JPRS ID: 8763 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8~63
14 November 1979
West Euro e Re ort
p p
cFOUO ~oi7s~
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- JPRS L/8763
14 November 1979 -
WEST El1ROPE REPORT ~
(FOUO 60/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
EUROPEAN PARI,IAMENT
. FRANCE
_ Nation's Parties Debate European Defense in Strasbourg _
~ (Michel Chamard; VAI,EURS ACTUELLES, 1 Oct 79) 1 ~
COUNTRY SECTION _
.
- FRANCE
~ Paecht Report on Military Arouses Indignation `
(Francois d'Orcival; VAI~EURS ACTUELLES, 8 Sep 79) 4
- Police Uniori President Interviewed
(Henri Buch Interview; Pp.RIS MATCH, 19 Oct 79) 8 ~
Inside View of Problems of Corrmiunist Publisher Noted
- (L'EXPANSION, 19 Oct 79) 10 ~ .
Elements of Maritime Strategy Outlined -
(Olivier Sevaistre; STRATEGIQUE, 3~79) 11
ITALY
-
Cra.~ci Poised To Provoke Government Crisis in January ~
(Zuca Guirato; LA STAMP,A, 25 Oct 79) 30
Barbieri Cormnents on Ponomarev's 'Burial' of Eurocommunism
(~ane Baxbieri; LA STAMPA, 19 Oct 79) 32
, Brezhnev Seizes Initiative for Monolithic ~as~; Bloc =
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 27 Oct 35
� ' a - ~III - WE - 150 FOUO)
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- CONTENTS (Continued) Page
MAZTA
' Interview With Pr anier Mintoff on Foreign Policy
(Dom Mintoff Interview; CORRIERE DELLA SF,R,A,
18 Oct 79) ..................e...................... 38
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Fg~J~
NATION'S P4RTIES DEBATE EUROPEAN DEFENSE IN STRASBOURG
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 1 Oct 79 pp 28-29
[Article by Michel Chamard: "Traps in Strasbourg"]
[Text] "People are going to start thinking we paid to have things happen
this way," exclaimed an openly jubilant Christian Poncelet, RPR [Rally for
_ the Republic] senator from the Vosges, in the lobby of Strasbourg's Palais
des Nations last week.
Yet the European Democrats of Progxess--DEP, a grouping of the RPR and its
- Irish, Danish, and Scottish allies--had been defeated. They had wanted to
prevent ~.ebate on the European arms industry, deeming that this sub~ect did
ilbt fa11 within the province of the European Parliament. They obtained
only 87 votes out of 410. So the debate took place on Tuesday 25 September.
- "Yes," Michel Debre told me, "but it did confirm our fears expressed during
the European election campaign. The European Parliament is seeking every
_ opportunity to impinge on the powers of the sovereign states."
Former Belgian prime minister Leo Tindemans, leader of the Christian Democrats
and advocate of a federal Europe, had explained to me back in July that it
was not necessary to change a single comma in the Treaty of Rome to increase
the European Parliament's competence. "If the European Council can meet
tomorrow and discuss world politics, who can possibly prevent the European
_ Parliament, the product of direct elections,from taking up the same theme
and holding a debate on the question?"
The debate on the arms issue did, however, cause some uneasiness within various
political groups.
~
On Monday 24 September, there were three proposed resolutions on the desk of
the Parliament's president, Simone Veil. One was from the RPR and its allies, -
= another from French socialists and British Laborites, and the third from
_ , French communists. All three resolutions requested that the Parliament declare
itself incompetent to det~ate the question proposed by a British Conservative,
Mr Fergusson, and a German Christian Democrat, Mr Von Hassel, namely "the
_ community program relative to the arms industry," in conjunction with NATO.
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A single vote was taken on all three motions. Only 87 members voted in
- favor of disallowing the debate: the 22 D~P members, 2I French socialista,
19 French communists, and the British Laborites. On the other hand, the
liberals, Christia:! Democrats, German socialists, and Italian commun~sts
voted against this disallowance.
Consequently the debate opened at 1700 the next day, 25 September. The -
discussion shifted very quickly from the arms industry question to the issiie
of European defense for which the Treaty of Rome makes no provision. Pierre
Messmer, speaking for the DEP, and Georges Marchais, �or the French communists,
both protested. German and French socialists agreed on a compromise: Glinne,
the group's Belgian chairman, did not question the usefulness of such a -
debate, but considered it premature.
All things cotisidered, the Giscardian members were the most uncomfortable.
Dissension broke out among them prior to the voting on M~ndav. Marcel
Poniatowski recommended abstention of the 26 Giscardian members, a mi~:ture
of liberals and Christian Democrats, in order to avaid falling into the
trap. The CDS [Social Democrats Center] indignantly refused. The Giscardians
then voted against disallowing the debate. Only Edgar Faure and Andre
Rossi voted for disallowance.
A total of some 60 Frenchmen out of 84 thus found themselves united in this
affair, with no regard for party labels. A sort of "joint committee" like
the one Giscard d'E~taing had hoped for during the election campaign. Para-
doxically enough, this commzttee or group was formed without the participa-
tion of the Giscardian members.
"This will cause the Europeanizers to be cautious," a satisfied Michel Debre ~
told me.
Aware of what was happening, Leo Tindemans remarked: "We had the rlght to
discuss the arms industry question. After all, at the Helsinki Conference,
- Aldo Moro was empowered to speak about disarmament in the name of the Nine.
- But we were not smart in speaking about defense. It is not within the
Parliament's competence."
- Chirac`s supporters were somewhat vexed by the flashy recovery made by the
communists. On 26 September, some 100 newsmen from all countries crowded
into the Palais de Nations' small conference room for a press conference by
Georges Marchais.
The PCF's secretary general was in great form. He spoke derisively of
- the "lords and bankers of the Conservative group," denounced the opportunity
missed by the socialists to achieve iuiity at the rank-and-file level during '
a debate on the "lobster war," and found Parisian accents to speak about the
land and the people of France.
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Messmer, however, had set a new trap on the 26th by requesting a vote on a
- motion ~eclaring the Parliament to be incompetent in defenae mattera.
_ Re~ecting the�,motion would be tantamount to giving one's implicit support
- to an extension of the Parliament's powers, in defiance of the Treaty of ~
~ Rome. The trap never worked, however, because the motion was referred to
committee, in other wordQ, buried and forgotten. '
"We are still a very small minority," Debre explained. "We can only react
by means of such backfires."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "ValEUrs actuelles"
8041
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COUNTRY SECTZON FRANCE
PAECHT REPORT ON MILITARY AROUSES INDIGNATION '
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 8 Sep 79 pp 36-38
[Article by Francois d'Orcival: "Dr Paecht's Check-Up"}
[TextJ Two armored divisions, 900 armored combat vehicles, 17,000 men.
On Wednesday, the chief of s~ate witnessed one phase of the broadest land
army exercise ever organized on free soil.
The night before, the parliamentary session in the National Assembly began
with this question: "Do we want ill-adapted traditional defense or
operational modern defense?" The discussion had to do with the military
- planning law approved in 1976 for five years, with the parliament being
called upon to exami.n~ the first three years of its implementation.
The deputy who raised the question was up to that time an unknown. A doctor
from V~r who dresses discreetly an3 speaks in a measured tone, he was
- elected last year for the first time on the UDF [French Democratic UnionJ
ticket and he discovered the parliament by becoming secretary of the defense
commission. He. is .Arthur Paecht, deputy from Toulon, educational director
on the Faculty of Medicine in Marseilles. Forty-nine years of age, he has
_ no experience in Paris politics, no professional savoir-faire, but he has
a definite taste for research and diagnosis.
In mid-September, the government sent to the parliament a report on the
implementation of the planning law. This document could be summarized in
two words: "Mission accomplished."
Dr Paecht did not quite share their view. He worked for six months,
meeting with military commanders, high officials in the Ministry of Defense
and the minister himself, diplomats and armaments industrialists. He even
had an audience with the president of the republic in Bregancon (with two
other deputies for the region) in August. And, in his dissenting report
dated 2 October he concluded coldly: "The parlianent has an incomplete,
inconsistent and excessively optimistic understanding of the planning law.
It is in danger of remaining unaware and misunderstanding the real st4te
- of the armed forces, which is very serious in itself."
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In 180 pages crowded with figures and tables, Dr Paecht listed the delays,
the lack of synchronization, the decline and the deflection of achievement
in relation to the commitment made in 1976. And, he added, in connection with
our nuclear forces, "The figures do not reflect the political will expressed."
Such a statement is sacrilege, the more so coming from an elected UDF
representative. Even before being distributed to the deputies, his report
irritated the Elysee Palace, aroused the anger of the minister of defense,
Mr Bourges, and made waves within the parliamentary groups supporting the
president. Rumors circulated, there was talk of bumbling and tactlessness,
= ironical comments. But all this was behind the scenes.
~ On 2 October, when the parliament resumed its session, Mr Paecht was the
first UDF speaker. His group had given hlm 30 minutes. He spoke immediately
af ter the minister of defense. Then the quarrel erupted in public.
Mr Paecht had not been speaking f our minutea when the min ister interrupted
him. He was to do so 10 times, even reproaching him by name.
"You should learn to handle figures," said Mr Bourges.
"is this the place to give me lessons?" replied Mr Paecht, who went on to
insist that there is a disparity between the official statements and the
budget reality. '
"A serious charge!" exclaimed Mr Bourges. ~
"You accuse me of falsifying the f igures. Why would I have done so? I have
used the documents you gave to me and have reached different conclusions,
that is all."
"Quote the f igures I gave you," challenged Mr Bourges.
"We are afloat with figures," the deputy responded.
"I am afloat with nothing," answered the minister.
The battle of the figures was in effect the heart of the discussion. The .
planning law was designed to correct and increase military credit: This
was done.
- But the law established a rate at which the credit would increase in
relation to the budget. The figure for 1982 was to total 20 percent.
Meanwhile, Mr Bourges has changed one parameter. He now prefers, over the
correlation with the state budget he defended in 1976, one pegged to the
gross national business product ("sum of the value added f or all branches
= of production"), which is not known with accuracy until f our years after
the year in question.
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"A laughable index," said Mr Chevenement, a socialist.
In brief, the 1976 law called for the military budget to come to 18.5
percent of the state budget in 1979; it will remain at 16.9 percent in
1980. ~
Behind this battle of percentages lies the reality of the credit allocated
to the armed branches.
_ An initial disparity was due to the armed forces treasury "gap" in 1976.
It came to 4 billion francs; 1.5 billion had been allocated by the budget
collectives, but the branches had to make up the rest from economy.
Additionally, they had to bear costs of 600 million in 1978 for the armed -
intervention in Chad, Zaire, Lebanon and Mauritania. Finally, 400 million
in credit allocated for the sixth nuclear submarine was and continues to
be drained into the budget for other aew naval construction not initially
envisaged.
Dr Paecht estimated the franc shortage based on the plan authorizations
(future credit commitments) at 8.6 billion francs for the three branches:
- 5 billion for the air force, 2 for the land army and the balance for the
navy.
"It is the plan authorizations which paint the picture of the future,"
- Mr Bourges had told the parliament.
The difficulty in meeting the goals can be seen in several examples.
For example, for the air force: "The maintenance of a fleet of 450 comba~.
_ aircraft requires the replacement of about 35 planes every year," the
Paecht report says (because of aging of the aircraft and accidents, an
average of 12 per year). Thirty planes were ordered in 1977, 33 in 1978,
and 27 in 1979. Thus ~he gap, conf irmed by engine orders.
The same lag is true of the navy. "In order to maintain the current
equipment, 12,000 tons would have to be built each year. Examining the
first three years of implementation of the law, the tonnage built each
year (excluding strategic submarines) comes to 7,300 tons." Mr Bourges
corrected the figure to 8,000 tons. The def icit would still remain 4,000
= tons.
~nd this while the increase in weapons production credit is greater for the
classic forces than for nuclear weapons: 11.8 percent more for nuclear,
in 1980, as compared to 22.7 percent for classic. "High officials in our
defense system have told us that in 1981 and 1982 nuclear expenditures
would decrease, the report says. "I don't see how one can say that,"
Mr Giscard d'~staing replied drily on Wednesday,
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~ Nonetheless, Dr Paecht's comment was as follows: "The M4 nuclear missile
program (multiple warhead) shows indisputable progress in relation to the
earlier system: it is a technological leap. We will have the M4 in 1985.
But the 1985 M4 will not be comparable to the American weapons which will
come out at that same time. Where we are best situated, we are matching
what the Americans did 10 years ago."
"Let us have a dynamic policy in the nuclear weapons sector," proposes
Dr Paecht. He says: -
"Concerning military problems, it is necessary to reason in terms of
op~ra tional efficiency. Too frequently we see economic, financial, social
and often even corporatist concerns prevail over the concept of defense.
It must be realized that in the rapid and even lightning-like movement of
the military sector, a lag or stagnation can lead to our destruction."
Mr Bourges sees neither a lag nor stagnation. He maintains:
"The 1980 budget is the f ifth I have ~roposed. For me it is a fifth source
of satisfaction."
General Bigeard drew laughter when he made this comment to him Tuesday:
_ "Bravo, Mr Minister! It is really good of you to reassure us."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Valeurs actuelles10
5157
CSO: 3100 '
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
POLICE UNION PRESIDENT INTERVIEPVED
- Paris PARIS MATCH in Frencfi 19 Oct 79 p 51
_ [Interview of Henri Buc}i, president of tfie Autonomous Federation of Police
Unions by Plorence Portes: ""Tell Us, Henri Such"; date and place not given] -
[Text] [Question] How are the police doing in 1979?
[Answer~ We have several reasons to tie angry. For years now, our most essential
demands have not been met, and tfie 1980 austerity budget for the national police -
does not hold fortfi much hope that we will be able to protect tlie poople more ~
effectively. Besides, we have found that the gendarmery budget was favored.
It is clear to us that a police force under military law that is silent and
sabmissive is becoming increasingly privileged, to the detriment,Af a civilian
police force.
[Question] What are your main grievances?
[AnswerJ The gradual touch-up reform imposed by Poniatowski in 1976-77 has -
only worsened the rivalries between policemen and increased divisions within
*he police force. We fir.d that the officer corps has been set adrift legally
and functionally. The advancement of the corps in general has gone from a
critical to an alarming condition. The investigators are at the end of their
rope. The administrators are watching a whol.e series of ineasures being taken
and they are being left out. All tfie inspectors are beginning to grumble, and
rightly so. Everything has been going against what we want: a modern, democratic
' police force serving everyone.
[Question~ I suppose you have talked to your cabinet minister, Christian Bonnet,
about it?
[~nswer] Of course we have had the opportunity to meet with the minister of the -
interior and pass on to him all our demands, but my impression is that despite
his obvious good will he does not have the last word and cannot provide the
national police with either the means to improve the security of the population
or the means to meet the most urgent needs of the staff that he heads.
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[Question] Wtio does have the last word?
[AnswerJ Logically, he would. But we wonder, Is it Matignon or the ~.:lysee?
[Questiun] What is tlie status of the "police forces' war"?
[Answer] It has always existed. It will continue as long as th ey keep
forming those anti-everything brigades that are really anti-nothing and _
only reduce efficiency in the long run.
[Question] Why do you tfiink Mesrine fiasn't been arrested yet?
- [Answer] He's been made into a comic-strip fi ero until somebody decides
it's to his advantage to put a stop to Mesrine's a~tivities,
[Question] Do you mean they could arrest fi im if they wanted to? You've ~
got to be kidding!
jAnswer] Ask the minister of the interior or tfie minister of justice.
[Question] The recent changes at the top of the Paris police have not been
to everyone's taste. How do you feel abou~ it?
- [AnswerJ After a seri.es of incidents the minister of the Interior may have
decided to shape things up and for once to change the unw.ritten rule that
- at the firemen's ball tfie same people always dance and the flunkies drink. -
But we are keeping a~close watch on tfie results o�"these changes, because
it may be that they are only one of the effects of the power struggle between -
the president of the Republic and the mayor of Paris.
[Question] Will you continue to fight the law allowing fines to be collected
on the spot?
_ [Answer] We have always shown our hostility to seeing policemen being changed
into schoolmasters, and our position has met with wide agreement in public opinion.
Now it is up to the members of Parliament to shoulder their responsibilities.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 par COGEDIPRESSE SA
- 8782 �
CSO: 3100
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COUNTF.Y SECTI^*? FRANCE
" INSrDE VIEW OF PROBLENiS OF COMMUNIST PUBLISHER NOTED
Paris L'EXPANSION in French 19 Oct 79 pp 37, 39
[TextJ The LDC [Livre Club Diderot-Diderot Book Club], specializing in
the sale of countless books by [Louis] Aragon, is one of the business
affairs that feeds the c~ffers of the PCF. Lean Larede and Jean-Claude
Blanchet tell in their book how for 6 years they used their energy as
communist militants and their enthusiasm as dynamic young go-getters
while working for the LCD.
The incompetence of the top men, personal bickering, double bookkeeping,
exploitation of the salaried staff and the short shrift given the trade-
unionists, all the ingredients of a backward business, are attributable
to the LCD. And, as a"bonus," there was always, in the background the
stifling atmosphere of the PCF. The picture is so dismal and the accusa-
tions so strong that one can hardly believe that the authors, fired by the
LC~ in 1978 for failure tu conform, still have their PCF [membership] cards.
Out-and-out anticommunists could not have done better. As an attempt to
demythologize, this book reminds one of [the book] RUE DU PROLETAIRE ROUGE -
[Street of the Red Proletarian] by Jean and Nina Kehayen; unfortunately,
it has a less flowing style and less color in the telling. Read it, none- -
~ theless, if only to learn a little more about the hidden aspects of the
PCF. (?his book has 316 pages, costs 45 francs and is published by Fayard.)
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Groupe Expansion S.A.
- CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
ELEMENTS OF MA,RITIME STRATEGY OU'~LINED
Paris STRATEGIQUE in French 3-79 pp 7-28 -
[Article by RAdm Olivier Sevaistre: "Elements for a Maritime Strategy"]
[TextJ Ma,r3time Strategy
Everybody u~ss the term strategy and we no lenger really know what exactly
_ it means. For civ~.lians and for the military, this generally involves a
rationalization of action in a conflict among several expressions of will
- and determinati~n. The civilian aspect against its components, the mili-
tary aspect against the enemy--both of them indeed adopt a series of co-
ordinated decisivns deriving from each other so as to attain an ob~ective
which itself iy selected as a function of a sysfiem of values, a policy.
The company manager, who has charted a strategy for himself, implements -
- it when he thinks the time is right in a context which he knows well or
which he thiaks he knows well. The military man applies his strategy as
= of a certain moment at which he is no longer in control, under circum-
stances which he cannot determine in advance. No tricks can remove this
difference--neither those strategic models which are a simplification of
- possible or probably mechanisms of triggering events, nor the scenarios
: which are working assumptions on the conditions for triggering those mech- -
anisms. Models and scenarios are very useful in testing decision-~making
systems and setting up exercises in which the command organization is put
to the tESt--but they cannot have any othe~ purposes. The military man -
- thus is confroated with a world of unknowns. He normally knows only
- "potential" enemies. In peacetime, he has to drafC a strategic doctine.
He must have a groupin.g of basic principles and procedures which will -
guide his action the day a crisis or a war breaks out or at least he must
have a realistic commitment of his forces.
The government's military policy consists in spelling out the ob~ectives
which it intends to assign to its forces, in peace or war, i.n adopting
the strategic doctrine which will guide their possible action, and in
- providing the necessary resources. Military strategy will then be the
_ conduct of war in the military domain. Maritime strategy, within military
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strategy, confirm~ the condiict of operations in m$ritime space; in other
words, the de~inition of missi.oas and tasks in this space, the constitu-
tion of Porces a~signed to them, their evolution in fihe course of opera- ~
tions, and the management of the potential. Maritime tactics is the art
. of leading the forces charged witY~ nperations in maritime space. While
operations are generally conducted from land, the forces involved here
are led on the sea by authorities on the spot where the action is.
Maritime Space
Strategic Analysis of Ma.ritime Environment
Maritime strategy is rather a latecomer in military thinki.ng. It is not
sure that it has really won its rightful place in certain countries with
a strong continental outlook, such as France. The sailor, an outsider,
is an unknown. The military danger has come from the East far too often. -
We have forgotten what we lost in maritime wars. The specialists have
their share of responsibility for this since they often had violent quar- -
- rels amoag each other, especially in the case of the Anglo-Saxons, although
this had profound repercussions in France.
Different tendencies have always manifested themselves. First of all -
there are those who think in terms of materiel, a natural tendency in
the sailor and aviator; for them, the tool, the ship or the aircraft,
_ creates the fighting unit, ahead of the men who use itl. After the
: episode of the "Young School" of Admiral Aube, who believed that he -
could solve ever~thing with just a few torpedo-boats and coastguard ves-
sels, a11 navies were dominated unt~I 1939 by gun-boats; after that they
were dominated by naval aviators. Today, the submariners are in the lead.
Among the all-out supporters of the preeminence of materiel, we might also
mention aviators such as Trenchard and Mitchell and certain exclusive sup-
porters of nucZear weapans. Now, while materiel is extremely 3mportant,
it does not solve all strategic problems; it was never anything more than
_ a means and any exclusive system is bad in an area that is wide open and
~ that demands a highly varied panoply. -
Other maritime strategies are based on history and the father of the his-
torical school is Mahan, followed by disciples such as the Britons Colomb,
Corbett, and Roskill, and the French Darrieus, Daveiuy, and Castex. This
school seeks in the past that which may appear i.n terms of constant princi-
ples and valid lessons for the fut;s:re; it tries to single oufi that which
- was only occasional and transitory and it separafies it from that w~ich may
be permanent. Sensitive to the various forms of wartime action and war
- itself, to its political and legal aspects, it finds it difficult to fore-
_ see the changes caused by a revolutionary weapons system, such as the
nuclear weapons system, for example2.
In the wake of the historians, we have the geographers, with the men of
_ geopolitics and geostrafiegy in the first line. Discredited by the Nazi
12
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excesses, the ~atter is nevertheless a form o~ analysis which retains its
value 3,f 3t manages to avoid assigning an almost mythical importar~ce to
- certain places or notions such as the "heartland" of Mackinder3. Another, _
more mo~erate and more pragmatic school of geography, inspired by Fren.ch-
men such as Vida1-Lablache and Brunhes, leads us to Castex. While the
school of geostrategy quite correctly accentuates the internal structure
of states and their relative positions, the moderate geographers study
the influence of the physical framework upon the action of miZitary forces
in order to derive rules of conduct for operations from that.
Geographers and historians are persuaded to make their considerations con-
verge upon the economy. Mahan emphasized the importance of maritime trade.
= Castex prepared a synthesis of several currents, which is probably due to
his own genius. The economists ~mphasize the phenomena of blockades but -
they have a tendency to allow the economic factors to take their course
k~ith the very laudable intention of preventing human losses. These phen-
= omena unfortunately have very slow effects. A dangerous military ass-
_ 3vity might result from that and it mi;ght leave the enemy the leisure to
reverse the situation by an action that is all the more abrupt since he
knows that time is against him.
Mariti.me strategy thus gladly gets out of the strictly militsry domain. -
Geography likewise remains an incomparable tool in strategic analysis
which enables us to put everything in its place and to perform the syn-
thesis. Castex found that "geography intervenes in varying degrees, at -
~varying stages, on varying scales. For small and medium units, it is the
'terrain' whose in�luence hardly goes beyond the tactical domain. For the
man who is in charge of operations in a certain theater, this is already -
a much vaster geography to handle. Finally, when we want to come up with
~ a genexal situation estimate of the peoples on the planet, from many dif-
ferent viewpoints, we must envisage what is called 'grand geography,' -
European, oceanic, and even world geography, because it is the only one -
that enables us to judge how certain groupings are put together and what -
the position deriving from that happens to be regarding the various strat-
egies involved, not only in terms of military, land, maritime, and air
strategies as such, but also i.n terms of political strategy, economic
strategy, moral strategy, etc."4.
France is only too familiar with the point Castex is trying to make. Start-
~ ing with the terrain compartment where he was born in order then to con-
sider the national "pressure,~' he often finds it difficult to go f~~�ther -
and r_o examine the world at large. But, in our time, problems become
worldwide; France runs the risk of having a shortage of domestic fuel
because there happens to be a revolution in Iran. I thus propose to
_ examine maritisne strategy on a worldwide scale with the sez4 constituting
an environment, such as we shall see, one of the essential links between
most of the nations.
- 13
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_ Geostrate,gi,c AnalyS~,a
An analy~is of the international s:ttuation first of all requires a critique ~
of the instruments of representing and illustrating the earth. 't'he Mercator
pro~ection puts the polea somewhere in infinity and our planispheres have
accustomed us fio look upon our planet as a cylinder. The manor in which
that cylinder is cut up and flattened out ia in itself deceptive; it drops
an ocean (Figure 1a) or it gives another one an exaggerated place (Figure lb).
We must therefoxe use rhe appropriate maps without forgetting the type of
distortion which each of them brings us. A polar pro3ection is particularly
suitable for our purpose here because most of the dry land is in the North-
ern Hemisphere (Figure 2).
Regardless o~ the sys~em used, we find that the earth is a blue-water
planet: Seventy-one percent of its surface are covered by the ocean. The
twenty-nine percent of dryland are surrounded by water. MacKinder's
_ "World Isl.and" made up of Eurasia and Africa, is a bloc c~t by two mari- -
_ time penetration areas, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, which ~oin. _
The Americas, two big islands linked by an umbilical cord, constitute a bar-
rier from the 55th parallel South all the way to the Arctic polar regions.
The latter links North America and Eurasia through an area that cannot be
negotiated on the surface and transformed two big oceans i.nto dead-end
streets. But the latter co~anunicate with a third one through a ring-
shaped maritime area which isolates the Antarctic Continent. The rest
of the world is made up of island groups the most remarkable among which
is made up of the countless islands of Southeast Asia, at once a bridge
befiween the continent and the last of the big islands, Australia, and a
barriex between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.
The woxld island does not contain any heartland whose possession supposedly
- guarantees domination of the entire continental space and, consequen~ly,
o~ the world. It is too vast to be occupied by a single nation. Two
countries occupy the major portion of its surface but the Soviet Union,
the tirst country in the world in terms of tY:e length of its coastlines
(24,000 nautical miles) can hardly use them because they are almost all
located in Arctic space. China, the tenth country in terms of the length
of its coastlines, is 104th by virtue of the ratio between this length and
- its total surface5. These two nations therefore by nature are continental
powers accus~omed to living by themselves, with immense land frontiers
whose frailt;~ has always given them a very strong feeling of insecurity.
Outside the world 3slands, the maritime powers use the~sea for a policy
which covers.the glahe, benef itting from the security which fihey derive
from the absence of land frontiers. The principal power among these mari-~
ti.me powers, the Unified States, togefiher with Canada occupies an island
having the dimensions of a continent.
1!~
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- 1--equator.
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' [Figure 2]. The "World Islands." Key: 1--Pacific Ocean; 2-South America;
3--North Amexica; 4--Australia; S--Atlantic Ocean; 6--Asia; 7--Africa; 8--
_ Indian Ocean; 9--areas frequented by ships. From Bordas Atlas.
y The rest of Eurasia is divided up among numerous states, a considerable -
_ number of whorn occupy peninsulas or the coasta'1 edge of the world islands,
They form what Spykman calls the "rimland" and they are the stakes in the
rivalry among the big continental powers and the maritime power. The for- _
_ mer can use them as base for an offensive designed to wrest use of the sea
from the latter and the latter can use them as bridgeheads for conquering
- continental space. Islands and island groups thus consitute as many plat-
_ ~orms for either side. The most uncomfortable situation is the situation
- o~ counrries having both a continental facade and a maritime facade. Tey
are *_~:ansformed into "islands" if they have nuclear weapons which "'santuar-
ize" their territory, thus reducing their strategic problem to facts close
to those of the island powers. These nuclear arms block major conflicts
and aggressiveness between nations is shifted into the area of indirect
strategies where oceans are a preferred place.
Between these two extremes, the strictly continental powers, on the one
hand, and the strictly maritime powers, on the other hand, there are
highly diversified situations. Each country is dominant either in a mari-
time or a continental manner. A fundamental dissymetry will always char-
acter3ze these two types of nations. If we look at contentional armament,
_ the continental nation would have to be invaded in order to be defeated
and one can hardly reach it by sea, except with nuclear weapons s~stems.
By acquiring a certain maritime capacity, it can on t:~e other hand weaken ~
or ruin the powers that depend on the sea for their economic or political
life. _
Strategic Zones and Spaces
On a worldwide scale, zones having strategic unity are those involving the
three major oceans (Figure 3). ~ao others, the polar spaces, are practi-
ca11y neutralized by their weather conditions and, as far as the Antarctic
is concerned, by its geographic location and international agreement.
~ 17 -
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