JPRS ID: 8536 TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN

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JPRS L/8536
a2 June ].979
~ ~
TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN
(FOUO 2l/79)
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' ~ JPRS L/8536
22 June 19 ~9
TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN
(FOUO 2]./79) I
CONTENTS PAGE
POLSTICAL AND 30CIOI,OQICAL
Ohira~s Political Tactics To Be Watched Closely
(BUNQEI SHUNJU, May 79) 1
~A5AHI~ on Results of Manila UNCTAD Meeting
(Editorial; ASAHS EVENIN(3 NEWS, 6 Jun 79) 3
Miyamoto Discusses USSR, China, Tolcyo Summit in 3~~e Speech
(Kin31 Miyamoto; AKAHATA, 3 Jun ?9) 6
~YOMLURI' Comments on UNCTAD Meeting~ Tolqro Swrm~it
(Editorial; THE DAIZY YONQUR.I, 5 Jun 79) 10
' ~MAINICHI~ Co~mnents on Soviet-Chinese Move for Talks
(Editorial; MAINICIiI SHIl~BUN, 7 J~ ?9) 12
Miyamoto on Inner-CP Relations, Narthern Territories Issue 1~ ~
(J~'S, 8 Jun 79)
Intellectuals Moving Away F~om JSP 16
(Takehi,ko Takahashi; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS~ 30 May ?9)
Van Wolferen Maps Persisting Coirununications Gap
(Itarel G. Van Wolferen; THE JAPAN ECONONQC JOURNAL,
g, 1~, 22 May ?9) 18
ECONOMIC ,
~yOFQURI~ Comments on New 7-Year Economic Plan
(Editor~al; THE DAII~Y YOI~QURS, 6 Jun ?9) 2~
Keidanren Affriliate Fi~esents 'Business Japan' on TV
(MAINICHI DAILY, 7 .:un 79) 26
~ ~ - a - [iIi - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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CONm~NTS (Continued) P~~e
Japan Must Seek Independence in Oi1 Supply~
Coal Technologyr
(N~HON ISEIZAT SHSMBUN~ 28, 7.~ May 79) 28
Avo3d Dependence on Mideast
Ranewed ~nterest in Coa1
MITI Forecasts Acute S3tuation for Oil Supply
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 1 Jun 79) 33
Briefs 34
Coal Powerplant
SCIENCF AND TECHNOLOQY
Research on Jet Seaplane, Hydrogen P].ane To Be Proposed
- (asAxz Ev~rrirta rr~as, 23 May 79) 35
PNC Unveils New Nuclear Fuel E~richment Centrifuges
(TH~ JAPAN TIl~IES, 9 Jun 79) 37
Genetic Erigineering Research Survey Group Files Report
(NIHON KETZAI SHINIDUN, 9 May 79) 38 -
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pOLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
OEIIRA'S POLTTICAL TACTTCS TO BE WATCHED CLOSELY
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japaneae May 79 p 149
[Article: "Keeping an Eye on Ohira-5tyle Polieical Tactics~'~ ~
[Text) The firet thing wa can obaerve about Ohira's three to fflur mon~ha of
leaderehip of the Diet since the beginning of hia adminiatration is the
"obacurity" of hia political tactice. A typical example is tihe convoluted
nature of the Ohira-sCyle "partial coalition" cottcerning the 1979 budget bill,
which was pasaed by the Houae of RepresenCatives in irregular fashion [after]
being re~ected by him in the BudgeC CoimniCtee and then given turnabout approv-
al in the main Diet aession.
Concerning the complex course of the budget revision issue, which was brought
to a close by this dramatic reversal, the 8 March NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN wrote,
"The Liberal-Democratic Party [LDP] membera concerned with piet policy and
those of the o position have been dallied with." A YOMIURI SHINBUN editorial
- on 4 March, entitled "A Budget Reviaion That Dallied With Our Expectations,"
criticized the "drama, mysteriously concluded behind cloaed doora," as
[something] the people find imposaible to comprehend.
Ohira himself, in a meeting with the heads of the Komeito and the JaPan
Democratic Socialist Party [DSP] on 1 March, appeared to comply with their
demands for rewriting the budget. In actuality, he used his high-class
tactics to "deceive" not only the opposition leaders, but even Secretary
General Saito and other executivea of the LDP. For the very next morning he
' "re~ected the rewrite of the budget," an about-face performed to avert a
challenge by the Fukuda facCion and other critical forces wiLhin Che party,
thus making the phrase "dallying" even more apt.
But we must not forget that not only were the leadera of ~he government and
opposition parties "dallied with" by the wily Ohira tactics, but also the
newspapers. '�If we look at Che morning editions of 2 March, all of them, with
the exception of the cautious ASAHI SHINBUN, concluded that Che negotiations
for revision by the LDP, Komeito, and DSP would result in an agreement, each
of them proclaiming with large headlines: YOMIURI, "Prime Minister Decides
To Rewrite Budget"; TOKYO SHINBUN, "Government, Liberal Democrats Decide
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Upon L~te Changey in liudget"; SANIC~I SHINBUN, "I3udget Iteviaion VirCunlly
SeCrled, [13end~.ng] Townrd Approval by LDP, Kameien, ~nd nSI'"; ~nd ~;A'rNICNI
SHIN~UN, "Pen~ions, ~mployment To t~e Rewritten; Komeito and n5I' 7'o Concur
~ on Budget." 13ut w~.Ch Che prime minister'a "change of heart," their ahorC-
' si~htedngsa became apparenr.
As an edi~orial in ehe 4 M~rch MAINICHI coolly poittCed ouC, the Crue char-
acter of Prime Minister Ohira's "partial conlition" was no more than "rhrowing
crumbs" to the opposition parties, given the fnct thati despiCe tiheir simi-
lariCies, Che LDP will persisC in preaerving its mnjority. The 1'r3me Minister
t~as no reason Co seriously conaider a coaliCion governmene wiCh middle of the
rogd parties, since the LDP is assured of a sCab~.e ma~oriCy, riding the wave
of a conservative cameback, if che House is disaolved and general elections
are held in Che fall as expec~ed, _
What has also become apparent is that, far from what slogans like "the honest
simpleton," "the dumb ox;'and "spontaneous government wiChout excesaes" [imply],
the subst~nce of Ohira's polieics has been surprisingly full of complex tech-
niques of calculaCed power designs.
Nonettieless, on 3 March, ufter the negotiations for budgeC revision with the _
Komeitn and USP hud been restnrCed, ASAHI proclaimed, "The Prime Minister
and, Still and All, Che LDP, Komeito, 3nd DSY." The paper appraised Ohira's
"partial coaliCion" rhetoric extremely naively, [assuming] that the decision
for the acCual revision accepted by Che Prime Minister meant the strengthening
of cooperation with the Komeito and DSP and, in short, progress along the LUP-
Komeito-DSP line. But ~udging from Che situation within the Komeito and the
DSP after that, there ~oas doubt whether the LDP-Komei.to-DSP line would be able
to progress smoothly, even after the consolidated regional elections in April.
Moreover, concerning Ohira's tactics on the budget bill, [ASAHI) seemed to
ha�~e only admiration for him, [reporting] "his biggest decision since coming
into office," and [Cerming him] "no mean Cactician" (16 March, ASAHI reporters'
symposiumj. One wonders if one of these days thaC paper too mighC not be
"dallied with" and taken in by the prime minister.
On 18 March, during a talk at the Defense Academy, Prime Minister Ohira put
forth his pet theory, that the heart of overall defense security strategy lies
in a"fully equipped defense strength." WheCher this signifies the trans-
formaCion of a former dove, or is nothing more than "playing with words" (20
March YOMTURI), opinions differ.
Political reporters, you must above all keep your eyes open for the new curve
ball tne prime minister has thrown, keep them open....
COPYRIG1iT: Bungei Shun~u Ltd 1979
9010
CSO: 4105
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POLITICAL ANYD SOCIOLOGICAL
'ASAHI' ON ItESULTS OF MANILA UNCTAD MEETING .
Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 6 Jun 79 p 2 OW
[Editorial: "North-South Dialog"--ASAHI SHINBUN 5 June] ~
' [TexC] The Fifth General Meeting of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, which was held in the Philippine capital of
Manila for about a month, has ended without fully achieving "cooperation
between Che north and south."
Delegates of the advanced countries in~the north and those of developing
nations in the south certainly had shared the wish of the Philippines,
as expressed by PresidenC Ferdinand Marcos, that "As the country aponsor-
ing the general meeting, iC wants the conference to be truly fruitful."
However, although the participating nations tried to reapond to the warm
hospitality of the Philippines, they found the reality of the north-south
problem too serious and complex to aettle there.
A large number of reso;utions were adopted at the mesting under the North-
South Agreement. They dealt with special measures for late-atarting
developing nations suffering from poor economic conditiona, auch as land-
locked states and inaular countries, ateps Co strengthen the functions of
UNCTAD and sCreamline its organi2ation, means for UNCTAD to investigate
trade protectionism and the question of industrial ad~ustments. However,
~ there were many resolutions that were adopted after making sure that the
measures would not be a burden to the advanced nationa or after emasculating
them to such a level
A decisive blow to the south was that it was unable to win concessions
from the advanced countries on a resolution on "interdependences," which
was the focal point of the general meeting, and that talka ended in
dissension. In this resolution, the south wanted the north to recognize
that the present and future prosperity of the advanced countries depends
on such things as the rich countries' exports to the south and that the
developing nationa are vital to the development of the world economy.
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If ~he north accepta Chis, it will have to change the world economic aystem
in ~uch a way ae to increase the say of Che south on mansgement of rhe
world economy, such as decisions on tirade, currency, financiul and devel-
npment policies. Ie was the draft resolution on "interdependence" ehat
aimed fnr a breakehrough for th~ establiahment of a"new world economic
order" wh~.ch Che developing countries have been demanding repeatedly.
A resolution aimed at changing the world economi.c aystem could not be
easily accepted by the advanced naCions. Advanced countries, sti11 am~rt-
ing from the 1973 oil crisis and troubled by lower economic growth ratea,
high unemployment, inflation and trade imbalancea, have become more cau-
tious in dealing with demanda of the kind made by the s~uth.
The south is now plagued with d3fferences within itself. There is the
regional gap between the oil-producing and non-oil-producing countriea, .
between developing countries well on the road to development and laCe-
starCing developing countries, and among souChpast Asia, Central and South
America and Africa. IC has become difficult for the developing nations
to cooperate cloaely with each other as beforp and force the advanced
countries to accept their demands. -
However, we snauld not 'be concerned only with the failures of the Manila
meeting. As poinLed out by Carlos Romulo, Philippine foreign minister
who served as chaixman of r_he general meeting, in his closing addreae,
there sho~xld be "neither victory nor defeat at UNCTtiJ."
By looking straight at the severe reality of the north-south problem that
showed up at the Manila session, the advanced natioiis and the developing
countries ahould continue to work to promote dialogue and cooperation
between t~e north and the south. Solution of the north-south issue ahould
_ r.4var be limited to UNCTAD. Efforts should be continued toward this end.
Because their economies are in bad shape now, the advanced c.ountries should
not be overly stubborn 3n thetr attitude toward th~ south's demands. At
the Tokyo Summit scheduled for late June, Japan, Which sent Prime Miniater
Ohira as the top delegate of an advanced country to the Manila meeting,
has the responsibility of extracting posittve postures of the advanced
nations and ~f serving as a bridge between the two economic hem;Lspheres.
~ Concerning contributions to the "second window" to encourage market devel-
opment for primary products, Japan, like the other principal advanced
naCions, did not announce concrete figures. However, Premier Ohira
~ pledged "cooperation commensurate with Japan�'~s capability" in his address
to the Manila meeting. So Japan should tackle this problpm wiCh ,
sinceriCy.
As a result of the recent general meeting, the question of industrial ~
adjustments for countries in the north to open their markets to products
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from the south has become an increasingly 3mpnrtant issue. IndueCrial
ttd~ustments are needed to prevent friction in trade among advanced naCions.
In conclusion, we aek the developing countries to be willing Co calmly
look at reality. The rec~nt general meeting in Manila hae shown Chat
hastily mak~tng exceseive demande to the north will only end in dieillusion-
ment.
- COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shinbun Tokyo Honaha 1979
C50: 4120
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL `
MIYAMOTO DS5CU5SES U55R, CHINA, TOKYO SUMrIIT IN 3 JUNE SPEECH
Tokyo AKAHATA in Japanese 3 Jun ~9 p 4 OW
[Speech by Kin~i Miyamoto, chairman of the Japan Communist ParCy Centr~l
Committee Fresidium, at the Tokyo Festival marking the 20th anniversary ~
of AKAHATA, 3 June]
[Excerpts] Excellent Proof of the Vita].ity of Our Party's InternaCional
L ine
Ladi.es and gentlemen. All kinds of international problems have arisen
over the past 20 years. Our Japan Communist Party's stance toward
~.nternational problems has eloquently proved the vitality of our party's
line. ~
Under Chese circumstances, the primary ob~ective of our party's basic line
on international issues is to resolutely f ight against the policies of '
war and aggression pursued by the imperialist and reactionary forces
headed by the United States, and t~ actively promote internati~onal solidarity
for Chis purpese..
The principle governing relations among communist parties is independence,
equality and nonint~iference in each other's affairs. As long as thi~s
principle is observed, friendly relations should be developed with all
communist parties.
.Ladies and gentlemen. World developments over the past 20 years have proved
the correctness of rhis principle. (Cheers)
Co~munication with the USSk in the Socialist Language
Ladies and tentlemen. Recently our party and the CPSU correctly settled
the so-called "shiga issue" and agreed to restore friendly relations.
This agreement is also based on the aforementioned principle. Under this
agreement, we are scheduled to hold formal talks with the CPSU in the near
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future. The Cwo parties share a common view on impnrtant iseues such as
opposi.Cion to the Jupan-U.5. Mi~itary Alli~nce. On Che Asian situation
also, Chey ehare nearly the same view. Being different partiea and hav-
ing differen~ historical backgrounda, the two parCiea httve different
opinion~ on various problems such as the terr:itorial and fiet~ery iasues.
13ut tnl.k~ beCween Chem are meaningful in that they wi11 confirm their
common ground and discuss ways to promote inCernationaL solidariry. WiCh
reg~rd ~o issues on which they have differing views, they will exchange
their frank opinions by using the language of socialiam and deepen mutual
under~tanding from the viewpoint of promoting genuine friendship and
solidarity beCween the two peoples.
Many people have often asked us: What is the significance of restoring
relation between the two parties when viewed f rom the standpo3nt of the
Japanese peopLe?
As for this question, our two parties--wh~ch both hold communism and
socialism as Cheir principle and Cheory--will be able to conduct frank,
cool, scientific discussions which cannot be done in government-to-govern-
ment negotiations. Through these discussions, we will accurately convey
the Japanese people's various wishes to the o ther side, thereby making
progress, even a step fr~rward, in issues up~n which the two parties differ.
We thi.nk herein lies our maior role of accomplishing what the Japanese
government would be unable to accompliah.
To revive Japanese militarism, the Japanese reactionary forces are now
advocating the introduction of new arms and the strengthening of the �
Japan-U.S. Military Alliance while describing the Soviet Union as a
potential enemy. -
Under these circumstances, I think the JCP has a very important role to _
play.
The Chinese Invasion of Vietnam and the Future of Socialism
In the wake oi the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, people feel uneasy about
the future of s~cialism~. -
Ladies and gentlemen. As a matter of fact, we were flabbergasted when
China, a socialist giant, launched open aggression against Vietnam,
a neighboning socialist country, by tlir~wing in hundreds of thousands
of troops, saying it was going to "punish" V ietnam.
Three Reasons for Dealing with the Chinese Question
You may ask why we must deal with the Chinese question. We have no
intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China, but we have
to deal with the Chinese question for the followlag three reasons:
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Firsr, in the middle af the culCural revo?.~ition, the Chineae Communist
Party persistently aCtacked the JCP for not push~.ng through a Chineae
Cype of revolutionary line. The CCP openly encourttged those JCP members
who were expelled from the party for blindly following the CCP.
5econd, the CCI' has taken the atiCitude of supporting the Japan-U.S.
M1litzry Alliance, the extremely imperial3st milltary alliance which
we have never c~ased to fighC, shouting "We oppose the Jap~n-U~S.
Secur:Lty Tren~y" and "Down wiCh the Japan-U.S. Milit~ry Alliance."
'Third, needless eo say, the aggression against Vietnam clea~ly consti-
tuCes a violaCion of peace in Asia, someChing we have in common.
A11 these are not China's 3nternal affairs. What I have cited amounCs
to unwarranted interference in the destiny of our country ~nd, at the
same time, iC is a common international problem. I firmly believe that, _
by candidly pointing ouC all these things, we wi11 help the CCP move for-
ward in Che right direction as a communist party. I believe that as long
as the CCP remains a communist party, the time t,~ill come sooner or later
- when it will find the right course worChy of its past brillianC revolu-
tionary struggles. (Cheers)
Historically, the JCP has had close relations with the CCP. The two
parties fought Cogether for a long time against the Japanese militarists'
scheme to wage a war of aggression and against the aggressive war when
they finally started it. We want to stress Che following.two pointa:
FirsC, when an unfortunate thing happens in a socialist country, we should
never allow it to becloud our view of the future of socialism. (Cheers)
Second, the JCP must continue L-o oppose the Ja~an-U.S. Military Alliance
and push ahead with the task of building a peac~.`.ul, neutral and indepen-
dent Japan. This is the only responsible way open �or us in having the
CCP really correct its mistake of supporting the Japan-U.S. Military
Alliance. (Cheers)
The Tokyo Summit and the In�ternational Theoretical Symposium
Ladies and gentlemen. There is another international problem.: A summiC
meeting of the seven major capitalist countries is scheduled to be held
in Tokyo soon. Similar summit meetings were held several times in the
' past, but their sub~ects were always the same. Each time they discussed
energy, international currency, economic growth, inflation, trade and the
north-south problem. The fact that the subjects are always the same means
that, no matter how often a similar cast of represenCatives gets together .
to discuss these problems, they will not be able to f ind basic solutions.
(Cheers)
,
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Th~ reueon fnr Chis inability ig: W~et Gerrt~ny, ~r~ncp, the UniC~d
5tnt~~ and J~pgn gr~ g1L ddminae~d by highly gdvgnc~d monopoly c~pit~li~m.
The d~~p-rnoted adntr~diction~ intrineic to the ~eruceur~~ ~nd ey~tpm~ df
eh~sp mun~poly capitaiist eountri~~ e~nnot b~ re~olvpd by th~ Clever
mn?~ipul~tion~ of th~ repr~~ent~Civ~g of the e~tablishmentg, b~ they from
u congptvativ~ p~rty ~r ~~ocigl d~moGr~Cic p~rCy. (Ch~erg)
I,ndf~y ~nd g~ntlarn~n. A~ ~n aneith~~3g ta Ch~ ~ummie in Ju1y, th~ JCP
pl~ns Co hold ~ th~oretiagl ~ympa~ium d� cnmmunigC p~rtieg nf ~dvgn~~d
cg~itgli~t counCrie~ in Tokyu ro m~rk ir~ fnunding ~nniv~rg~ry. (Che~rg)
We h~ve invited the cdmmuniet partie~ of nin~ countrie~ ~u~h ~g the
Unitcd Stateg, France, Itnly, Britain, Weet Germnny and Sp~in. 'fh~
sympo~ium will di~cus~ the following thr~e gub~ect~: "The preaenC gtate
and outlook for the ~truggl~g in advanapd c~pitaligt countri~g," "A new
ine~rn~tinn~l eennnmic nrder," gnd "The te~k~ nf ~cientific goeigli~m
tind peace."
Ladi~gs and gentlemen. I will noe go intn detai.l, buC I will tell ynu
this much. Government leaders of the capitaliet countries attending the
summit will try Co contrive ways to rnaintain the nld economic order.
gut, instead of diecusaing the old economic order, we will discu~e g new
economic order, a new international economic order to replace the preaent
intprnational ecanomic order cent~red dr~und monopoly capitalist countries
led by the United Statee, We will discuse the prospecte for this new
- international economic order. There is AZDO an urgent, comman problem .
concerning Che progpects for the struggleg of com?nunist partiee in
highly advanced cepitalist countriea. Furthermore, we have to geriously
think about ~he question of pe~ce as xelated tn the cauee of socialism
in the context of the current Asian situation. We will discuas all thea~
very important international problems. Ours will be a meeting of parties
not in power, but its occurrence and the perspecCive it will provide will
be such that, unlike the goverivnent-sponsored summit, our aymposium will
pravide an outlook for the new future and Che theory to usher in"that
future. tt will be an epoch-making symposium, and we think we have to
make it such. (Cheers) �
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kyosan-To Chuo Iinkai 1979 nen
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POLITICAL AN~ SOCIOLOG~CAL
'YOMIURI~COi~NTS ON UNCTAD MEETING, TOKYO SUMMIT
Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in Englieh 5 Jun 79 p 2 OW
_ (~ditorial: "Le~gon for Summit"J
~Textj Rieing oil prices and diviaion~ within thetr own ranks worked
againat the developing countries in their bargeiaing with ind~atrially
advanced nati~n~ at the FiftY? UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), and as a result, litCle ~a~ achieved.
The conference demonatrated Che ineffectiveness of the collective bar-
g~ining formula, and this fact alone will greatly influence north-south
problems in the fut~e~ Although the south talked of cooperation, ita
stance ~as etill one of confrontation.
Power Balance Against South
The rnot of the problem is that the north wants to keep the statua quo,
while the south desires change. And, in negotiations, isaues are uaually
discugeed from a position of poaer and the powei balance went decidedly
~+gainst the south.
Even befo.re the fif th UNG"rAD, the internal split among the developing
countries was evident, and this division became more pronounced on the
question of rising oil pricea during the conference! and because of this
split, the south presented its sweeping demands without force.
The present oil crisis hardened the attitude of the n~~rth~ and hac'1 the
effect of unifying the industrially advaaced countries in their c.~iscus-
sions by their abrupt shirting from abstract ideology to concrete plans
and problems.
The south put forward a resolution stressing the interdependence of nations
in the economic sphere and asserting that the present rules on trade,
f in,~nce and currencies muat be radically reformed to give the south a
voi~:e on decisions that affect the world economy.
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Whi1~ ~greeing Ch~C thi~ i~ gn ag~ of inC~rd~pend~nce, ehe north oppn~ed
th~ reg~lution ~r$uing ehgt noChing e~n replac:e Ch~ ru1~~ of Che mgrkee
~nd th~re wne no ne~d to radica].1y teform the exi~ting int~rnaCional ~ygt~m.
It ie gppnrent thet only when th~ combined e~dnomie ~er~ngCh of eh~ ~oueh
surp~~~ea thnt of th~ nnrth wi11 iee demand~ b~ accept~d.
Nattonal Inrereet~ Far Ap~rt
It ig v~ry difficult if not impoe~ibl~ fnr thg gouCh to re~11y ~p~ak with
nne vniCe becauee the national inCeregtg nf developing eounerle~ diff~r
grR~tly from n~tinn to nation. Nowever, this is not Co say that Che
souCh can be diemiesed and ignored.
And, unfortunately, iC seeme now rhat the nat3onal leaders participat3ng
in the Tokyo summit will be too pr~occupied wieh Che oil problpn? t~ ~pend
mueh Cime on north-sout~ problemg.
Howev~r, prime Minieter Ohira, who ie the hogt of the summie~ ghauld not
a11ow thie to happen. Ohira attended the UNCTAb becauae he wanted to
serve ae a"bridge" between north and south, and ahnuld at the summit
urge advanced countries to open their markete to induetrial producta
. from emerging nations.
COPYRIGHT: DAILY YOMIURI 1979
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'MAINICHI' COMMENTS ON SOVIET-CHIN~SE MOV~ FOI~ TALKS
Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMgUN~in ~fapanege ~ Jun 79 Morning EdiL�ion p 5 OW
(Editorial: "Our Expectations of China-USSR Telke"]
[Excerpte] In a note to China on 5 June the Soviet Union proposed vice
foreign minieter-level Calke to be held in July or Auguet in Mc~scow to
~ discusa improving releeiona between the two countries. The Chinese
~oreign Ministry haA mt yet formally reeponded, merely saying thaC the
proposal ig "under atudy." Judging from recent exchanges between the two
governments, however, Chere is no doubC Chat China will go along with the
latest Soviet move. Thia development ia indeed noteworthy as it brings
bright proep~cts to Sino-Soviet relationa, which have been atrained.
In fact, thaC Che tw~o countriea began moving toward negotiations apparently
~ has something to do with the Chinese deciaion to renounce its treaty with
the US5R. While the treaty is due to expire in April next year, the stipu-
lation that either party "shall not participate in any a113ance, action
or measure directed againat the other party"--in the latter part of Arti.cle
3 of the tr~ty--will remain valid until then. Although it might be in
name only, China, unceasingly complaining about the Soviet threat, would
naturally want to have a new arrangement in place of this proviaion before
the two countries enter a nontreaty state. Making this need more urgent
is the fact that it is necessary for China to have stability in the inter-
_ national field so as to push through its modernization programs.
Meanwhile, Sino-Soviet rapprochement may have the effect of driving a
wedge in USSR-Vietnam relations. Or.e cannot rule out the poesibility
that it may help im~orove the deadlocked Sino-Vietnameae relations.
The Sino-Soviet confrontation is so deep-rooted that it is premature to
speculate that the current move will lead to an early reconciliation between
the two countries. Let us tak~ a look among other things, at the anti-
hegemony clause in the 5 June Soviet propoeal, which demands a basic
change in the Chinese attitude toward the Soviet Union. It is extremely
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diff~.CUlt Co expece ~ Chinese compromiee on Ch3~ point. It i~ glso
pog~~ble that the 1969 ~tipulation of understnndi.ng may prove to be an
obstaclp eo tl?e proposed talke.
~ dn the other t~,~nd, one cannoe rule out tha posaibiliey nf the twn noun~-
. tries reachir~g an accord on tihe nonuse of forca. Such a br~gkrhrough,
if, it materializes, would h~ve a ma~or impact on the international
community. Future developmente in the Sino-Soviet talke will be a matter �
of great concern to Japan, too, which pursues a foreign poltcy dedicgted
Co peace.
COPYRIGHT: Mainich3 Da3.1.y NeNa, 1979
- C50: 4120
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
MIYAMOTO ON INNER-CF' RELA'~IONS, NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE
Toky~o JPS in Engl3sh 0856 GMT 8 Jun 79 OW
[TexC) Tokyo, June 8, JPS--In an in~erview with the Japan BroadcasCing
Corporation TV on June 7, Ken~i Miyamoro, Preaidium chairman of the
Japanese CommunieC Party, tal?ced over 30 minuCea, expresaing viewa in
reply Co an inCerviewer's quet3tions. The following is the ma~or points ~
of Miyamoto's views on Che international questions.
On Che Themes of Japan-Soviet Communist Party Summit Talks
Miyamoto: The questions interested ~n by both aides, that will be the
ma~or aub~ects. They include such questions as Che international situa-
tion, the aituation in Asia, and the question relating to the military
alliance between Japan and the U.S., the question of the state-to-state �
rel,~tionship between Japan and Che Soviet Union, the territorial question~
the fishery quesCion, and the question of cultural exchanges between both
aid~:s. Another thing is how to actively push ahead with th~ party rela-
Cio~iship from now on, taking lessons from the past aeverances of Che party
relationahip.
On Four Islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu `1
Mi~~amoto: Our position differs from Che goverrunent's position. The
government says it will maintain the Japan-U.S. Military Alliance, or in
that sense, by keeping the U.S.-Japan SLCUrity Treaty, renounces the
Chishima Islands, which is provided in the San Francisco "peace" treaty.
The JCP, which was not involved in theae matters said once that there should
be a new way of approaching the question of Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands,
After the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is abolished; that is when Japan has
become a peaceful nation. From Che standpoint of wishing really long
friendship between Japan and the Soviet Union, we sincerely hope that such
a question be given ample time for a solution...concerning Hasomai and
Shikotan Islands, as they are part of Hokkaido, and even the late
Khruschev once promised that they would be returned at some time in the
future. [Sentence as received~ But taking the Japanese government's
demand for a bundle return of the four islanda, this carries various
1!~
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~Oit 0~'~ICYAL USC ONt,Y
r
conergdiceinng, gnd we ~hould l~.ke Cn ngrry t~lks ~ep~rating Che qu~gtion
o~ the ~hiehima Islgnda~c~nd ehe question of Hgbom~i and ShikoCan Islende~
On theitel~tiiun~ Between tha JCP ~nd thg Ch3nese Com~nuniaC Party
Miy~moto: Our position, from the beginning, i~ th~t th~ JCP wi11 aeso-
C~8t3 W~CM a~l cocmnunieC parCiea irrespece~.ve of differenc~e of viewe,
if Chere ie no interference in tihe party affairs. But Chin~ still
aonCinu~~ ies intervention in ehe JCP. In addition, China recently
nnnounc~d ChaC China would aupport the Japan-U.S. Milit~ry Allian~e, and
thie is a serioue maC~er for Japan's progressive forces. Beeides Chinn
recenCly launched an aCtack on Vietnam. This is not an inCernal affair
of China, but internaCional issues. In Chis point~ too, it is regrettable
to eay, Chat the present Chinese way of doing things and our way of doing
things .~re quite different. As the primary rhing, thnt the Chinese inter-
ference in our affai:re is still continuing, there is a long way ahead of _
us to reach the point where China will not follow the policy of inter-
ference.
But I believe Chat Che time will eurely come that the Chi:neae Communist
Party will change its ideae, if it is a communiet party.
On Vietnam 'Intervention in Kampuchea'
Miyamoto: I have a, clear-cut viaw on this matter...The Kampuchean side
(in the era of the Pol Pot regime) had repeatedly attacked Vietnam, but
the Vietnameae aide time and again propoaed Chat the dispute be eettled
by negotiationa, and separate (each troops) five kilometers away from
the border. But the Kampuchean eide re~ected them by severing diplomatic
relations. China was giving aid to that Kampuchean government in the
form of axms, preCending that China was supporting Kampuchea, so that
we investigated and found out that the border dispute between Kampuchea
and Vietnam was nothing but an unjuetifihble attack on Vietnam, atarted
by the Pol Pot regime.
In this sense, it amounts to a(Vietnam's) counterattack against the
offensive started by Kempuchea, a(VieCnamese) defensive counterattack.
This was overlapped by the Kampuchean people's insurrection againat the
Pol Pot regime, a civil uprising of the Cambodian people to liberate them-
selves, and resulted in a downfall of the Pol Pot regime. We hold that
in such a situation, the so-called border clashes mean that Vietnam was
compelled to counterattack in self-defense.
eSO: 4120
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I'OL L'1' LCA1, ANI) SOCInLOGIC~L
tN'L'I,LL(:C'i'UALS AtOVING AWAY I~ItOM JSP
~?~u!;yn MAINtCHI UAII.Y NLW5 in ~ngligh 30 Mc~y 79 p 4
[Cnlumn by Tttkehiko Taknh~shi: "NngaCacho Uoings"] ~
[TextJ Secretary GenerAl Mitsuo having a Soclallst prime
Tomizuka ot Sohyo (General ministercameintobeing.
Councll oE Trade Unions ot There are several reasons tor ~
Japan) has stfrred up a con� the lntellectuals' recent
trnversy by declaring that tm allenation from the Japan
tellectuals And 0
m o~ ~he re~soins Parc probabiy ipas
Abandon(ng supp
Japan Socialist Party. The toliows. -
stntement is drawing attention Unions Stronger
as one pointing out the reality ot First, the voice ot labor
the JSP today. unions has becom~ stronger in
When the Japan Socialist the party. Among the Socfalist
Party was established atter the Diet members, there is an over-
end ot the war, a teeling spread Whelming number hailing trom
Among the peopie that since Iabor unions. Sohyo's present
,lapan was adopting a policy is to support the JSP and ,
democratic structure, the JSP When an elecNon takes place,
would be the politfcal pnrty to the JSP is dependent on Sohyo
shoulder Japan's destlny. for both tunds and votes.
Accordingly, even the The moat tmportant thtng for
managers of some enterprises Diet members is to win in an
joined the J5P. Among the e~ectton. As a consequence,
general publlc, there were Sohyo has become an organtza-
people who, w ithout any -
thought oE recompense, spent tion exercisiqg leadership over
their own money to work tor ti~e the JSP. The party's [ormer
,~Sp Secretary Generai Tomomi
In part(cular~ the sacalled Narita stated that "it is
intellectuals gathered arnund necessary to overcome the
the JSP and supported it. All dependence on labor unions"
lhis bore truit~ enabling the and the present Chairman Ichio
Japan Socialist Party at one e s t a b 11 s h
m e n t~ o t� i
n-
lime lo become the No. i party
~ ot a coalltiogn ian administration ntt
tude c to ard thelect on,s
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,
contlnues to be "dependence on h~s gradually made the in�
labor unfona," tellectuais dlslike tl~e J3p.
Now that the labor unfona' Np ~e6 t
volce tn the party has become P~
thls atrong, the volce oi tho Thirdly, the Japan Soc!n11st
InteUectuats has weuker~ed lo Purty doea not ehow respect tor
that extent, Since labor unton intell~ctuals, ~
leedera have thelr organl:a� It is not only that the
tlons backing them, they can strengthened vofce ot the labor
and have made the voice ot the unions has led to disrespect tor
. lntellectuals inetfectual, intellectuals. When the In�
It Is only natural,'under these tellectuals write Arttcles tor the -
circumatances, tor the in� JSP's organ~ practlcally no
tellectuals to move away trom payment ls made and this is ~
the Japan Socialist Pnrty, said to be "only netural," There
Ideolo Ical Dls ute was one noted economic scholnr
- g p who clearly atated, I 11 never
Secondly, the ideological wrile articles tor the JSp
dispute within the Japan again."
- SociAlist Party 1s lntense. The These Intellectuals belteve
largest ldeologtcal group within that there should be ap-
the JSP is the Shakai Shugi propriate remuneration Ior
Kyokai. As it began to display "Intellectual work," The party
such strength as to be calied "a seems to consider It as
pnrty withtn a party," op� "voluntary activity by
position to the group ~rose, comrades."
The controntatlon between The 1ntellectuAis have no
the Shakai Shugi Kyokat and means tor pressing tor
anti�Shakai 5hug1 Kyokal payment. F'or them, the
factfons intensified And the problem is best solved by not
party faced the denger ot a wriling. This Is another tactor
schism, lt was to act as a that has put a distance betwcen
mediator in this sttuaHon that the intellectuals and the JSP.
Asukata resigned from his There are other reasons.
posltion as mayor ot Yokohama Among them, the possibility o[
to become the JSP chairman. a Soctalist government being
In the recent unit{ed local estaqlished appears very
elections, there was severe remote. Because the i~1-
controntatfon between Kyokai tellectuals who have supported
and antf�Kyokat groups, the JSP see no possibility ot
especfally in Chiba and Fuku� their ever assuming posttlons ot
shima pretectures, resuiting in power, their enthusiasm has
the de[eat ot the Sozialist waned.
candidates. ~ It is uncertain whether what
Then again, there is a strong Sohyo Secretary General Tomt-
feeiing ot antagonism ~mong zuka has pointed out will be
intellectuals such as Masao taken up by thc JSP as a
Takahashi toward ltsuro problem but the link that this
5akisake, We theoretical teader has with the current decline of
ot We Shakai Shugi Kyokai. the Japan. Socialtst Party
This Ideolo~tcal conirontatton cannotbeoverlooked.
COi'YnICHT: Maini~hi Daily News, 1979
CSO: 4120
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~
FOR O~FZCIAL US~' ONI.Y
POLSTICAL AND SOCIOLO(3ICAI, ~
VAN WOLFEREN MAPS P~RSISTING COMMUNICATIONS GAI~
Tokyo THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in Engliah 8, 15, 22 May 79
[Article by Karel G. Van Wolferenj
[8 MaY 79, pp 17, 20] _
Formal-factual Gap Has Been Inetitutionalized
[TexC ~ Knrcl G. Vnn Wolferen is
corre~pondent ,for N RC ~
'f~andelsblad t'I'he Nettier�
landsl bnsed {n Tokyo. He
has lived in Asia since 1961
.and specializes in the polltics
and sociology of Japan,
Thailand and Indochina.
'1'his series wili be carNed tn
three installments. - Editor
It is no secrel. that A com� lla~a~ on Japon~ If Germany suddenly dist~p
munication gap hae opened be- peared from the map, her
tween Japan and the West. It It, in fact, the,United States ne~hlta0t~a wouid adifer aevere
thia gap persists, let alone and the EEC decide to ~mpbee '�economic diatreee; but i! the
widens, we can in the long run limitations on their free trade, same thing happened toJapan,
expect severe damage to the r~ult could well be an uo- very tew tAustralians perhepe
sense of solidarity, long teken ~n~'ollable protecNonist chain excepted~ wauld shM many
tor granted, ot the communfty reaction, ot the kind that tears.
of nun�communlst industcial prologued the great depres. Yet, ,ironiraliy. it ia Japan,
nations. ~ sion of the 193o's. the mast diaperelble ot the
Last year In Bonn, these jus itiably orhnotp most ot the tradi g sy leme t~hat ate'ndsrto
nationa, tearing possible b~me will be ~
economic and politicai chaae, Germa p~~ on Ja n. lose most if the system should ,
once again resoived to avoid i~y ~adiW~ch also bur� be abandoned.
formal protectionist sanetions. ~~ance ot ~~~~ners with ~'or ,many in the West, it is
But the issue has not gone ;s much bett~e~ in~~ p~~ems; therefore all the more puzzling
away; if one takes recent �r~tern communi~rated in the that the Japenese themselves
warnings seriously, this German gy~ epP~r unable to see that oNy a
laudable resolution may well be geogr~ hi ~lon s to the West dramatic change In Japan's
overruled by consideralions of p cally, racially and import pol(cies can help atem
economic self interesG cullurally; Germamr e~ the trend towards rotectioh
cupies a eentr~l position in the igm, A
network ot multltateral (nveat
ment~, whtch may be even
more signiticant.
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'1'heqe lwo di[terent per� An ~x~;mpla A reuder oF ry~F~~ ~Ap ~rlw~~en whut nc�
reptioru~ are a clear Illugtrullon Japane~n ~ngligh language tu~lly is und what le guppased
ot the existence ot u com� newsp~p~ra who lacks a tirgt to b~ La not unlque to Japan,
munlcAtion gap between Japan Iwnd knowledge ot Japanese W~t s~ts' Jnpan ~pa rt trom
end the Weat, realities g~ts th~ impresslon W~gtern experience le the tact
Thg SN~aternere ure puzzitd u~"'~ '~pan ~~la ~n parilamentary that thla gap betwc~n "torm~l
by the Japanese tallure to ~mocrary, that It mainta{ne reallty" und "factual reality"
raspond to their werning,~; the pol?tical partles, labour unlorLa has been institutionalixed.
Japunes~ ere puzzled that the and the like, which tunctlon ~or YJesternere, the urge to
Westerners ure puzzled, The more or lesa as thcy do in the
cammunicutlon gAp h~s two W~t, But thl~ is very for trom SOIV@ C0111PA(IICII0113 Ig a ba81C
y~de8 . rultural cnmmend requiring nn
being the case, excuse or explunation,
~ x c e 1 I e n t t a c t i c i a ns, A Japaneae prime minister, Japanese snciety, on the
Japanese are poor strategiats, tor instance, does not have other hand, Is inaengltive to
6 or people who know Jupan anything like thu same power
well, it is not easy to imagine exercised by his counterparts contradiction. JApAnese feel no
how the Jupanese economir in other countriea, naBging Impulse ln be coo-
system with its very diftused Japanese commentatore ot S~ntly testing what is formally
internnl pnwer and res rr lrue agoinst what is visibly
Po any sophistlcnHon are wcll ue.
sibilities can dn anything so aware ot severe limitatlons fm� ~or Ja anese this institu-
drastic ns td allow completely pos~, not by law, but by com� p
fr~e competitinn on ita home munal tradition, tionalized gap between the
market, or geverely to curtail to~mal end ljie tartual is
its exports before the tuughest Doubl~ ~tandard purticularly Important in social
circumstances torce Japan to gut in imitatlon of their relr~tions, ot which, InJapanese
do so, eyes, trede negotietlons are n
foreign colleagues, or tor pur- subs ies.
'Cherefore, to Japanese eyes, poses of invective, they otten ~
their Western trading partners Nere we have a prime cause
seem to be asking tor the im� biame the Japanese prlme ~ t~ communication gap.
saible, as lo as the don t minister for not accomplishing Negotiating wilh Japanese,
match actio
s to y their ~~ngs they know are beyond W~terners naturally suppase
Ihreatening words. his capabtlities. that the tnmiliar Judicfal and
In this instance the journalist commercial concepts uged by
Unehall~y�! iilualom is doing something very their Japanese opposite
Japenese: he ia using a double numbers rMer to what they
Communication gapa are standard tor judging reality, seem to be referring to; lhe
built on unchailenged ilitmions. The foreigner, however, is ~me procedures lhey know
One such illusion ahared by unaware of this double stand-
Ix~lh sides is that they apeak the ard. from home.
The Japanese also behave as
same language. I am not ~"�i~tern style political b~ if they were negotiatlrtg with
tniking about the limited ability ~viour described try Japenese pnrtners at home. '1'hey tend to
lo speak each other's ~ p~ausible, it has make elaborate use of the in-
languages, which, although an irmer'coroiatency, ond so It stitutionnlized gup between
demonstrably ot less im� ~g understood by thc (orelgn ~~fo~mal reality" and "faGtual
portance, is often emphasized ~itoc as he would understand reality" to have it both ways.
by Japanese. ~~paper comment in his own If a Western buqinessman ar
The real problem is that ~~vy,, government representative ap
,lapanese and Westerners often gut it is a purely formal peala to a contract, A law, or an
have essentially difterent In negotiations with international agreement, he
perceptions of what is denoted toreign emissaries, and even may hear trom his Japanese
by the same term. Japanese amongst themselves, Japaneae counterpart that in Japenese
journalists and scholars have reter to this tormal reality as if aociety one is not solely ~uided
Added to the confusion by ;t actually existed. by cold rulee on lifeless paper,
describing their society with a but rather by warm humun
larrowcd Western terminology. ~~~M~~at~d und~ntondin4 feelings determined afresh on
it is ~enerAlly agrecd that
Jupanese ~nd Western institw At the same time there is a every separate occasion.
tions are o(len ditferent The Japanese "tactual reality;' a But when the toreigner. at
uae of Western terms in talking largely unformulaled under- the next opportunity, appe~is to
iibout Japan blurs lhe underly standing without which this extra�legal tradition, [or
inK, muchgreater, ditferences. Japanese cauld not cope with instance by urging
their social environmenl.' bureaucrnlfc intervention in a
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trade problem, I~e should not bc 'Cn Japan~sc thi~
aurprisr.d to heAr thnt lhig is muno~uvering Ig nnn of the
Impos~ible In d~mocraNc w,ays by which the gtrong apd
� th~ higher�rankinpj Cl~im thuir
Japan w~ilch, he g ou utr rivile Ce In n societ which
derstand, Ia aftor all gnv~rnCd' has nuvcr insisted on resolvinq
by ~~Wg' ' rnntradictions,
, Purguing n delwte on purely ~ut It often brings ths
ralional grounds.in Japan o[ten lo icall reasoning outstd~r to
deteriorateg intn a ch~a g~me ~he edge of exus eraNon, and
in which the Jupanese npponent ?~yond, ~ p
changes the rules whenever 1t
auitg him,
[15 May 79, p 24]
'.Crade Gap Proves Wider Than Show of 'Sincerity'
[Text]
~ormidable iilusions on both number ot these people who pressecl hlm with thefr readi�
sides in the eronomic conflict can be umazingly trank, neas to take etfective action, is -
between Japan and the West convey genuine understanding ckceiving himself.
huvc helped turn a11 the ~oE the toreigner's dittlculties, Such persona with the necea~
energctic eftorts of one side to and create the impression of snry broad authorlty stmply do ,
meke its position understood by willingness to c~ter to hia not exist in Japan.
the other into exercises of wishes. it is an illuaion; the Inevitable disappointment
futility. ~ "butfer" has no auch mandate, with the minimal concrele
One oE these illusions is, as I and usually er~oys rather little resulfs [ollowing "trank dis�
suggested last weck, the aup~ iniluence himselt. cussions" leads lo the next
posiNon thal because Japanese The tormer minister ot ex� Western mtsunderstanding that
and Westernera share a fWest� ternal trede, Nobuhiko Ushiba, lhe Japanese are deliberately
ernt vocabulary of eocia who is atill the most important fooling the worid.
economic terms~ they are international economic trouble
talking about the same thfngs. shooter, is a super-butter, one D~aiMuilnus
A second illusion of Western � of the more telented Japan has ~e New York Times~ com-
trade negoUators is that when produced. menting recently on the deceit�
they come here~ they talk to the Ushiba is sophlsttcated {n the (ullness ot the Japanese tacade
right people, ways of the West and pleacffi the of goodwill, expceased a wide
1'he problema t have Japanese case convincingly, spread notion whieh ie ateadily
described in the firat part of but he dces not have the spreading even wider.
thls article are often not even mandate Western leaders heve However, ot the eccusation of
noHced by the of[icfal envoys been led to believe he has. conscious deceit I belleve that
sent to Jepan to clear up Mlnisters more influenttal the Japanese are not guflty.
than Uahiba~ a leaders o[ the
matters, as they get to deal Truth tends to be established
with plein-apeaking Japanese economic tederationa, and even ~n Japan not ao much by objec�
negotiating ~artners wit~ the prime minister hlmself, ~ervatlon aa by an
whom, so it seems, they can otten play the bufEer role on ~ ~emotianally directed ~pkture in
realiy get to the heart ot the occasior~ toreign trade envo W~ch things are the way they
matter. get to apeak with them. re suppoeed to be. And the
~`~n~ � It is Just as much a mistake ~
to rely on theae potentat~es' way they are supposcd to be
tends to coincide with the io-
These are the "buEfera": maktng good what Westerners teresls ot the gtoup to whlch
Japanese entrusted with the interpret as their promises. ~e;~fvidual belongs.
lask ot making contracts with 7~he trade negotiator who ar� Moreover, whet sometimes
toreigners as smooth as rives home yet again with the s~ms to outside~a to be Japa-
poseible. news that this time he has nese hypocri9y, or even
Every big corpocatlon and really talked with lhe Proper ~Uight lying, may be a simple
qovernment ottice employs a uUthorities~ who have im� Casa oE ignorance; as. for io-
. 20
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~
_ ~Wner, when the dir~~clor nf u JbpbtlC5C pnsitinn ut lhe '1'hat, in the pcrceptlon ot tne
ministeriul bureau dunles the Coming surnmlt of industrfal dissatisfled, urgument�weury
exiatence of speclfic non�turlff nntlonsinTokyo, forelgner is propAganda, und
barrlera. ' In all the yearg thnt L have not helpful nnulysis.
Japanegc bosses uro in many iived here, sesrce a week has A shcond llluqlon on the Jnpa�
C8g@8 meraly nominally peased wlthout same news- nese side is that dig~atisfied
responalble tor the activitles of paper's pleading In some treding pnrtners will bc im�
their subordinates, And the context or another tor Im� press~d by a gpnerttliced tlurry
officiul nuthorities within the proved mutual understanding, ot ectivity, withoul this lending
Japanese sygtem have them� This ia ~ marvellous rhetori� to the results the impatienl
qelve~ quite otten a poor (dea of cal device, Ilke being tor peace, pflrtners want,
the precise goings on in an slnce nobody can possibly
esaentinlly selt�regulating disagree; and no one can Oood {ntintions
syatem, measure the progress of the an- pmong J~?panese, good interr
Westernet~ may conclude nounced etforts. tions demonstreted with e lot of
that the Japanese nre ltars, The However, in my view, all this energy are often more im� _
,;apAnese in thelr turn ronclude hammering on mutual under� ~rtent proof nt "sincerity"
trom this that the Westerners etanding merely multiplies the ~httn the l~ngibl~ consequences
completely fail to underst~nd misunderstandings, of their ncUons.
Ja An. Apert from diverting atten~
p Indeed, the Jnpanese trans�
Prime minister Ohira re~ t~on from the issues really at ~~,tlon of "sincerity," As most
cently voiced A common Japa� stake, it blinds the ,lapanese to long term fnreign residenls
_ nese opinion when he told a the tact that one ot causes of ~Ve ~scovered, covers a
parllnmentary coriimlttee that , the communication gnp is that rather di[ferent concept.
Amerlcn does not know Japan ~ey don t want to be under- yyhile lhe USA ~+nd the EEC
and that this ignorance leads to 'sloo~ ut all. in tl~eir troubles with Japan see
misunderstanding. ~ The uniqueness of being only broken promises and a
Jnpanese, which by definition ludicrous gap between '
'Mutual und~rs~andinp' cannot be understood by projected trade balance
One of the illusions nn the foreigners (as Japnnese con~ Statistics and the reality, the
Japanese side is that a cam- stantly persuade themselves in Japanese authorities keep
pai~n [or the promotion of schools and via the media) is polnting to the "emergency
"mutuAl understanding" wi11 t~ important an ingredient for measures" they have taken to
contribute to a solution of the ~apanese self�esteem. appease lheir crltics.
trade corflicts with the West. In practice, therefore, Japan ahowed "ginverity"
The latest move in this "mutual understanding" means ~e trade gap - and more
direction is, I hear, the alloting ~at foreigners should accept impurtant, the communication
ot one billlon Yen to help ~e picture of Japan presented ~p - is wider than ever,
pre.~pare understanding of the bY the Japanese establishmen~
[22 May 79, p 24J
Japanese System Can Work Dramatically 'When Too Late'
[Text]
is lhe wny in which the Japa- practical purposes, they are not su[ficiently conscious ol
nese economy is organiZed beside the point. A problem this. It is nevertheless the
right or wrong? Are the exists and ethical debate will Western natiaas, the over-
complaints of Japan's trading not make it go away, whelming ma jority of the in- .
partners about persistent trade dustrial world, who will decide
surpluses justified or not? Unacc~proble po~ition the outcome.
In the absence of common The Japanese have In the first two parfs oI this
standards oE judgment these manoeuvered themselves into article I described two sets of
endlessly debated questtons an international economic illusions: Western illusions ttwl
have no mutually convincing position whlch, rightly or they and the Japan~se speak
answers, but in any case, tor wrongly~ is unacceptAble to the the same language, that they
Western nations. Japanese are talk with the right people in
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,IUp~n, und thAt thc Jupflnesc tests to A busic ignnr~nce nbout Japane~~ history shuws
iire deliberntely deceitful; und howJapun (nc, works, many examples relevunt lo the
,lupunese illualons th~t stopgap Thcre is in Japan no le~ding ronclusion that the weakly led
me~sures ~und incunt~tions center that makes decisions yy~~~m wiil only unito �or a
nbout mutual under~tunding und has the.authority to cnrry palntul, drnstic change nf
will solve the problem, these out. The J~panese esf~tr policy when overwhelming
There Is another contributlon Iishment dces not need strong clrcumstances leave It no other
to the communication gap from centrxlized leadership to choice,
the JApanese side: the crum� function effectlvely on its own In the present econnmic
~ bled pereeptlon of the lssue, ground, conflict with the West, no
OF course, therC are ctrcles ln Decisive action on the part of signiticunt changes in the eco-
the bueiness world, especinlly a prime n~inister to a degree nomic structure will lake plnce
on higher executive levels, in comparable with thnt ot hfs until the entire eslablishment
- the Gaimusho, in the rarifled Western counterpnrts is not has been thoroughly imbued
heiKhts of MiT[, and I suppase needed or tolerated, with the ideu thnt they hnve
- even in lhe prime minister's The Japanese system works become c+bsolutely necessAry.
office who undoubtediy worry wlthin Japan because it ls No thre~ts from the U.S�
ubnut the ominous epectre of made up of finely meshed nll� cnuch less from the ~~G, nre
protectionism. Japanese components, and it likcly to bring this about,
But thts adds up to no more has a capable bureaucracy to ~~~e they have tor many
ths~n inchoate ,feelings ~of repntr small defects. ye~rs pro~~ed empty.
unense without A clear pattern. As long ns "emergency
True~ to lhe cas~~-by-case tradi- a~vs sho~teomin~s imporls," a subsidlzed voyage
tion, the perception of the protr But in coping with the outside by a floating American
lem is not shared by all who world the JApAnese system department store, highly
should be conscious of it, and oflen demonstrates grave placed buying missions, nnd
any progress in this direction is shortcomings. JApanese policy other cosmetic measures
blighted by the tendency to within Japan is not [inaily continue to give temporAry
lreat Western protestations as determined by reason, but by relief from Western pressure,
isolated rumblings of a dor- power. The system has protr the Japanesersyatem will be '
mnnt vulcano. lems with its external relatlons g~rengthened in its delusion
Sometimes a slrong feeling of because the rest~ of the world that no major surgery is neces-
unreality 'comes over me as I conceals power behind a mask gary.
read Japanese editorial of reason and political prin- c~ne way for the West to
comment about a new phase in ciple. achieve reciprocity in dealing
the conflict, writlen as if the Foreigners find only "buF- with Japan would be to follow -
current dispute was ttiunder fers" to reason with. And they Japanese methods. That means
out of a blue sky. As if no bACk- search in vain for the men with firm, continuous pressure in a
log ot similar unresolved cases power in Japan. Diffused ~ngible, not verbal, torm.
existed. throughout the system as it It could, for instance,
The Japanese establishment tends to be, or in some in- "suddenly be diacovered" that
as A whole dces not see a clear stances ~arbitrarily organized, some ~Japnnese automobiles
picture of the situation, at least in foreign eyes, Japa- developed mechanical
because it is broken up by the nesc power eludes the Western problems on Western higtr
ad hoc cas~by-case analysis; grasp. ways, necessitating a period
in the same way, the system The futile attempts to "nego- "in quarantine."
does not respond with counter- tiate with nobody" frustrate However, the importers in
measures oF the necessary foreigners equally in the fields the trading system of the West,
broad sweep. of national security, general being rather more free, would
So we are back at the strat~ foreign policy, and in- never accept such measures.
gic failure of the Japanese sys- ternational economic relations. Other alternatives are [ew.
tem, as i see it: the likelihood One is [or the West to learn to
that it can only respond in a 'Taks me to I~ader' live with perenniai tradedN
dramatic way when it is ~~Take me.to your leader!" ficits with Japan and cease the
already too late. must be the secret scream of harping that irritates ~nd
Washington, at least until re- ' many a highly placed foreign alienates the Japanese,
cently, upparently thought that visitor who is ~sed elsewhere to Another would~ be to ad-
thc directorate of J~pnn Inc. getting down to brass tacks. minister An ultimate "shokku"
w~is puwer(ul enouKh tn nego- lu lh~~ qysl~vn in th~ ~chup~ of
tiute pallcy chun~es. Thls at-
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fdrm~i protprtlonl~m, wnuldben~eeeaaryfartheU,S.
gpcrlfir~lly gingling out Jap~n, ~nd the ~~C to atop thelr
- 'Chi~ la a rpmedy, howcver, diplometle agr~ement with the
which muy provg wore~ than Japan~ee a~rgument that tbey
the d?eeaxe, aleo inuet tr`y~~ 1i~~der ~~to
DIM~r~n1 wIN penet~ate the Japene~p
market.
Ther~ la another poerlbllity, Another paH ot a new tet of
perhape the magt hop~tul of all, c~nditiot~a c~auld ~or i~ta~e b~
but {t would need a dcg~ of dl~ecl tixed eommltmeMa be~
imagln~tfon the We~t haa not xo tw~n Weatetn end Japan~
tar ehown, economlc Inslitutlaw for an
tt wouid be to at~lve tor the Internatlonal divlalon ot labaur,
development nt an cnlirely dif� Propo~a1 would ta doubt
terent ~t ot nile~ to govern Initlally be denounced by
trad~wlthJapan. , Japane~ sa d4criminotory
The firet etep would be to and untair. But to allow t!~
jettlaon the tletlon that Japan ia conftlct to teater Indeiinft~iy
a fre~ market economy eimltar eould lead to a dla~itrou
to tta:e ot the Weat, To m~kke eatrangement~ whlch tor Japan
~ woutd be !er worae.
the polnt pertecqy clear It t~ndojserleil
COPYRICHT: 1979 The Nihon Keizai 3himbun~ Inc.
CsO: 4120
~3 _
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~CONUMIC
'YOMIURI' COt~fENTS ON N~W 7-Y~ L~CONOMIC PLAN
Tokyo TH~ DAILY YOt~tIUR2 in L~nglish 6 Jun 79 p 2 OW
~~ditorial: "3haky 7-Year Plen"]
[TexC~ The governmeet ruehed to draw up a new 7-Year ~conomic p~rogram,
centered on doublie$ the eocial overhpad c~pital to etimulate domeetic
demand, because of th~ forrheoming Tnkyo eummib buC withour seemingly
euffici~nt aCudy.
The program is to be carried out during f igcal years 1979-8S and is de8lgn~d
to lower the level of criticiem against Japan over ite trade surplue.
However, a neW oil crisie has arisen becauee of the Iranian revolution
and rhe renewed pric~ hike of�eneive by the Orgaeization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). We Wonder if it ia poseible for Japan to
mainCain an economic growth rat~ of elightly under 6 percent ae envisaged
in the new program. A~eo, can the social overhead capital be doubled?
possible Miscalculation
If the government has failed to take into full coneideration these problems~
then the new program Wi11 be difficult if not imposeible to achieve.
Under the program, social overhead capital, now totaling yen 150,000
billion, will be doubled to yen 300,000 billion by �iscal 1985, switching
the growth peCCern of the economy from an export-led to domestic demand-
led pattern. It is to bring into exiatence a Japaneae-style welfare
gociety. The main objective ie to appease foreign countriea who are
critical of Japan because of ita gurplus in its balance of current
accounts.
' Economic Planning Agency Director-Genera~ Tokusaburo Kosaka intends to
travel b~the U.5. and Weatern Europe to explain in detail the plan in
advance of the Tokyo summit. HoWever, if the plan does not take into
consideration the rapidly changing international economic ~ituation, then
Japan may be unable to honor its promise and imite international dis-
truet as a reault.
~
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Irnnie~l `i'wige
irnni~~iiy thi~ pian wa~ h.~teh~d when ie w~r~ b~coming clear EheC JAp~il
wnuid nor eome und~r f3re ~e che ~ummiC. Con~~rn over ehe pric~~ ~nd
~~ppiy af oil i~ likely ed d~minae~ ehe m~~ting~~ ~nd J~pgn'~ b~1~nc~
of current account~ ~urplue hae b~~e ~harply d~cr~asing ~tnc~ rh~ et~rt
of thig y~r.
te i~ now extr~meiy diff icu1C to prediee ehe oiL ~ituation, but in ~11
pr~bnbiiiey, OP~C at it~ ~eneraL meet3ng ~ueC before th~ summit wi11
further rai~~ ~11 price~. Tha governm~nt'~ new progr~m dn~~ hav~ a chnptpr
on energy but it~ wording i~ gbstract and general~ and the worid eronomy
bec~u~e of oi1 pricing gnd eupplip~ f~cee Che pro~ppct~ of plunging again
into inflation and depre~s~on.
~he govercuaent ehould be honest enough to revise ite program, and promptly~
if the oil situation changee proepecte for achieving the program'e goale.
COPYItIGHT: Dai1y Yomi.uri, 1979
CSO: 4120
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~CONOMIC
KEIUANitEN A.f~~ILIATE PRES~NT5 'BUSIN~SS JAPAN' ON TV
Tokyo MAINICKI DAILY in Engllsh 7 Jun 79 p 5 OW
[Textj A new Engli~h-iangu~ge TV program will ~tart on June 13 for
, foreign diplomat~, businessmen gnd corre~pondents in Tokyo a~uer a cable
Celevigion neCwork. The same program wi11 ~l~o be pregentgd in Che
Kaneei area over another cable t~levieion ne~work.
_ The prim~-hour 30-minute "gusinegs Nippon" program begins et 9:30 pm on
the second and fourth Wedneedays each month wiCh repeats at 8:35 am on
the secnnd and fourth Saturdays on Che JCTV cloaed-circuit network
(Channe,t 2 nt hotels and apartments in Tokyo).
'~he commercial-free, dialogue aeminar program is intended for foreignera
ia Jgpan to deepen their understanding of Japaneae economic activitieg
by t~king up problema and questiona about the Japanese economy as posed
by �oreign bueine~smen and correspondents with their participation and
with noted Japaneae businessmen's participation~ said the sponaor, the
Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs (JIS~A), an affiliate of
the Federation of Econo~ic Organization (Keidanren).
The JISLA said it will take due care in chooeing each installment topic
so as tn~ensure an even-handed approach to Japanese economic relationa with
Lurope and the U.S. as well as the developing countries auch as ASBAN. -
' '~he inaugural program~is subtitled "Problems" and it will sketch the
economic problems between Japan, the U.S., ac~d Europe. The scheduled
participants are: Jamea S. Balloun, vice president of the American
Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACOJ) and the coordinator of the recently
publiahed "White paper on U.S.-Japan Trade"; Martin G. Barrow of Jardine
Matheson; Masaya Miyoahi, Keidanren director for the International ~conomic
Affairs Department; and Dick Yamashita of Marcom International as the
moderator.
Subtitled "Domestic Problems," the second installment will deal with the
basic Japanese economic issues such as growth rate, lifetime employment,
~
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~obLer,g reCe, ~ob reCraining, ~nvironmenCal proCeeCion, ~nd energy on the
oeceglon of th~ Tokyo summit m~eC3ng. Ie wi11 be p~reic~.p~e~d in by
Yoehixo Idek~, preeidene o� Mir~ui & Co; Mas~ya Miyoehi, Keid~nren dirpctor;
nnd Cl~arleg Smith, FINANCIAL TIMES correspond~nt.
The ~hird installment wi11 be entitled "Distribution Syetem" and wi11 be
aCC~nded by 8eiki Tozaki, president of C. Itoh 6 Co and chairman of th~
Keid~nren Committee nn dieer3buCion; Miyo~hi; gnd oeher~.
The fourth inetallmenC ie to be on the "Tradg Mieeion." Samuel Jameson,
LOS ANG~LL3 TIt~S correspondent~ will take part in it rogether with
Miyoshi and Crading houee offic~als~
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily Newe, 1979
CSO:
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~CONOMIC
~
JAI'AN MUS'I' SE~K IND~P~NUENC~ IN OIL SUPPLY, COAL TECHNOLOGY
Avoid Dependence on Midea~t
Tokyo NIHON K~IZAI SHIMIiUN in Japgnege 28 Mgy 79 p 1
[~xcerpt] A group to srudy the correlation of Che Mideast political sieua-
tion and oil supply stability with the development of Siberian oil resourceg
ha~ been formed in Kasumigaseki. If Che Soviet Union's principal reason for
its intervenCion in the MideasC is to secure the oil resources, Chere would
be new grounds to reconsider the concept of ~oint Japan-U.5.-USSR development
of the T~tmen' oil fi~lds. In other words, ahould the development of oil
fields in Soviet terrieory be foseered, it may serve to mitigate the USSR's
interesr in Che Mideast to that extenC. "Japan is unable to aurvive without
a srrategy of auch scale," says a medium-level bureaucrat heatedly. ~
Chnnging the sub~ect, ~ehe world oil market is allegedly in the midsC of a
disCribution revolution. That is, up to now, nil flowed through ma~or oil
companies (international oi1 capital), but recently, the proportion of "DD
crude oil" handled directly by oil producing nations has increased. Fo11ow-
ing Che revolution, virtually all Iranian crude oil has changed to DD. For
this reason, there is a growing feeling that the power of ma~or oil companies
is on the decline. ~
Reconciliation With Foreign Capital Oil
However, iC musC be remembered that some view the "power of ma3or oil com-
panies as becoming increasingly greater." This was clearly poinCed out by
Senator E. Kennedy in his interview with Che LOS ANGELES TIMES (April 19
edition). Even if the pipe from oil producing nations were made larger,
it must not be forgotten that nearly 60 percent of all crude oil shipped
to Japan comes via the ma~or oil companies. Despite the increased propor-
tion of DD crude oil, Japan would be in a quandry should the major oil
companies look the other way.
� When Exxon notified Japan's oil companies of its intent to curtail the
delivery of crude oil because of difficulty of procuring it from Iran,
speculations arose Chat the "major oil companies were ultimately planning
~ ~ 28
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