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~PRS L/5863
- 14 January 1980
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JPRS L/8863
14 January 1980 -
WEST EUROPE REPO RT
(FOUO 2/80)
- CON7ENT5 PAGE
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
FRANCE
Georges Buis Questions Value of U.S. Nuclear Umbrella
(LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 26 Nov-2 Dec 79) 1
COUNTRY SECTION
FRANCE `
Reaction to `ESPRIT' Special Issue on Leftist Intellectuals
(Claude Roy; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 29 Oct-4 Nov 79).... 4
New Book Analyzes Dissident Intellectuals, Destalinization
(Francois George; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR,
26 Nov-2 Dec 79) 7
Former Gaullist Minister Comments on Sahara Visit, PLO Talks
(Jean Charbonnel Interview; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
29 Oct-4 Nov 79) 10
- Comments, Poll Reveal African's Judgment of France
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Nov 79) 12
Changes in French Policy After Foccart, by Francois
. Soudan
Changing Role of Whit~ Man, by Sennen Andriamirado
Conjecture About Giscard's Successor, by Jean-Louis Buchet
Results of 'JUENE AFRIQUE'-Harri.s Poll, by Jean-Louis ~
Buchet
" Titanium Shortage Seen Threatening Industries
(Frederic Barrault; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 19 Nov 79)....... 34
- a - [III - WE - 150 ~'OUO]
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. Page
CONTENTS (Continued)
Y ~
Advanced Technical Military ~raining Reviewed 3~
(Robert Bouchard=, ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Oct 79)...������
ITALY
Oil Refineries Threateneu by North Africa, Persian Gulf
(CORRIERE DELI.A SERA, 4 Dec 79)..����������������������� 41
SPAIN
Brief s 43
FAL Growth
-b-
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THEATCR NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE ~
- GEORGES BUIS QUESTIONS VALU~ OF U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 26 Nov-2 Dec 79 p 60
[Text] If the organizers of the international colloqueum on the defense
of Europe, which was held on Saturday, 17 November, are to be believed,
Western Europe is facing such aggravation of the threat from the Warsaw
Pact that the coming years for it are taking on the nature of a decade _
of "survival." That sentiment is strongly held by some--not all--of those
in the chorus which surrounded the high priest, American Gen Alexander Haig,
on the dais. The irony of one of them, however, became biting when he
affirmed the capability of the USSR to produce whatever weapons it pleases '
in whatever quantities it pleases. This, according to him, is inherent in
its character. Another declares that the blind will continue to see but
very little in the coming years. Finally, a German general, who was the
inspector-in-chief of the West German Army, proclaimed without blushing
that "Europeans must place confidence in the Americans; but confidence is ~
two-way street and we must ask ourselves if we are giving the Americans
sufficient reason to have confidence in the Europeans."
Just what does this man from Lorraine require? Indeed, are not 3^ years of
truckling under, still constantly to be observed, on the part of peoples such
as those of Europe, to a great protector, enough for him? Here we are far ~
from Machievelli, writing precisely the contrary to the Prince: "Your army
has the right to find fault with you for having made of it a rough shape
instead of a perfect figure."
It is in fact with this eternal truth that the great protector, represented -
by General Haig, is seized by the throat. And it is indeed upon this topic
that the Welsh general, statin~ that the "outdated military system which
has been imposed upon us"--upon us Europeans--"since 1949~' has in a few
words put the past and present strategies of NATO upon the grill.
It is from this system that the French have been at~.le to extricate themselves
and it is fortunate that a very ~arge majority of the left have understood,
in time, that despite the honor of Hiroshima the independence of France
has been achieved through French nuclear deterrence,
1
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The American, Gen Alexandez Haig pres~,ded over the colloquium. By virtue
= af his recent p~litical past under Kis:~ingex, Nixon, and Ford, the man is
not unimportant, What is more importa~it for Europeans--he comes with 5
- years in the position, up to last June, of Supreme InCerallied Commander
in Europe, SACEUR in NATO ~argon. If anyone is informed about the ratio
of East-West forces in Europe, and thu;~ of the "military" defense of the
latter, it stands to reason he is the ~~ne.
Now, here for the first time in 30 years in discussions of this kind the
great American chieftain did not dictate to his European suppletives. _
, No longer did he scold them for not placing enough conventional forces at
the disposition of the organization to which they so enthusiastically
- adhere not for not standardizing their weapons, that is to say, not buying
all of them from the Unit~d States. He did not hold up, as has become the
fashion, the 150 divisions and 40,000 combat tanks of the Warsaw Pact.
First, because he knows that these figures, which are exacerbating an alarm-
_ ist campaign, would mean nothing even if the,y were exac* (they have to be
"weighed"), and, moreover, they ar2 wrong. For those who doubt it, and
consider it their duty to be informed, let us recall that there is in existence
the "Military Balance of Forces" in which the figures are p:ecise, complete,
and analyzed. Price: $8.50. This is within the reach of all pocketbooks
and it is appropriate to refer to it ir' one does not wish to engage in -
impassioned discussions which are beside the sub~ect.
General Haig .,aid that Europe is threatened and that is true--more so than
~ ever it is strikingly true; and that Etirope must no longer count too heavily
upon the Americans--it has been 13 years since France has counted upon
them--for total defense because the Americans are, and are go~.ng to be, more
and more occupied elsewhere. We have at the moment enough spectacular
examples of that. What he did not say, however, was that this would be a
3ust twist of fate because it was they, and not the Soviets who, in their
vainglory of the immediate past-war period, completely destabilized the
world. Perhaps they were not wrong, but the fact remains.
_ Preoccupied with the worldwide problem, which is that of th~ United States
as well as that of the politician which ~.t seems he hopes to become, General
Haig dismissed Europe by going straight to the essential point. He avoided
mention of the Russian "steam roller~' and p~.aced direct stress upon the
considerable success achieved in the East in the area of "intermediate range"
nuclear weapons systems (Intermediate Range Ballestic Missiles). In point
of fact, for 3 years we have seen the Soviets deploy, facing Europe, the
"Backfire" aircraft and SS 20 Missile which bring within firing range
(nuclear) Europe as well as the Mediterranean and to oppose which NATO, or _
rather the Amer3.cans in NATO, have nothing.
But whose fault is that? The Americans have always denied Europeans access
to the atom. The various organ3.zations wh~.ch they have proposed to the
Europeans--multilateral force, supreme nuclear committee, and so forth--were
or are delusions, The reality is the countering of the threat--which has
= 2
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no meaning unless based upon display of possession of the nuclear device--
and sovereign possession of the key to the machine. The Americans have
reserved both to themselves and have even pressed the NATO members (in
company with the delighted Soviets) to sign the "non-proliferation" treaty,
that is to say that they voluntarily renounce once and for all the only
weapon which would discourage a possible adversary.
Today, faced with the anxiety of European governments, the Americans are
proposing--if they agree--to install upon the territory of NATO members a
weapon vaguely comparable to the SS 20 although of much inferior range,
the Pershing II. This is what is delicately called ~'modernization." The
operation would be carried out in 1985. Why in 1985? Because the Pershing II
is yet to be manufactured. Intermediate range weapons are not part of the
American parioply for the very good reason that they serve no purpose at all--
for the moment--in defense of the American sanctuary. One may then well
wonder what is meant by the "American umbrella." It would seem that it is
a delusion. It consists, in fact, of central weapons systems--which, by
the way, surpass those of the Soviets--which were designed to protect the
United States and not others, even if it be the well-beloved Europe, that
Europe, we are told, which America would see die only with sickness at
heart. That, it seems, is the kind of sickness most: easily endured.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
REACTION TO 'ESPRIT' SPECIAL ISSUE ON LEFTIST INTELLECTUALS
_ Paris LE PTOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 29 Oct-~+ Nov 79 P 30
[Article by Claude Roy: "The Lullaby of Lies"]
[Text] ESPRIT devotes a special issue to inventorying the perpexities of
the "intellectual" left, under the title-question "What to Think? What to
Say? What to Imagine?"
If I had to answer ESPRIT's three questions, I would like to have a fourth
question precede them: ~dhat is it? It seems to me that the vague longings,
the fuzzinsss of ideas, the seasickness and the defective sense of direction
of a lar~e proportion of the "intellectuals of the left" have their origin
. in a prodigious indifference to reality, the habit of "thinking" first and
then observing and verif~ing afterward. Whether the sub~ect is the distant
- iunaginary paxadises that have constantly replaced one another as the E1 Dor-
ados of ;;he intelligentsia (USSR, China, Third World "socialisms," Cuba,
Vietna.m, etc), or the immediate realities of France, or whether the sub~ect -
is the daily life of the real French people, one has gone from astonishment
to stupor, and from stupor to han~;over, because one has too often found before
looking, responded before askin~, and foreseen befare having seen. Marx and
Tocqueville formed their analyses on the spot, in Manchester or the Uni.ted
States. Althusser and the ideologues who produce systems every morning as
the autumn rain produces mushrooms have made up their theories in their dens. ~
I~norance of reality and blindness are the two breasts of "modern" thought. ~
What to Think? The preliminary question is already a help for answerin~ this
one. The abundance of contemporary "thought production" is prodigious. It
is a"thought" in which the sound of the words is often faster than the think-
ing, in which speech precedes reflection, in which supersonic theory goes
, faster than practice: one speaks before seeing, one believes before knowing,
one concludes before deducin~. The two cures that one would like to propose
for the perplexed moroseness that presently prevails would be an inquiry cure
--go see what is happening, next door or out in the world--and a silence cure
--accept silence when you still do not know, and do not expound neatly pack-
aged theories beforE~ examining carefully the concrete facts of a problem.
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What to Say? ~ne is slightly ashamed to h~.ve to reply first of all with two v
banalities: that it would be best to say nothing when one does not know ~.nd
is not thinkin~ anything; and if one does speak, then to say what one thinks.
A little key phrase from the memoirs of Andre Wurmser left me both musing and
enlightened. Iie evokes the era in W~11CY1 we divided ourselves on the basis
of fundamental q~xestions, questions wnich ~.re st~ll on the order of the day
(or of the twili~hti: Stalinism, the ~so~ialist" character of the Soviet sys-
ten, the problem of knowing whether "real socialism" has eliminated capitalist
exj~loitation or has replaced it with exploitation of the workers by a stt3.te
capitalism. I share Andre Wurmser's present opinion when he writES that it
"inv~lves a system, a monstrous logic, which, once set in motion, saps and
destroys." But I cannot follow Wurmser when he writes, regarding the years
1.956-1957: "One should not judge what we on one side or another thought at
that tirae by `~hat we said." I knot�r very well the complex mechanisms that
lead one to say something other than what orie thinks--and often the contrary.
It starts with "right feelings." They lead one to throw Noah's cloak over
the shoulders of the Unworthy Father or of a somewhat bl~ody Party, to pre-
serve the truth of the future by the lies of the present, to favor the essen-
tial (or what one believes to be such) over the accessory (designated at the
outset as a"report a+~tributed to," then same obvious faults, then some de-
finite crimes, endirig with the "monstrous logic" of a s,ystem). This leads to
blatant cynicism about the bald lie: shouting an untruth so loudly that the -
other side is stunned into silence. But I find it ver,y sad to hava to recall
that if one is not to "~judge what one has thought by wha~ one has said,'' ab-
solutel,y nothing further is possible: no action, no communication, no thought,
no reflection. Fven if Marx had caught us that men do not always know what
they are and do not always do what they say, i believed in 1956 that Andre
Wurmser was thinking what he was saying. If I was naive, I would do the same
if it happened again. But in that era I formed the naive idea of trying to
say always what I think. It is very difficult, it is very uncomfortable, and
it certainly does not give assurance of never deceiving oneself. But it
greatly simplifies relations with one's fellow-men, and with oneself, and
makes them healthier.
~dhat to Imagine? I would be tempted to reply to the last question posed by
ESPRIT that the most; possible should be imagined, but never forgetting that
huffing is not the same as playing, that imagining is not the same as doing,
and that the violins of the imagination must not play faster than the brass
of reality. I admire those learned persons who do not confuse a hypothesis,
albeit a fertile one, with a law, not yet established. I admire those actors
who act correctly because while acting, they do not forget that they are act-
ing. I prefer those dreamers who while dreaming are aware that their dream
is a dream to the schizophrenics who have lost contact with reality.
T4an is the animal who needs pro~ects in order to live and outdo himself. Pro-
ject is a very fine word and a very fine thing. One is really ashamed that
the term is used at this time tiy the disorderly clowns of the Socialist Pro-
ject. Their succession of double hits, foul blows, and blows for no reason -
puts Utopia on the level of the worst sort of politician's politics ana trans-
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forms the notion of "social p--~,ject" into a Mac Sennett comedy pro~jec~ion,
full of pie-throwing and mise~able pratfalls.
At this point I hear r?~y readers, who are not imaginary (as their letters tes-
tify): "All the same, one has to believe in something...; one cannot ,just say -
no all the time...; it's fine to criticize, but what do you propose instead?
By refusing to play the gaxne, one does nothing and leaves the eneiqy free
t o act . "
Not at all. Who absolutely needs to believe? One needs only to know in
order to be able to wisli. ~f course one cannot limit oneself to saying no.
But the strength of our rejecti.ons is the measure of the firmness of our as-
sertions: a yes must be founded on the courage of the noes. It is not nec-
essary to "propose something other" than plague or lying--except for the health _
that makes it possible to act and the truth that makes it possible to think--
in order to undertake to cure a mortal epidemic or to denounce the lies. ~gt
really amounts to refusing to play the game, effectively leaving the field in
the hands of the right, the new right, the old foxes and the young wolves,
is the warfare of words, the fallacious illusions, the real disaster of the
"unreal socialisms," the lulla'~y of lies and the bitter awakening from ideo- _
logical drunkenness. He who h~.s too much blind hope will despair befo.re the
day has dawned.
ESPRIT, special issue, Septer~ber-October 1979: "j~Ihat to Think?
What to Say? Wnat to Imagine?": articles and interviews by
Cornelius Castoriadis, Louis Dumont, Jacques Julliard, Clau~ie
Lefort, Pierre Rosanvallon, etc.
Andre Wurmser: "Fidelement Votre--Cinqua.nte Ans de Vie Lit-
teraire et Politique" [Faithfully Yours--50 Yeaxs of Literary
r~nd Political Life] (Grasset).
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Observateur"
11267
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COUNTRY SECTION FIZANCE
NEW BOOK ANALYZES DISSIDENT INTELLECTUIILS, DESTALINIZATION
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 26 Nov-2 Dec 79 p 27
, fReview by Francois George of the book "Toward 'What Tomorrows" by Jeannette
, Thorer.-Vermeersch, Hachette]
[TextJ On 21 December of this year, Iossif Vissarionovitcl-~
Djougatchvili, also called Stalin, would have been 100
years old. Francois George has read the latest book by
Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch in order to celebrate, in his
own way, this centennial...
5talinism, which once held sway over the USSR, the "people's republics,"
and China too, as well as over all the countries where a powerful communist
party looked to Moscow, has now shrunk back to the confines of little
Albania. Albania, whose territory is smaller than Alsace-Lorraine, will
celebrate this centennial alone; with its innumerable statutes of the
founder of "socialism in one country." Under the leadership of Enver
Hodja, this nation of two and a half million fearlessly defies the entire
world, and particularly the traitors: revisionists, T~toists, Khrushchev-
ians, and now the Chinese.
/"Thank God for having sent us communism,"/ (italics) an old Albanian
peasant--forgetting that atheism had been decreed in 1967--once told Jean
Bertolino, that sympathetic but vigilant* witness. The enigma of Albania
becomes a bit clearer if we recall that this sterile land once nourished
the Janizaries, who t,elonged to a dissidpnt Moslem sect, close to the
Shiites, called the "bektashi" order. The bektashi doctrine, beyond incul-
cating an indomitable courage to its adepts, contained an egalitarian and
communal ideal. Moreover, the bektashi fought during World War II on the
side of the Ccmmunists. There could only be room for one Grand Master in
the tiny country of Albania, and Enver liodja rid himself of his rival.
But the Stalinist Sparta perhaps lives on the religious heritage of the
Ottoman Empire.
* "Albania, Stalin's Sentinel," Seuil
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Could Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch be a baktashi? Adherence to such an
oriental doctrine would suffice to explain her hostility to Eurocommunism. -
In any case, Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch is our own Albania. Indeed, -
- whereas Enver Hodja's ideological Janizaries fight unyieldingly against
"bourgeois and revisionist filth," Maurice Thorez's helpmate reproaches
~talin for several "personal faults." This is her only concession to
opportunism: nobody is perfect. I'at she continues to defend the whole
concept of communism that prevailed during the fifties, and to hold to an
idealized image of the Soviet Union.
It is difficult not to be impressed with the solidarity of her certitude,
that loyalty which facts cannat shake. One must read Jeannette Therez-
Vermeersch to understand the Stalinist spirit, which Hegel anticipated in
describing the "ethical world": in this world of the beginnings, the
hero knows no doubt, he does not reflect on what he has to do. The indi-
vidual personality is not yet disengaged from the collective substance;
the firmness of character which impresses us is only the law of the com-
munity acting through the individual. The exemplary figure of this
ethical world is, for Hegel, Antigone, who fulfi].led, against the whole
world, har sacred sisterly duty. Correspondingly, could one not see in
� Georges Marchais a Creon, preaching realistically of the need fo r unity
at the hase?
With destulinization, the Marxist-Leninist myth lias lost its rigidity,
but also its hieratic beauty. The faith has become flat, and a secular
worker's movement has been substituted, so to speak, for the millenarian
faith. Nevertheles5, the Stalinist Antigone is not content just to
render funerary honors to a shattered dream. In the manner of the real-
~ ist-socialist artists, she depicts a marvelous Soviet Union where the
productive forces progress unceasingly in the service of the people, whose
rights flourish in the bosom of a large and vital democracy. Socialist
justice pursues the all too famous "dissidents" because they commit
, offenses against socialist laws, and besides, despite obfuscation of ~he
Eurocommunists, the future will no doubt unmask these agents of U.S.
imperialism who dream of reestablishing private property and the exploi-
tation of man by man.
Let us remember that Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch's point of view, which
today may seem like a caricature, was in the past shared unanimously by =
communist intellectuals and "fellow travellers." What has changed? How
did we get from blind adulation of the Soviet Union to the cult of dis-
sidence?
Gilles Lapouge, in his book, "Utopia and Civilizations," remarks that
between Plato's "Republic" and Huxley's "Brave New World," between Cabet's
"Icarie" and Orwell's "1984," the only difference is in presentation. It
is only our subjective attitude which makes the difference between paradise
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and nightmare. Utopia, like the imago of the psycho-analysts, is composed
~ of positive and negative sides indisso"lubly bound together: thus it ap-
pears to us successively as white or black without itself changing.
There remains to ask oneself whether communism is historical in the sense
in which Marx understood the term. It seems sometimes that this utopia,
characterized by the identification of snciety with the sCate, calling
in question the value of ~he individual and the family, the reabsorption
of the private tnto the public, may be a permanent archetype which is
realized from time to time, not only in the works of Plato or Campanella,
but also for example in the Inea Empire, whose methods the Jesuits endeav-
ored to copy in Paraguay, or indeed in that Ottoman Empire to which Stalin-
ist Albania ys perhaps a monument. And the Cambodia af Pol Pot was only
- an aborted utopia. Our thinkers would do well, instead of reviling Marx,
to bring their indictment against Nimrod, the architect of Babel.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Observateur"
_ 9516
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE �
FORMER GAULLIST MINISTER CONIMENTS ON SAHARA VISIT, PIA TALKS
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 29 Oct-4 Nov 79 p 5~+
[Interview by Pierre-Marie Doutrelant with Jean Charbonnel, former minister:
"A Gaullist among the Sahrawis"]
[Text] Jean Charbonnel, former minister, has returned from
Tindouf, where he met at length with the leaders of the Pol-
isario Front. He is the first French politician to have
visited the Sahrawi refugee camps. _
~ [Question] Were you on an official mission?
[Answer] Not at all. I was there as president of the Federation of Repub-
licans for Progress.
[Question] With the ~uai d'Orsay's agreement, all the same.
[Answer] I had informed the ministry of this trip. It officially acknow-
ledged it, while at the same time making it clear that the French position
in the Saharan affair was known and that it would not change.
[Question] Why this visit, then?
[Answer] We have here a classic case of right to self-determination. This
is what motivates the Gaullist that I am. But I wanted to assure myself on
the spot of the representativeness of the leaders of the Polisario Front.
[~uestion] Morocco calls them "mercenaries in the pay of Algiers." � ~
[Answer] I met authentic fighters. I saw the complete mobil~~a~ion behind
the Polisario Front of the the Sahrawi people, old people, women and children. "
_ I was also shown the results of the struggle: +ons of weapons and materiel
taken from the enett~y. For example, rows of brand new American trucks--as if,
by way of Moroccans as middlemen, the United States were equipping the resis-
tance fighters.
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[Question] You already knew this to some extent.
[Answer] Yes; but what surprised me the most was the Sahrawi school with
1,200 children opened in the desert in liberated territory. They are being
taught to read and write in Ar~.bic, Spanish, French. That is not a~ob for
mercenaries, The camps themse]_ves are organized on the model of the Saharan _
proVinces or wilayas, which will be created tomorrow. I saw competent young
administrators everywhere. Foi� ex~nple, I met the future prefect of SYnara,
a to~rn still occupied by the Moroccans. Obviously,11the Polisario Front is �
setting up the structures of a new state. This too proves its representa-
tiveness.
[~uestion] The French government continues ~o deny it.
[Answer] It is locked into its policy of support for Morocco. But during
this time, the international community has been evolving: the Polisario Front
is listened to in the UN, in the OAU [Organization of African Unity], among
the nonaligned nations. Even Claude Cheysson, one of the commissioners of
the EEC, has met with its leaders in A].giers.
[Question] It is curious that a Gaullist like you supports a Marxist lib~ra-
tion movement.
[Answer] The leaders of the Front all talked to me in a;,A+ionalistic wa3~,
and at na time in a P~arx~ st way. Very bril:iiant young Peop'i.e! In Afr. ica, _
cou lc~ow, ther~~ a.re *..he Gubans whom we produ~e ourselves, by politica.l blind-
r~ess . In tYie S~.hara af f,-~ir, France shou.td choose neutrality. 'I`he Polisar. i.a
~r.ont ~.~ks no More, Do ~OU W3I"~t t,o save tlie thron+, of Hassati TI? Let us
r.c?n~ri.nce tr~e king that he wi7.l keep it if he gets out of this war quickly.
[(~uestion ] Ilaven't the Sahraw is won alreac~y?
[Answer] I found their morale lifted very high by the signing of the peace
treaty with Mauritania, and thoroughly determined to increase their military
pressure on Pdorocco; but also prudent about the chances for an immediate set-
tlement. They fear that the war will go on.
COPYRIGHT: 1.979 "le Nouvel Observateur"
11267
CSO: 3100
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,
COUNTRY SEi;TION FRANCE
CO1~A4ENTS, POLL REVEAL AFRICANS' JUDGMENT OF FRANCE
Changes in French Policy After Foccart
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Nov 79 pp 77-78
[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Shadow of Jacques 'La Foque' Foccart"]
_ [Text] At the first glimmer of dawn, seven gray pickup trucks slip away
from a side wing of the Elysee Palace. Paris is still deserted and the -
weather cool on this late April morning. Headlights glowing, the vehicles
move onto the southern highway and then, 30 kilometers ahead, at Melun,
take three d3_fferent directions and vanish into the morning fog, never to
be seen again. Five and one-half years ago, 20 April 1974, Jacques Foc-
cart's secrets disappeared and a page had been turned in the history of
French-African relations.
Secretary of state for African and Malagasy affairs foz 14 years (1960-
1974), "La Foque," as he was known in the Special Services, did not wait
for Valery Giscard d'Estaing to be elected (May 1974) before resigning. He
knew well that the first act of. the future nresident, whoever he may be,
' would be to "thank him." PZor was he unaware that before he died, Georges
Pompidou had already tried several times unsuccessfully to send him
back to his business as a banana importer. Times were changing. So were
France's "Africans." As was his wont, Foccart made the first move: He
put his files and records in safe hiding.
Cooperation: Lighter Policy
Jacques Foccart is no longer in office and certain things have changed be-
tu~een France and Africa. The ministers of cooperation that would follow -
one another on Rue Monsieur (Pierre Abelin, Jean de Lipkowski and today,
Robert Galley) would all follow the Giscardian policy, a policy that is
remar.kably well defined, with respect to economic affairs, by the 1975
- Abelin Report: With the world economic crisis, French aid to Africa would
have to be transformed; The "heavy, massive" cooperation of the Gaullist
period would be replaced by cooperation on "projects," cooperation that
would be more precisely defined, lighter, more integrated into world
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economic circuits. There would be a change in orientation entailing a
change in men and institutions at all levels.
Technical Assistants
As a result, the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC), set up in 1959 on the
basis of former colonial investment organizations, an enormous machine ~
which under de Gaulle furnished nearly all the aid and cooperation credits
to Black Africa, was dismantled beginning in 1975. Its budget was con-
siderably reduced and its funds were sent instead to new institutions
such as tha Central Fund for Eeonomic Cooperation (CCCE). Many of its -
officials did not have their contracts renewed. This "clean sweep" re-
sponded to something more than a concern for efficiency. It was related to
the rivalry between Gaullists and Giscardians in Africa. The FAC, "pene-
trated" by the Foccart connections, had actually become the stronghold of
former members of the French colonial overseas administration, most of whom
were close to the Gaullist circles. There was a like desire for a clean
sweep of technical assistants for both economic and political reasons.
The Gaulle-Foccart period had been ma~ked by a steady increase in the num-
ber of teachers at the expense of the technicians (technical assistants).
:;aintaining French influence in the area of the intellectual training of
upper-level African personnel was then deemed more important than its pre-
sence in the sectors of economic decision-making and p].anring. Here again,
a radical change began in 1975. Many of the "missionary" teachers, often
suspected of engaging in "Gaullist propaganda," were recalled to France and
the number of effective, "apolitical" technical assistants rapidly increased,
especially in new sect~rs such as industry and data processing, while
clearly less in the traditional and less "profitable" sectors such
as rural development.
Open Intervention
With respect to direct political intervention in Africa, there has been an
equally profound change in men. De Gaulle, who distrusted the army ever
- since his Algerian disappointments, had always given priority to the role
of the secret services, through Jacques Foccart. Closely associated, the
SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service] and the "Foque .
networks" had the task of intervening wherever and whenever it was necessary.
Consequently, the army played a real role only once: in 1964 in Gabon, in
order to save President Leon M'Ba from an attempted putsch. Beginning in
1974 and with the departure of Jacques Foccart, Valery Giscard d'Estaing
would do everything to reduce the influence ~:~d means of action of these
"nests of Gaullists" which the French Special Services had become in Africa.
This resulted in a reduction in SDECE personnel (from 2,500 3gents and
contractors in 1975 to 1,800 in 1979) and drastic cuts in the operating
budget. It has also resulted in prc~ound disarray and cunsiderable bitter-
ness among the secret agents of the "Big House" and is un3oubtedly the
source of the current dissatisfaction reigning within the SDECE.
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Excluded from African operations under de Gaulle, the army has now been
brought to the forefront by Giscard. Chad, Mauritania, Shaba and the Cen- `
tral African Empire: four theaters af operation of 5 years. Since 1976,
a French Intervention Force has been set up (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 978).
It will achieve full form and self-sufficiency in July 1980 with the addi- .
tion of half an armored brigade. Furthermore, several operational assis-
tance detachments (DAO) have been set up. These are shock groups with the
task of pulling off discreet overseas coups. A large Transall carrier
aircraft has gone into service to provide long-distance electronic equip-
ment freeing the intervention troops from their dependency on American
satellites for their communications with Paris. In 10 months, the ~nter.-
vention Force will have 19,000 men. Finally, GEST (Scientific and Techni- _
cal Studies Group), the army's information service, has in recent months
seemed to gain in importance in the gathering of information in Africa
(its role was decisive for the success of Operation Barracuda in the Central
African Empire). Naturally, all this has taken place at the expense of the
SDECE. Officials, technical assistants, secret agents: In less than
5 years, a major housecleaning has swept out and replaced France's "Africans."
Nor ha~ this whirlwind spared diplomatic personnel. Some 50 ambassadors,
embassy secretaries, military attaches and special advisers in Africa have
been transferred and replaced by cooperation "technicians" who are less
political and therefore mor~ Giscardian. It is a movement that seems to
have concluded with the retirement of two of the most visible proconsuls:
Jacques Raphael-Leygues, "the Ivorian," and Robert Delaunay, "the Gabonese."
There remains the Elysee Palace. Of course, Rene Journiac and the head of
African affairs at tlie Quai d'Orsay, Guy Georgy, Valery Giscard d'Estaing's
two "African" eminences, are new, but they are both said to be very close
to Jacques Foccart, the old master and the old demon. Men and policies
come and go, but "La Foque" cannot be buried all that easily....
Changing Role of White Man
Paris JEUNE AFRIQ`JE in French 28 Nov 79 pp 84-87
[Article by Sennen Andria:nirado: "The 'Toubab' Is No Longer What He Once
Was"]
[Text] They are still called "buanas" in Central Africa, "toubabs" in
West Africa, "vazaha" in Madagascar or "s'oreilles" because their ears
turn red on the other Indian Ocean islands, but the white man a label
as pejorative as the word "black" in the mouth of a European has changed.
What is more, the some 280,000 French people in Africa (including 117,000
in the riaghreb and 152,000 in French-speaking Black Africa) no longer make
up the homogeneous community of colonial times or the early years of inde-
pendence.
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Old and New ~
In the beginning came the settlerss strapping, sun-tanned or swarthy young
_ men who drove through the coffee fields of southeastern Madagascar or the
central region of the Ivory Coast in old, patched-up Land-Rovers. Two
sheets of corrugated metal served as cover on tlie sides and a lengthened
exhauat pipe bent upward made it an amphibious vehicle that could speed
through the lowlands or scale the forested cliffs. The settlers spoke the
language of the country and their French generally turned into Creole, the
language of the local people. When single or a widower, a man would marry `
a young woman from the village. When married, he took a mistress. But the
men who were then 50 years old are now 70. Some have remained, gradually
assuming their status as "aanatany" (literally, "sons of the country" in
Malagasy) an1 have even become rural mayors since independence. The others
are scattered throughout France, often experiencing a difficult retiremPnt:
The clash of the emerging nationalisms was intolerable and many of the old
settlers abandoned everything.
" And yet, not all their descendents followed them into "exile." Some have
even become so well adapted to independence that they have even been con-
verted. From the plantations, they have gone into the import-export
or restaurant business.
They have migrated from the villages to the cities and al~oays own property.
They have organized so we11 that the cleverest among them manage to live
both in their native country and their adoptive land. For example, two
- brothers who are in the restaurant-hotel business on Place d'Antananarivo
take turns every 6 months going to France and minding the establishment in
Madagascar. This has been going on for 20 years.
The old people have seen the emergence of another generation of Europeans
alongside them: that of the technical assistants of the first d~cade of
independence. Some 25,000 technical assistants have now swarmed throughout
Africa (out of 28,000 in the world): 11,000 in French-speaking Black
Africa and 14,000 in North Africa.
Lost Soldiers of Cooperation
Between the two groups: settlers and technical assistants, relations are
difficult, however. In Dakar or Bamako, they do not fraternize. Each -
"clan" has its own cafes. The old-timers are known as "old settlers," while
the newcomers are "tenderfeet."
Among the technical assistants themselves, understanding is not always the
rule. In 20 years, they have also changed. Those who came for the osten-
sible purpose of making some CFA francs (the franc of French-speaking
Africa that is, to "make some bread") were joined by the idealists of
" the heroic years. Belonging to specialized French organizations such as
the BDPA (Bureau for the Development of Agrieultural Production),
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IRAT (Institute of Tropical Agronomic Re,;earch and Food Crops) or IRAM
(I:~stitute for Research and Applications cf Methods of Development), they
at one time tried to present an image other than the one left by the admin-
istrators of French overseas territories. But they were also changed.
Some left the rural cotrrmunity development pro~ects in Senegal or Niger.
Others put down roots, pursuing their old dreams, cost what it may, or
became privately employed. Still others and this is the fortunate part
followed the evolution of their countries, staying in one place and remain-
ing sufficiently at a distance to avoid getting involved in the conflicts
that marked the end of the 19h0's or the 1970's here and there.
Among those who adapted tt~e best, the teachers definitely deserve the
laurels. They saw the African youth assert themselves. They saw their
discontent and their will for change grow. But without exception, they ~
stayed aloof from the upheavals in Senegal in 1968, Madagascar in 1972 and
Niger in 1974. The university professors even sometimes had to condemn `
a number of France's official policies. At the end of 1976, those in Mada-
gascar who were affiliated with the SNESUP (French National Union of
Advanced Education Teachers) sent their government a protest motion: At
the time, a number of officials from the Ministry of Cooperation allegedly
did their utmost to discourage technical assistant candidates for Madagas-
car.
- It would actually have done them little good because in the meantime, the
mentality of the technical assistants changed. At the beginning of the
_ 1970's, in fact, the survivors of May 1968 swarmed into Africa. Idealistic,
nostalgic for the Latin Quarter barricades, waivering between Fidel Castro's
beard and the long hair of the hippies, they came, brandishing Mao's
"Little Red Book" in one hand and their diploma in the other. A single
country escaped their tirades: the Ivory Coast. The well policed Ivorian
society did not tolerate and still does not tolerate long hair,
sandals, fad.~d blue jeans, even open collars, in official offices.
Moreover, these young technical assistants have been quite well integrated,
to such an extent that some of them also have been won over by the thirst
for easy profits. Enjoying a comfortable income compared with the nation-
als, partially paid in France, some of the former Parisian revolutionaries
- organiaed a fruitful traffic in foreign exchange. Tq their African col- -
leagues or friends leaving for Europe, they proposed an exorbitant exchange
rate: For 100,000 CFA francs (2,000 French francs) which they received
locally, they would make out a check for 1,000 French francs (50,000 CFA
francs), payable in France.
Others, less bent on profit, sank into individual decadence. In Africa,
they discovered the delights of soft drugs, Indian hemp in particular,
whose use is common in many countries. "But the white man does not know
how to smoke," they say in Dakar. "He puffs on his joint frantically and
uses five times more than a young Senegalese would." -
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Colonizing the Economy
H~3e thtK rr~ce nF lost soldiers of cooperati~n 9urvived? It is actually
~Ilc~,ipperirlnK bec~~~ur+c~ ii new r~ice hnA come lnlc? I~eing: l~hriC c~( th~ dyunm(c
young executives (JCD), good for export. It e~nerged in the mid 1970's,
arriving in smal?. groups in Abid~an or Antananarivo. White-shirted, attache
� case in hand, they run down the halls of the Hotel d~ 1'Amitie in Bamako
under the blank gaze of young (white) women whiling away their time at the -
bar or swimming pool. These new toubabs have nothing left in common with
their ancestors. They are financial experts, data processing engineers,
economists. They do not use the familiar form of address with bellboys
or their subordinates. They show no sign of emotion: no nostalgia for
the "good old colonial days," no (false) feeling of guilt for the first
technical assistants, not even a spirit of (true) solidarity with the
veterans of May 1968.
These toubabs are specialists. They did not come to coloniae men, but
things that is, the economy. They know only one rule: PERT (Program,
Education and Review Technique), which they say enables them to solve
everything by means of organization. They have but one ambition: effi-
ciency. Highly trained, these dynamic young executives have been "leased"
to French cooperation by organizations whose very names are synonymous
with technocrat: SETEF [expansion unknown], SODETEG [Technical Studies
and General Enterprises Company) or the Chamber of Commerce of Paris.
They often come alone and may make several short trips during the year:
2 months in Abidjan, 2 months in Paris, 2 months in Abid~an. They have
joined the ranks of the 50,000 highly-trained upper-level French personnel
scattered throughout the Third World.
From the Settler to the Cold Technocrat
The new toubabs have officially been entrusted with the task of promoting
French foreign trade. In their attache cases, they carry the plans for a
textile plant or a hydroelectric dam whose equipment must be exclusively _
French. In their financing program, it is their mission to demonstrate that
the French financial organizations are the best. Their contact with the
French community in the African countries is reduced to one theme: Buy
French; import French, even if the materials imgorted for the construction
of low-dost housing is more suitable for Sarcel?~es (Parisian suburb) than
for SICAP [expansion unknown] in Dakar.
These French are much more effective for France than the Lorraine miners
in Shaba or the paratroopers in the Central African Empire. It was un-
doubtedly not any accident if it was not until the end of 1979 that there
has been some thought in France about having French people living abroad
represented in the National Assembly. Previously, only six senators had
been their spokesmen. But the French Senate is more a council of wise men
than an institution in which decisions are made. Allowed to have their
own deputies, the toubabs will gain recognition of the fact that they are
no longer second-class citizens. On the contrary, they are the bridgehead
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- of the French presence abroad. That is why France has gone from the image
of the bedraggled settler to the label of the cold technocrat, and this
technocrat is far more dangerous to Africa than the settler or the techni-
cal assiatant, who from now on are nothing more than part of folklore. -
How Many Are There?
Out of the 987,531 French people officially registered with the consulates
throughout the f~ve continents, those in Africa account for over one-fourth:
279,155. But tY~e consular statistics are definitely low. Like any other
emigrant, the Frenchman does not systematicalZy register with his consulate, _
- especially in Africa, where the national administrations, quite lax with
regard to the French, generally do not require that they keep their status
current.
Nevertheless, the following table, based on a map published by our Parisian
colleague L'EXPRESS and presenting the distribution of French people through-
out the world, gives a correct idea of the French presence in Africa.
1. North Africa
_ Egypt 2,181
Libya 2,003
Tunisia 14,750
Algeria 42,570
Morocco ~ 51,985
Mauritania 2,768
Total 116,257
2. West Africa
Mali 2,420
Senegal 14,478
- Gambia 42
Guinea-Bissau 62
Guinea 656 -
Sierra Leone 105
Liberia 264
- Ivory Coast 40,862
Upper Volta 3,436
Ghana 315
Togo 2,992
Benin 2,058
Niger 3,670
Nigeria 3,715
Equatorial Guinea 12
Total 75,087
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- 3. Central Africa
Chad 3,859
Cameroon 11,413
Central African Empire 2,967
Gabon 21,013
Congo 6,248
Zaire 5,271
Total 51,269
4. Southern Africa
Angola 118
Zambia 312
South Africa 5,338 -
Malawi 111
Mozambique 194
Tanzania 141
Total 6,214
5. Eastern Africa
Somalia 35
Sudan 316 �
Kenya 521
Uganda 107
Rwanda ~73
Burundi 676
Madagascar 18,481
Djibouti 9,719
Total ' 30,328
Conjecture About Giscard's Successor
Par.�is JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Nov 79 pp 91-93
[Article by Jean-Louis Buchet: "A President in the Mist"]
[Text] Will Francois Mitterrand, the eternal loser'.in French political
life, get his revenge in 1981? He has twice failed in the presidential
elections: in 1965 against de Gaulle, when he was beaten before he started;
and in 1974 against Valery Giscard d'Estaing, when he came very close to
winning.
Another chance was provided with the 1978 legislative elections. After the
defeat of the opposition and the collapse of the Union of the Left, the
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press did not hesitate to write: "Mitterrand, you're done for!" While he
kept his post, the first secretary of the Socialist Party appeared to be
one of those "archaisms" in French political life condemned without furtrier
ado by Michel Rocard. Today, the young deputy from Yvelines is in a heated
battle with him for the title of best socialist candidate for the 1981
presidential elections. But Mitterrand, the old fox, has not capitulated.
At the Metz Congress in February, he regained control of the party appara-
tus. Since that time, he has worn doWn his adversaries. In the f inal
analysis, his candidacy only depends on himself. One can rightfully ask,
~ now at the end of 1979, if he could not well threaten Giscard!
Will Giscard Succeed Giscard?
And yet, only a few weeks ago, reelection of the president was not a matter
of. doubt for anyone. In the face of a divided opposition and conf ronted
with the sterile guerrilla warfare of the Chirac supporters, Giscard seemed
in the best position to succeed himself. It was a permanent fact of politi-
cal life since March 1978. Since there were no adversaries, it was thought
that only two factors could get in the way of Giscard d'Estaing: the
impact of the crisis, at least part of whose effects could be blamed on the
government; and the growing unpopularity of Prime Minister Raymond Barre and
his policies, which might spill over on the president. Giscard's art con-
_ sisted of presenting the crisis as a stroke of fate and keeping his distance
from the head of the government, while covering him with flowers, t~thich
ga.ve rise to all kinds of comments on ~the air and in the press.
The tactic enjoyed some success, as a SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Com-
pany]_L'EXPANSION poll published at the beginning of October shot~ed: For
a majority of the French peopl.e, neither the economic situation nor the ac-
tion of Raymond Barre changed their vot~ng intentions with respect to the
presidential elections. Giscard would win over Mitterrand, Rocard or
Marchais and with a larger margin than in 1974 (with 53, 52 and 64 percent
of the votes, respectively).
Crisis Called Unemployment
What is the French people's o~inion of the crisis? It means unemployment
(72 percent) and inflation (52 percent) much more than oil (25 percent).
It is perceived as lasting and oppressing. Whatever the result of the
presidential elections, little change is expected (47 percent) and at any
rate, it will continue (75 percent). As for Raymond Barre, while 42 per-
cent of the French people believe that someone else could do better than he,
46 percent have no substitute, which in the final analysis lets the presi-
dent off the hook: He really ;;~.;ad no choice.
,
- "Relatives and Diamonds"
- Valery Giscard d'Estaing would therefore have been able to sleep peacefully
if the wave of scandals had not taken place: diamonds from Bokassa, real
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estate deals, the death of Robert Boulin, ~11 against the background of the
- Chirac-Giscard battle. It was no use to c]aim that the exchanging of gifts
is cummonplace in official circles, that there was nothing actually illegal
in the real estate transactions dragged up and that any man who commits
suicide ~akes secrets with him. Politicians are now discredited in the
eyes of public opinion and the image of the president has suffered. For _
many French people, Pompidvu's republic of "pals and rascals" has been suc-
ceeded by the Giscardian republic of "relatives and diamonds," to use the
sp iteful phrase of LE CANARA ENCHAINE.
In vain will Giscard search for the real France in his native Auvergne
and then state that one must "let the dead bury the dead." He will never
again appear as sovereign, detached and above the melee as he did in the
past. The grace that seemed to have touched him in March 1978, the advan-
_ tage he had built up over the months have forsaken him.
Since the Boulin affair, the Gaullists who rallied to Giscard have been
particularly shaken. Their support and the possib le choice uf a prime min-
ister from among their ranks were essential elements of the strategy for
1981. Inasmuch as Barre was perceived as a man of the UDF [French Demo-
cratic Union], the Giscardian Gaullists were to allow the president to
retain the votes of the entire majority.
As for Chirac, he was counting on Giscard`s faux pas to find his stance.
S ince the European elections in June, he had adopted a more detached and
serene attitude. Nevertheless, according to the polls at the beginning of
October, tr~ leader of the RPR (Rally for the Republic] did not exceed
the score of Chaban-Delmas in 1974, given the possibility of a first ballot
opposite Giscard (15 percent). Can he do better between now and 1981?
It is difficult to see how he could, after the rumors that brought Chirac's
f ollowers into question in the scandals, particularly the Boulin affair,
especially since the Gaullists also have things f or which they might be
blamed.
_ At Mer cy of New Af f air
For the first time sinee 1978 and on the eve of a pre-election year, Valery
Giscard d`Estaing is cornered. In mid 1980, would he like to exchange
a politically wornout Raymond Barre as some said he had the intentior. of
~ doing a short time ago in order to throw a littlE dirt in the eyes of the
voters? Who would take his place? Not an Alain Peyrefitte, whose promo-
tion would almost be a provocation after the accusations made against him
by Rabert Boulin on the eve of his suicide! Nor can Giscard get rid of
his keeper of the seals: This would amount to proclaiming his guilt in
the affair. Moreover, from whom could he separate himself in order to
bring about a shakeup presented as a new departure? The fragility of the
edifice is now such that it is difficult to touch any one of its elements
without endangering the balance of the whole. Will he have to content
himself with a discredited, unpopular team? And continue to play Giscard
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l~r~ck I~~~mc~ in A~iver~ne, as if nothin~ ever t~rippE~ned? The m~tlnise i9 nlrendy -
Jeepse.ited, and it another well-pluced indivcretion, another "affair~"
should occur, it would be a debacle.
This powerlessness of the government and the cr.isis of confidence in public
opinion play into the hands of the socialists. They alone can derive an
advantage from the current situation. Marchais realized this and flew to
the help of the majority and attacked the press after the death of Minister
Boulin. The welfare of the Communist Party depends on the rout of the So-
cialist Party and therefore, on keeping the right in power. Furthermore,
despite widely held opinions, I~iitterrand is more dangerous than Rocard for
Marchais. According to the L'EXPEINSION poll mentioned, Michel Rocard, un-
like Mitterrand, would not be assured of outstripping the communist leader _
on the first ballot ot the presidential elections. The fact is that the
extreme left and the ecologists are in a battle with the deouty from Yvelines
for a fringe of his electorate and Giscard the other. Moreover, Rocard
has little attraction for the communist voters and for many socialists, he
is too far to the center. Mitterrand, on the other hand, has the stature
- of a vote gatherer, despite his often criticized past and the wear and tear
of time. Much better than Rocard, he can "pull them in" on the left. In
addition, now rid of the support of the Communist Party, he can win votes
from that group of French people mainly influenced by their fear of the
"Reds." Then there are those who now think: "Why not the socialists? It
couldn't be worse!" In other words, if he overcomes his internal opposi-
tion and if the government continues to hand hi.m gifts on a silver platter,
- Francois Mitterrand would have a good chance a~ainst Valery Giscard d'Estaing.
New "Mr X" in Elysee Palace?
At any rate, the game is much more open than it was a few months ago. One
even wonders whether, breaking through the monopoly of the four major par-
ties, a man who has made gains in recent months could not take advantage of
the crisis of confidence affecting the government and the politicians.
Could there be a new "Mr X," a man now (almost) unknown? With many "ifs,"
the operation no longer appears to be totally impossible.
Results of 'JEUNE AFRIQUE`-Harris Poll
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Nov 79 pp 97-98, 100-101, 103, 105, 107-108
[Article by Jean-Louis Buchet: "JEUNE AFRIQUE-Louis Harris Po11"
[Text] For Africans, France is an important, medium-size country which
plays a corresponding role in the world. Its population is racist and
France gives them a poor welcome. Cooperation is aimed more at defending
the interests of France than those of Africa. As for military interven-
tions, as in the Central African Republic, they are repudiated, and the
Africans are asking for the withdrawal of French troops stationed in their
countries.
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This is the lucid and critical image of African opinion that emerges from
our exclusive JEUNE AFRIQUE-Louia Harris poll, the first of the "Africans
Judge France" type.
Africans in the northern and southern Sahara, like those living in France,
wrote to us in balanced proportions. We have analyzed and made an abstract
of 800 of these responses. They constitute what one might call a represen-
tative sampling, if not of all African opinion, then at least of the Afri-
cans who read JEUNE AFRIQUE.
France is therefore "one of the front-ranking powers among the average
powers" for 50 percent of the Africans (question 1). A slightly larger
~ percentage (54 percent) believes that it plays a"rather important" role
ia the world (question 2). In the final analysis, this is quite close to
the truth. However, a large majority (one-fifth of our readers) has a ten- _
dency to overrate France's role, viewing the nation as a"great power." It _
is an image which probably owes a great deal to the colonial past and to
France's influence in Africa, which is stronger�than elsewhere, according
to our readers: Some 79 percent are "very or quite" interested in what
happens there and another 71 percent deem the consequences to be "very
important or quite important" to them (questions 5 and 6).
This also undoubtedly explains why opinions are divided aG to retaining
French as the "working or official language" (question 7). It is true that .
France reuiains for Africans the country of culture it ceased being long ago:
Some 53 percent rank it among the leading countries in the world in this
, area (question 4), while 59 percent rank it "squarely average" with respect
to its technical achie~vements (question 3). -
Racism and Immigration
What about the attitude of the French concerning Africans? For 84 percent ,
of our readers, the Africans who reside in France are "quite poorly" or
"very poorly" received (question 8), and for 55 percent, those who reside
there are less favored than those who live in their native country (ques-
tion 9). Two elements might explain these responses: the French immigra- ,
tion policy, which is increasingly harsh, and the knowledge of the situ~-
tion encountered by foreign workers, on the one hand, but on the other is
the matter of racism: Some 82 percent of the Africans believe that the
French are racist (question 10). -
Only the English are on a par with them, while the Americans and Soviet
would be less racist (question 11). Consequently, people do not forget
the colonial days. The French and English have probably retained reflexes
from the period that the others do not have.
Moving on to the matter of cooperation, compared with other countries `
(Western and socialist), there is recognition of France's effort (ques-
tion 12), but the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have
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a better ranking than the Netherlands and Sweden (whose aid, compared with
their GNP, is actually greater) or the USSR and China (whose aid is of a
different nature). It is perhaps the image of countries that are economi-
cally more powerful and more effective that is decisive here.
Having said this much, France's aid i~ far from being disinterestQ~ (ques-
tion 13). For 64 percent of the Africans, France uses cooperation in order
to defend it~ economic interests: the looting of natural resources, markets
for its products, exploitation, and so on. One correspondent sums up this
- opinion in the phrase: "In Africa, the people grow things; in France, they
enjoy them." Some 34 percent of our readers refer quite simply to "neo-
colonialism." Next come the maintenance of cultural influence, a search .
for strategic or military support, and so on. Only 6 percent of the Afri-
cans believe that French cooperation is based on generosity, humanism or
a moral obligation.
Under such conditions, it may be surprising to see that 50 percent of our -
readers place education and health at the head of the areas affected by _
cooperation (question 14), undoubtedly because (along with.security, which
obtained 31 percent of the responses) it is the sector in which it is the
most visible, because of the technical assistants. However, it is also be-
cause the Africans seem anxious to discern the purposes hidden behind the
flattering speeches and the deceivit~g reality. Giving priority to the -
training of future elites may also be one way of finding markets and con-
tracts for the future.
Some 53 percent of our readers have a poor opinion of the technical assis-
tants and 57 percent believe that cooperation is more negative than positive
for the country aided, although 42 percent believe the contrary (quest~ons
17 and 18). But this does not prevent them from being critical: For 90 ~
percent, cooperation serves France's interests first of all (question 19).
This is a figure that can be compared with the 88 percent who believe that
' it favors certain countries, undoubtedly deemed to be moze docile or de-
pendent (question 16). Furthermore, it would appear that the image of
cooperation has worsened with time: A total of 60 percent believe tnat it
was de Gaulle who helped Africa the most, compared with 12 percent for
Georges Pompidou and only 13 percent for Giscard, "the African" (question
15). It is true that the general's name remains associated with indepen-
dence.
No to Military Adventures
That is the story for cooperation, which is only one of the aspects of
France's African policy. That policy may also take a more spectacular form,
with military interventions and other coups d'etat.. Such actions are not
any more appreciated; far from it, as ~een by the fact that 77 percent of
the Africans disapprove of France's position in the Central African affair
and 81 percent are against keeping troops stationed in Africa. Without
forcing things, one can deduce that our readers are not in agreement with
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the military adventures of Valery Giscard d'Estaing (questions 20 and 21).
. These responses should be compared with the opinion$ of the French, whom
we polled in October (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 981): Some 63 percent thought that
it was up to the Africans to organize their defense and 49 percent were
against any new military intervention. Clearly, Giscard's policy on the
matter is disapproved of by the French and the Africans.
~
On these latter questions, the opinion of the South Saharans and the Afri-
cans living in France is more categorical than that of the Maghrebians.
It is true that the former had the "privilege" of seeing the French soldiers
in action more frequently. As for the latter, one may reason that they are
better informed. Throughout the questions in the poll, there were nuances
- between the three aones. Rarely do they express contradictory opinions.
One noteworthy exception: Concerning French, the majority of Black Africa
is in favor of keeping it. The Maghrebians are more likely to see France
- as a great power, but fewer are interested in what goes on there. Perhaps
they believe that French influence is not as strong in their region as it
is in Black Africa. They are the only ones who do not think that the Afri-
cans living in France are treated unfavorably. This may be explained by
the amount of persons emigrating to the former mother country, which is
much more common than in the southern Sahara. As for the Africans living
_ in France, they are generally the most political and more critical than
the others. However, without exception, they all disapprove of France's
African policy and show that they are not t~ken in by the line speeches
they hear.
Giscard and Chirac
A~logical consequence, the men of the opposition are judged more favorably
than those in the government. Robert Galley (82 percent negative opinions!)
pays dearly for his coy phrases about Bokassa. Chirac (46 percent positive
opinions) wins out over Valery Giscard d'Estaing (41 percent), but the two
majority leaders are "in the red." It is true that their quarrels have also
touched Africa and that the Gaullists are associated with Foccart.... As
for the French president, he might meditate about the spontaneity of the
crowds that welcome him during his African tours, when he finds a"popular-
ity" he does~not enjoy in France. Only Raymond Barre receives more favor-
able than unfavorable votes (59 percent). But he is precisely the only
"non-African" in the majority, which confirms the fact that the African
policy is decisive for the opinion held of the French leaders.
It is interesting, at a time when Giscard's position in France appears t~
be less favorable than it was a few months ago, to note that the opposition
- leaders achieve scores that are more than honorable. The case of Michel
Jobert (64 percent percent positive opinions) is undoubtedly special. Well-
known in certain countries and to the readers of JEUNE AFRIQUE, the former
minister of foreign affairs of Pompidou has the advantage of having remained
aloof from public affairs recently. Francois Mitterrand receives 52 percent
favorable opinions, despite a colonial past that is not the most brilliant.
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Georges Marchais does almost as well as the first secretary of the Social-
ist Party, although in many countries, anticommunist pressure is strong.
While they may not yet have shown how Franc~e's African policy could be
_ dii'Cerent, the opposition leaders at least have the merit, in the eyea of
the ALricans, of some~imes condemning the government's policy, even iF too -
frequently, they do so only for reasons of domestic politics.
JEUNE AFRIQUE-Louis Harris Poll: The Africans Judge France
1. How would you classify France's place in the world today?
Overall Northern Souther�n Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
One of the world's great powers 21 26 15 21
One of the leading medium-size
- powers 50 48 51 50
An average power among others 18 t:i 22 lg
A small power 5 3 8 5
No opinion 6 8 4 6
Total 100~ 100% 100% 100%
Tt is in the Northern Sahara that one finde the largest percentage of re-
sponses classifying France among ~he great powers..
2. At the present time, how would you classify Fraiice's role in the world?
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
Very important 21 23 22 19 -
Quite important 54 54 57 54
Not very important 19 18 17 23
Not at all important 6 5 4 4
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
No noteworthy differences between the areas, but Africans living in France
believe that it plays a slightly less important role.
3. With respect to its technical achievements, how do you view France's
current position?
Overall Northern Southern Africans �
~ Sahara Sahara in France
One of the leading countries
in the world 26 33 23 24
Squarely average 59 53 65 58
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[cont.]
Behind 10 9 9 15
No opinion 5 5 3 3
Total 100y 100% 100% 100%
Once again, it is North Africa which has a tendency to place France in the
leading ranks, while 15 percent of the Africans living in France (10 percent
overall believe that it is behind, technically speaking.
4. How would you rank it culturally?
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
One of the leading coun-
tries in the world 53 60 53 46
Squarely average 36 33 38 38 -
Behind 9 6 6 14
No opinion 2 1 3 2
Total 100% 100~6 100% 100%
The same tendencies are seen in question 3, but France's image as a country
- of culture is strong in the three regions. _
S. Personally speaking, are~you very interested, quite interested, some-
what interested or not at all interested in what happens in France?
~ Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
Very interested 33 28 34 39
Quite interested 46 53 . 41 43
Somewhat interested 17 16 21 13
Not at all interested 4 3 4 5
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Should one be surprised? Africans in France are more interested than others
in what happens there (39 percent).
6. For you, are the effects of what happens in France:
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
Very important 33 26 34 39
Quite important 38 42 37 34
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[cont.]
Not very important 21 21 21 20
Not at all important 8 11 8 7
Total 100% 100% 100Y 100% r
_ No variations, but curiously enough, the Africans in the Northern Sahara
feel less concern about the effects of events in France. -
7. Are you in favor of retaining French as a working language or as the
official language in your country, or would you like to replace it with
another language?
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
Retain French 49 45 63 36
Replace it 49 55 35 60
No opinion 2 0 2 4
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
_ There was a clear majority in favor of retaining French in the Southern
Sahara. Among the languages proposed were Arabic, in the North, different
national languages and English, in Black Africa. Many Africans living in
France would substitute a mixture of African~languages for French.
8. In your opinion, are the Africans coming to France treated:
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in FranCe
Very well 3 2 4 3
Quite well 13 10 18 10
Quite poorly 47~ 48 47 47
_ Very poorly 37 40 31 40
Total lOQ1 100% 100% 100%
There are no differences between the areas here either, but the Southern
Saharans are a little less severe.
9. Are Africans living in France treated better or worse than those living
- in their native country?
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
Better 36 47 31 31
Worse 55 47 60 58
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[cont.~
No opinion 9 6 9 11
Total 100Y 100% 100% 100%
It is in North Africa that opinions are the m~st divided. The opinion of
the South Saharans is more similar to that of those living in France.
10. Do you think that the French are racist?
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
Yes 82 80 84 84 ~
No 12 14 12 9
No opinion 6 6 4 7
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
The figure is slightly lower in the Northern Sahara, but it is still 80 per- .
cent. Overwhelmingly, the Africans say yes, the French are racist.
11. In your opinion, are the French more racist, equally racist or less
racist than:the:
Overall N. Sahara S. Sahara Africans in Fr.
M. L. Eq.Total M. L. Eq.Total M. L. Eq.Total M. L. Eq.Total
Americans 40 28 32 100% 50 27 23 100% 33 35 32 100% 35 15 50 100%
- Russians 46 25 29 100% 53 26 21 100% 33 34 33 100% 50 15 35 100%
English 31 25 44.100% 34 33 33 100% 22 25 53 100% 34 15 51 100%
This time, the South Saharans are a little more indulgent toward the French,
at least compared with the Russians and the Americans. .
12. Regarding cooperation, would you say that France helps Africa more,
as much or less than:
~ Overall N. Sahara S. Sahara Africans in Fr. -
M. AM L. Total M. AM L. Total M. AM L. Total M. AM L. Total
United States 43 27 30 100% 51 20 29 100% 43 28 29 100% 30 30 39 100%
West Germany 43 30 27 100% 50 28 22 100% 40 34 26 100% 37 29 34 100%
Netherlands 65 17 13 100% 79 8 13 100% 64 18 18 100% 49 26 25 100%
Sweden 57 14 29 100% 72 11 17 100% 57 14 29 100% 40 19 41 100%
Soviet Union 54 24 22 100% 48 28 24 100% 65 20 15.100% 44 26 30 100%
China 60 19 21 100% 69 16 15 100% 18 64 18 100% 47 22 31 100% -
France's generous image is much stronger in the Northern Sahara than in
Black Africa. Africans residing in France are the most severe.
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13. In your opinion, what are the reasons for the French policy of coopera-
tion and aid to Africa?
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
To defend France's economic interests 64 55 62 76
Including:
Control of raw materials 27 20 28 32
Markets for its products ~ 12 10 14 12
Exploitation of Africa 25 25 20 32
Neocolonialism 34 25 46 30
- Maintenance of cultural influence 13 11 14 14
Need for strategic support bases 11 11 10 13
Limiting socialist influence 4 4 3 5
Desire for power or political reasons 5 5 5 5
Jobs for French 5 3 11 2
Moral obligation, humanism, generosity 6 5 8 4
Other reasons 6 5 6 7
No opinion 2 2 2 1
(For questions with more than one answer, the total is higher than 100 per-
, cent.)
Defending France's economic interests easily wins. Africans residing in
France are particularly sensitive to this. For 46 percent of the Southern
Saharans, it is neocolonialism that motivates the French.
14. Of the following fields, to Which ones would you say that French coop-
eration gives priority?
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
Education and health 50 67 58 48 "
Industrialization 8 8 6 7
Agricultural development 3 1 4 1
Major projects: roads, bridges, -
dams, ports 5 4 5 4
Army, police 31 19 24 38
No opinion 3 1 3 2 -
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% ~
Africans living in France are more sensitive than others to aid provided
to security forces (38 percent). _
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15. Which of these three French chiefs of state helped Africa the most?
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
ChnrleH de (;aulle 60 52 fi4 62
Georges Pompidou 12 12 12 12
Valery Giscard d'Estaing 13 22 12 5
No opinion 15 14 12 21
Total 100% 100% 100~6 100% ~
De Gaulle is more popular in France and in the Southern Sahara than in
North Africa. In France, Valery Giscard d'Estaing has the poorest rating.
16. Does Trench aid seem to be distribute~: nearly equally, in your opinion, .
or does it favor certain countries?
Overall. Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France '
Distributed nearly equally 9 12 8 7
Favor certain countries 88 81 88 81
No opinion 3 7 4 12
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
More Southern Saharans believe that some countries receive favorable treat-
ment. ,
17. What is your opinion of the French technical assistants working in
Africa?
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
Very good 7 9 6 4 _
Quite good 39 42 45 28
Quite poor 32 26 33 36
Very poor 21 14 16 32
No opinion 1 9 0 0
Total 100% 100% 100% 100!
On the whole, the technical assistant has a poor image, but Africans resid-
ing in France are the most critical.
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18. All things considered, does French cooperation seem to you to be posi-
tive or negative for the countries helped?
Overall Narthern Southern Africana
Sahara Sahara in France
Positive 42 53 45 27
Negative 57 46 53 72
No opinion 1 1 2 1
- Total 1009' 100~ 100X 100%
Cooperation seems to be slightly more positive than negative for the Northern
Saharans. Once again, Africans living in France are harsher than the others.
19. In your opinion, does French cooperation in Africa serve Africa's inter-
ests first of all or the interests of France?
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
Africa's interests 10 10 9 5
France's interests 90 90 91 95
Total 100% 100y 100X 100~
Near urianimity. Trend reinforced by responses from France.
20. Are you personally in favor of or opposed to maintaining French troops ~
in certain African countries? ~ ~ _
Overall Northern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
In favor of 17 28 � 13 10
Opposed to - 77 63 81 86
No opinion 6 9 6 4
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Everyone disapproves: 63 percent of the Northern Saharans, undoubtedly
less concerned; 81 percent of the Southern Saharans; and 86 percent of the
Africans residing in France, who perhaps have broader information. .
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21. Do you approve or disapprove of France's attitude in the Central Afri-
can affair?
Overall NorChern Southern Africans
Sahara Sahara in France
Zg 13 8
Approve gi 66 86 90
Disapprove 2 6 1 2
No opinion
iooy iooi iooi ioox
Total
Clearer responses (against) in the Southern Sahara, where troops were seen �
in action, and in France.
22, What is your opinion of the following personalities (good, poor):
Overall N. Sahara S. Sahara In France
G P Total G P Total G P Total G P Total
Raymond Barre 59 41 100% 73 27 100% 51 49 100% 31 69 100~
Jacques Chirac 46 54 100y 53 47 100% S1 49 100% 34 66 100%
Robert Galley 18 82 100% 23 77 100y 15 85 100% 11 89 100%
V. Giscard d'Estaing 41 59 100% 63 37 100% 36 64 100~ 24 76 100%
Michel Jobert 64 36 100~ 79 21 100~ 68 3'2 100% 60 40 100%
Georges Marchais 50 50 100~ 32 68 100y 48 52 100~ 67 33 100%
Francois Mitterrand 52 48 100~ 37 63 100% 66 34 100% 51 49 100%
In North Africa, the people are "kinder" to the men in the ma~ority. Govern-
ment figures are particularly unpopular among the Africans in France, who
put Georges Marchais ahead of Jobert.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPIJA 1979
11,464
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
TITANIUM SHORTAGE SEEN THREATENING INDUSTRIES
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 19 Nov 79 pp 75-76
[Article by Frederic Barrault]
[Text] Supplies cut off, breaking into the stocks, the French aeronautical
construction imperilled, the production of Airbus endangered...titanium
penury is now causing panic.
~ The other week, in the administrations of the companies belonging to the
Group of French Aeronautic and Space Industries (GIFAS), the same words were
heard everywhere: "I would buy some at any cost, but it's not to be found
- any longer!"
Titanium is the material of tomorrow. Its density, half that of steel, its
resistance to corrosion and high tEmperatures make of it the essential com-
ponent of the most modern industries: nuclear power stations, sea water
desalination plants, and of course, civil and military aeronautics.
Since the beginning of the year, it has become practically impossible to
procure any on the world market.
Is there a shortage of ore? The reserves are estimated at 400 million tons.
As regards abundance, titanium is the ninth element in the earth's crust.
The world production amounts to 1 million tons a year.
What is lacking today is titanium in the form of "sponges." This is the
stage through which one must pass to obtain industrial alloys.
Four countries of the world produce these sponges: the United States is the
second largest producer in the world, with 25,000 tons a year, but still has
to import it. Japan produces 13,000 tons, Great Britain, 6,000 tons a year,
and especially the USSR, who with a production of 40,000 tons is prac-
tically the only country able to export some.
This access to titanium has been cut off. Moscow has stopped all its deli-
veries. Giving priority to its own needs, diplomatic and military blackmail
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(especially for the purpose of making the Germans give up the installation
on their territory of Pershing II missiles), simple speculation to wait for
the rates to rise (100 percent increase in 3 months), all the hypotheses
have been suggested. The only certainty that the Soviets have re3~cted the
requests to put an end to the non-reception policy, whether these applica-
tions come from the industrialists or the French Government.
Our present needs hardly exceed 1,000 tons. The aerospace industry itself
consumes 60 percent of this. But in 1982, the needs for the aeronautical
construction alone would reach 2,000 tons. Will the strategic stocks, set
up hastily, and whose amount is kept secret, be sufficient?
This is what is asserted in the circles close to Mr Andre Giraud, minister
~ of industry. Substitute materials can always be used. True, that would
mean that the parts would be heavier. This is what has already just been
done by Airbus Industrie when they replaced 200 kilograms of titanium in the
fixing struts of the engines by 400 kilograms of steel.
However these are only momentary solutions. On two occasions, in the VALEURS
ACTUELLES, Gen Jacques Mitterrand, chairman of the Aerospatiale and Mr Andre
Turcat, former flight test director, drew attention to this problem. What
did General Mitterrand say?
"All the builders are rushing to their suppliers at the same time. The
latter are rare and are in a difficult position when it comes to satisfying
the demands."
He added that:
"Efforts will have to be made in most of the large countries concerned."
In his turn, early this month, Mr Rene Ravaud, chairman of SNECMA, recom-
mended the creation of a plant for the production of titanium sponges:
"It is a must", he said, "if we wish to satisfy the influx of orders for the
Airbus and Mirage."
This factory existed 30 years ago. The "sponges" were produced at the fac-
tories of Les Clavaux (Ugine) and La Praz. The French market was then 100
tons per month.
Between 1960 and 1962, the Russians, and also the Japanese, attacked the
French market proposing titanium sponge at a cost which left no room for
competition: between 12 and 17 francs per kilogram, whereas the cost price
in Europe at that time was about 30 francs per kg. Being unable to put up
any opposition to this "dumping," French production was stopped in 1963.
It is now reported that a sponge production plant, the Societe Francaise
d'Elecrometallurgie, a 100 percent subsidiary of Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann,
is considering the installation of a factory in the Tarentaise valley. The
investment would cost 150 million francs.
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- Having burnt its fingers once, the Puk Group does not want to launch this
venture on its own. Their main argument: and what if the Russians were to
resume their deliveries tomorrow, at unbeatable prices? Everybody knows -
that for Moscow, any expense in roubles has no meaning; what is essential
is to bring in foreign currency.
In other words, the Puk manageme~t would like the government to be an active
participant in the business.
Mr Andre Giraud was to declare, on 8 November, that: "The government has
no intention of giving state aid tc~ Puk."
At the beginning of this month, Mr Armand Carlier, adviser to the minister
for industry for raw materials, asked the following question:
"Is the maintenance of titanium psychosis intended to exert pressure on the
government for the latter to involve taxpayers' money?"
As for Mrs Margaret Thatcher, she believes in the urgency of the problem.
She has given the green light to the release of a 20 million pound credit
to increase the British production of spongPS.
Mr Giraud proposed to the British to launch a possible project in which the
Germans would also be associated. A concrete way to provide for Eur~pe.
The minister of industry also asked COGEMA [General Raw Materials Company],
a subsidiary of the French Atomic Energy Co~ission to "cough up" the
titanium sponges.
Another operation may also be organized with SNECMA and SNIAS. But even
if the decision were taken, it wQUld take 2 more years for the plant to
become operational.
For Mr Jean-Yves Eichenberger, chairman of the Federation of the Employers
for Ores and Non-Ferrous Metals, this matter is revealing. It shows that
the ultramodern industries, which are Europe�s chances, are threatened by
the weakness of the basic industries of the community. Yesterday, it was
cobalt, as a result of the events in Zaire; tomorrow, it may well be
molybdenum, whose rates are beating all records on stock markets. -
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Valeurs Actuelles"
9018
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
ADVANCID TECHNICAL MILITARY TRAINING R~VIEWED
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOUF~'HUI in F`rench Oct 79 pp 70-71
[Article by Nfa3or Robert Bouchard~
[Text]"Culture is directly related to evexything that man discovers,
- invents~ conquers, and accomplishes or else ~.t is nothing but a hoax....
In reality, fear of specialization is undoubtedly the Clearest sig~1 of
lack of culture." Jean I,acroix
Every day scientific and technical progress penetrates a little more tnto
the fielda of study and action, transforming institutior.s int~ very complex
systen;;. The army is not immune to this phenomenont the strat~eic use of
resourcas and the carrying out of operatione require officials xho are
competent in as many diverse and complementary fields as there are systems
to control.
The training of our upper echelon personnel thus requires continued and
sustained attent3on. The EMSST [Advanced Scientifie and Technical Milita.ry
Instruction] is involved in this effort by accepting into its ra.nks those -
officers who want to acquire a serious and deeper understanding of their -
scientific field c,r learn modern management techniques.
The EMSST in Advanced Tiilitary Training
At the Ievel of technical diploma this training prepares the student for
the role of specialist or technician. As army engineers the graduates in
"civil engineering," "electronic data processing~" or "azmament" xill be -
utilized as researchers~ writers, or as construction supervisors. Those
- certified in languages~ human sciences~ or physical education will either
teach or serve on general sta.ffs or in specialized organizati.ons.
Their role is firsst of all that of an officer and their recruitment has
bzen primarily due to their officer-like qualities.
Thos~~ officers who receive the technical cartificate 1n advanced military
studies have prepared for large commands or management positionso for
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holding responsible posit;ions on the general staffs or for filling pos-
itions that require a high level of scientif'~c or technical knoHledge.
Their role as responsible leadere aleo explains the fact that their admisBion
to the EMSST iq directly dependent on their prior succeas as o.fficers~ pa.r-
ticularly as officers in charge of small units. -
The EMSST Curriculum
The resumption of formal studies af�ter an absence of several years usually
present~ serious difficulties. If they haven't been forgotten, ideas learned
in the past have often ~~own obsolete and sornetimes distorted by time. This
is why candidates for the ~r~i55T program routinely take correspondance
, courses in the year precedin~ their admission regardless of the courae of
study that will eventually be pursued.
Examina.tions are given at the end of February in the sciences~ letters~
and languages, Only those candidates who perform satisfactorily on those
tests are considered by the committee on aclm~ssions.
Within the two training programs the students are distributed in similax
proportions. More than 75 pe~ent are in the engineering saiences with the
remainder in human sciences, languages, and foreign studies.
The ma~ority of candidates for certificates ta.ke their courses at various
civilian schoolsi the various universities in Paris~ the na.tiona.l school
of the department of bridges and highways, the national school for meta.I-
lurgy and mining at Nancy, the special architectural school~ the ~chool for
advanced electricity, the national school for advanced data processing and
applied ma.thematics, the national school fox advanced teleaommunications,
the institute f. or business information, the Par3.s institu't:e for political
studies, and the na.tiona.l institute for orientral Isnguages and ci.vilizations. "
So?~e students in the certificate program alsc attend military schoolat the
Cherbourg school for military applications of atomic enexgy, the ~oint
. center for operations research, and the advanced rois~ile cour~e.
Those who are participating in the diploma prr,gram on the other hand ~
generally pursue their studies at military schoole~ the achool for advanced
military engineering at Versailles, the school for advanced army electronics
at Rennes, and the advanced armamen�t coura~o Others pursue their couraes
either in university-level ~technological institutes in the provinces~ or -
the UER for lax, languages, physScal educationo or human scienaes in Paris.
All of the courses of training offered by the EriaST are reputed to be
among the best in their fields. For the certificate pcogn.*~ most of the
large engineerir.g schools used are thoae to which gr~~cluates o~ the polq-
- technical school apply. _
In spite ~~f the years of intarruption and the modest level of theoretical
knowledge that the students possess at the time that they resume their -
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studies, thoy are alniost invariably successful arui often achieve very high
- class ranki:ags, The excellent nature of the prepare.tory cour$ea~ the
- poKex~ful motivation of the officers~ and the seriouanesa of their efforts -
combine to make them achieve results that reflect honorably on the entire
officer corps.
The school directors, their deans of studies, and their prnfessors often
~oin in pre.iae for the qualities of dynamism, tenacity~ and organization
in thc~se students xhom they viex as catalysts in the excellent conduct
of their couraes.
Advanced. Military Tra.ining
Balanced tra~ining for the BTEMS [Advanced Milita.ry Training Certificate~
requires that the students acc~uire more than 3uat a high level of competency
in civilian sub3ecta during their 2 or 3 yeara. The officors also pursue
arivanced military studies.
For this reason all of the certificate progras students t~re combined with
the officers admitted thrnugh ESG coapetition into a single clasa for 1
year. In the same fashion about half of them pursue an advanced inter
service course over a 5 month period. As a source of mutual enrichment~ _
understar~ding~ and reciprocal respect, this approach provides an element
of unity in the tra.ining that is essential for those officers xho xill
perfor~ similar ~obs.
An Origina.l Approach Designed for Maximum Efficiency
Only a sma.ll percentage of the students are physically pr~sent at the
EMSST facilitiesi only about 40 out of a total enrol]aent that in recent
years has varied betxeen 300 ar~d 400 atudents. The actual direct instiuct-
ional role for the EM3ST is limited to prepare~tory trainirpg for technica.l
- candidates and txo original couraes~ armament and roalcett~~.
Fssentially a"matMculation structure~" the FMSST plays its role at a
distance. Ita principal rale is in the area of infox~aation and oMentation,
of organization and follow-up.
Inforaation is sqstematia right from the tiAe of orientation by the
captaina~ the provision of docwnents and course conferences Which
frsquex~tly lead to ind.ividual viaits to the "prospective orientation"
_ section.
Applicants are evaluated closely since resources are never in eaact
corraspondence xith needs. It is necessary to drax out the best qualities -
in the candidates and ad.apt the courae of $tudy to eaeh officer. During
the aourae of studies atudenta mainta.in regular contact xith the "scholastics"
office in a cl~~aate of mutual confidence and informality.
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Flexible and original in concept, this style of operating has been
coerpletely satisfactorq since its inception. The graSuating classee have
been outetanding and there have been very feW failures.
The reorganization of advanced military training will retain EM3ST's
mission of advancad treining and its original methode of operation. The
DEM3ST [expansion unknoxn~ xill be reaponsible for overseeing the
execution of the various contre.cta covering cartificate studiea.
The high level of instruction received in the n?ajor ahools, institutas~
and universities will more than ever reiaain.the basis for advanced military _
trainin~ for army certificate candidates.
The same spirit that drove the faunders and pioneers of the EMS5T guidea
the e.ctivities of their succ~;'ssors~ firm goals~ availability of personnel, _
flexibility in organization, and F,ersonalized training. The afficiency of
the "EMSST system" remains, i,~ie distinguishing featuz~ of its activities.
Ma~or Ro'bert Bouchard, a line officer, Kas a member of the Vercors clas$
(1960-62). A BTEMS in "human sciences" he is currently deputy chief of
the schola.stics section at the Directorste of Adva.nced Scientific and
Technical Military Training.
COPYRI~rii; 1979 - Revue des forces armeea francaises "Ariaees d'Au~ourd'hui"
CSO~ 3100
7779
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COUNTRY SECTION I~LY
OIL REFINERIES THREATENED BY NORTH AFRICA, PERSIAN GULF
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 4 Dec 79 p 11
~Text~ After the latest Arab-Israeli conflict (the Yom Kippur War),
beginning in 1973, the Italian refining industry has seen its production
shrink considerably, From the highest peak reached of 132 million tons
of oil refined in 1973, there has been in fact a decline to 102 million
tons in 1975. At best, we will have to wait until 1985 to see once again
the na~ional refining industry reach the production levels of 1973 and
remain at that level for the rest of the 1980s. -
That is what Ernesto Natham of Agip affirmed when he presented his report
during the conference on "Re~fining in the Eighties," which FAST (the
Federation of Scientific and Technological Associations) organiz~d in
Milan, in collaboration with Agip and Italian Esso, under the patronage
of the Ministry of Industry.
It is proposed to exami.ne a situation which is very complex, in which--as
Natham kept emphasizing--the remarkable refining capacity developed in
Italy before the latest Arab-Israeli conflict has all of a sudden become
severely unbalanced with respect to domestic consumption and to export
trends. It suffices to note that utilization of the plants fell from 78
percent in 1973 to 58 percent in 1975,
Nevertheless, the structural orientation o� the demand for petroleum products
anticipates, for the future, with respect to 1978, a generally constant demand
for light distilled products; an increased demand for medium distilled -
products (diesel fuel) and a decrease in demand for fuel oil. During the
1980s, these variations will tend to become greater in the presence of,
among other things, an expansion of the diesel fuel market, to say n4thing .
of a progressive substitution o� fuel oil by other sources of energy developed
in the meantime,
On the other hand, there still remain many questions concerning the future of
the Italian refining industry in the 1980s. First of all, we must consider
the fact that the development of the demand for oil will be held down during
the next few yearso Accordi.ng to the various forecasts advanced up to now,
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in 1985 domestic demand will be held to between 106 a5dt1~0~ percent compared
which corresponds to an average annual increase of 1.
to 1978. This means, among other things, that even the long-term pros~ects
for improvement in the rate of utilization o:C the Italian refining plants
are not positive.
But another fact wi11 have noticeable repercussions over the next few years,
especially in the Mediterranean area: considerable masses of semifinished
_ and finished products wi.ll arrive from the oi1-producing countries. Within
a little more than a year there wi.ll be placed in operation in Skidka
(Algeria) the first of the large refineries to be built for Che export
market, which will be followed by others in North Africa and on the Persian
Gulf: it is estimated that the capacity for refining in these areas--
according to whati Emilio Grassili of Italian Esso stated in his report~-will
go from the current 200 million tons to 350 caillion in 1985.
The greater part of the product which will be produced at these refineries is
to be sold in ma.rkets for local consumption, but a considerable share is also
intended for export: it is estimated that in 1985 a volume on the order of
50 to 60 million tons of semifinished and finished products will be devoCed
to exports. ~
To overcome these characteristics of rigidity and vulnerability, one can
single out--according to Grassili--a few lines of orientacion: 1) an energy
- conservation poZicy must become a concrete fact at all levels; 2).the
objective of substituting other energy sources for oil must be made concrete
by suitable actions; in particular, the substitution of fuel oil by coal
burned at ENEL ~National Electric Power Company~ power plants can make a
contribution in�the medium term, if the restrictions represented by the .
lack of infrastructures and by ecologiuctsPusedeas fuelcarergradually toebe
come quickly; 3) if the petroleum prod
replaced by nonpetroleum energy (like coal or nuclear energy) the refining
system must constantly orient itself toward plants for complex refining,
plants, that is, capable of increasing the returns in valuable products.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
8956
CSO: 3104
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- COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
' BRIEFS
FAL GROWTH--Certain sectors do not hide the concern that they have over
the growth of the Andalusian Liberation Front (FAL). This extrenne left ~
organization has maintained contacts with the practically disbanded GRAPO
groups. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Dec 79 p 5]
CSO: 3f~10
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