JPRS ID: 9057 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040050-0
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 50
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ 1980 ~ ~ 1 OF 1
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JPRS L/8881
24 January 1980
West Eu~ro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 4/SO)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
JPRS pu'~lications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also fro~n news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and -
other ~haracteristics retained. -
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or followirg the
last Line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
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mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- _
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
_ The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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For further information on report content
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JPRS L/8881
24 January 1980
- WEST EUROPE REPO RT
(FOUO 4/80) ~
CONTENTS PAGE
COUNTRY SECTION
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Cormnentary on Ariane Flight, Ground Test Successes
(AIR & COSMOS, 3 Nov 79) 1
CANADA~
. -
Corrmiunist Leader Comments on Policy, United States
(Alberto Rabilotta; PREI,A, 13 Jan 80)
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY -
Industry Leader von Amerongen: Aid United States Against Iran
(Otto Wolff von Amerongen Interview; STERN, 6 Dec 79) 6
- Schmidt Acts To Improve Flight Safety Over FRG
(Harry Ilrewes; STERN, 6 Dec 79) 9
FD~~s Hirsch Urges Land Electoral Pact ti!ith CDU
(Alfred Welti; STERN, 6 Dec 79) 11
Metalworkers Union Prepaxes for Strike Action
(Ilieter Straubert, Heiko Tornow; STERN, 6 Dec 79) 13
FRANCE ~
Commentaxy on U.S. Policy Toward Islam, Iran
(Editorial, Jean Daniel; LE NOUVEI, OBSERVATEUR,
26 Nov 79) 16
PCF Relations TnTith Soviet, International Corrmiunism
(Branko Lazitclz;, Z'EXPRESS! 1 Dec 79.) 19
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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CO?VTENTS (Continued) Page
Airbus Industry Developments Await 1980 Decision
- (AIR & COSMOS, 17 Nov 79) 21
ITALY
U.S. Base in La Maddalena Creating Problems for Populace
(Mario Guerrini; LA STAMPA, 13 Dec 79) 24
Armored Units Proposed for Defense Modernization
(RIVISTA MILITARE, various dates) 26
Tactical Utilization, Deployment, Organization,
by Sandro Azais
Need for Modernization, by Salvatore Sabatino
Status of Bilateral Trade Relations With Albania
(IL SOLE-2L~ ORE, 13 Dec 79) 1~6
. Venezuela To Supply 5 to 10 Million Tons of Crude Oil in 1980
(LA STAMPA, 13 Dec 79) 1~7 ~
SPAIN
PM Suaxez Reportedly Will Not Ma,ke Cabinet Changes -
(Jose Oneto; CAI~IO 16, 13 Dec 79) 50
Some UCD Factions Reportedly I,ooking for New Leadership
(CAM3I0 15, 16 Dec ?9) 52
PSOE 'Moderates~ Said To Control Provincial Organs
(CAMBIO 16, 23 Dec 79) >~t
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COUNTRY SECTION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
COMMENTARY ON ARIANE FLIGHT, GROUND TEST SUCCESSES
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 3 Nov 79 pp 37,40
~Article by K.I.: "'Ariadne's* Clew "'1
~Text~ In the few weeks since the first launching of Ariane
' at the Guyanese Space Center, the press commentaries in the
wake of this event have, in general, been taking on an in-
creasingly optimistic tone that is disturbing to the experts.
We have received, from an expert witli lonq experience in this �
~ field, a very interesting communication that we feel should
be brought to the attention of our readers.
Every technological realization of any significant complexity requires very
extensive testing in the course of its development. The final conPigura-
tion of the product of this development cannot be determined until it has
gone through this phase of testing and debuqging. No matter how extensive
accumulated knowledge may be in advanced technological fields, this method
of "trial and error" remains indispensable. The product of advanced tech-
nology that can be designed entirely "on paper" simply does not exist.
This is especially true of the aeronautical and space technologies. ~
~
The development of an airplane involves hundreds of hours of flight testing
to explore its actual flight environment, and to make final adjustments to
its systems and quite often to its basic design.
These flight tests proceed in successive stages of added complexi~y under
increasingly difficult conditions, until the entire environment has been
~ covered and a11 systems are operationally perfect.
With rockets, it is different. Only their ground tests can be conducted in
successive stages, gradually bringing the different systems under progres-
sively more complex conditions. Their flight tests, their launchings,
* Translator's note: King Minos's daughter in Greek legend: Ariane in
French, Ariadne in English.
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however, are "all or nothing" s;tuations insofar as concerns time and space
constraints on the conduct of the tests: real time, total environment, and
all systems functioning simultaneously.
The entire study of performance under actual fliqht conditions that is
divideci into progressive stages over hundreds of flight hours in arciving
. at the final design of an airplane is compressed into a few minutes in the
case of r xkets, under "roll call," that is, under full operational, condi-
tions, there being no possibility of progressively phasing them in. Wk~ereas
in the case of a plane a test flight can be interrupted at will in the
event of a malfunction, and resumed later, a malfunction or technical
deviation durinq the flight testing of a rocket must be resolved by an -
interruption having all the earmarks of a setback. The technica]_ result in
both cases is nevertheless the same: detection (by telemeteriny) of a mal-
function or of a technical deviation on the basis of whic'r, 1 corrective
change can be applied to further the final design process.
It follows that a substantial number of launchings should be necessary to
"flight test" rockets, the number of interrupted flights (setbacks, accord-
ing to the press) being high at the start of this phase of the design pro-
cess and tapering off as final design is approached. And the larger, that
is, the more complex, the rocket, the larger will be the number of such
interrupted flights. In the case of giant rockets like the Ariane, this
~pproach is not feasible because of the high cost of a launching. This is
why ground tests, leading to a final "evaluation," are exploited to the
~itmost, using flight simulation techniques as much as possible. Such simu-
lation, however, can never be more than an approximation, and even then, of
known and predictable environmental conditions. The exploration of actual
environmental conditions and their unpredictable effects (unpredictable by
definition, hence not simulatable) remains necessarily a function of flight
tests.
The entire problem of the rocket design process boils down to this dilemma:
whereas the very "all or nothing" nature of the testing process calls for
a significant number of test flights, their high cost compels compression
of that number down to a very few launchings. ~
The design task is excruciatingly difficult even when it includes accep-
tance of a ~ertain number of "setbacks" as normal (on the assumption that
the technical objective, namely, identification of the fault. and its cor-
rection, will be achieved for each launching). It becomes even more taxing
if the allowable number of final-design flight tests is fixed in advance.
Strictly speaking, this number should be continually revised, based ~n the
actual results of each flight, and their scheduling also revised in accord-
ance with actual progress of the tests.
_ All.of this is evident and well known. And yet...a reading of the articles
and co~rnnentaries that preceded the first of the four (only) Ariane flight
tests dces not leave one with this impression. Tones make music. And the
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tone of these commentaries is one of disturbing optimism--as if these four
Flight tests are supposed to do nothing more than cc~nfirm that the ground
test evaluation has already achieved the final design objective: an opera-
tional rocke t.
No. Not until the completion of the necessary test Elight launchings is
the laborious final design process achieved, after having eliminated suc-
cessively the malfunctions which the ground test evaluatiun--because of its
inherent limitations, no matter how fully exploited they may be--has not
been able to detect.
The course and conduct of these test flight launchings must obey the im-
placable laws of the technology, which are not known to the general public.
The public must therefore be given to understand the diffPrence k.etween
these four test launchings and the first operational launching. Stress
needs to be put on the objective that has been set for these test launch-
ings, which is that two of the four launchings must prove successful for
the Ariane rocket to be declared operational, and on the fact that only if
this objective is attained can the Ariane program be deemed to have pre-
ceeded according to plan.
Let us not repeat the errors of the "Europa," from whose technical mistakes
_ "Ariane" has benefited in full. It is time now to also learn the lesson
of its public relations mistakes: to make the public and the officials _
aware in advance that two successful shots out of four would be an excel-
lent result, that the addition of one or two supplementary shots would in
no way be abnormal, and that a total success on the very first shot would
be nothing short of an exceptional feat.
It would be exceedingly regrettable were the Ariane program to be suddenly
judged a f,~ilure, despite a remarkable prior advance through its testing
phase, solely as a result of ignorance on the part of its judge s regarding
these realities, for lack of prior information.
This is the thread that holds Ariane's ~Ariadne's~ future in suspense...
COPYRIGHT: AIR & COSMOS Paris 1979
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COUNTRY SECTION CANADA
COMMUNIST LEADER COMMENTS ON POLICY, UNITED STATES
PA142257 Havana PRELA in Spanish i350 GMT 13 Jan 80 PA
[Article by Alberto Rabilotta]
(Text] William Kashtan, secretary general of the Co~nunist Party of Canada,
has stated that the party's 24th convention outlined very clear positions
regarding national and international affairs. In an interview given to
PRENSA LATINA at the end of the convention held recently in Toroton, Kash-
tan pointed out the clear positions adopted with regard to the struggle for
peace and noted the need for Cdnada to withdraw from NATO and the North
.American Air Defense Agreement [Acuerdo Norteamericano de Defensa Aerea].
hashtan noted: "The conventior. denounced the dangerous maneuvers of the
administration of U.S. President James Carter and of the Chinese leadership
aimed at inciting anti-Sovietism and weakening detente to return to the
cold war, which is so dangerous to peace and security in the world."
- The convention also adopted a strong position regarding ~anada's internal
situation, Kash'tan noted. It called for work to attain the unity of the
- working class and the democratic forces and to strengthen the struggle
against multinational corporatioii.;, he added.
Kashtan said that the delegates put special emphasis on the need for
uniting the working class with the democrztic forces to protect achieve- -
ments despite the efforts of monopolies to dump on their backs the effects
of the present economic crisis.
He stated: The workers are struggling again and our objective is to help
them defend themselves more effectively and to work for new forms of
struggle in other directions and for a new government.
Kashtan predicted that neither the Liberal Party nor the Progressive
Conservative Party will obtain a majority in the 18 February elzctions
and said he trusts the most important result of this will be a stronger
voice in parliament for the working class and the democratic forces.
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Kashtan said that Canada is now at a crossroad in its relations with the
United States, a country he characterized as a sinking ship that continu-
ously clashes with more difficulties.
He said: The Carter administration has dangerously drifted away from the
detente policy and is heading toward an attitude of confrontation and arms
race. Faced with the U.S. position regarding the Afghanistan events, the
Canadian prime minister, instead of criticizing it, supported the U.S. ~
President.
Kashtan stated: The Canadian Gov ernment, instead of cautioning Carter
against a cold war a;id his almost war-like attitude, just told President
Carter: "Me too." Kashtan went on to ask: Why does Canada have to agree
with the United States and refuse to sell wheat to the Soviet Union tQ
weaken its relations with the Soviet Union?
This attitude does not benefit the Canadian people nor does it favor peace
or security in the world and it does not have the support of the majority
of the people and fcr this reason it should be rejected, Kashtan affirmed.
He added: Because of the dangerous path taken, it is required that al~ the
peace-loving forces in the world adopt more forceful actions to safeguard
and defend peace.
Kashtan noted: Canada must not tie itself to a sinking ship but must be
t guided toward an independent policy of commerce and peace based on con-
solidated relations with the socialist countries and the recently liberated
nations to promote and strengthen its own interests.
Kashtan also denounced continentalism (an energy market project inte-
grated by Canada, the United States and Mexico) as an effort to integrate
the economies, policies and military affairs of those countries to adapt
them to the objectives of the U.S. Government.
Kashtan said that continentalism is a prcrposal aimed at obtaining Canadian
and Mexican oil, gas and other natural resources so that the United States
can solve its problems at the expense of Mexico and Canada.
The implementation of that project would finish off the Canadian industries
and turn the countr~ into a supplier of raw materials and a buyer of pro-
ducts manufactured in the United States.
He stressed: There is no future for Canada with that type of proposal and
there will be no jobs for the workers. Fur this rea~on, he added, we--and
I would say the majority of the Canadian people--are opposed to continen-
talism.
Regarding the development of the nonalined countries movement, Kashtan ~aid
that it has given a new scope to the struggle against imperialism becd~~se
it has united various types of governments and countries with different
levels of progress. Kashtan pointed out the importance of the sixth non-
alined summit held in Havana. 5
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_ COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
IND'~STRY LEADER VON AMERONGEN: AID UNITED STATES AGAINST IRAN
Hamburg STERN in German 6 Dec 79 F 196
[Interview with Otto Wolff von Amerongen, president of the Federation of
Chambers of German Industry and Commerce, by Manfred Przybilski, STERN
editor: "Khomeini's Anathema ^,an Affect Us, Too"; date and place of interview
not given]
[Text] [Question] Herr wolff, in the economic war between Iran and the
United States, you, as an influential industrialist from an uninvolved
country, have taken sides and called for solidarity with America.
[Answer] Now, of course, my purpose is not to be a hero. But in certain
situations one simply must show his flag and declare his colors.
[Question] What does that mean in practice?
[Answerj rIy demand to show solidarity with the United States consists
specifically in the fact that the Western world not buy any oil from Iran
that was destined for U.S, consumers and is now floating across the Atlantic
in tankers.
[QuestionJ But, of course, charity begins at home in an emergency.
(Answer] That would be short-sighted. Industrial nations are extremely
~ dependent upon one another in regard to the overall oil supply. Anyone can
get into difficulties and must then be able to rely on the support of one's
partners.
[Question] But solidarity, strictly speaking, would mean that even the FRG
would impose a boycott on Iranian oil.
[Answer] That would be going too far, and I have a low opinion of embargos.
[Question] To UN Secretary-General Waldheim the conflict between Iran and the
United States has precipitated the greatest international political danger
since the Cuban crisis. Is it not frivolous to play with fire around the
Near East powder keg with flaming appeals?
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[Answer] Apart from our solidarity in regard to oil, there are no meaGUres
which would make the bilateral relationship between Iran and the FRG ~~orse
and would intensify the situation in the Near East trouble-spot.
[Question] That could change quickiy. The FRG has been involved in the
economic war ever since Iranian capital investments in the Krupp conglomerate
were seized by the U.S. Morgan Guaranty Bank.
(Answerj That is unfortunately the result of a perhaps precipitate measure. _
_ If a debtor--in this case Iran--is in default with its interest payments,
then the U.S. banks have the option of interpreting this as a refusal to
repay and of demanding immediate payment of the total amount. Thus, they
want to protect themselves on all sides iummediately.
[Question] Can you preclude the possiblity that Khomeyni's anathema can
also affect the FRG?
[Answerj Heavens above! As far as I cari see, in the past few weeks so many
irrational and unexpected things have taken place in Iran, even that can
still happen.
[QuestionJ How many German merchants and technicians wot:id possibly be in
cianger then?
~Ariswer] At present we do not have a clear overview of the Ztimber of persons
from the FRG who are sti]1 there. Recently there was a strong reduction in -
the German colony. Naturally, skilled workers must continue to take care -
of current projects.
[Question] The building site at the atomic power plant in Bushir has already
been shut duwn. Will still other installations of German firms that are
under construction be put in mothballs?
[Answer] The Iranian government will have to decide that. To date I have
heard nothing nf the sort. The jobs are being continued to the extent
that current troubles allow. In any case, a mass exodus would be the wrong
reaction.
[Question] Nonetheless, DM 4~8 billion are at stake which Iran still has to _
pay to German companies.
[l~nswer] That is only the total of the industrialization pro~jects that
were financed on a long-term basis with credits, proj ects which are being
realized there by large German firms....
[Question] ...and are protected by state guarantees from Bonn. In addition,
there are demands on Iran from current German deliveries running in the
millions without state guarantees.
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[Answer] Correct. For example, my company regularly delivers tin sheeting
to Persia. It exports without export guarantees, as do most companies in
normal commerce. As far as I know, the Iranian refusal to pay debts concerns
bills that are payable in dollars. I do not think that the government in
Tehran is stopping payments generally. That would be suicide. Then there
would be no one who would sell Iran even a piece of chalk.
[Ouestion] Germ3n exports to Iran have declined by 63 percent this year. Is
big business with Persia a thing of the past for German companies?
[Answerj Let's not go into whether it was every very extensive business. But
naturally, it is true that German businesses in Iran are affected, and there
is the threat of substantial reductions in export orders. It does not
require a prophetic gift to recognize that in thE near future we can no longer
anticipate any large deals with Ira.n.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + 3ahr AG & Co.
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COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
SCHMIDT ACTS TO IMPROVE FLIGHT SAFETY OVFR FRG
Hamburg STERN in German 6 Dec 79 pp 240-2~~1
_ [Article by Harry Drewes: "Chancellor Clears Up the Skies"]
[Text) The FRG has the most dangerous air space in all
Western Europe. Now Helmut Schmidt intends to pct an
end to the quarr,ei between civilian and military air
traffic controllers. �
The American news magazine TIME warned its readers that the air space over
the FRG is the "most dangerous in western Europe." No doubt true, since
the German sky is crammed full. NATO pilots leave their vapor trails
between Flensburg and Constance, the largest private air fleet on the
continent is hustling about here, and the scheduled and chartered planes
have to try to find a place for themselves somewhere in between.
Masters over this chaos are the air traffic controllers. It is their job
to ensure safe flights, take-offs and landings. In the process, not only ~
the crowded air space causes them problems, ~ut also a homemade mess on the
_ ground: Civilian and military air traffic controllers are quarreling over
who has the say in the sky.
Sometimes the civilians and military sit side by side and provide the same
service, sometimes they have divided the sky ~with an invisible fence. In
that case then, each is responsible only for his side. This approach is not ,
only absurd, it is also dangerous. In the period between 1973 and 1~76
there were 22 collisions over the FRG. Near-collisions number in the hun-
_ dreds every year. -
One person who for many years has been preaching uniform flight supervision
is Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. When he was senator for the interior in
Hamburg, he ridiculed the fragmentation in the air traffic control service
and warned of the consequences. Now he has dictated to his two responsible
ministers, Apel for defense and Gscheidle for transport, how the skies over
the FRG are to be made safer.
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Schmidt wants to set up an integrated federal office for air traffic control
which will be responsible for both the civilian and military sectors. It
is to be under the minister for transport. Technical control over the office
will be by a supervisory board whicYi will be staffed in equal numbers from -
both ministries and will only be able to make unanimous dPCisions. The -
president of the office will be a civilian, his deputy a member of the military.
Thus, Schmidt is basically fol,lowing the recommendations of the civilian air ~
- traffic controllers. For years they have been demanding uniform air traffic
control for all air traffic. Their arguments are logical, and they would
have long since achieved their goal if in 1973 they had not stabbed themselves
in the back with their slowdown. When air traffic was paralyzed at that
time because the controllers worked strictly according to the book, they -
not only brought the entire nation of. vacationers down on their backs, they
also provided the military people with the excuse to classify the civilians
in the towers as a safety risk. -
The Ministry for Defense was then dreaming only of air traffic control by
soldiers. Then everything could have been controlled according to the
principle of command and obedience; a slowdown would have been ended by a
terse command.
The civilian controllers, gathered around their "Association of German Air
Traffic ~ontrollers," even at the end of last week considered the military .
solution to be the most likely arrangement, for ever since the slowdown
the government has been taking a hard line a~ainst the controllers with '
disciplinary actions and suits for damages.
But Schmidt the tactician still prefers the civilian solution and wants to
implement it by next summer; this surely stems in part from the fact that
there will,be an election in 1980. He can hardly expect his party and
. voters to militarize a sector of public service without an emergency. And
anyway, the chancellor has an ace up his sleeve: If the civilians slow
- down again, he can order the military to put on extra shifts.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
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COUNTc2Y SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
FDP'S HIRSCH URGES LAND ELECTORAL PACT WITH CDL
Hamburg STERN in German 6 Dec 79 pp 200-201 '
[Article by Al.fred Welti: "Emergency Slaughter Instead of Dismissal"]
[Text] Burkhard Hirsch, North Rhine-Westfalian minister
of the interior, is to become Lar.d chairman of the FDP
and put the desolate party back on a steady course.
The party of the liberals is "in a higher sense open"--that is how Horst
t,udwig Riemer en~oyed announcing it; he is the recently sacked FDP Land
chairman and minister of economics in North Rhine-Westfalia. His party
friends in Solingen have now appeared open in a lower sense.
Boldly, as if there were nothing to learn from Riemer's sudden end, they
went about forging an election alliance with the CDU for the Landta~ election
on 11 May 1980: In one of the two Solingen election districts an FDP man
was supposed to give up his candidacy in favor of a Christian Democrat, and,
in return, in the second district a liberal was to seek a direct mandate
with the support of the CDU. The FDP leadership in Duesseldorf, however,
put a stop to the horse-trading at the last second.
_ The conniving in Solingen against the SPD coalition partner shows in what
sort of desolate condition the largest Land association of the liberals
reveals itself to be scarcely a year before the Bundestag election. For not
only the FDP rank-and-file got drunk on the crackpot idea. Even Peter
Eykmann, the designated FDP Landtag caucus manager, praised the idea of
scrounging a few votes at the expense of the Sozi's [Social Democrats].
- The liberal applauded it as a"very interesting blueprint."
Land Minister of the Interior Burkhard Hirsch towers like an oak above such
Free Democrat underbrush. His position vis-a-vis the social-liberal alliance
is always one of discipline, straight thinking, often inconvenience, but
always loyalty. This weekend, at the FDP Land Party Congress in Meunster,
he will learn whether any success can still be scored with the North Rhine-
Westfalian FDP.
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Fol.lowing Riemer's fall, Hirsch must stand for election among the delegates as
Riemer's successor, as obligated by federal leader Hans-Dietrich Genscher.
But Minister Hirsch cannot expect an ideal result. Too often he has frustrated
the opportunistic machinations of his party brothers. In addition, he is
not exactly what people call a politician who draws.
This Hirsch, the complicated man, was given popular Liselotte Funcke, the .
party's tax expert, as a running mate. Bravely she gave up the honor of
Bundestag vice-president and promised to remain in Land golitics even if the
liberals should once again be found on the opposition benches. Last week
she took over Riemer's deserted Ministry of Economics. She is to enter
the Landtag campaign as a leading candidate. Achim Rohe, RDP president in
Duesseldorf, is happy about this "dream couple." Everyone would like Frau
Funcke as a mother-in-law."
The ideal mother-in-law must go vote-gathering because Riemer repeatedly
was unable to keep his mouth shut. At a drinking party with journalists at
the beginning of November, he had blabbed personnel decisions without having
discussed them in advance with party and caucus committees. Ae called SPD
Minister-President Johannes Rau "a bottle," with whom, at the most, it would
be possible to get through half a legislative session. Even in Bonn--as
parties to the discussion recall--the "change" is said to be overdue, and
then it would be only proper if he were to replace "pipe Verheugen" in the
office of the FDP general secretary. "It was not an execution," said an
insider ~bout the Riemer dismissal, "it was an emergency slaughter."
Hirsch, the proper one, had, however, up to that point continually refused
to organize a putsch against Riemer with whom he has been associated since
Youn~ Democrat times. That could now be disastrous. The Free Democrats
in ~he last North-Rhine Westfalian Landtag election managed a full 6.7
pF-rcent. The question is how many voters will switch to the Greens and to
- the big parties because the childish FDP hopscotch has simply gotten too
stupid for them.
If the liberal mini-war in Muenster continues and the divisiveness of the
party is clearly renewed, then, of course, the change in the trend hoped
for by Riemer will come sooner and in a form different from what suits his
party friends. Then the RDP could fly right out of the Landtag following the
May elections. Result: The CpU, to date the strongest party group in -
the Landtag, would take over the government--a situation which, a half year
before the Bundestag election, would be like a signal to Bonn.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
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COUNTR'1 SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
METALWORKERS UNION PREPARES FOR STRIKE ACTION
Hamburg STERN in German 6 Dec 79 pp 202-205
[Article by Dieter Straubert and Heiko Tornow: "Strike Tips From England"]
[Text] The Metalworkers Union is getting ready for future
work disputes with full treasuries and new tactics. .
Inquiries from the factories are mounting up: "Are we going to strike this
time?" Among the members of the Metalworkers Union it has already been
established that the upcoming wage talks will not come off without a labor
dispute. However, the question has not yet been clarified for them in which
of the 16 wage sectors the metalworkers wi11 be asked for a strike ballot
and called out in front of the factc~ry gates in case the employers are
prepared for only modest wage increases.
Since Hamburg's district manager Otto vom Steeg has already declined ("not
this year!"), since his colleague in Essen, Kurt Herb, is still licking his
wounds from the steel strike in January that was a failure and since Franz
Steinkuehler, the fighter from Stuttgart, received a strike prohibition
from Eugen Loderer, head of the Metalworkers Union ("It will not do for just
one district always to consume the strike funds of the entire organization"),
everything points to a wage dispute in Hesse.
The 2 million organized metalworkers do not intend to be content with small
potatoes this winter. In the metalworking nlants the shop stewards have
already listed their demands.: "We want 12 percent, we demand 10, we shall
get 8."
The employers, meanwhile, have been arming themselves with counterarguments.
If the trade unions come in with reference to the high rate of inflation,
then the employers intend to counter by saying that "we cannot be charged
for the income of the sheiks and the enormous profits of the multinational -
oil companies." According to their calculations, more than 5 percent just
- is not in the cards, for in 1980 the meialworkers received one additional
day of vacation anyway and a bonus added to their vacation money. That
already burdens the employers with 0.9 percent of the wage costs and must be
taken into consideration by the Metalworkers Union.
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Wage politicians in the workers organization predict that "there is going to
be a row,then!" They do nor want to be charged for the 6-week vacation for
everyone that they obtained in the 1979 strike: "After all, 1979 is no
longer of any significance to the union in the matter of wage policy. We
demand more pay for 1980" (~his from a board member of the Metalworkers
Union) .
It was only with difficulty that Eugen Loderer this fall had throttled the
_ vigorous add-on discussion" at the source: "That takes the necessary
pressure off the real wage negotiations." Loderer's tactics resulted in the
fact that the metalworkers have even greater expectations, for the welders,
lathe o~,erators and fitters see the "reasonable wage settlements," which were
highly praised in the spring (4.3 percent �or 13 months), as long.since
eaten up by high price increases (5.7 percent in November).
It is of small help that the works councils in many companies negotiated
additional bonuses added to the Christmas money from their bosses: The
roughly 100,000 employees at the BASF ~aden Aniline and Soda FactoryJ
conglomerate in Ludwigshafen are receiving a bonus amounting to 160 percent
of a month's income. Volkswagen is again paying a seniority allowance of
between DM 4~100 and 525 in addition to the Christmas money (up to DM 4~1,088)
and the 13th month's salary. At Ford in Cologne there is an extra check for
DM ~1440 and at Opel in Bochum und Ruesselsheim one for DM 4~250. Alois
- Schwarz, chaizman of the works council at the MBB Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm
Aircraft Company, also has reason to be happy because "we have managed to
get DM 1~500 extra Christmas money for the 24,000 members."
OF course, the executive board of the Metalworkers Union does not take
seriously isolated wage demands ranging as high as 17 percent (for example,
~ a North German el�vator company), but it is a different story with the
reports from the Mercedes shops: "At least double digits and more for the
' lower wage groups." At Opel in Ruesselsheim, the largest metalworking plant
in Hesse, the 1,000 shop stewards came on strong for "DM 4~250 for everyone."
That would mean a 14-percent increase in wages.
On the other hand, the Gesamtmetall employers organization is hopit:g for
more restraint and~believes it has already detected symptoms of same.
According to a spokesman for the employers, the union reco~endations have
gone down in recent weeks. In addition, Gesamtmetall is hoping for the help -
of the Social Democrats. Because, according to the calculations of the
employers, the comrades in the factories will do everything they can in -
order to spare their Chancellor Schmidt a strike in an election year.
The two sides agree on one point only: "These will be short wage talks."
The reacon is that employers and union are signing a new arbitration agree-
ment this week. The old one had been terminated by the Metalworkers Union.
In order to reach a new settlement at all, Gesamtmetall had to make an
important conc`ssion: The trade union is permitted to "make smoke" with ~ -
wildcat strikes even during current wage negotiations.
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A further measure with which the Metalworkers Union plans to sharpen its
strike weapon, dulled as the result of lockouts, is that future labor
- disputes are to be conducted in such a way that the damage is as great
as possible for Gesamtmetall; the costs incurred by the uni~n are to be as
low as possible. Hans Janssen, the board member.responsible for wage
questions, during a recent trip to England picked up tips on tactics from
his British colleagues, who are otherwise quite disdained because they.are
always on strike: "For example, it would be possible to strike only Mondays
or Wednesdays for weeks at a time." Something like that would disrugt factory
peace more seriously than any of the usual German labor disputes which to
date have been clean and orderly.
In order to fill the strike fund in time for any event, the Frankfurt Central
Office of the Metalworkers Union is calling upon its 2.7 million members to
pay in on a stepped-up basis. In fact, the members were also forced by an
"Operation Honesty in Contributin" to pay to the union the member~s contribution
of one percent of gross wages, an amount set by statute. At the Wolfsburg
Volkswagen factory 1,200 workers and employees thereupon surrendered their
membership books with indignation--but a good 400 returned remorsefully after
their initial anger.
Wage expert Janssen says: "We are not afraid of a strike." The Social
Democrat also doe, not want to hear of any concerns for Helmut Schmidt that -
have to do with election tactics: "We are negotiating so early in the
year that it won't help him and it won~t hurt him."
COPYItIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
CQNINIENTARY ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD ISLAM~ IRAN
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSFRVATEUR in French 26 Nov 79 pp 46-47
[Editorial by Jean Daniel: "The United States Under Siege by Islam"]
[Excerpts] Since last Thursday, for the world's leaders and strategists,
the question is no longer whether the United States will meet the Iranian
challenge but rather where, when and how they will do it.
Initially, the dilemma was save the hostages or save face. Jimmy Carter's
coolheadedness during this period impressed the world as it did the
American public opinion. One then hoped for, indeed from this fact, a
solution negotiated under the discrete pressure of Tehran's allies and
with the help of the secret good offices of the Soviet Union. But once it
became a question of a trial inflicted on the U.S. Embassy staff inembers
still kept hostage~ then worry overtook world opinion because anger ha~d
taken over the United States. Wednesday, the pools indicated that public
opinion and Congress would be unanimous in the event of an intervention.
In addition, one was to lear than the partisans of firmness were found also
outside the United States. Often even in the ranks of those who denounce
American hegemony: such as Arab heads of sCate att.ending the conference
in Tunis and who~ themselves Moslem, were not afraid of citing "the terrible
plague of Islamic fanaticism." But also Europeans, French and Germans,
whose governments had nonetheless just shown the greatest caution in
solidarity with Washington.
- Here, we are not dealino, at least not dealing solely, with the usual '
doubletalk of politicians. This involves the serious matters of geopolitics.
Tlie world is so constituted~ even today and despite what one refers to as
"multipolarity," that, when one of the two superpowers overly displays its
vulnerability and passivity, the entire planet goes out of kilter: it is
as if seized with vertigo. This means that a certain order in the world,
despite the monstrous leaks that it covers up, is seemingly still provided
by a balance between Moscow and Washington..
So, then, this response? The decision on it has been studied all the more
carefully since they are convinced in Washington that they had better take
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the students and Khomeyni seriously: the trial of the hostages will indeed
take place; it will demonstrate that certain of the diplomats are in the '
CIA, Demogoguery intended for the naiev--everyone knows that all the
embassies, and esp~cially the American and Soviet ones, house members of
the secret services, generally baptised commercial or social or military
attaches. Those are the rules. Being a spy is not prohibited. What is
_ prohibited is getting caught. The prophet Khomeyni doesn't agree with this
code? The Americans intend to show him that it is the masters of the game
who set the rules.
For the moment, it is a question of aircraft carriers joining others in
tiie GulF of Oman, near the.Iranian coast; of naval blocades of Iran to
prohibit tanker traffic; of bombing the Abadam refinery or the mining of
this or that strait. The very fact that the White House encourages specu-
lation on the forms of a military reply is already of significance. This ~
shows that, far from fearing a Soviet intervention, the Americans have an
interest in stirring up the specter of a destabilization of the region.
It is also a warning to this revolutionary Third ~dorld, and in particular
the Islamic one, where the prophet Khomeyni is busy stoking all the fires
available for a veritable holy war against the United States. The Islam
of the people, the poor and the prophets is laying a siege of hatred
around America.
Jimmy Carter was not expecting this role which history has laid on him.
Fiis toughest opponents agree that hi5 ideal is more to make the United
States loved than feared. He presented himself as a dEfender of the rights
of man, going even so far as to denounce--and who remembers it?--both
Iran and Brazil during his election campaign, promising that there would
not be any American citizen in a situation of fighting anymore against the
f.reedom of other peoples. In fact, never has the United States been less
interventionalist. (And there were Americans and Westerners to reproach
them for it: didn't Giscard try to pick up where Jimmy Carter left off in
defending the West in Africa?) It is nevertheless this same Carter who is
reaping what so many others have sown everywhere so assiduously before him.
Hatred is never pretty to see. There was, nevertheless, a sort of deliver-
ance in the hysteria of those televised mobs in Tehran who cried for
blood. The American flag shredded, dirtied and burned; the picture of
Carter burned next to that of the shah; the curse against "Satan," the
forces of evil, everything showed the unleasing of passions too long pent
up, repressed, contained. Where ~'id these come from? What a strange
story: The nation of refuge for all the dissidents of the world is at the
same time the one which entire continents deem to be oppression incarnate.
A classic contradiction and one that is good for a book a day in the
Unitecl States. But usually it was whenever some university professor
visited Latin America or those bordering countries where the curse, accord-
ing to a Mexican proverb still quoted, comes from those who are "so far
from God, so close to tr~e United States." To these countries, everyone
knows, Jimmy Carter could no doubt resign himself. But in the Arab or -
- Moslem countries, and especially in this period when the Israeli influence -
appears on the decline, why this explosion of hatred?
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Suddenly, all at once, the demnable face of Reza Mohammed Pahlavi coalesces
in the mind of the Iranians with that of a president of the United States,
one who did not deserve it but who could not by himself erase a terribly
burdened heritage. A heritage where the prodigalities of Washington for
the I:ings, the princes, the feudal lords and the president gave rise among
the people to an ever less bearable quarrel of humiliations and hatreds.
From time to time, a reaction would explode. 1973: seizure of hostages
at the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum, ca~ital of the Sudan. The i
United States ambassador is assassinated. In 1976: assassination of an
American ambassador in Beirut. In 1979: assassination of an American
ambassador in Kabul. Without counting all the sermons, all the demonstra- -
tions, all the professions of faith from the doctrinaires of Islamic
socialism in Syria and in Libya, in Afghanistan and in Pakistan: When the
cnost irttelligent of inemoir writers and one of the most prestigious of
diplomats, a man of the breadth of Henry Kissinger, does not understand
that loyalty with regard to the shah is in reality a disavowal with regard
to tlie people, it means that there is something awry among the specialists
in geopolitics. Kissir~~er begins his memoirs with a sentence that 'the
United States has entered into a world where it is no longer the strongest,
and it is a painful transition.' A pertinent comment but one which seems
to be followed up only by a description of the relationships between military
forces. Islam, the new superpower, is nowhere given its due.
For the moment, Ji~rmy Carter is forced to react like one besieged. He must
break the blocade of scepticism~ the coalitions of disdain, the assaults
of defiance which his country receives, wipes off and endures with a sort
oF evangelical and shamefaced passiveness. But before him he has an
adversary whose sole and unique weakness is his age. The Khomeyni
pt~enomenon has but one president in recent history, and that is Gandhi.
One recalls the exasperation of Churchill in face of 'this dirty beggar
wl~o, displaying a bony and nauseating nudity, would oppose Great Britain.'
Ktiomeyni is Gandhi plus oil and minus nonviolence. When he revokes the
customs, the laws, the rules in the name of which he believes one half of
the world has oppressed the other half; when he sets against the compromises
the insane radicality of his attitude; when he preaches puritanism and -
even sectarianism..,he strikes a responsive chord in all those who have
been excluded from wealth, the victims of waste, all those whom the princes
neglected to invite to the day of the great alloting of shares. Like all
radical positions, that of Khomeyni has a logic which is clearly not that
of life: around it hangs a scent of absoluteness and death. Unfortunately
it is none the less fascinating for millions of victims of the industrial
ideologies. Just as fascinating~ moreover, as almust all the fascisms,
so popular at their birth.
Tt~is Khomeyni, if he doesn't unleash a war, that is, and if he is stopped
in time in his search for a deadly absolute, wi].1 perhaps have nourished
tlli.s great self-questioning that one sees arising here and there among
the super-greats--or those who, even yesterday, thought they were.
COPYRiCI1T: 1979 "Le Nouvel Observateur"
9550 18 -
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
~
PCF RELATIONS WITH SOVIET, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
= Paris L'EXPRESS in French 1 Dec 79 p 132
[Article by Branko Lazitch: "From Euroco~unism to Euro~Sovietism"]
[Text] Since 1974 two coammunist strategies have been in operation in
Western Europe; the Soviet strategy, which aims at reinforcing the inter-
national position of the USSR; the strategy of several communist parties
seeking a rapid entry into government.
The first has obtained undeniable results.
On the contrary, the second, that of th e Western communist parties, has
met everywhere with defeat.
Fortified by their success, the Sovie~s are elaborating new plans to
neutralize Europe. On the other hand, the Portuguese, French, Italian and
Spanish Communist Parties have no strategy ready for their immediate acces-
sion to power. In 1979, therefore, only ane strategy offers some prospect
for these "brother parties": it is no t that of Eurocommunism, but that of
the Soviet Union. The present task is to coordinate Moscow's entire Euro-
pean policy with the local policy of European communist parties. This
synchronization is in progress and off ers a new method of resolving a series
of rather old problems, in particular that of the PCF, until recently the
"enfant terrible" of the International after 1975.'
The ties between the PCF and the international communist movement have
been brought to the foreground by Geor ges Marchais. As early as December,
1978 Marchais stated before a group of four hundred communist intellectuals:
"To wish to deliberately isolate our f ight from that of other forces in the
world struggling against capitalism and for socialism would be a serious
mistake". At the last central committee, at the end of October 1979, the
secretary general was even more explici t: unable to announce the victory
of communism in France, he commended "the socialist transformation of
humanity being fashioned today." This week he declared that the USSR has -
"suppressed oppression and exploitation." Back to square one:
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This position, forged not as a function of national communism or Euro-
communism but rather from the point of view of Soviet~dominated inter-
national communism, was relegated to the Dackground by the government's
_ Common Program. This last policy was an attempt at a national means "to
open the way for soci3lism in France." FTOm the beginning, Moscow was
closed, if not hostile, to this policy, Upon returning from Moscow, the
socialist Lionel ,Jospin stated to the foreign press on 15 October: "The
Kremlin authorities do not appear to wish to experiment with a union of the
left in France." -
_ On the other hand, these authorities hope to lead the majority of political
forces, including the Socialist International, into a struggle against the
"armaments race," which is the central theme of the new Soviet peace
offensive.
Un 1 October, Brezhnev received a delegation from the Socialist International
in order to talk about disarmament. The 12 principal European socialist
and social-democratic parties were represented, including the French Soci-
alist Party. Then three weeks later, the same appeal to the social-democrats
was made by the Politburo of tfie PCF, employing a language of unity which
we have not heard from it for a long time; "The PCF wishes to create condi-
tions favorable to the united action of democratic forces, especially the
social-democratic parties...for such objectives as the struggle against
the arms race." The soc'al-democratic parties are called upon to become
partners in foreign policy, although they are considered renegades when it
comes to domestic policy.
Of course, the PCF does protest certain outrageous Soviet violations of
human rights, but it is careful not to translate its indignation into poli-
tical acts. For example, it has not demanded the withdrawal of soviet occu-
pation troops nor decided to suspend relations with the authorities of the
Czechoslovak Co~nunist Party, which is responsible for the repression.
Moreover, at L'HT.T2�iANITE's festival in September, stall No 57 at the inter-
national city was reserved for the Czechoslovak daily RUDE PRAVO. And the
- PCF rebuked Jean Francois-Roncet, French minister of foreign affairs, for
having canceled his trip to Prague following the trials. Was this not
"working against detente" on the part of the minister?" -
A recent encounr_er between the PCF, represented by Charles Fiterman, and
the PCSU, represented by Boris Ponomarev, had as its goal the development
of cooperatiori between the two parties.
'Chere is perfect agreement in the propaganda positions of Moscow and of the
Western parties on the subject o.f Asia as well as Europe. As to the taking
of hostages in Tellran, L'HUMANITE of 23 November condemned those who busy
' themselves by "denigrating the legitimate anger of those people who speak
out against t}ie United 5tates government."
COPYRIGH'f: 1979 s.a. Groupe Express
CSO: 3100
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C'OUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
AIRBUS INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS AWAIT 1980 DECISION
_ Paris ATR & COSMOS in French 17 Nov 79 p 11
~Tex t~ Last week, Mr Bernard Lathiere, manaqing director of Airbus Indus-
trie, drew up the balance sheet of orders for A 300 and A 310 Airbuses, the
total of which is now approaching the break-even point of 400 planes. Sales
in 1978 totaled 82 (69 firm orders and 13 optionsy. As of 8 November 1979,
sales for the year, from 1 January, had reached 215 planes (128 firm orders
and 87 options). This total consists of 92 A 300's (67 firm orders and 25
options) and 123 A 310's (61 firm orders and 62 options). Mz Lathiere
pointed out that the brinc~ing out of the A 310 has in no way slowed the
gr.ow th of. A 300 sales.
Credibility Achieved
Whe reas in 1970 Airbus's share of the world market for airliners was nil,
its share of the world marke t in 1978 was 14 percent (in terms of value),
_ and by the end of the first 10 months of 1979 it was 29.1 percent. Thus,
in a more favorable market that has recovered its upward trend, ttie Airbus
Industrie team has achieved credibility with the airlines. The negotiation
of every major contract for the purchase of large-capacity planes i~ow finds
Air bus Industrie pitted against Boeing in the final round.
Air bus Industrie now realizes a profit on every plane it sells, permitting
it to recover, from the 120th or 130th plane on, the initial losses suf-
fered by the partners.* Mr Lathiere called attFntion to the fact that
sinc e Airbus Industrie has no compensative programs, it is at a disadvan-
tage with respect to other airliner manufacturers that already have other
established product lines in operation. This situation will be different
when new programs can be undertaken with support from existing ones.
Thir ty airlines have now opted for the A 300 and A 310 Airbuses, with esti-
rnated long-term needs totaling 800-850 planes. Other airlines sre sure to
order Airbuses. Thus, it is virtually certain that more than 1,000 of
* The selling price of an Airbus A 300 currently averages around $35 mil-
lion.
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these planes will be sold eventually. How then, Mr Lathiere asks, can one
speak of an indifferent success when one-third of the world market for
medium-range heavy-transport aircraft is about to be practically cagtured
by Airbuses?
Not a Case of Euphoria
Mr Lathiere is by no means unaware of Airbus Industrie's relative capacity
as compared with Boeing's. The European group currently produces three
planes a month of a single type, whereas Boeing produces 28 a month of var-
ious types. But in the field of civil aircraft manufacti~re, relative posi-
tions of the manufacturers can change rapidly. Mr Lathiere recalls
Boeing's position relative to Douglas's 30 years ago. Airbus Industrie is
now concentrating on increasing its production rate, with a goal of 8-8.5
planes a month by 1984 and 10 planes a month by 1985. Within 7 years, it
expects to have quintupled its current production rate. The fabrication
cycle of a single plane covers a span of 3 and 1/2 ~ears. And the goal
that has been set will be the harder to achieve in a European social context
that is less yielding than the American one. This context will require an
increase from the present 17,000 to 35,000-40,000 employees assigned to the
fabrication of Airbuses. This does not appear impossible, however, if one
considers that the total number of persons currently employed by the Airbus
Industrie partners is 150,000.
As more and more orders are accepted, delivery times become longer and
longer. But this is also true for Boeing, although the production start-up
time of the A 310 will be longer than that of the 767. McDonnell Douglas
and Lockheed, with a greater currently available production capacity, could
to some extent benefit from this situation. But I have not seen any report
of orders placed on these manufacturers to date. -
Three New Developments under Study
with regard to extending the gamut of Airbus Industrie's manufacturing
activities, Mr Lathiere said that ~nree projects are under study: a 200-
passenger, 4-engined jetliner 'uased on the design of the A 310, capable o�
bei.ng equipped with the c;FM 56; a narrow-bodied, 2-engined, single-aisle
plane also capable of using the CFM 56 (projects SA ~Single Aisle~ 1 and 2);
and a 2-engined, peavy-transport plane which is an elongated version of the
A 300 with a capacity of around 300 passengers (TA CTwin Aisle~ 9). The
latter project looms as a direct competitor of the large 3-engined liners
~ of the DC-10 and TriStar types, compared to which its economy characteris-
tics agpear very favorable. It is already the object of very lively
interest on the part of the clientele. It is a foregone certainty that
Airbus Industrie cannot undertake all three of these projects concurrently.
Its priorities will be determined by the market, and, as things now look,
its decision should be forthcoming during the second half of 1980.
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Investments an~ Titanium
Asked about investments by the Airbus Industrie partners in gearinq to meet
tha demand, Mr Lathiere replied that these investments continue, especially
in Great Britain, where British Aerospace is having to provide the largest
share of the funding, since the A 310 is being equipped with a wing of new
design. The relative size of the investments being requirea of the French
partners is about midway between those of the German and British partners.
Asked about the effects of the titanium shortage on the Airbus program, Mr
Lathiere, who estimates the amount of titanium needed for the Airbus pro-
- gram to be around one ton per plane, felt that this shortage should not
have any long-term effects on the program. Besides, iL seems that European
industry is in the process of equipping itself to achieve a degree of Euro-
pean self-sufficiency in the production of titanium metal sponge.
~
L�fiphasizing that the Airbus marketing effort continues, Mr Lathiere stated
- that in the cc~rse of the visit he will be making to Japan.to discuss pos-
_ sible cooperation with Japanese industry in the construction of new planes,
he plans to also visit China for talks with President Hua Guofeng, who,
during his visit to Europe, had indicated considerable interest in the Air-
bus.
COP`.%ttIGE1T: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1979
9238
C50: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
U.S. BASE IN LA MADDALENA CREATING PROBLEMS FOR POPULACE .
Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 13 Dec 79 p 15
[Article by Mario Guerrini: "Riots and Polemics at La Maddalena Around
'Nuclear Base ~
[TextJ La Maddalena. The presence of the U.S. bases has created many
problems for the inhaUitants of La Maddalena. Not only is there the fear
oF atomic pollution, but the American base has had negative effects because
of the rise in prices and the heavy influence on tourist activity. Further-
more, the riots between American sailors and the peaceful Maddalena citizens
are by now habitual and now there are also drugs which until some time ago
were unknown on La Maddalen. The inhabitants of La Maddalena say they were
imported by U.S. sailors.
There are moments of particular tension because of the presence of atomic
, submarines and the support ship "Gilmore." The leftist parties became
spokesmen for the negative feelings of the people. But results were negligible:
"Franco Tamponi, PSI [Italian Socialist Party] group leader in the City Council,
said: "When 2 years ago there was the incident of the "USS Ray" submarine
with the danger of atomic pollution, the reaction of the people was enormous.
- In less then 2 days we collected almost 4,000 signatures of citizens who
demanded that the U.S. base at Santo Stefano be removed. But unfortunately
nothing happened. The "Gilmore" is still there."
A completely different opinion was expressed by the mayor of La Maddalena,
lawyer Gavino Canopoli, a Christian Democrat, who said: "If it is true that
the city is a thermometer of the humor of the people, I must say that the
American presence worries no one except for the positions taken by the more
politicized groups which dramatize the problem. The inhabitants of La
Maddalena have been sued for centuries to coexisting with military personnel
and I do not understand why it should be any different with the Americans. _
Here at La Maddalena, the Italian Navy puts about 12 billion lire into
circulation each year which is spent for workers' salaries, civilian and -
military employees. If to this we add another 3 or 4[billions] by the
Americans, I do not see why this should be given up. There are at least
80 La Maddalena citizens who work with the American Navy and this is a positive
fact if one considers how difficult it is today to find a job. Certainly
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there are negative aspects such as the housing shortage, but that problem
- should be overcome shortly. The project for the construction of 250 houses
for �amilies of American military personnel was approved once again after
seve.ral changes and now it is awaiting the approval of the Ministry for
Cultural Affairs."
'l'he communists were very surprised by these statements since they considered
that Canopoli certainly was not favorable to the American presence.
Sebastiano Demuro, city secretary of the PCI said: "Just a few years ago
Mayor Canopoli, in a very highly publicized effort, said he was willing to
fight for the removal of the "Gilmore" if there was any suspicion of the
slightest danger for the health of inhabitants."
As is known, an Italian Navy base has existed for many decades at Maddalena.
The commander, Admiral Massimo Marandini, tries to attenuate the polemics
and min=mizes the problems: "I don't know how they can speak of an American
military base since all the requirements for calling it such are lacking.
Let us say that the 'Gilmore' is a repair ship for nuclear submarines and
it is tied up at the NATO dock of Santo Stefano. Its presence is justified
; by precise bilateral agreements (within the framework of the Atlantic Pact)
between Italy and the United States."
But leftist political leaders have no doubts about the meaning of the U.S.
presence at La Maddalena. Salvatore Sanna, PCI group leaders and member of
~he regional committee for military service, replies: "The Santo Stefano
nucl~ar base can be considered not only the fruit of a violent attack of
prevarication against the provisions of our constitution, but also the first
act of savage militarization of Sardinia by the United States which, even
though in a reduced form, once more proposes other prevarications at Monte -
Arci (province of Oristano). American aggression and the parasitism demon-
strated by the local DC in receiving the new colonizers with open arms has
caused only trouble: In recent years La Maddalena has seen violent riots,
a shortage of housing, the use of drugs."
Even the small businessmen and hotel keepers who at first were convinced
they would make a lot of money have changed their minds. The proprietor
of a well-known restaurant says: "They rarely come to us and probably -
be~ause they are forced to come and are made to leave exaggerated tips.
'fhe truth is that the Americans are self-sufficient: With a tender that -
iiiakes the trip to the supply center of Naples they can even get fresh bread.
For the people of La Maddalena. they have now merely become a burden, and
in fact many soldiers are sta~ioned at Palau (a coastal village in northern
Sardinia). We have shown them many times that they are not welcome here."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editrice LA STAMPA S. p. A.
6034 �
CSO: 3104
2C
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
ARMORED UNITS PROPOSED FOR DEFENSE MODERNIZATION
Tactical Utilization, Deployment, Organization
Rome RIVISTA MILITARE in Italian May-Jun 7~ pp 26-31
(Article by Gen Sandro Azais: "Tank Detachments"]
[Text] The process of unit modernization was characterized, among other
things, by a constant increase in the number of tank detachments in re-
lation to the real operational possihilities on national territory, to thP
point where it reached saturation levels in the most sensitive areas.
The issue of the M-60 tank and the effect deriving from the inclusion of
"Leopard" tanks on the line considerably boosted the armored units in terms
of armament, mobility, and endurance. This produced the need for better
coordinating the operational requirements with "the real situation existing
in the theate- of operations."
_ The best step here--capable of providing greater freedom of maneuver for the -
mechanized and armored "tactical groups"--appears to begin by modifying the
organizational structure of the minor detachments in order then to move on
to the higher and middle echelons of the armored Lnits in the light of
economic requirements and the consequences of production costs.
This brief st~sdy is essentially intende~ ~u exawine ~iie advisability of
this step by looking into the following aspect$ of the problem: operational
environment; combat equipment; organizational formations; reorganization of
armored units.
Operational Environment
The morphological features of the Italian operational environment and the
pr.ogressive limitation imposed by the spread of residential areas, in-
dustrial areas, canals, and crops limit the employment of armored forma-
tions and point to their organization in the form of light, maneuverable
tactical groups which can be easily commanded and which are spaced further
and Further apart.
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Even though the order of battle of the various ~ormations, the succession -
oF action in terms of time, the alternating spreadout and concentration of
f~~rrey due [o lhe eEfect of. warttme developments seem t~ attenuate the spACe
limtcatlon lmposed by tlie natural environment, one can say that the current
ratio between forces and space--also taking into account the operational
deployment of the detachments--entails a saturation which limits the emplcy-
ment possibilities and the chief characteristics attributed to armored
units, sometimes wiping out the basic principles dictated by doctrine.
We must therefore try to work toward a considerable thinning-out of the
overall density of tanks without however harming the operational possibili-
ties of the major armored units.
Combat Equipment
The search for formations that can operate effectively in a certain theater
of wrir obviously is based on the characteristics and performance of equip-
ment and on suitable formations for employment.
The tactical formula, modernization of on-board systems and the character-
istics which suggested the replacement of equipment curreritly in service
through the adoption of the M-60 tank and the subsequent inclusion of the
_ "Leopard" tanks will make it possible to fight at longer ranges with greater
~apacity Ear fire and movement.
These considerations underscore the need for reducing the tank units pre-
ciseiy in order to enable the commanders fully to utilize the tremendous '
power of fire and movement of the new fighting equipment. _
Organic Formations
The Tank Company
The current tank company, consisting of a company HQ and three tank
p].atoons, has one company HQ tank plus five tanks for each platoon, giving
us a total of 16 tanks.
I~ is a minor unit featuring a weight and dimensions of particular signi-
ficance whose employment on Italian territory is not always pleasant, not
only when it constitutes a part of a grouping of forces but also when it
must operate on its own.
As a matter of fact:
When in action, it covers a front of at least 1,200 m and a sector with a
width between 3 and 4 km, which is. the space necessary to assemble, combine,
and coordinate the action of the individual platoons;
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In view of the broad spaces involved in an area such as the terrain avail-
abl.e in Italy, with all of the subsequent limitations on observation--it
entails maj.or difficulties in visual command, a requirement wfiich we cannot
da w:ithout i.n order to i.mpart to our operatfons the necessary tigfit pace
and to accomplish recurring assignments;
It is rarely able to carry out coordinated "fire and movement" action by
its platoons which move on a normally broad front which is almost as big as
the effective range of the equipment involved, while most of the time those
platoons are forced to alternate in terms of their individual initiative.
The above-mentioned difficulties also exist in terrain that is easier for
tanks and experience demonstrates that there are only few cases where it
is possible correctly to maneuver with more than two platoons forward,
If we then move on from our individual company to an examination of the
"two companies," constituting the standard base of the armored tactical
group, then the same difficulties obviously become even bigger.
This is why, before moving on to an examination of the tank platoon, we
must consider the armored (or mechanized) tactical group and the effect
which the current structure of the tank company has on that formation.
The Tactical Group
Recent trials and observations derived from field exercises demonstrated
that the armored (or mechanized), tactical group on the battalion echelon,
due to the increase in tlie number and weight of the components, has grown to
the detriment of the requirement for timely action and maneuveraliility.
The dimensions in which the tactical group is deployed turn out to be about
11 km in depth and 7 km in width; here is what that means:
Difficulties, for commanders on all echelons, to coordinate and fit in
- assignments and formations in the available space;
Uifficulties in employing the armored tactical group in the conventional
combined form, featuring two tank companies, forward, and a consequent
tendency toward setting up and employing minor units;
Difficulties in exercising command and in unit handling due to the employment
of smaller groupings.
We must therefore seek an organizational structure for the tank company
which will give us a"combat formation," within the scope of the company and _
the platoons, which will be suitab.le for effectively exploiting the "action
areas" and "vacuums" on a battlefield. The solution of this pro~lem can ti.e -
found not only by tfiinning out the current structure of the tank platoon.
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The Tank Platoon
We just saw the difficulties connected with the employment of a company of
16 tanks and we might now briefly look at the five-tank platoon such as it
is currently constituted organizationally.
This formation presents undeniable advantages, that is to say:
Sufficient substance so as to assure continuity of action; ~
Capability of guaranteeing the accomplishment of the mission through al-
ternating "fire" and "movement" (in pairs)--within its own environment;
- Suitaliility when it comes to playing the role of minimum unit absolutely
- required for operational employment (elementary unit).
On the other hand, their formation also presents obvious disadvantages,
to wit:
It takes up a front of 500 m, in other words, so broad as to make it not -
always available and so as--by virture of the nature of the terrain--not
always to enable it to permit the unit commander effectively to control _
fire and movement;
- It almost always calls for developed action with constant alternation of
fire and movement by the pairs; this is an action in which different and
conflicting requirements often produce the result of wasting rather than
combining effects;
It makes it difficult for the platoon leader to control and correct fire
for the purpose of keeping It united in terms of purpose and distributing
it properly over the firing targets of the individual tanks;
It necessitates the paired arrangement for particularly important assign-
ments, such as providing support for the constitution of patrols, road-
blocks, etc.
It seems therefore a good to reduce the number of tanks in the platoon in
order to get:
Platoons which will cover a less broad front and which will enable the
platoon leader to provide more fruitful and appropriate leadership of
movement and fire;
Lighter companies with smaller space requirements and, hence, with consi-
derably broader and more fruitful employment possibilities;
Tactical groups which will be reliably mohile, flexible, and realistically
dosa5le;
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Unity of comntand action even when the platoon is spread out (no longer op-
erating in pairs) at roadtilocks, in patrols, etc.
The solution calling for the four-tank platoon was already tested before the
war with not at all encouraging results although the British Army recently _
adopted this solution.
As a matter of fact, the reduction by just one tank does not substantially
reduce the overall weight of the platoon and deprives the platoon leader of
many of his prerogatives by directly making him a part of one of the ~two
- pairs and creating uncertainty as to the definition of the formations and
the positior? for the platoon leader hinself.
The three-tank platoon today looks harmonious, fully functional, and in
keeping with requirements. This structure as a matter of fact:
Guarantees easy and instinctive command: the two teamed-up tanks in practice
operate by way of imitation and only haye to flank or follow the command
tank;
It involves a narrower front (300-4Q0 m) which is easily available on
Italian terrain;
It makes it possible to shift the sequence of fire and movement into the
company setting with the advantage of better guaranteeing the rate of fire
and its control;
It promotes a greater spreadout over the terrain;
It simplifies training.
Reorganization of Armored Units
After the structure of the company has been established and after its
financial cost has been estimated in relation to the production and oper-
atitig costs, including the first-line and second-line issues, one must
establish the best way to insert it on the basis of considerations relating
to operational employment and the real operational capacity of tfie battalion,
also in the light of the personnel situatiou.
Considerations Relating to Employment
The current order-of-battle setup involves units which in peacetime are
made up of armored or mechanized battalions alone which, in wartime or in
_ a training situation, can be properly converted into tactically and logis-
tically autonomous force complexes.
The latest tactical experiences stressed the obvious difficulty encountered
by conventional major units in getting themselves organized rapidly and in
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a maneuverable manner; this is why units which are trained to operate in
small nuclei, with strong individuality, aggressiveness, initiative, and
autonomy have turned out to tie more in line with those criteria. Tfie
Italian terrain is heavily tiroken up; it reveals rather little in terms of
a"straightaway" run; these factors, plus the spaces in which the tank units
are called upon to operate, only underscore and reinforce those concepts.
The considerations presented earlier relative to the natural environmEnt,
the organic formations, and the weight of the tactical group instead sug-
gest the advisability of operating with smaller, previously constituted
groups for combat operations so that, even in peacetime, we may already
have armored units ready for immediate employmezt, flexible, maneuverable,
suitable for in-depth operations repeated in terms of time and space.
Considerations Relative to the Real Operational Capability of Present-Day
Battalions
Reorganization sprang from the fact that operational employment has priority
over the organizational setup as such and this in turn introduced the need
for raising the standing of the regimental unit (a noteworthy step forward)
to the brigade level (a pre-established grouping). But in the light of
lessons learned in the past and also in connection with the personnel situa-
tion, it seems a good idea to draw the first conclusions and to come up with
some suggestions to make up for any possible shortages.
The current solution, in terms of the original idea, was supposed to have
offered the following major advanr.ages: drastic reduction of organic per-
sonnel; beefing up the detachments with personnel taken from the deactiva-
tion of the regiments; putting the battalion directly under brigade HQ
without any intermediate links.
Althouth it is true that we get a more fl~xible setup, a careful review of
_ the general situation today looking at the battalions will lead to the
following considerations:
We did not get as much personnel out as we had hoped for since the estahlish-
ment of the brigades took up many more men than we had anticipated;
As things stand now, the battalion musr. follow brigade HQ to no greater and
no lesser a degree than was true of the now deactivated regiment b.ut it no
longer has a functicning HQ now which is why the commander is forced to
devote too much time to paper work and that of course is to the detriment
of the other decisively more important activities such as those concerned
with training and personnel leadership;
The number of captains assigned and present for duty does not enable the
[battalion] CO to detach any of them for duty with HQ and the assignment
of more senior officers begins to create problems of seniority with re-
lation to the commanders;
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One must also realistically take into consideration the numher of inen taken
away from the tank crews and assigned to detachment and garrison house-
keeping duti.es;
i?Jhen it gives rise to a tactical group, the battalion becomes difficult to
command since its HQ does not have sufficient facilities for the necessary
control and coordination of static, dynamic, and fire actions which it is
called upon to perform on modern battlefields both on the defensive and on
the attack.
Conclusion
This study points up the need for adopting a solution for the makeup of
armored units which, on the various echelons, will take into account the
environmental features as well as the characteristics of available equip-
ment, the economic resources we have available, in the light of the pro-
duction and operating costs as well as the current availability of officer
and NCO as well as enlisted personnel.
Tank Platoon
The three-tank setup is the one that best reconciles the requirements of
employment and command and which at the same time guarantees the unit
greater homogeneity and therefore more adequate fire and movement control.
Tank Company
Looking at the organizational chart for the tank company, after the re-
duction of its platoons from five tanks down to three tanks, the following
solutions could be adopted (see organizational chart a jbelow]). -
Solution A: make no ~:~~Znges in the current organizational setup and there-
fore have the followin~;: one command tank plus three platoons of three
tanks, each, giving us a total of 1Q tanks.
FFhile this organizational structure on the one hand eliminates all employment
and command difficulties, as compared to the current situation, it does on
the other hand reduce the number of tanks from 16 down to 10, thus limiting
the overall power of the unit.
Solution B: increase the number of tank platoons from three to four and
thus have available a total of 13 tanks (1 command tank and 4 platoons ~f
3 tanks, each).
'I'his solution would offer the advantage of leaving the overall power o�
the tank company unchanged whereas, when it is part of an armored tactical
group, it would have to yield one tank platoon to constitute a minor
mechanized unit.
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Solution C: insc~rt, into the company, a"command nucleus," made up of the
command tank and two reserve tanks. That would give the un;Ct a total of
12 tanks.
In addition to giving the company a lighter structure and thus making it
easier to command, this solution would guarantee a certain degree of sus-
tenance for the effort to be made within the company itself and it would
enable the commander to integrate and complete the action of the support
platoon by boosting it with the action of his own command nucleus.
Table 1 shows an organizational comparison among the proposed solutions.
- Tank Battalion
The most suitable structure--also taking into account the considerations
relative to the real operational capacities of the present-day battalions--
seems to he the one based on three tank companies.
In substance, compared to the current tank battalion with its Sl tanks,
we could have the following:
A battalion of 33 tanks, specifically, three companies of ten tanks, each,
one command nucleus with three tanks, giving us a saving of 18 tanks;
A battal~on of 39 tanks, specifically, three companies of 12 tanks, each,
one command nucleus with three tanks, giving us a saving of 12 tanks.
There are furthermore two special aspects which must be underscored because
of ehe effect they may have on the organizational appearance of the tanks
units. The setup suggested for the n~inor tank units does give the battalion
greater mobility and flexibility but considerably reduces the overall
personnel strength. This latter step may, on the one hand, give the com-
mander more effective and far-reaching command action but, on tfie other
hand, it clashes with the currently greater requirements for personnel
employed for g~irrison and territorial housekeeping duties.
Hence the need--in ordPr not to take personnel away from the tank crews and,
therefore, in order not to limit the unit's operational capacity--for con-
stituting, within the battalion, a platoon which will be qualitatively and
quantitatively capable of providing all of the services, including garrison
services.
The other aspect to be taken into account--no less important--pertains to
the battalion C0. Among the lieutenant colonels, only 20% are promoted to
the rank of colonel who, with the Plimination of~the regiment, is exclusive-
ly assigned now as deputy commander in a position, in other words,
which does not enable him to express his own personality and make use of the
career maturity he has achieved.
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It would therefore be desirable--as has already been done in other armies--
to give the colonels command of battalions since that position can presently
be considered the last tour oi effective cotmnand duty in the officer's
career. This would make it possible not only to employ, as battalion COs,
officers who have already gone through a severe selection p~ocess and who
have a chance of remaining in their command assignment for at least three
years; it would also resolve those command facility and functional operatiorr
al pioblems which likewise are connected to seniority relationships with the
higher-ranking officers assigned to the various units.
In summary, this step--having a battalion commanded by a colonel, in other
words--would have a twin objective: on the one hand, upgrade the basic
combat unit by assigning command to reliably suitable officers; on the other
hand it would also upgrade the figure of the colonel by employing him in a
position which would enable him to perform effective command action.
FIGURE APPENDIX
[See table on following page]
Organizational Chart A. Organizational Options for Tank Company.
Key: 1--Solution A(Command Tank Plus Three Platoons of Three Tanks, Each);
2--Solution B(Command Tanks Plus Four Platoons of Three Tanks, Each);
3--Solution C(Same as A Plus Two Tanks in Reserve~; 4--Reserve tank,
bringing up the rear, ready to go into action, replacing any gossible
l~sses.
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ORGANICI ALTERNATIVI DELLA COMPAGNIA CARRI
1 ~ SOLUZIONE A(eirro eom~ndo + 3 plotonl dl 3 eurl)
h~-- too m-~�--io0 m I to0 m-~
a
ra., ~ a
, r1
~JI ~ ~~~,I
i.~,
r`~ r ~ ~VW
~
~ ~
i l00+70~ m
_ ~
2) SOLUZIONE B(e~rro eomando ploto~l dl ~ e~rrl)
- ~ ~ 111 ~'oH--~~ ~ 1~ ~ ~0 T
I�'pi I' I�~.
~ L~ ,:i~
~
~
i