out that Egypt will be greatly affected by the cut- _
off of Arab oil. Although it produces about 25 million tons of oil per
year, of which it exporta half, which bringa in an income of a little more
than S500 million, it ie compelled to import aome apecific types of Arab
oil, for which it paid $95 million last year. This figure vill approxi- ~
mately doubla thia year eince Egypt is compelled to import this oil ' '
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from other eources--moraover, it is difficult to obtain, and theee problems
wi11 increaee if it ie compelled to fulfill a1~Sadat's commitment to eell
Sinai oil to Ierael.
However, Che Arabe will be able to deliver a hareh blow Co the SgypCian
economy if they totally commit Chemselvea to euepending econoaaic aid to it.
In thie area, ehe Araba can do a great deal. In the language of figurae,
one can talk in aome deCail in thie ephere:
The Arab Sumnite: $400 Million Annually
At the Khartoum sumnit of 1967 and at the Rabat gummit after the 1973 war,
the Arabs decided to give economic aid to Bgypt. Although the figures on
this aid are etill secret, because they were given to aupport the Egyptian
ar~ed forces at a time when Bgypt was in a etate of war wiCh Ysrael, eeti-
_ matea range from $350 Co 400 million par year.
The value of the aid Bgypt raceived from ita fraternal Arab staCes from
Arab su~oit resolutions alona ro aupport ita war affort has coms to $4 bil-
lion since the 1967 aetback; thia does not include the private and amerg-
ency Arab aid offered Bgypt, including, for example, the arms the late
Algerian president Boumediene be+ught and paid for through a loan from rhe
Soviets and delivered to Egypt during the October war. The cutoff of this
aid will now cause great haran to the military role expectad of al-Sadat as
the patrolman in ~he Axab region, eepecially since the Amaricana have not
ahown much enthusiaem to offer him military aid and equipment if thn rich
Arab statee do not finance it.
The diacuasion on Arab aid, gifts and loana to Bgypt is a lengthy ons.
The Arabe offered more than tWO thirda of the aid and gifts 8gypt received
in the period from 1913 to 1977, which are eatimated at $8 billioa.
The Gulf Authority: $2 Billion
Four Arab cauntriea--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and
Qatar--established a apecial financial fund to aupport ~gypt under the
title of the "Gulf Authority for the Development of Bgypt." President al-
Sadat uaed up all this authority's capital, Which totalled $2 billion, in
1977 and 1978. This fund helped Presideat al-Sadat obtain Buropean~
American and internatioaal loans by undes~citing them, and a1loWed Bgypt
to benefit further from the intereat due on the loans it waa provided.
This fund wa8 to have backed a$250 million financial loan which Bgypt had
been trying to get from the Union Des Banques Arabes et Francaises (UBAF).
Last year the Arab MoneCary Fund also alloaed Bgypt to withdrav ita ahare
in the fund, ahich was $17.5 million, and negotiations took place to give
it a loan of $20 million from the fuud.
The aid acui granta given by Arab countries declined eomeWhat after Pree-
ident al-Sadat made his haplesa initiative in November 1977.
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~ However, that did not prevenr him from continuing ro receive valuable aid. '
Saudi Arabia alone offered him S1 billion lasr year and agreed Co finance '
his trensaction for Amarican F-5A airplanes worth approximately $500
million. . ~
Arab Contributiona to Development Pro~ecte
i
It would be fair to state here Chat Arab aid and gifte have not ,~uet baen ;
reatricted Co in,~ectione of financialliquidity into the Bgyptian syeCem,
so that Bgypt can pay off the debts it hae accumulated ae a coneequence of !
the failure of ite economic policiea; rather, they have also been concerned
wi~h financing Bgyptian development pro~ecCs. `
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BgypC was the firat Arab country to benefit from aid and and loans from ~
Arab financing funds. Same of Bsypt's development pro,~ects are being com- ~
pletely financed by Arab funda, and aome are being financed in participa- '
Cion with some Arab countriee and such international organizations as the ~
- World Bank and International Monetary Fund. ~
~
There is no doubt that if the Arabe refrain fran continuing to contribute
to the financing of these pro,~ects, this could lead to a suspanaion of work ~
on these projects, which will yield negative economic and aocial conae-
quences as fat as the regime's political and labor relations on the domeat-
ic level are concerned.
.
Perhaps ordinary Egyptian citizens--in particular citizens working on theae
prajects--will realiz~ the extent of the fraud they are e~cpoaed to when the ~
Egyptian media allege that peace with Ierael w~ill bring bleseings and com- ,
fort to Sgypt.
The Araba have offered Bgypt development aid through a number of financial ~
funds, foremost of which are the Saudi Developmant Fund, the Kuwait Fund ~
for Arab Development, the Abu D~abi Fund for Arab Development, the ~Arab ~
Furul for Sconomic and Social Development, and the Islamic Devalopment Bank. '
~
Th~ae five banka, epecifically, contributa to financing for the biggeat
Egyptian development project ever preaented, the Suez Canal devnlopment ~
/project/, whose costs total $1.5 billion. It is estimated that the firet :
st~ge of this project, which ia restricted to expanding and deepening tha
Suez Canal to enable supertankers to pasa through it, will be completed in ~
1980. ~
The project also includes the excavation of one or more tunnels under the
Suez Canal to connect the sast bank of the canal to Sinai /,eic/. A1-Sadat ;
announced this side project in 1914 but, as a result of red tape and admin-
istrative corruption, excavation on it was delayed until 1977. The job ie -
being performed by the Britiah firm (Sharmack) and Arab Contractors Co, ~
which is oWned by 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, father-in-law of al-Sadat'e ,
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- daughter and one of the moat important of Che men cloee to him; hie name
in Egypt has been linked to influence-peddling exgloitation in recent
years.
These five banka ~rovided the sum of $139 million as their contribution to
Che pro~ect to ~:evelop the Suez C,anal, and there ie no doubC that tha pro-
~ect will be affected by theee banke' withdrawal frocn the ~inancing procese.
Perhape this will lead to the auepeneion of work on the pro~act.
In order to ehow how important the 3uez Canal is in terma of hard currency
receipts, it is enough to point out that iC providee al-Sadat~,e regime with -
$500 million per year in ship traneit tolls. '
The War Production Authority
However, the moat important pro~ect, and one which Arab coun~ries are financ- _
ing, is the Arab Induetriea Authority progran?. Thie authority was basic-
ally establiehed for advanced Arab war production with capital of $1.4 bil-
lion, ahared equally by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emiratee, Qatar and
Egypt. However, it ie the firet three countriee which provide Che real
financing, While Egypt provides the n~anpower.
al-Sadat's regime will not be the only one to be affected by the suapeneion
of work on this masaive pro~ect. The United StaCes end Britain, which
, etrongly eupport the Egyptian-Iaraeli treaty, Bgypt's depasture fram the
Arab front-line trenchea, and the fragmentation of Arab aolidarity, also
will be a~fected.
However, the Arab countries providing the financing will also be affected
on the financial and military levels, although these losaes may be compen-
sated for if the Arab Induatrialization Authority is transferred, for ex-
ample, to Saudi Arabia, where these three Arab countries will help carry
Qut a aimilar war production pro,~ect, known as the al-Kharj Coc,plex, cloee
to Riyadh.
In fact national necessitiea require that the activities of the Arab In-
dustrialization Authority in Egypt be stopped eapacially aince it hae
started producing advanced equipment and weapons whoae purpose was to aup-
port the perseverance of Sgypt in particular and of the Arabs in general in
facing Israeli expanaion and occupation. After the eigning of the treaty,
al-Sadat will use its�production to support his war effort, which aa the
United States and Israel are planning, is dirncted againet the Arab nation
and Africa. .
One project on which work has atarted in this sphere ie that t~ produce
jeeps and military tranaport vehicles (12,000 per year), by sgree~oent with
the giant Amarican General Motora Corporation.
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Then there is Che pro~ect to assemble and cmnufacCure "Swingfire" anCi-
tank miesilea; a contract for their production was eigned with the two ~
British firme Dynamics and Aerospace in 1977. Its cosCe will total 4n '
million pouede eterling. '
There ia a pro~ect to produce the Alpha,~et airplane; an agreement wae ~ ~
reached on Chia in principla with Weet German and French companiee last
September. ~
Work on the pro~ect to produce the BriCiah Lynx helicopter and GM enginee, ~
which will coat 400 million pounda sterling, has advanced to en important
stage. ~
i
- There ia also an ambitious pro~ect Co produce the advariced Mirangs 2000 j
airplane by agreement with tha French firm Daesault.
;
Delaying work on pro,~ecta of thie kind inflicte some dam~ge on Arab count- ;
riea also, but their removal from Egypt and transfer to Arab Gulf countries ;
will in the long run prevent al-Sadat's regir_ne, which ie cooper~tting wiCh i
Israel, from mc~nopolizing atrategic war production which it could uee i
against the Argh nation and ite national interesta. Transferring Chese ,
projects will eneure these Arab countriea the maximum degree of aecurity in ;
the context of financing and military aufficiency, thua assarting to the ~
United Statea and European countriea that the Arabs can tear up treaties ~
aimed at imQosing terms upon them. ~
There are also dozena of projects and programs to which the Araba have con-
tributed and are contributing, expreasing their support for and their ;
solidarity with their brother Egyptians and acknowledging Egyptian perae- i
verance and the great burden Egy~t ie bearing in confronting the Zionist !
invasion supported by the United States of America. ~
Theae projects, for example, include the canstruction of a town near the ~
Suez Canal bearing the name of the late Saudi monarch Faieal ibn 'Abd-al- '
'Aziz, and 10 Ramadan City near Cairo. ;
They also include Arab Economic Unity Council projecta costing billione of ~
dollars. It was aseumed that Egypt and rfie Egyptians would have been the .
~ first to benefit from theae projecta in the next �ew years hs~d it not been
for the initiative President a1~Sadat's regime made.
Unallocated Arab Expenses
i
Is this all?
No. The Araba can do a great deal to al-Sadat's regime. ;
The Baghdad conference also ruled that placing depoaits in Bgyptian official ~
financial institutiona would be prohibited, that these institutione were to ~
. ;
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be deprived of all bank aid or facilitiea, and thdt stocke, bonde, ordera
and general it~debtednesa loane ieaued by the Egyptian Creaeury and its.
financial inetitutions were not to be purchased. Thie aleo applies to gov-
e,rnmenC and privnte inetitutiona which deal wiCh the Ieraeli enemy, Co -
which the Arab boycott lawe will be applied. Thie incl~udes intellectual,
cultural and technical activities promoted for interacrion with Israal.
In 1977, in agreement with the United Statea~ President al-Sadat agreed to
break, or loosen, the chaine of the Arab boycott of ma,~or American coropan-
ies dealing with Iarael and recomn$nded taking them off the blacklist if
they agreed to invest as much money in Arab countriea as they had invested
in Israel.
al-Sadat did not wait for Che opinion of Arab countriea in this ragard be-
fore~ allowing the American Coca Cola Company to establieh ~ citrus prod~ic-
tion pro~ect near the Suez Canal. A number of major financiera and influ-
ential persona cloae to him participated in the project.
Likewise he permitted the American firm 2eroz, which ie now considered one
of the biggeat of copying e~;uipment and machinery producing companies, to
establiah a branch, ~nd hie "well known" share from the company waa a mas-
aive copying macbine which is still out of order in one of the presidential
palacee,
There are eimilar projects in which the Ford and Colgate Palmolive companiee
are participating. -
Is this everything either? '
No--the Arabs can do a great deal to al-Sadat's regime.
The Baghdad conference resolution~ atipulated that Arab ambassadore (18 in
number) be withdrawn, that political and diplomatic relatione be severed~
and that the headquartera of the Arab League, including its secretariat gen-
eral, employeea, apecialized committees (12 in number), technical commiCteea
(18 in number), branches of Arab organizations with headquart~ra in Egypt
(three in number), and apecific Arab federatione (12 in number) be moved to
Tuniaia.
These councils, committees, branchea and funde includP the Economic and
Social Council, the Mutual Defense Council, the Fund for Technical Aid to
African and Arab Countries, the Council on Economic Unity, the Arab Labor
Organization, the Arab Poetal Federation, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Arab
Food Industriee Federation, the Arab Insurance Federation, and tha Arab
Bank Federation.
It was also decided that the Arab countries would ask the United Nationa
to transfer the headquarters of its regioaal officea from Sgypt to /other/
Arab capitals.
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%
Thousands of Arab and foreign employees and aervants are working in these ;
embasaies, council, organizationa, federations and agencies, and their ;
countries and authoritiea spend hundreda of millione in dollars and ~ther
hard currenciea on th~m. The Egyptian treasury and Egyptian touriat snr-
vices banefiC from all this~ to say nothing of thousande of Egyptian fami- ;
liea whoee heada and providers gre working in theae Arab and foreign ineti-
tutions. It is estimated that three quarters of Egypt's tauriet revenuea -
come from reaident white collar workers and Arab tourists. It is suffici-
ent to show how importanC this is Co state that Bgypt's tourist income ie
eatimated at 125 million EgypCian pounds per year. ~
;
1.25 Million EgypCians in Arab Countries ,
Last but not least: ~
Is this everything? , ~
_ No. The Arabs can do a great deal to sl-Sadat's regime.
1.4 million Egyptiana are working in Arab countries, fram the Gulf to the
Atlantic, according to International Monetary Fund estimatea. They are
- basically concentrated in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, the United Arab ;
EmiraCes, Iraq und Algeria. ~
They aend hard currency estimated at $1.7 billion per year to their rela- ~
tives in Egypt. This amount accounts for one quarter of the hard cursency !
al-Sadat's regime receivea annually from abroad._ ;
If these people return tu Egypt it will reault in the total collepee of ~
al-Sadat's regime. Not only c~ill this important source of revenne be cut ~
off, theae people will constitute a dangerous problem to the regime aoci- I
ally and economically. When th~y find themselves out of work and see that ~
the revenues which uaed to guarantee them a standard of living far higher I
than all their brothers enjoyed have been cut off, they will rebel against i
the regime and join the forces opposed to it and the armiee of the unem- ~
ployed who wander aimlessly about in the towns, which are basically packed ,
with people. ~
Nonetheless, the Arab countries have taken no decisiuna against these ;
peaple, although they realize how effective they will be in putting a limit
to a regime which is burning all its bridgea and bonds to the mothe~rland,
is in ~ractice washing its handa of all its Arab linka and is ~enouncing ~
its national duties.
~
To prevent the regime from doing Chat, it is intended, as the Baghdad reso= ~
lutions state, "To show concern for the feelings of the Arab people from i
Egypt who are working and are present in the Arab countries, to observe ;
their inCereats and to strengthen their national adherence ro Arabhaod." ~
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It remaine to be said that the real eff ect of the actiona the Arabe can
take againet President al-Sadat's regime lies in the psychological and
moral influence Arab boycott of the regime may exert.
A relationship with Ierael, even America, will not be a life-raft to save
Egypt from the isolation al-Sadat will be experiencing. For 34 yeare of-
ficial Sgypl hae been breathii~g through its Arab lung, end the Arab world
is ita viCal support. Ite influence and reputation in the world depend on
iCs Arab premises and pointa of departure.
Throughout history, Egypt has lost ita effect and influence--indeed even `
its independence and national aoil--whenever iC relinquished ita regional
or Arab role.
This fact was in no way loat on the thinking and straCegy of the late
preaident Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. However, Naeir was willed tha bad luck of
choosing a vice president whom the fatea suddenly appointed to be liis
auccessor.
A1-Sadat ia not wrong just because he ie expoeing the intergats of thn Arab
nation to daager but also becauae he pretends to forget a fundamental
Egyptian truth that the Arabs are Egypt's wings and it cannot fly without
them, not even with all the artificial winge of Tel Aviv and Washington.
COPYRIGHT; 1979 A1-Watan al-'Arabi
11ss~ . .
CsO: 4802
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SSVERE OPPOSITION TO TRBATY~ AL�SADAT'S INCOMP8T6NCB UNDLRSCORBD ;
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Paris AL�WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 Apr 79 pp 20, 21 '
/Articie: "Cairo: the Regime Cete More Narvoue A~ Oppoeition to tha ~
Traaty inteneifies_'/
/Text/ AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's correepondent in Cairo talks abou~ the symptom~ ;
of nervouaneee and irritability which appaared in ths bahavior of aY-Sadat
and his agenciee as a result of the popular and political oppo~ition hia
treaty is meeting in Egypt ~nd the i~olation it ie experiancing in tha Arab
context~ which he consumnated recently by his c,rm hand: ~
preeident al-Sadat i� getting more narvoua and irritable by the day. Ne is ~
diatreesed by everything except the Americane ~nd the I~raeli~. He ia even
distreseed by hie advisors and asoistants. Ha is di~Cra~~ed by his oppon- ,
ente ac~ by all Arabe, including "modaratas," who continuad to beliava till ~ ;
the last mo~aent that they would not agrae to imposa puni~hmsnts on him.
~
~
al-Sadat'8 nervousnees became clea~ly obvious in hia latest �paach to the
People's Assembly. He threatened the lPaleatinians, probsd into tbe Saudi ~
pulae and affira?ed hia determination to coaawmmate hie Arab isolation 4
himself. ,
al-Sadat has na+ confirmed that the Arabs ara all determined to boycott him;
therefore he iesued ordera prohibiting tha transfer of the Arab League head- '
quarters, with itaeecretariat general, and freezing its funds, except for ~
the salaries of its 600 employeea�-70 percent of ahoou, aa is vell knovn, are ~
Egyptians. ! ~
Egypt'e relationa vith 12 Arab couatriea have now been frosen or totally f_
broken off. There has been a mutual aithdrawal of ambassadors with Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, the Uaited Arab Lmirates, Qatar, Tuniaia, Bahrain, aed ;
Morocco and a full aeverance of relations vith Iraq, Algeria, Libya, South ;
Yemen and Syria. The rope is on the tractor, as they say. Tha only two '
remaining countries aith wham al-Sadat is str~ngthaning his "Arab solidar- 6
ity" are the Sultanate of Muscat and Omaa and Prasident Nu~oayri'i Sud~n.
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~ A "Village" 6attlamenC vith Kha1i1 ,
Tha final thing al-3adar euccaeded ia "fraszing" temporarily ha~ baan tha
reeignation nf hir prima minioear~ Mu~tafa Khalil~ who r~fu~ed eo b~ar th~
re~poneibiliry of impiicirly agreaing~ wirh hie pYe~idant~ ro th~ Aaiaric~a
aacutiiCy guararteee Pra~idene Carear offared to I~raei~ vh?ich ar� �~~enti-
aliy dir~cted againet rha Arab~~ inciu~ing tha 8gyptian~ thaau~iva~.
The Cempor~ry ratzlamant aa� reached in the mennar of tha "viliage" cu~tom~
in hi~ adharanca to vhich al-Sada~ doae not miss any opportuniey to .xpr~~�
pride. Thu� ai-Sadat allowed Mueea~a Khalii eo boycotr Begin's vieit.
Khalil wa� �ati~fied with thie moda~t "protast" and with tha tao memoranda
, he sent xo America'e eacrarary of etate Vanca~ which took tha form of mara-
Ly "r,ecording" posieione in rasarva for futura ~avalopmanta, a~pacially
aftar ha had ~aen �uch prima minietars ae Bhueto and Amir Abbas Hovayda
pay dearly for rhair mistakae~
Nervousne~s and irrieability dominaee ail the regime's actions a~ a raault
of the tension adhering to al-Sadat. al-Nabaai lema'il~ mini~ter of tha
inCerior~ aleo aummoned up hie aarve� and ehaved his mi~cla� to hi~ fa~lov
citizena a~nd the opposition, t~?reataaing to apply deterran� maa~uras "lock
stock and barrel" against ~nyona vho moved against tha Bagi~-al-Sadat
rreaty.
Thn ordinary citizen in Bgypt may not hava bear aaara that America hat car-
ried out a military demon~tration in tha Culf araa~ but interaally ha haa
~ managed eo feea, aith his ovcti hands how Cairo al~o ha~ baan tra.n~formed into
an armed c~ap, wieh the cantral eecurity forca~ ~oining together in its
etreets and aquares in noticeably cancentrated form. At tha oaoe time,
Carter'e viait vae praceded and accompaaied by conetant arreats of inembare
of Islamic groups, and citizena noticed the inapection of vahicles and
paeaers-by going on at late houre in tha night~ eepecially in �ectiona
close to the eatrancea to tha city and the areas ahare th~re ara bridges
ovar the.Nile. Personnel Well knam for their activitiae in factorias re-
ceived warnings from the police not to leave thair homes during the visit.
Decrees were also isaued naving othar people from their ,~oba to arau re-
mote from labor complex centers. The Laf+yer~' Union announced a�ym~poaium
to discu~s the Camp David agreement on 8 and 9 March, and the aurhoritiaa
hurriedly exerted every preaaure to pre~s the union to delay the sym~po~iwn.
1'hey got vhat they aanted.
� One of al-Sadat'a nervous explosions took the form of an outburat against
hia prees leadera. Oaly a short time had el~psed eince the attack he made
against theee leaderi in his cloaed meeting with them, promQting Muhain
Nuhammad, chairman of the bwrd and editor in chiaf of AL-JUl4~tJRIYAH, to
wonder in amagemeat and bitterneao vhat precirely t~e president vanted from
the leaders of the presa orgaaisationa and ~+hat faules or ahortcomiags they
could be raproached for.
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- The Story of Dr 'Ali ai-'Atfi ~
With graaC anger~ membere of the arcned forcee in ~gypt circulsta the erory
of ehe urgant cabie Preoident al-Sadat eent Lt Gen Muhammad ai�Mahi~ tha
director of Caneral Ineeiligenco~ from Waehingron after hi~ cnaating wieh
MeRaahem Sagin at tha Bgyptian Smba~~y the night before tha eigning o! ehe
agreemant. ~
The texr of the cable, which wae paeeed from hand to hand~ was; "PYOm eha '
Preoidant and Supreme Comcmnder oi the Armed Porcee to LC Can Muhammad
al-Mahi, the director of Canarel Intelligence; Ramove Lt Can Munir Haabu~
~ d~pury ditrector of intalliganca, fram hig poeition immediatsly and �and ma
' an urgent raport on the case of Dr 'Ali al-'Atfi."
The firat time Preaidant a1-Sadat had heard of Dr 'Ali al-'Atfi vae from '
Begin~ at the meeting, ahan Begin told him Chat he did not doube tha man's
truthfulneee and eincarity on the iasue of "pnace" vith Isronl bur thaC ;
many peopie in charge of ~oa~or, aetu itive po~ikions in 8gypr, eepacialiy ;
in the intelligence agency, did not ahare thir truthfulne~s and sinceriCy.
in explaining his opinion vith facts--according to the accounte vhich hava `
been paesed on--Begin aent on to aay that he had received � raport from his ~
intelligence 2 daye before tha~ on 20 Ma~ch 1979 Lt Gen Munir Hasbu~ depu~y ;
director of Ge~erai intelligence, virh a group of aide~, who ara all ,
Nasiri~ts, seized an Egyp~ian citizen named Dr 'Ali al'Atfi in the heart of
the al-Ahli Club in Cairo on the charge of "epying and conductiag intelli-
gence on behalf of the Israeli enemy" and that the oniy proof of that aa~
that he had forn~ed a friendship vith eaa~e Ieraeli ~ournalists aad officials
going back and forth to Cairo.
President al�Sadat etreased to Begir? thst that aaa the first titae he had ~
heard of that matter. He promised him that he vould immediatal.y malce an
investigation iato the autter ac?d take the decisive, deterrent niea0urea
the situation demanded.
Immediately telex contact wae made betveen the Presidency's unit at the ~
Egyptian embasay in Washington and General Intelligence in Cairo, raquast-
ing the information.
LeBS than 1 hour after the ftr~t comownication, information came in from ,
Egyptian Gener~tl :ntelligence to Naehington putting the follwing facts
before al-Sadat:
Dr 'Ali al-'Atfi, phyaical e~ducation profeasor at the Higher Ynstitute of
Sports, Was put under observation after meeting repeatedly vith a number
of Iaraeli pereonalitiea viaiting Cairo. These personalitias proce~ded to ;
get in contaat with him by telephone and apecify tia~ea for mea~ing him in
a language similar to a code.
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A numbar of ineseinge weYa obeerved baewaan Dr 'Ali ai-'Atifi Rnd 6liahu
61aBSar, director of Manacham Bagin'� butiaau �nd an official in eha Moeead ~
Organiaa~ton (Irraali inteiligenca), Whan the lattar wa~ prasent in Caitio~
Through �utwailii~nce, ie va~ a~tablished that ha wa� in privaee tiadio con-
eace wirh ehe (Taeannue) Cenrar in Ieraal. Ie wae aloo ob~arv~d thar in hir
di~cuasione and quaeeione Wi~h �enior mtmber� of rra govsrnmeet and ths
araied forceo~ ha concantrated on learning eh~ naa~e and addra~~~s of paopla
oppo~ed to peace with Ierael ae ae11 ae of paopla aho through ehsir voca-
tiona or personal inCerait� vara in �erong contacc aieh rha Pala~tina Lib-
ararion t?rgani~aeion~ Syria, Ir~q, ~~ordan or Saudi Arabia.
4n ehe avaning of 20 March he va~ arrestad aftar he hed finiahod hi� ~es~
eion at rha ai-Ahli Ciub and had bean foila+ed to hi~ homa~ wh~re Bgypti~n
intailiganca surprieQd him in fiagranea dalic~u in the procasa of contact-
ing the Ieraeli cantar by talex. Moraovar, larga quaneieia� of raport�~
vera eeised Which v~ra writtan in invitible ink.
Dr 'Ali ~1-'Atfi maie a fuil confa~sion on hi� contact� vi~h eha I~Yaelis
but explained that they~ aere "in~ocuoua."
A Coa~petant Maa--So Thay Tet~minat~i Him
After Pra~ident al-S~dar read tha cable vith the information r~caiv~d fraa
his intalligence in Warhingtoa, he told his aida~~ "There is no doubt that
. ai-'Aefi is apying for Iarasl~ but Iaraali aspionaga in 8gypt hu bacoma
meaninglesa, na+ ctu~ va have m~ds ehia aerida toward 'p~aca.' I lcnow tbi~
Hasbu. Ha i4 a caapatent man but ha is exeram~ly bo~tila to Isrui and
there must be some plan behir,d hia action. Ha mu~t ba tereninat~d at oaca
in order to make thie plan fail, th~a we vill invastigate latar. Thi� tar-
mination vill eaoptusiza to Begin that we ara raally searioua about not
letting anyona in opposition in Bgypt aabotaga eha 'paaca' procus."
Thu~ Prasident al-Sadat otdar~d that a cable ba eant ramoving Munir Ha~bu
fran his position aa deputy director of Canara~ Inteiligance, to sati~fy
Begin, and ord~red hi� ambaieador in Washington. Ashraf Churbal, to go im-
mediately to Begin~ inform him of his decision to terminata Na~ Can Munir
Hasbu~ and promiae elut Dr 'Ali al�'Atfi vould ba ralaued after ha re-
turned to Cairo aad that ehe cue vould ba parmaaenrly ~halv~d.
In ehe Opposition Camp
No+~, if ve move to the oeher camp, ehe opposition ca~, ve vill obaerve
that the most conapicuous t6ing in it now is the increeting~.e~and~d ac-
tivity by Islamic groups. Thase group� prote~ted againat Cartar's visit
and the sattlemant vhich it impoaed. The Alaxandria Croup hu beea aor
still ia the eo~in scana of oppo~ition religious aceivity, aad thi� oppo~i-
tion hu beea, arad atill is, more concentrated in Alaxtadri� tbaa in the
ot~er major citiea of the country. For example:
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While Career wae in Alexandria, on Friday 9 Matich, Aoma imame epoke in
moeques~ condemning the visit ce~d ite ~oalg~ Whan neaopapara pubiiohed
the c~xt� of rha treaty~ rha Gamenitee@ on Information and Publications of
the BgypC~an F4daraeton of Studantr (which ie lad by Ioiamic groupe) die-
tributed a laaflat againet it.
Af~ar thae comas eha rola of rha lafeWing opposition, wieh all ite datach-
menre. Tha foliov-up ~commireae of the National GYOUping Parry ieeued a
declaration calling f~~r al~rtna~e againgt the nea Amarican onslaught on
ehe region.
Un:~r ehe influenca of theea tao curtients--tha Ialamic and tha lefeving--
studante hava baen acriva in the Univareitiae of ai-Mansurah~ Alaxandria,
Cairo, Tanta, al-Minya and Asyat. Thie prompted tha aurhorieiee co raDca a
number of repreaeive and deterrant tnaaguree, the most savara of Which ware
again8t ths Alaxandria UnivaYeity 8eudanee; eome conenandor ae a.ii aa
police and Central Securi~ty forces aare ueed agaieet theai. .
In brief~ the oppoeitioe of the maagae of the otud8nte vae cleor: ie aae
agaiest Camp David, Carteti'o visit, and ehe sattlemant thst had ic~posed.
Naturaily, people aaked about the Nav Wafd Party'e poaition on avarything
that vae happening. Since tha party vas coneidered to ba digaolved from
~he official 8tandpoint~ its head, Fu'ad Siraj-el-Din, sav fit to i~eue a
s~atemant in hia name oppooing the tretey. He prasenCed eha ~taeament ro
the heada of the press, but naturally it va� out of tha qua~~ion that ~ny-
rhing should be publiahed about a statea~ent vhich vaa said eo hava baan
saritten in a tone characterized by aaperity.
Future of the Opposition
;
in any event ahat ie ab~olutely certain is that the oppo0ition kno~m as
the political man in the atreat has cocae~ to incorporete extYamaly large
eega~enta fran far right to far left~ and it coti~tains legal, semi-open and ~
aecret organizations. Hokaver, the problem the combined oppo~ition forces
face is one of reaching a practicai u~ifi~d position a~d of actual seiourcea
for coping with the post-treary stage.
In another area, there is an increasing realizatioa on the part of pubtic
opinion that the praaige of a permanent peace is a great illusion. For
example, people are observinpt that the "peace program" vhich Ifiuu~tafa
Khalil'a cabinat preseeted to the Paople's Astembiy requa~ted a bigger
Hinistry of Defenae b~dget for 1978-79 than for the previow year. In
justificat�on, it waa aaid ttut this aas "to fulfill armed forces require-
ments in order tn enable them to pexform their aiiasion~ in peaca aAd aar." ;
Paople comment that peace is vith Lfael but that var ha~ �tareed el~e-
vhere. The Sgyptian dafanse mini~ter himsalf stat~d at tha Peopla's
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Aegambiy that thare aYa Bgypeian army forcae in aighe African couneriae,
whiah confirme Praaidaee 81-Sadat's datarminarion eo piay the role of
Mnorican polica backup in the region.
Ie Bgype Ciaohing Wi~h Libya and Yamen?
Ona oign of rhi0 rola ie rtut eha m~dia ara pYaparing publia opinion eo ac-
cgpt, or at laase be nautral over~ probebia military ciaaha� vith Libya or
Soueh Yeman on grounds thae ehey are threataning cloeure of the ~outheYn
anrrancae eo the R~d Saa and ~otuaquantly ~he ihutdawn of tha Sues C~nal.
Oboarv~ra coneidar ehd~ aithough ie wouid ba ~+rong to bolittla ehe laa~i-
bility of rhaAa maehoda~ Which rha ragime vill usa at �ome ieagd aftar tha
eigning of the ereaey, ie vouid aleo ba vrong to axaggorata thoir aoneinu~d
effecr on pubiic opinion. For axaanple:
~ 1'he treaty impooag ralinqui~tunant� on Bgype vhich are dagrading to 8gyptian
dignity~ not ro manrion tha face that ehay a=e oppo~~d to eha naeional
interase.
The treaey truly ridtculsa the re~!bioue faelings of the owrwholming
majority of tha papulation of ehe counery.
Although ehe ruling parry is margad into tha apparatuo of eha gov~rnmane,
it ia being aatan away by many coneradiction~. ita compo~ieion ia ~xernaa-
ly fragila bacauoe it io baied on tha narra+ intaY~st� of tha bloc� and -
groups wiehin ie.
The United Statea aill not be able to apare the ragima fraa eha intanaify-
ing opposition to it.
- Finaily, moat opposition forces gan~rally tend to pnt thair ideological
disputas to the side, at leaat for the time being, in order affactivaly
to countaract tha peaca treaty and the noxioua ef~ects to naeional �av-
ereign~y, and to the otandard of living and cultural and opiYitual life
in Bgypt, which will raeult from that.
For all thaaa and other r~uona many obeervara ara right ia rai~ing this
ianpor~ant questior: "The eigning of the treaty hae ended; hu tb~ count-
down begun for the existiag regima in Bgypt4"
COPYRIGNT: 1979 AI-Watan al-'Arabi.
11887
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