JPRS ID: 9079 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050016-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8914
8 February 1980
, Ja ara Re ort
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CFOUO 4%80) -
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_ Fg~~ FOREIGN BROADCAS-;~~ INFORMATION SERVICE -
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NOTE ~
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- are supplied by JPRS. Prccessing indicators such as [Textj -
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The contents of this publication in no way repre~ent the poli-
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JPRS L/8914
8 February 19~0
JAPAN R~PORT
(FOUO 4/80)
CONTENTS PAGE
POI,ITICAI, AND SOCI07~OGICAI~
JCP Chairman 5cores JSP Decision on Coalition Negotiations
(JPS, 12 Jan 00) .........a 1
'JAPAN TIl~ES' Cormnents on JSP-Komeito Policy Accord
(Editorial; THE JAPAN TIMES, 16 Jari 80) 2
~JAPAN TIl~IES' on Results of Ohira's Oceania Visit .
(Editorial; THE JAPAN TIl~IES, 22 Jan 80) !t
~JAPAN TIMES' Views Self-Defense Force Spy Case
(Editorial; T1~ JAPAN TIl~IES, 22 Jan 80) 6
r
Ohira: Pacific Ba~in Concept Could Include PRC, USSR, ROK
(JIJI, 16 Jan 80) 8
'JAPAN TIl~ES' Columnist Views ~Lesscns~ F~om Afghan Incident
(Ma,saxu Ogawa; THE JAPAN TIMES, 13 Jan 80) 9
'JAPAN TIl~fES' on Econonuc Ties, Iran, Afghanistan
(Kentaro Koshiba; THE JAPAN TIMES, 15 Jan 80) 12
F`inance Ministry: "Bureaucratic Paradise~, Officials
Defend Their Interests
(ASAHI JA?VARU, 26 Oct 79) 15
MIZITARY ~ -
~JAPAN TIMES~ Views Gravity of Self-Defense Force Spy Case
(Masanori Tabata; THE JAPAN TIlKES, 20 Jan 80) 23
- a - [III - ASIA - iii FOUO]
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CONTFNT i (Continuzd) p~~~, _
ECONOMIC
~ Steel Companies Sse ~zture in Overseas Projects
("Tsunesada Someya; BUSINESS JAPAN~ Jan 80) 26
Bri ef s
Trade Deficit . 29
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Solar-Hydrogen Heating, Cooling Project To~Start
(NIKKEI SANGYO SHIl~IBUN, 22 Nov 79) 3~
France Offers Exchange on Ocean Observation Equipmen~;
(NIKKEI SANGYO SHIl~IiBUN, 22 Nov 79) 32 _
~zel Cell Power Storage 11-Year Projecr~ To Start
(NIKKAN KOGYO SHIl~BUN, 23 Nov 79) 34
JDA, F~ji Electric Develop Calcium Hydride-Air ~.iel Cell
(NIHON KOGYO SHIl~IBUN, 27 Nov 79) 38
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGI~AL
JCP CHAIRMAN SCORES JSP DECISION ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS
OW121429 Tokyo JPS in English 0921 GMT 12 Jan $0 OW
_ LText] Tokyo, Jan. 12 JPS--The Central Executive Co~ittee of the Japan
" Socialist Party on January 10 officially decided to exclude the Japanese
- Com~nunist Party from the negotiations on the coalition governrnent in the
= 1980's. The reason for this decision says, "The Communist Party has re-
- tracted the concept of a'better government', and this is contrary to the
socia~ist position". _
Kenji Miyamoto, presidium chairman of the JCP, sield a press ~anference in
the Diet on January 10, and gave an answer tc ~;he press corps' questions
on this matter. The gist of Miyamoto's answei- folZows:
- "The essence of the SociaZist Party's pol3.cy of excluding the Ccmmunist
~ Party lies in its approach to the right-leaning anti-communist Kemei Party, ~
even if it is well aware that the Komai Party favors the continua~ion of
the 3apan-U.S. security treaty and the self-defense forcea.
"The Socialist Party is trying to make out that although it wants to dis- r'~
cuss a government plan with the Communist Party, this is not possible because -
of the Communist Party's attitude. This is a deception, a play of worda.
When the Socialist Party proposed consultations in the Diet in November ~
last year on the government plan of the opposition partiea, only the Com-
munist Party among the opposition parties took the poaition to accept the -
proposal... The JCP takes the position that in [words indistinct~ case,
the party will take part in all consultations for a provisional government. �
It is an outrageous slander that the Socialist Party ia saying that the
Communist Party 'has cancelled, in principle, a provisional government ptan',.'
"1fie JCP program ca11s for a'better government'. (Chairman Miyamoto quotes -
_ part of the party program.) At the ti.me of the crisis of the Tanaka govern-
ment in 1974, the JCP called for an establishment of a provisional election _
control government, and at the time of the general election in 1976, pro-
posed a provisional government. The resolution of the 14th party congress
makes clear the party position on this matter. The Socialist Party argum~nt
is a mere trick, which can be seen through even by people who have little
knowledge of the communist literatures".
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- FOLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
_ 'JAPAN�TIMES' CONIMENTS ON JSP-KOMEITO POLICY ACCORD
OW160230 Tokyo TI~ JAPAN T Il~IES in English 16 Jan 80 p 12 OW -
[Editorial: "Socialists Turn to the Center"] -
[Text] The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Komeito managed late last week
to conclude a basic policy agreement envisaging their joint participation
in a coalition government. Coming after a similar pact signed.last year-
end between Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), the JSP- -
Komeito accord means a significant extension of the opposition alliance `
aimed at ending the Liberal-Democratic Party's (LDP) monopoly of govern-
ment.
Potentially at least, the JSP-Komeito agreement is the more important of _
the two separate deals because it compelled thE largest party of Japan's
political left to accept some major policy changes. And these concern ~ _
questions of an ideologically sensitive nature, like the desirability or
non-desirability of communist partnership, the future status of the Japan-
U.S. security treaty and the self-defense forces (SDF) and the more cur-
rent problem of whether or not to support nuclear energy development
' projects. -
- The toughest issue faced by JSP and Komeito negotiators provsd to be that
of how to treat the Japan Communist Party (JCP) either with regard to the
planning for or formation of an anti-LDP coalition. Firmly committed to
an anti-JCP position, Komeito and the moderate DSP earlier rejected it as
an alliance partner, explicitly stating they have serious misgivings about ~
the Japanese communists' sincerity in a~hering to the principles of polit-
ical pluralism.
As it turned>out, the socialists dropped their residual deference for the
JCP as a comrade in the camp of Marxism-Leninism and agreed with Komeito
to exclude, "Urtder the present circumstances," the JCP from the coalitior~
talks. The socialists insist that the accord with Komeito is meant to
cover tlie first, half of the 1980's only and riot to rule out communist
partnership for good. The JSP-Komeito decision to keep the JCP from the
joint dx~ve to unseat the LDP government represents, nonetheless, a turn-
about in the JSP's previous policy in favor of an all-embracing, opposition
front. -
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(hi ti~e other mujor policy issuea as well, it aeems to be the aocialiets,
rather than Komeito, that has conceded more to malce a common program a
reality. Instead of calling for an iffinediate and unilateral abrogation
of the aecurity treaty with the U.S., the JSP now 3oins the Komeito in
regarding it as something they must live with for the foreaeeable future. -
The JSP-Komeito policy agreement calls for the creation of an international =
_ environment of a kind that no longer requires the treaty. The two parties
say, further, that they will seek its termination through diplomatic nego-
tiations with the United States.
The JSP~Komeito agreement also says that the ~l~F inay be retained for the
time being under effective civilian control. It is, how~ver, in favor of
- holding studies about a possible reorganization or reduction of the forces
- in the future when this becomes feasible. ~he JSP-Komeito common policy
program is more reserved about the nuclear power projects than is the pre-
ceding Komeito-DSP statement of agreed policies. The sacialists put off
- a decision on whether or not to support the construction of new atomic
power plants. -
It is entirely possible that the JSP made these concessions to Komeito
' entirely for tactical reasons. Even if the socialists offered to be less
doctrinaire and take a few steps toward the center only for political
expediency, it is equally true that they are now under powerful compul-
sion to ~demonstrate greater flexibility.
The general election of last October produced an impression of the contin-
uing erosion in electoral support for the LDP. The opposition groups in
~ alliance seem to have a better chance than at any time in the past to ex- `
ceed the conservative party in parliamentary strength.
The October election, however, also reinforced the bel.ief that the social-
ists are as much in trouble as are the liberal-democrats. They are likely
to keep going down as long as they refuse to part with the faded slogans
_ conceived as far back as in the 1950's and stop counting on friendly labor
unions to deliver all the votes they need. Most opposition parties seem
to stand to gain in the upper house election this summer, but the outloak
fa,r the socialists is anqthing but encouraging. They will surely benefit
from vote-poolirig arrangements with Komeito and perhaps with the DSP as .
, well. ~
The JSP's turn toward the centrist parties and away from the Com~unist Party
is a welcome development conduci~�re to the better functioning of parliamen-
tary democracy in this cou?atry. But that does not yet assure that we will
have soan a credible, non-co~nunist replacement for the LDP government.
COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times 1980
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'JAPAN TIMES' ON RESULTS OF OHIRA'S OCEANIA VISIT
OW230603 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 22 Jan 80 p 12 OW
[Editorial: "Future of Pacific Democracies"]
_ [Text] Australia and New Zealand certainly deserve more visits by
Japanese prime ministers than once in five years and a half. It may
be also true that Mr. Masayoshi Ohira could have usefully stayed there
longer than he did last week. Stability and the growth of cooperaCion
in the Asia-Pacific region commands premium va'ue to our security at the
turbulent opening of the 1980s. And clearly, any.constructive endeavor
to build a hopeful future for the region needs to be supported by a
firm partnership between Japan and the two western Pacific democracies.
Though Mr. Ohira's Oceania visit lasted for less than five full days,
he and his hosts have made most use of the occasion to emphasize, their
_ concerns about some recent developments endangering world peace, and
the vital ties of economic interdependence binding Japan with Australia
and New Zealand. _
A statement issued last WPdnesday by Prime Ministers Ohira and Fraser -
_ was particular~.y notable For the forthrightness with which they opposed
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as well as ~he Iranian seizure
of the U.S. Embassy and hostage-taking in Tehran. The Soviet action in
Afghanistan was deplored as a direct violation of that country's
sovereignty. Reasons~cited by the Soviets for it were re~ected "without
- legal and moral ~ustification." The Japan-Australia statement asked _
- Iran t.o free the hostages first of all, telling its suthorities that the
continued holding of the hostages "threatens the reasoned and civilized
conduct of relations among states."
_ Stable supplies of coal, uranium and natural gas from Australia are z~
matter of critical importance to Japan today when much of its oi1
imports is dangerously destabilized by the political upheavals in the -
, Middle East. Australia appreciated this Japanese anxiety and reaffirmed,
in a most encouraging manner, its intention to meet the Japanese
requirements.
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Prime Ministers Ohira, Fraser and Muldoon were also agreed in recog-
nizing that the future relations between Japan and the two western ~
Pacific democracies w311 eventually have to be anchored in a larger
framework of cooperation, enveloping the enCire Pacific community of
nations. In this regard, Mr. Fraser's offer to step up researches on
the concept of Pacific basin cooperation with an international
symposium in Australia should be highly gratifying to Prime Minister
Ohira, a declared advocaCe of the idea.
- The Ohira visit did not seem to produce much progress, however, over
some questions of immediate interest to the two host countries.
- Japan must~attend seriously to these practical needs in Australia and
New Zealand, because the three countries have a manifest and shared
destiny ahead in working for the evolution of a peaceful Pacific com-
munity.
COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times, 1980
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAC.AND SOCIOLOGICAL
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_ 'JAPAN TIMES' VIEWS SELF-DEFENSE FORCE SPY CASE / ;
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OW230607 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 22 Jan 80 p 12 OW ;
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[Editorial: "The GSDF Espionage Case"]
[Text] These days spies at high places ~.ze no longer shocking Co most . ~
of us. Yet the arrest of a three-man team of agei~ts working for the
Sovi~t Union was news to.the nation because the trio was headed by a
former intelligence specialist,in the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)
_ and his two junior colleagues ~are,GSDF officers on active duty.
- According to the Metropolitan Police Department ~MPD), whose securitiy ;
officers uncovered the spy ring, ex-Major General Yukihisa Miyanaga ;
has been offering classified information to his Soviet contacts in ~
Tokyo probably since as far back as 1970.
Ever since the end of World War II, Japan has been labeled a paradise '
for spies because there is no anti-espionage law in this country. This '
does not mean, however, that there are no state secrets and ather i
classified informaCion that cannot be turnpd over to foreign govern- ~
ments without hurting our national interests.
- This is the reason why there are laws that forbid such a Cransfer of ~
information. In the case of the GSDF men in question, they are alleged '
to have violated the self-defense forces law, which makes it criminal
_ for a member of the self-defense forces to "leak" secrets he came to ,
possess in the course of his official duty. This prohibition app?ies ;
to the personnel after Cheir retirement as well, with a penalty of one '
year in prison for a viola*_ion. ;
As a matter of fact, such a prohibition is incorporated in the civil
service law, which binds all civil servants in this regard. ~
The collection of intelligence is done by every country as a necessity
to preserve and enhance its own national interests. We cannot blame
- Soviet or any other foreign intelligence officers operating in Japan for
~ doing their ~ob. But Japanese citizens cooperating with them muat be
~ punished by whatever relevant law affecting them.
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Since Japan has no military secrets of the kind that might radically
alter the fate of mankind when they go into the wrong hands, what
intelligence may have been turned over to Moscow probably has done
litt].e practical damage to our national interests.
Yet, the case of ex-Gen. Miyanaga bespeaks a definite laxity in the
_ discipline of the self-defense forces. It also suggests that the
particular instance uncovered this time may be only a small portion
of a much larger picture that may or may not be yet revealed.
At least to prevent further erosion of popular confidence in our defense
establishment, the currenC GSDF espi~nage case must ba Choroughly
probed. And in that process, means for preventing the recurrence o�
similar inGidents may be found.
~ COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times, 1980 ~
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POLITICaL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
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OHIRA: PACIFIC BASIN CONCEPT COULD INCLUDE PRC, USSR, ROK '~i
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OW161445 Tokyo JIJI in English 14Q6 GMT 16 Jan 80 OW
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[Excerpts] Canberra, 16 Jan (JIJI Press)--Japanese Prime Ministe~;,
Masayoshi Ohira said Wednesday Japan would not refuse if China, the
Soviet Union and South Korea hope to join his "Pacific basin coopera-
tion concept." ~
1~ .
He expressed the view in his second-round talks with Prime Minister
Malcolm Fraser ir. tre afternoon.
They agreed to hold the first private-level seminar at the Australian
Natio:ial University in Canberra this autumn as a first step for the
materialization of the concept.
As for bilateral relations, they agreed on the establishment of a
1i "working holiday system" proposed by Australia for interchange of ~
- youths of the two countries.
Concerning the "working holiday system" Australia had informally
suggested earlier, Ohira promised to study it positively after
receiving a formal proposal.
Under the system, youths of both nationa would stay in each other's
country for a long time, working as language teachere, for example, to
deepen mutual understanding.
Referring to what is said to be the world's highest air fare between ~
Tokyo and Sydney, Fraser proposed a drastic cuC. Ohira answered he
hopes a satisfactory conclusion will be reached at a meeting of civil
- aviation officials of the two countries scheduled for February. '
As for coope.ration in the resources and energy fields, they merely con-
firmed the contents of t~?eir joint press stat~ement, which was issued ~
after the talks, on account of a time limit. They will discuss concrete
problems over breakfast Thursday.
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POLITICAL AND SOGIOLOGICAL
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' JAPAN TIMES' COLUMDTIST VIEWS ' LESSONS' FROM AFGHAII INCIL~ENT
OW150353 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 13 Jan 80 n 1-4 OW
- ["Our Times" column by Masaru Ogawa: "Lessons From Af~han Rape"] �
_ [Text] Japan's opposition political parties displayed rare unanimity
with the governing Liberal-Democratic Party last week in con~iemnir~g the
- Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and caliing for the immediate
withdrawal of Moscow's sizable invasion forces.
This was only natural, for the Japanese cc.;nsensus is that this naked
aggression on a neighboring nation constitutes a grave and serious threat ~
to world peace.
Even the Japan Co~unist Party, which had just mended fences with its
_ Soviet comrades last m~nth, found itself forced t~ break its silence'~nd
_ to join the public outcry.
_ Bu~ the JCP, of course, did not forget to devote the major portion of its .
"protest" to a tirade against the United States' "intervention" in reprisals
against the Soviet military action. It is resorting to that old trick of
confusing the issue by conveniently forgetting which action came first.
Indeed, while the JCP had to bow to local pub lic opinion in view of its
political future--especially with this summer's House of Councillors' -
election in mind, the Soviet propaganda machine is operating full blast
not only to "justify" its invasion but also to threaten nations contem-
plating participation in economic and political sanctions against the USSR.
Japan is naturally aware of its proximity to the Soviet Union and of the ~
many problems which exist between the two countries, not the least of which _
are the Japanese northern territories, fisheries and Siberian development
projects.
But these issues have not 3.essened Japan's feeling of shock, repulsion and
outrage over the Soviet military attack on Afghanistan. While this reaction
is common to all civilized nations, it should not be allowed to pass without
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putting this a~;gression into proper perspective for future reference and
_ application so that this grave threat Co global peace will not be repeated.
In the words of Foreign Minister Saburo Okita, Japan "must learn a les~on"
from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan by reassessing Tokyo-Moscow
- relations. He made this comment in noting that the Soviet aggression ~
occurred despite the existence of an Afghan-Soviet treaty of friendship,
, good neighborliness and cooperation. .
Okita did not elaborate further on what steps Japan would take in its re-
assessment of Soviet relations, but Moscow for the past several years has
= been propasing Tokyo's acceptance of a friendship and good neighbor pact
~ to take the place of. a peace treaty, which tlze two nat~ons have been unable
to agree upon since .1956.
The Afghan experience w~�?:i suggest that it is dangerous to enter into
a treaty with the Soviet Union, whatever it may be called which can be
used as a pretext for invasion. There is also no safeguard in maintaining =
a pro-Soviet regime, unless it is willing to become a fawning puppet. _
'The Sovi~ts have demonstrat~ed, moreovPr, that they will deploy their own
= troops i:~ a military Uacuum where the nation's defense forces are com-
pletely disorganized and unlikely to resist effectively or to seek outside
succor.
~ This means that Japan's self-defense forces should be kept in active pre-
paredness to resist any aggressor at the initial stages at least in a -
- holding ~.ction until outsid~ assistance can be mobilized.
There is also need to activate the U.S.-Japan security treaty to a point =
where it will be judged a real deterrent against an attack. Japan must
naturally take the initiative in this effort and not leave it up to the ;
U.S. where the feeling persists that this nation is taking a"free ride"
on its security. -
The reassessment process should also include the question whether .Tapari`s
all-directional diplomacy of being the friend of. all nations and the enemy
of none leaves the nation with any real allies in times of its own crisie.
This means it must not be afraid of taking a position on giobal iasues
and it must prove itself a true friend in need.
= It is not enough, in this period of turbulence which has gripped the world,
for Japan to emphasize its devotion to peace: It must join other nations
in positive moves to stem aggression and to show that violence does not
PaY� ,
The current round o� Soviet-instigated aggression has its beginning w.ith
the communist success in Vietnam in 1975. With war-weary U.S, and other
~ democratic nations putting up only token opposition, Angola, Ethiopia and
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- South Yernen came under Soviet influence. To thia could be added last
year's Viernamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia. And now, it is
Afghaniatan.
~Regrettably, recent'events are proving that crime.does pay off and that
- one successful aggression breeda another. Z'here is need to call a hal.t.
But this can only succeed through united efforta and the employment of all
economic and political means, not excluding the boycott of the Moecow -
olympic games.
What is amazing at this stage is that tb~ ~apan S,ocialist Party and the
- Komeito, the nation's two opposition parties aspiri~g to repl.ace the LDP -
with a cQalition regime, agreed on a;;"basic policy of gradually eliminating
the U.S.~-Japan security ~~~ct and evzntually down-grading the self-defense
forces. ~
One wondeLs whether they know what'is taking place outside the peaceful
Japanese '"paradise." Were they on?~y going through the motion and giving -
lip-service in their conde~ation :last week of the Soviet rape of Afghan-
istan? When will they ~+~ake up? ~
COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times 1980
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'JAPAN TIMES' ON ECONQMIC TIES, IRAN,..AFGHANISTAN
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OW160639 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in ~nglish 15 Jan 80 p 5 OW i-
' [Commentary by Kentaru Koshiba: "Japan Economie Ties at Stake"] '
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- [Text] The Iranian and Afghan crises provide disturbxng examples of how _
Japan's bilateral economic cooperation can be adversely affected by external '
developments that are beyond its control. ~
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_ In Iran, the netrochemical project in which the Japanese Government also
- has a stake is deadlocked. The prospects for its early resumption are
clouded by the continuing Iran-U.S. confrontation and moves by the U.S. ~
and its allies, including Japan to apply economic sanctions. ;
That project, involving an estimated cost of about yen 700 billion, had I
been stalled by the Islamic revolution. But the government's decision ta '
provide financial backing, r.eached in late 1979, saved it from collaps~, ~
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The situation suddenly changed. However, after the seizure of the American ~
Embassy in Tehran, where radical Iranian students took some 50 Americans
hostage. ~
Japan protested against the action in strong terms, though somewhat be- I
latedly, and expressed support for the U.S. attempt to impose economic ;
sanctions.
There was no other alternative for Japan but to go along with the U.S. ;
Japan's choice was extremely narrow, and it still is--maintaining its I
trade and economic ties with Iran as much as possible while.keeping in ~
step with Western countries. ~
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So far no serious disruptions have reportedly occurred in those relations. ;
- On the contrary, Japan has clinched a direct oil deal to import 520,000 ;
barr.els a day from Iran, or 14 percent more than this country contracted
to buy last year.
But this is no ground for self-complacency. Iran's revolutionary govern- '
~ ment apparently reserves the right to take "retaliatory" action if and when
_ the U.S. and its friends.go ahead and impose tough sanctions. ~
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Tehran has already dErkly warned, in fact, that Iran would cut off oil
exports to countries that joined in the U.S~-propoeed sanctions. The
_ fear is that, in a worsening climate of Japan-Iran relationa, the reaump-
tion of the petrochemical pro~ect, the symbol of economic cooperafiion
- between the two nations, migint be further delayed.
- Meanwhile, the prospects far Japan-Soviet economic cooperation are clouded
- by the Afghan crisis. The U.S., as in the~case of the Iran crisis, is
. trying to rally its allies behind its moves to "punish" Ruasia by economic
means. ~
Japan is not in a position of being ahle to take any strong punitive action -
against the Russians any more than it can against the Iraniana. Among the
- steps ~hat have been suggested so far are the following: '
--Holding up negotiations on new development projects in Siberia, such as
those to produce pulp and lumber and construct port facilities.
--Suspending new credits and loans to help finance thoae projects, es~imated -
at about $1.2 b illion.
~ --Restricting the sale of sensitive high-technology products, such as com-
~ puters, that are subject to the approval of the Coordinating Commiteee for
Export to Communist Countries (COCOM).
At the mo~ent, the gavernment is taking a"wait and see" attitude. Bu*_
- sooner or later it is likely to be compelled to make clear what it intends
~ to do or not to do, by way of protesting against the Soviet military i.nter-
vention in Afghanistan. .
It is the-hope of the gover~ent as we11 as the business community that
Siberian development projects, including several existing ones to produce
_ oil, natural gas and coal, will remain intact. -
Japan has nothing to gain by interfering with those project's. As is the
case with Iran, any strong protest move on Japan's part is likely to invite -
some retaliatory measures from Russia, including a ban on Japanese fighing _
in Soviet waters.
,
- Japanese participation in development projects in Iran and the Soviet Union
serve as a catalyst for economic cooperation between Japan and these coun-
tries. And such cooperation help to promote overall bilateral relations.
The basic relationship that exists here is that of economic interdependence.
Russia, like Iran, is an important exporter of naturaZ resources to Japan, _
- while Japan is a major supplier of techraa~logy.
In 1978, the Soviets exported $1.4 billion worth of goods to thia country,
of which 65 percent consisted of raw materials (e.g. lumber) and energy
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_ (coal and fuel oil). In the same year, Japan aold $2,5 billion worth,
mostly in chemical and heavy-indtistry goods.
_ 7'he philosophy that supporta this relationahip, at least from the Japaneae
point of view, is that politics and economics should be separated. The
same principle applies to Japan-Iran relations.
But the Iranian and Afghan crises put this principle of "seikei bunri" -
(separating politics from economics) to a severe test. Both make it clear '
that bilateral economic cooperation can be hamstrung by political decisions
- forced by external events.
COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times 1980
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
FINANCE MINISTRY: 'BUREAUCRATIC PARADISE', OFF ICIALS DEFEND THEIR INTERESTS
Tokyo ASAHI JANARU in Japanese 26 Oct 79 pg 100-104
[Text] Mutual Entertaining Inherent Among Japanese
- Astonishing facts concerning the "bureaucratic paradise" havP been brought
to light in successive expases, beginning with the mismanagement of accounts
within the Japan Railway Construction CorporaCion. Especially at thia time
when the reconstruction of national finance is demanded, the existence of
- "dinner party politics" whereby bureaucrats entertain each other with the
taxpayer's money, and the fact that the Finance Ministry stands at the apex
of such conduct, were totally incomprehensible from the standpoint of the -
people who face i~ninent tax increases. The major defeat of the Liberal
Democratic Yarty in the recent Lower House elections--known as the "tax
increase elections" and led by Prime Miniater Ohira, who had stated during
part of the campaign thaX "a tax increase is inevitahle"--cannot be sepa-
rated from these exposes. Also, the soil in which "dinner party politica"
was nurtured is not peculiar to the Kasumigaseki government district of
Tokyo. It is indeed endemic throughout Japan.
About 2 months ago, an article in the British magazine EURO MONEY, entitled `
"Finance Ministry Bureuacrats--The Most Powerful Group in Japan," was trans-
. lated by the Japanese Ministry of Finance and distributed internally as -
ministry data. It is an extremely interesting article resulting from 6
weeks of research conducted by the magazine's correspondent in Tokyo, and _
it introduces the makeup of the Japanese Government as well as various
aspects of the Finance Ministry bureaucrats. The following is an excerpt
of the article. -
"It Is Painful To Be Held Up for Exposure"
- (After dwelling on the popularity of young and elite Finance Ministry '
bureaucrats as prospective bridegrooms,) the article pointa out that a
marriage with a Finance Ministry bureaucrat does not necessarily become a
happy one. By the time the many young daughters with prominent connections
realize that the Finance Ministry bureaucrat is overworked and underpaid,
it is too late. They realize the difficulty of adjusting from the spacious
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and traditional homes where they were brought up to the narrow and dilapi- _
_ dated government housing where the majority of the young bureaucrats must
live. Among such wives are some who suspect that the hueband's late return
- home is not due to budget drafting, but to carousing in the teachouses.
The number of such wives has undoub tedly increased with the recent expose
~ of "dinner party politics " among Finance Ministry bureaucrats.
As investigations by the Board of Audit into the Japan Railway Construction
Corporation progressed, reports began to filter out that "Finance Ministry
~ officials are demanding dinner party entertainment" or that "they are passing
dinner checks on to their clients for payment." As a result, late last -
month Administrative Vice Minister Nagaoka of the Finance Ministry ordered
Chief of Secretariat Matsushita to conduct "a strict irivestigation." So ~
far, however, while taking the position that "demanding dinner parties and
passing on dinner checks are unconscionable a~ts," the official posture
concerning the so-called "dinner party politics" has been that "it does
not deviate from social common sense."
If so, how does the Finance Ministry itself construe the "entertainment
of Finance Ministry bureaucrats"? The following opinions are those of the
Budget Bureau, which is at the focal point of the controversy. Mr A(in
his 40's) is a budget officer. Mr B(in his 30's) is an assistant budget -
officer. Both are Tokyo University graduates and career bureaucrats (elites ~
who passed the higher civil service examinations to join the ministry). The
following report was prepared from recollections of conversation at an inex-
pensive bar where the bureaucrats were entertained with the meager po~ket
money of the reporter.
(Mr A) Concerning the current exposure of "entertaining Finance Ministrq
_ bureaucrats," my frank reaction at the moment is that it is "painful." In
theory, I can only admit that "you are right. We don't in the least con-
sider it a good thing." Moreover, if we were to try to refute it, we would -
- be immediately subjected to a sound drubbing. Therefore, we can only bear
it for the moment. However, inwardly, we are left with mixed feelings.
' That is, we would like you to understand that we do not at all accept dinner
invitations from other ministries and agencies simply for the sake of drink-
ing and having a good time. We accept the invitations because we believe
that "in the present makeup of Japanese society, a certain amount of lubri-
cation is indispensible." Since we do not go a].ong with the practice as
something "inevitable," we feel it "painful" when we are unilaterally
attacked as the "xoot of various evils."
(Mr B) In a word, it is truly "painful." The work in the Budget Bureau
is extremely hard work, ~nparalleled elsewhere. Especially during the
budget drafting season from September until the end of the year, we return
home in the middle of the night and often sleep at the office. There are
often no Sundays or ho~.idays off for us. Of course, we would like to go
home early and eat a home-cooked meal, but when we are asked, "How about
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having dinner.with us tonight?" we go along. The assistant budget officer
~ and oth~r younger staffers return to the office after the dinner and con-
tinue their work. Despite the current furor over the "entertaining of
Finance Ministry bureaucrats," we would probably accept an invitation to-
- night if there were to b~ one.
(Mr A) It is not so enjoyable to drink and eat with officials of other
ministries and agencies wita whom we are not intimate friends. The reason
the custom has prevailed is that, if I were to reject a long cuatom, I
would be branded as an eccentric. I aould not mi.nd it if I were to be -
considered as such merely within our owa miniatry. If the opposite minis-
try or agency were to think so, work on the budget would not proceed
smoothly. Additionally, in Japanese society work can be conducted smoothly
only after the participants have had some drinks together at dinner and
- are able to mutually relax.
Japanese Custom To Reveal True Intentions "Over Dinner"
_ (Mr B) That is true. During the dayti.me when we are shawn the budget
drafts across the desk at the office, our clients are accompanied by their -
aides, and their explanations tend to center entirely on the "importance of _
this or that phase of the budget." It is inevitably confiaed to rhetoric
on the basic principles. As for discussion of the substance, such as "Item -
A is requested as a matter of routine, but Item B is an absolute necessity,"
- this will only be brought out in the evening over dinne~. For exauiple, we
would never discuss with you at the office, during the daytime, what we
are discussing with you now. I have absolutely no confidence that I can do
justice to the assessment of a budgeti draft merely on the basis of daytime
explanations.
(Mr A) We would only be happy if our work could be accomplished on the
basis of daytime negotiations at the office. It is perhaps possible in a
foreign country, but unfortunately it is still impossible in Japan. For
~ the work to be conducted smoothJ.y, there are certain essentials which _
transcend rhetoric. Even we in the Kasumigaseki government district cannot
be isolated from the Japanese custom of partying among businessmen and -
politicians, referred to as the "expense account paradise" or "expense
account elites." To disregard this fact and to punish pub lic expense
entertraining is to be unrealistic and pretend to be a friend of justice.
Nonetheless, the Finance Ministry cannot air this fact openly, since it
would inevitably become the target of a concentrated attack. Therefore,
we can oniy say, "It is painful to be sub~ected to such criticism."
- (Mr B) It could of course be pointed out that the issue concerning the
"entertaining of Finance Ministry bureaucrats". lies in the use of the tax-
payer's money, unlike entertaining among the businesa co~nunity. However,
from the standpoint of the total 38,600 billion yen budget, it is a mere
pittance. If society can function smoothly because of it, it should be
o~verlooked, The issue should rather be, for instance, the waste of the
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_ taXpayer's money by the Mitsui Group which started the Iran petrochemical I_
industry project for profit and could not finish it, necessitating the ~
national treasuty to come forward with 20 billion yen. Moreover, although ' ;
= there have been various criticisms, such as "Finance Ministry officials
clemand entertainment" or "bureaucrats are angered when taxie are aent .
instead of limousines to pick them up" or "the officials ask for geishas," ` ~
can you imagine either Mr Nagaoka (administrative vice minisfer and former.
Budget Bureau chief) or Mr Tanaka (present Budget Bureau chief) making
such demands? ~
(Mr A) After a11, the Finance Ministry consists of human beings, and there
may have been some individuals throughout its long history who made auch
senseless rema.rks. However, they were exceptions and should not be con- '
doned. In considering the present members of the Budget Bureau, I am ce.r-
tain there is no one who would be so foolish. On the other hand, I some-
how feel that some members of the other ministries and agencies (who do the
- entertaining) might be a bit oversensitive and overeager to please.
(Mr B) In any case, the recent uproar wi11 probably leave us with a residue
~ of distaste for a long time. What we fear most is reaction such as "the
nerve of those fellows at the Finance Ministry to say such things after
making us squander public funds" at this ti.me when we firmly believe that
financial reconstruction is our prime task for the sake of Japan's economy.
tde niust ask for a tax increase while making strict assessments of.budget
requests. There is a big difference between money required for financial
reconstruction and public funds used for entertaining. ~
Of course, it is easy to refute a11 this, and some may have a sense of~ I
repulsion towards the Finance Ministry officials for throwing up their ,
hands while admitting that "we would be subjected to a barrage of criticism j
if we were to argue our point openly." '
~
Nonetheless, the problem of "entertaining at public expense" which is rooted
deeply in the soil of the Japanese climate cannot be dismissed. It is a
society where a wide discrepancy exists between principle and substance,
and where the influence of "acquaintance" is strong. Even on the osten-
sibly businesslike scene of budget negotiations, it is a sentimental
society wherein the human relations between the requesting parties and the `
- assessors are subtly reflected. Entertaining not only among government
officials, but also of politicians and government officials by private
business, is a well known fact. It sometimes results in criminal cases,
but it is a ~ecognized and common practice if it is conducted for purposes
of "getting acquainted" or "holding heart-to-heart talks."
That is to say, the Finance Ministry bureaucrats are not the only ob~ects
of entertaining at public expense. As the economy and society become in- _
creasingly complex, administrative problems faced by the ministries and
agencies alsa increase. This has resulted in a cloaely interwoven syetem
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- of "dinner party po.litics," whereby Office A entertains Office B, Office
B entertains Office C and Office C entertains Office A. Naturally a
conspicuously large number of Finance Ministry bureaucrats, centering in
the Budget Bureau and Finance Bureau which hold the powerful authority of
= assessing budget requests and financial investment plans, tend to be the
- objects of such entertaining.
Japan is a nation where the salaried worker--living in a"rabbit hutch'!--
is lavishly entertained at an outrageously expenaive cabaret on the Ginza
or a high-class teahouse in the Akasaka district or is out on the golf
course on a workday at public expense. The bureaucrats of the Kasumigaseki
government district are also deeply immerse~l in this custom, but they are
not the only sinners.
Rhetoric of Entertainers: "To Build Effective Relations"
_ Now for the explanation of "those who entertain Finance Ministry buresu-
- crats." The speaker is a veteran section chief (in his 40's) of a compara-
tively small central government agency. "We can well understand the feelinga
of the Finance Ministry bureaucrat who complained that the criticism was
'painful.' Since we are a small agency, we hold three main dinner parties
a year at which we include budget officers: When the budget is passed by
the Diet, during the summer season of personnel shifts, and in September
when the budget requests are submitted. However, each budget officer or
_ assistant budget officer is in charge of several government agencies and,
since each bureau in the larger ministries does its own entertaining, it
must be quite a burden on those who are entertained.
"Meanwhile, it is a rather delicate matter concerning whether or not th~
_ Finance Ministry bureaucrats ever demand such entertainment. At least at
our agency, there are none received from career budget officers or assistant
~udget officers. That is probably because they have wide jurisdictions, are
entertained frequently and do not wish to damage their careers. It is dif-
ferent in the case of the lower-echelon, non-career officers who have not
passed the higher civil service examinations. Of course, they do not make
open demands, such as 'How about a party tonight?' But we do get the mes-
sage somehow through telepathic communication.
"We sense their intention and invite them. The venue for such parties is
a grade lower in class than that used for the budget officer class, and
~ taxis are used instead of limousines. Assuming that non-career officers
would be more at ease with other non-career officers, section chiefs from
our side do not attend.
"It could be said that entertaining by us is, in effect, related to approval
- of our budget requests. However, it does not mean we exp~ct immediate re-
sults, such as going easy on assessments or increasing our.budget alloca-
tions. It could be said it is for the sake of better relations, or in the
typically Japanese manner of mutual greetinga during the midyear and
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yearend sessions. Once we have exchanged cups of 'sake' together, there
will be a difference in a single telephone call. It is for this reason
- that we are also entertained by other ministries and. agencies.
"The worst thing possible from the standpoint of the entertaining side is
to offend the feelings of those who are entertained. That would defeat
the whole purpose of en*_ertaining. Therefore, when entertaining Finance -
- Ministry officials, we exchange information with agencies in similar situa- ~
= tions concerning the venues and levels of entertaining. Especially when a
- certain budget officer goes on an inspection tour to the provinces, the
provincial offices are in a dither. Since not only our provincial office,
but also the provincial offices of all the ministries or agencies under
the jurisdiction of the budget officer are involved, they take turns in
entertaining him. They are sensitive to each other and compete in their
treating. ~ ,
As a result, the custom tends to escalate every year. The section chief
must prove his ability in raising such funds. In a small office, even
diverting convention funds does not suffice, and pains are taken to raise
money from off ice expenses and miscellaneous funds. A bona-fide restaurant
charges about 50,000 yen per person and taxi~fares nowadays a.re nothing to
scoff at. Since our office is small, and we are within surveillance dis- -
tance fram other offices, we do not have bogus trips. But there are probably
- offices which fake trips in order to create fu:.ds."
"Public Expense Paradise" Is Outcome of Japan's Social Fellowship
The distortion of social fellowship among the Japanese has cast its shadow
in the form of dinner party politics--known also as a"public expense
paradise." It is a fact that, today, the midyear and yearend exchange of -
gifts, intended to come out of one's own pocket money, are paid with office
funds, As a result, the expenses of a public employee for ceremonial
occasions (marriages, funerals, etc,), especially those of a senior bureau-
� crat, tend to accelerate in proportion to his rise in position.
The money spent towards congratulatory and condolence gifts for not only F
immediate subordinates, but also for former subordinates and job-related
acquaintances, probably exceed several tens of thousands of yen per m~nth
in the cadre class. Of course, it varies according to the extent of such
relationships, but a general rule-of-thumb is 10,000 yen for a bureau
- crief and 5,000 yen for section chiefs and under. It is utterly impossible
for one to pay out of his own pocket. One can easily imagine funds being
squeezed out of faked trips and.allocated as expense funds for cadre
officers.
Also, an example of the discrepancy between Frinciple and substance may be _
seen in the expose of "bogus a~aards" among the semigovernment special
corporations, including the Japan Railway Construction Corporation. The
Finance Ministry, which oversees the awards funds of special corporations,
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stipulates under its wage regulations that such awards "must be in accor-
dance with regulations for government employPes." Therefore, awards must
agree with those for national government empluyees. On the other hand,
special corporations employ civilian management methods, unlike government
a};enciea, and their employees are thua given the three labor (contractin~)
rights.
In other words, a peculiar situation exists in the �act that, although the
' labor union wh;ch is presumab ly protected by the three labor rights may
~ reach an agreement on awards independently as a reault of labor-management
negotiations, absolute].y no funds would be allocated for the awards in the -
budget if the amount exceeds that for national government employees. Actu- =
- , a11y, the problem has been solved by raising the difference through bogus
trips and thraugh gaps between personnel quotas and actual number of person-
nel.
Of course, such improper methods should not be permitted. But since the
problem has risen from the present discrepancy in the system based on prin- _
ciple (rather than substance), the government is painfully grappling for a
solution. Equating awards to those for government employees would mean
depriving corporate employees of the three labor rights. It wou:.d also
mean confrontation with the formidable Council of Governmental Sp%:~cial
Corporation Employees Unions and the Japan Council of National a.nd Local
Government Workers Unions, which the government has no confidence in over-
coming. On the other hand, to leave the matter to independent negotiation
would give rise to the difficult problem of incorporating the demands in
the budget draft. If they are included in the reques ts for reserve funds,
they would become the starting point for labor-management negotiations
and bring on additional requests for increases. So far, the government has
found no solution.
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In any case, while not a few bureaucrats would probab ly want to feeload
on drinking and carousing, there is no doubt that dinner party politics is
rooted to a great extent in the typical Japanese amb iguity, Therefore,
no solution can be reached by merely probing into bogus trips and other
surfacing problems. The top administrators of the Finance Ministry, who
- are now pushing a"severe investigatian," state that if insidious cases of
"passing dinner checks" and "demanda for entertainment" are found, "proper
measures will be considered." However, they say at the same time, "It is
difficult to detern:ine to what extent it is based on socxal cotrnnon sense.
For example, when a newly appointed administrator arrives on the job and
is invited to one of these parties, it probably could be considered as
"social common sense."
As long as the cencept of "social common sense" prevails, bureaucrats may
refrain temporarily from dinner party politics, but they will inevitably
resume the practice at an even greater pace. There is only one way to
eradicate the practice. That is, the government itself, or the Finance
Ministry, which is the most frequently entertained, must declare that
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"all evening entertaining must cease" and implement it. The ~overnment
. offices themselves must take the initiative in putting an end to the per-
_ nicious Japanese custom.
Amidst the furor over the cozy relationship between politicians and the
business community, Toshio Doko, "prime minister of the financial world,"
. declared on assuming the post of chairman of the Federation of Economic
Organizations (Keidanren) that he would "refuse all dinner party invita-
tions," and has actually lived up *_o his word. He has pledged to "enter
, from the front door in broad daylight if there is any business to perform"
, and asks, "How can any important issue b e discussed at a1Z at a dinner
p~rty?" ,
However, some persons feel that the Doko formula would not be practiced
outside the Keidanren, while some inside the Keidanren complain that "it
is extremely difficult to conduct business this way.", It is possible that,
when Chairman Doko retires, things will revert to former ways after a single
period of restraint. In Japan, to abolish the practice is probably com-
parable to "waiting 100 years for the Ye11ow River to flow clear."
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbunsha 1979
5884
CSO: 4105
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MILITARY
,
'JAPAN TIMES' VIEWS GRAVITY OF SELF-DEFENSE FORCE SPY CASE
OW210147 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 20 Jan 80 p 2 OW
_ [Commentary by Masanori Tabata: "Spy Case a B1ow to Defenae Planners--
How Much Did Soviets Learn of Hokkaido Troops?"]
[TextJ The unfolding espionage case that aaw the arrest of a retired top _
intelligence officer of the ground self-defense force (GSDF) and two active
duty junior GSDF intelligence officers Friday on suspicion of passing
classified information to the Soviets has dealt a h$acy blow to the nation's
defense planners and the moral of the all-volunteer self-defense forces
(SDF).
At the same time, the major espionage case has aroused the specter of spy
hunt mania, a reminiscence of the xenophobic prewar totalitarianism, under-
- scored by tY~e loud call for revived enactment of an antiespionage law, like
the official secrets act of Britain. The government, however, so far main- ~
tains a relatively cautious attitude on this score. -
A former ranking GSDF intelli~ence officer, who had worked under Yukihisa
Miyanaga, 58, the former major general who allegedly organized a spy ring
inside the GSDF's intelligence unit specializing in evaluation of Soviet
military intelligence information, was interviewed by the JAPAN TIMES. The
exintelligence officer said the most serious question is whether informa-
tion on details of ~he deployment of the frontline GSDF troops in Hokkaido,
- the northernmost of the four major islands of Japan facing the Soviet Union,
had been passed to the Soviets.
Miyanaga's three-man spy ring had been allegedly controlled by Col. Yuri
Kozlov, the military and air attache at the Soviet Embagsy in Tokyo who -
is believed to be a member of the Soviet military intelligence directorate
known as the GRU. Col. Kozlov, accompanied by his wife, hurriedly left
Tokyo for home Saturday, after declining a request from the Tokyo metro-
politan police department for an interview by citing diplomatic immunity.
- The chief of ground staff, Gen. Shigeto Nagano, told the press Friday night
that he believes Miyanaga, who retired in 1974, has had no access to the
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latest top secrets concerning the operational plans of the GSDF and the
latest weapons systems.
Bur ~hc. sou~'cce said since Miyanaga aerved as head of tre G-2, or intelli-
f;encc section oi' tlie staff, of tlie nortl~ern army headquarters in Hokkaido .
beCween 1967 and 1969, he was in a posi.tion to know almost everything
about the defense plans and details of deployment of the troops and classi-
fied data concerning characteristics and performance of individual weapons,
- ranging from rifles to tanks and artillery pieces, although information on
them is some 10 years old by now.
- Weaponry may have become obsolete in the past decade but information on
other subject matters is still valuable and dangerous in the hands of a ~
hostile foreign power as these other matters are virtually unchanged, the
source said. j
The ex-intelligence officer described hi.s former Russian-speaking boss as
an able G-2 (intelligence) ma.n. "By nature, he is a kind of man who is '
outspolcen in his likes and dislikes, although he was usually very quiet and
quite understandable as long as intelligence work is concerned. For me, he
was both an able colleague and trustworthy boss. But he was hardly called
a sociable chap by the others," he quipped.
He also said that one of Miyanaga's accomplices, lst Lt. Eiichi Kashii, 45,
was in fact his subordinate when he was in active service. Kashii was at
one time assigned to a section of the intelligence unit dealing with Korean
military affairs, he said.
"If my memory serves me correctly, I didn't think he was an excellent G-2
man. But because he was such a type of 'handy' man, I let him transfer to
an administrative section of the intelligence unit where no vital informa-
tion concerning the domestic affairs is dealt with," he said, ,
The ex-intelligence officer said that the magnitude of the damage inflicted
on Japan's armed forces is yet to be determined. But the sensational case
wi11 bring forth adverse effects on the relationship between the SDF intel-
ligence service and its U.S. counterpart or other American intelligence
services, because the disclosure of the "turncoats" has considerably under-
mined the credibility of the internal security arrangement of the Japanese
armed forces, he said.
[OW210149] Besides, strict disciplinary measures will be taken and a major ,
_ reshuffle of the SDF intelligance apparatus is almost imminent under the '
circumstances. That, in turn, will strongly affect the morale of the s-2
boys, not to mention the members of the other branches of the SDF. Ab;le
intelligence analysts are hard to come by, and their training requires ;
many years so that it is not advisable to radically r~align the intelligence
setup," he said. -
2J~
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A former veteran field agent of the public security i.nvestigation agency
of the Ministry of Justice, which maintains domeatic surveillance over both F
- Japanese and foreign subversives and other socially undesirable elements
- or groups, said that it would be safe for the public security authorfties
to assume there are more "low-grade informers" working for the Soviets
~inside the GSDr an3 the two other branches of the SDF, namely the air and
maritime self-detense forces. -
"I would say that the people at the defense agency and the SDF bases have
been far from security conscious. They are very sloppy and iasensitive in
handling classified materials from the v:iewpoint of a professional counter-
espionage agent."
He said that unless there is a change in the unwarranted optimism of the
Japanese people, who lack awareness of the evil intentions of foreign
powers, the nation will continu~uEly provide foreign intelligence services
with easy access to classified information on its security.
"Japan has been, and will be, known to both professional 3nd amateur opera-
tives alike as 'heaven for spies'," he said.
The Miyanaga affair is said to be the most successful case of Soviet eapion-
age operation in Japan in more than 20 years. This is because the three -
~ "turncoats" were all trained military intelligence officers, whose loyalty '
- to the apparatus to the SDF is usually considered to be quite strong.
In the case of the past spy scandals involving either of the two Sovi.et
intelligence services--the Committee for State Security '.cnown as the KGB,
and the GRU--the locally-recruited agents were all amateurs trained by
the local control.
~
It is yet to be known whether Miyanaga betrayed the Japanese military
secrets to the Soviets voluntarily or if he was blackmailed into doing so.
It has been known, however, that he was captured by the Russians as a
prisoner of war at the end of World War II and detained for some time in
one of the Siberian camps where systematic brainwashing was generally con-
ducted on Japanese POk's.
COPYRIGHT: THE JAPAN TIMES 1980
CSO: 4120
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ECONOMIC ~
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STEEL COMPANIES SEE FUTURE IN OVERSEAS PROJECTS j
Tokyo BUSINESS JAPAN in English Jan 80 pp 73, 75 ~
- ~Article by Tsunesada Someya, editorial writer, Nihon Kogyo SlZimbun]
CTextl ~
J APAN'S steel industry is enjoyinS a In tisc;il I')7R, liuwever, thc stcel
favorable demand for stccl products companies' s;iles and earnin~;s st~rtcd -
in Uoth the domestic and ovcrseas to improve as a result of thcir el'funs
m~ukets. I3ene(itting from the rise in
sales prices, steel companies reported to rationalize operations and because
thc highcst sales and carnings in his- of the improvement in thc busincss !
environment. Output of crudc stcel .in !
tory at thcir intcri~n accuunting in ~
- Scpteml~er 1I79. They havr, aiso becn fscal 1978 rose to 105,050 million '
coopcrating intcrnationally shrough tons and is bcing produced this fiscal '
p:~rlicipation in such ~i;int ~~rojects as ycar at a pace that should raisc it to j
the construction of the "r~ibaron steel 110,000 million tons. This ~vill be the ;
?nill in I3razil and tlic Shanphai third highest output in hisCory after
I'aasliun stccl mill in China, fiscal 1974, an indication that produc- ~
tion is recovering vcry favorahly.
~v(any pcnding problems, however, ,
cnnfr~>nt them, ~uch as thc rising costs Exparts I11JC 1IS0 bccn E`i~king up
stcmming trom thc hikc in crudc oil ~~~ring this pcriod. In fiscal U78, thc~
totaled 31,280,000 tons in voli~mc, a
rrices, the nced to raise the prices c~f decline of 8.7% from the preceding '
stccl materials to cope ~:~ith the uil (iscal year, but in terms of value,
~~rice markups, and thc sharp incrcase hip,her by 15.9%, ame~unling lo .US-
in imports ~~t~ stccl matcri~~ls fr~~m ~13~~~U million. It surpassc~ thc ~~re-
' ~~;iriuus cuuntrics. 7'he sleel com~~;inies vious hi~liest figure of IJSS 12,i0U ~
t':~c~ tlie dilficult situ,ition ol' whetlier l1UII1011 recarded in tisc;il 1~)74. The
liic~~ can sunnc~unt tl~e lonE;-term s!o~v- recoi'd was achieved despite the dec-
~i~~;~~i~ and c,labli~h lhc l~~nd,ition i~or line in export volumc becausc thc s~ccl
,tahle ~;ruwtli. canpanies instituted price hikes to '
As a rrsult oi' Ihc oil crisis in 1973, improve thcir pro(it margins.'fhc avcr� ~
the Japancsc steel industry ~v;is plung- age price of USS145 pcr ton in (iscal
ed into,i scrious recessinn with a sharp 1978 was ~96 higher tlian in the
fall in demand ;end sales prices. For preceding year.
inst;~nce, uutput of hlister steel which On t}ie domestic marhet, tlie manu-
- tot,iled i'0,OIU million tuns in fiscal facturers have left prices unchanged
1~)73~ fcll to 1G~1,000 million tons in for the past ihree years. As a resull of
1977, ,i s~ccp drop ol' 16;:~. As ;i rewlt, the improvemcnt in supply and de- '
the stcel aimp,inics ~~�cnt sub;t;u~tially mand, ho~vevera sli~l~t hike in prices oi '
intc~ the red aud fcars c~!' bankruptcy steel deliverel directly to both users i
c:mer~ed. and wholesalcrs is likely. ~
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1~lcanwliilc, the slccl cotnpanics are volume, Ihe ratio of intports to the
rationalizing lhcir operations. For ex- entire volume of consuinption is still
ample, tliey are tr~~ing to economize low, but t}~e steel companies are con- -
on the consumption of fuel and re- cerned since the recent pace of in-
sources, improve the compositiun crease is swift. _
_ ratios of thcir }~ruducts, reducc thc _
sire of lheir worh I'orce by cutting Many Overseas Project
back on the hiring oF new employees,
check investments in 'new facilities, Japanese steelmakers, however, are
and ligliten tl~eir financial burden cooperating positively witli the less
through repayment of loans. developed nations in establishing ne~v
Tlie foregoing efforts have paid off, steel mills and expanding tl~ose already
and the steel companies' sales and in operation. 7'his is because they
earnings have shown a rapid recovery. consider such cooperation a natural
According to the interim settlement of obligation for Japan whi~h is indus-
accounts in September 1979, the five trially advanced, and they alsu regard
major steelmakers-Japan Steel Corpo- it as a major part of thcir business _
- ration, Nippon Kokan K.K., Sumi- strategy in view oC the fact that all
tomo Fleavy Industries Co., Ka~vasaki major stcehnakers are seeking to ex-
Steel Corp., and Kobe StecT - regis; pand their engineering operations.
~ tered sales of ~'3,570,000 millioii and Specific projects include tlie follo~v-
current carnings of Y2~1,600 tn~llion. ing:
_ I3oth sales and earnings wcrc the higli- Overall cooperation by ]apan Steel
est semi-anmial accounting ~gures ever Corporation in providing tecf~nalogy,
recorded. facilities, funds and supervision for llie
Wit}i the interim September aa construction of tlie 1'aoshan steel mill
counting as the peak, however, corpo- in Shanghai. [t will be an integrated
ritc sales and earnings havc shown plant with a potential annual output
si~~s of worseniii; ~uring thc latter of 6 million tons of blister steel, a
half of this liscal ~year. '1'his is due to project which might be called a
the fncrease in the prices oC oil, nwly- symbol of Sino-Japanese cooperation.
beden~nn (a nnn-f'crrous metal) and Target date for start of opcration is -
subsidiary matcrials, thc hi~;hcr ii~tcr- i983.
est burdcn stemmin~; fr~iin tlic liike in In 13razil, K8W8S:tICI Steel Corp. is.
_ the discount rc~te, and ~the rise in extending cooperalion in providing
import costs of iron ore and coking . funds, technology and I'acilities for the
coal. conslructiun of thc Tubarun stcel mill,
According to Eishiro Sato, presi- a three-way joint project with Italy j~
dcnt of Ja~~an Stccl Corporation, thc and 13razil's national stccl corporation.
cost incrcasc will rangc I'rom 7�8`l0, and "Thc plant, whicli is snc~~lulc~ to go on
so hc cl:iims tliat a hike in steel prices sUcam in f~)fi2, will bc an inlcE~,r,ited
- is necessciry. lle has made it clear thal mill capahlc of praducing 3 million
thcy ~vill bc raiscd aroimd April. tons of bli~tcr stccl annu,illy. f~ull-scalc
Anullicr rruhlcm is that imports of cunstructi~~n will Fct unJcr way in
stcel materinls have been rising sharp- early 1~)80.
ly, from 21 l.05~ toits in fiscal 1977 to 7'hcrc arc also man}~ othcr pr~jccts
718,$58 tons in fiscal 1978. In thc for whi~h cuopcration is bcing rc-
(irst half ot~ fiscal 1979 alone, thcy qucsled and whicli are cxpccted to
amount to 7G5,174 tons, already ex- , materialize hcrcaflcr. For instance, the
ceedin~ the volume of the preceding Soviet Union has; asked Japau to pro- ~
tiscal year. Most of the products con- vide wide-ran6ing lielp in the construc-
sist of I~lates and steel ingots, including tion of a large-scale integrated steel
semi�finished items. C~norting coun- mill in the country's far eastern region
tries are chicfly the industrially devel- witlran annual production capacity of
oping countrics such as Taiwan and ]0-]5 million tons of blistcr stcel.
Sc~uth Korea. Despite the increased Tl~ere are increasingly strong indica- ~
tions of the project matcrializing,
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The thrce con~panics of Nippon ~~~cstern Australia, a projcct which i
Kokan, Kol~c Stccl and ;~~yo ~1cnka uncc had becn pul off. '
~ arc ~irocceding ~vith plans to sstablish In addition, requcsts I~ave been
a joint venture with lhe ~gyr~tian rcceived from the Philiprines, Thai- ~
' govcnunent for construction of a land and Argenlina, .uid coopcr~tion is '
direct c~nversion steel mill in ~gypt taking concretc shape in tl~e form of
with an annu~l proctuction capacity of the planned implementation of fea- '
(00,000-800,000 tons of blister steel. sibility studies.
Plans are to set up the new firm early The reason that the stecl companies
in 1980 and get the milI operating by are eager to cooperate in en~ineering ~
1982� projects involving the constniction of -
The A4exican government has asked steel mills abroad is that they foresee
Japan Steel Corp. to provide assistance their annual output increasing by only '
in expanding the existing Sliikarutua 3~% and, consequently, welcume new f
stcel mill to boost blister stcel output projects as a mcans of cxpandiug and
to 280,000 tons annually and to con- strengthening their operatials.
- struct a new plate mill with an annual Anoii~er important point for steel-
, output of 1,.500,000 tons. makers is whether the hike in raw
~ It has also requested Sumitomo material prices expccted in early 1980
]14etal Industries to provide cooper- will assure adequate prc~lits. In ordcr ,
ation in the construction of a large- to stand up to international cooper- '
diameter steel pipe mill and Kobe ation, it will be necessary to modern- '
Steel for a steel forging plant. ize and ratiunalize operations, but for '
ThP Australian gavernment is again that purposc ;idcquatc prufits must be
seeking cooperation from Japanese assured. The cruciai key tc~ the stable
steelmakers for construction of an growtli of tlie stcel com~rinies will be -
integrated steel mill, with an annual more enginccring projccts and high
- output capacity of 10 million tons in prices for steel materials. p
COPYRIGHT: 1980.The Nihon Kogyo Shimbun
CSO : 4120
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ECONOMIC
BRIEFS
_ TRADE DEFICIT--Trade contracts concluded by 13 ma~or Japanese trading
firms turned sharply in their disfavor in November with the imbalance
reaching 213.5 billion yen, the Japan Foreign Trade Council reported
Thursday. The council said that this was due �~o their trade with the
Middle East turning also into a sizable deficit of 167.6 billion yen
from substantial excess sales in September and October. Both export
and import contracts maintained high levels in the month under view
and the trade gap came although the import growth was inclined to stag-
nate, the report said. Exports totaled 876 billion yen, up 27.8 per- -
cent over the previous year, and imports 1,089.5 billion yen, ahead
72.8 percPnt. In spite of large drop in plant exports, the export
volume was increasing and fuel imports, with the largest share of 39.3
percent, are still soaring, due to imports of spot crude oil. In the
- export sector, metals rose 39.8 percent with steels posting the largest
gain of 97.6 percent as a result of prices and vol,xme rising by 30.7
percent and 45 percent. Machinery increased 12.2 percent. Ships rose -
11 percent with continued brisk sales.to Africa. Chemicals and texCiles
increased 68.9 percent and 20,3 percent, but foodstuffs were ahead only
4.2 percent. In the import sector, fuels increased 2.7 times as a
result of increases in prices and volume. [OW010104 Tokyo MAINICHI
DAILY NEWS in English 28 Dec 79 p 5 OW]
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SCT.CNCE AND TFCHNOLOGY -
SOLAR-HYDROGEN HEATING, COOLING PRQJECT TO START ~
Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 22 Nov 79 p 16 ;
[Excerpts] The New Technology Development Corporation (President Takeyasu i-
Yoshimitsu) on 21 November announced that it had commissioned the Sekisu I
_ Chemical Co, Ltd to develop a totally new cooling and heating system which
makes use of chemical reactions of inetals and hydrogen, setting forward ~
the research and development for the practical use of the system. This
system was devised by Assistant Professor Seijiro Suda and other members
of the Engineering Department, Kogakuin University. The objective is to
establish a private home cooling and heating system which utilizes solar
heat, etc by manufacture of a heat pump operated by a low temperature heat
source that takes advantage of the characteristics of inetal hydrides. In !
general, it is hoped that it may be a considerably cheaper system than i
conventiona.l cooling and heating syfitems when running costs are taken into ~
_ consideration, because of the long service life of the equipment. The corp- _
oration intends to provide 200 million yen to the Sekisui Chemical Co Ltd, ~
hoping to commercialize the~system within a 3-year program.
Certain kind of inetals such as titanium, manganese and their alloys react ' ~
,with hydrogen and produce metal hydrides. During this process, the following
reactions take place: the metals generate heat when hydroginating and absorb
heat when decomposing. These reactions are influenced by temperature and ~
pressure and hydrogen gas is characteristically released from metal hy=
drides when heated. '
The system designed by Assistant Professor Suda et al utilizes the char-
acteristics of inetal hydrides such as described above. I~ is so contrived
th~t~heating is accomplished by an exothermic reaction and cooling by an
endothermic reaction, with the hydrogen tossed back and forth between two
kinds of inetal hydrides.
Practically speaking, the system consists of two kinds of inetals with dif-
ferent characteristics M1 and M2, respective cylinders (heat pumps) V1 and ;
V2 each containing hydrogen, solar heat collectors which are the source of
' 30
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the heat, a room fan coil unit and an outdoor radiator. First, a metal _
hydride previously reacted with hydrogen is decomposed in V1, which initiates
an endothermic phenomenon. This cool heat is transferred into rooms by means
- of a fan for cooling. The hydrogen gas generated by the decomposition is Ied
_ into V2 and allowed to react with M2 to form a metal hydride. The heat gen-
erated during this process is vented outdoors via a radiator. Next, the
metal hydride in V2 is decomposed by heat from the hot water of the solar
heart collectors and the hydrogen gas generated is led into V1, which pro- _
duces a�metal hydride of M1 in the initial condition. Be repeating these
processes, cooling is provided.
Heating can be accomplished similarly as in cooling if the exothermic -
phenomenon which manifests when M2 reacts with hydrogen is utilized.
The currently avai~ati.:l:e cooling systems which use solar heart require heat-
ing water up to approximately 100�C by solar heat, whereas the new system
accomplishes cooling if the water is heated ~niy up to 70�C. Because of
this feature, it is expected that a low temperature heart source such as a
low temperature waste heart from factories may also become effectively use-
able.
The New Technology Development Corporation has not calculated in concrete
terms the price of the commercial system. However, the maintenance and
operational expenses will be low since there are few mechanically moving
parts. This lowers the cost of the system as a whole to less than that for
existing solar houses, although the installation cost of this system is
assumed to be considerable higher.
Drawing: General Drawing of the Cooling and Heating System
Key: ~s.~n~ ~~T~o~~.�0
1. cooling . . ,
2. heating cT c~ ~ti~
3. solar heat collector 4 1~'~ ~yi~~
4 . radiator ~ ~ ' ~
5. radiation : T`
6. heat accumulator ~ ~sKx ~ ~
- ti I ~ ~ ~ I -
. � r.: x..-- ~ tr
7. supplemental heating d,-~~~ r=L` M~�~ r~=,
~..i L v
8. hot water supply v~ v'.
� ~ ,
~ a;:.
9 . cooling : H~;~ ~ ; H:~ ~
10 , solar heat loop , _
11. cooling loop s ~ tN, � N 'N~ -
~:i �ti~;� ~n;~r-.
12. radiation loo p ~
13. heating :~c~!~,~-~ ~r~~,,~->
14. heating loop ~r;~-7 " ~~;~-y
_ ~
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1979
- 8940
CSO: 4105
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY '
FRANCE OFFERS EXCHANGE ON OCEAN OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT
Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 22 Nov 79 p 16
_ [Text] The National Ocean Development Center of France (CNEXO) has lately
asked the Science and Technology Agency ~or an exchange of information per-
taining to the development and utilization of ocean observation equipment.
Although in the past France and Japan have had a history of conducting joint
research on the development of diving technology, etc, this is the first
_ time that they have requested an exchange extending to the field of ob-
servation equipment. The authorities concerned regard this request for
an exchange as a manifestation of a great French interest in the rapidly
improving Japanese ucean development.
The following four themes are proposed for the exchange of information:
an ocean pallution analqzer which uses ion exchange resins, an undersea
drif ting buoy for measuring swirls of the sea by remote sensing from a
satellite, a wave-measuring buoy and an ultrasonic system to measure posi-
tions of deep submergenic equipment. Among those, France has almost com-
pleted the development of the undersea drifting buoy and the wave measuring
buoy, but for the remaining two themes they are seeking a technical ex-
change aspiring to introduce technology from Japan.
The Science and Technology Agency, which accepted the French proposal, has
actively started to study the matter. For example, the agency considered it
significant to absarb the technology for undersea drifting buoys which col-
lect stable data of the swi~tls in the sea, since the current state of sci-
_ entific progress in Japan only facilitiates the measuring of the swirls on
the surface of the sea, although undersea swirls are an important point for
projecting the drifting of the currents. Also, the agency regards the
technical exchange useful for the improvement of the technical standards
of both countries, considering that there are some subtle procedural dif-
ferences between France and Japan, although the principles may be the same.
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With this in mind, the Science and Technology Agency will decide on re-
search institutes to be assigned the respective themes as soon as possible,
and will speed up completing specific exchange methods.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1979
8940
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY -
FUEL CELL POWER STORAGE 11-YEAR PROJECT TO S'PART
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 23 Nov 79 p 4
[Text] Research and development of a power storage system by means of a -
secondary cell has emerged. The Agency of Industrial Science and Technol-
ogy (director, Seiichi Ishizaka) will embark on an 11-year plan for tha
development of a new cell power storage system, investing a total sum of
approximately 17 billion yen, starting from the next fiscal year. Mean-
while, the Electrical Society organized a committee which specializes in -
power storage cell systems (chairman, Hiroshi Uenosono, also an assistant
director of the Power Technology Research Institute of the Central
Research Institute of Electric Power Industry) to start an investigation
of the cell characteristics conducted by the entirety of the public and
the private entities, including electric power companies and cell makers.
Also, the electric power industry recently indicates its increasing inter-
est in storing power by means of secondary.,cells, which is demonstrated by
the Tokyo Electric Power Company, which has start~d full-scale research
activity on this matter at the Technical Development Research Institute.
On the other hand, the U.S.A. is also extremely eager to develop this
secondary cell and plans to complete a Battery Electricity Storage Test, _
(BEST) facility in the next year to test and evaluate a large-scale power
storage cell created for load leveling. Under the current situation,
Japan is behind the U.S.A. in this race, but on the other side of the coin,
it is expected that Japan will rank with the U.S.A. and rapidly advance in
the development of a new cell storage system, since after all Japan has a
reputation of having the world's top level electric technology as far as
system technology is concerned, as e~emplif ied by the inverter.
Electric power is an energy diff icult to store, and simultaneous supply
and demand is characteristically said to be required. Therefore, the power
generation facility is constructed to accommoda~e the needs on the basis of
the peak of the dema~d. However, this practice creates waste in capacity
during nonpeak hours. Presently, there is a pumping-up power generation '
which is counted as one of the practices which use the power effectively
during the nonpeak hours. However, it is said that all the large-scale
. sites where the pumping-up power generation is operab le have been already
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devetoped to the full extent, and it is very difficult to seek a new
bu~i.lding site under the present circumstances. Additionally, the acqui-
sition oC the land rec~uired for the construction of transmission lines
is ciifficult, and the transmission loss is also a problem. It is urgent
therefore to develop a new power storage technology to prepare for the
power demand.
As a new power storage method to meet this need, there are flywheels, com-
~ressed air, a super conductive coil, a condenser and hydrogen. However,
for the time being, a power storage system by means of a battery is con-
sidered the method to ~ive practical effect to the idea in lieu of a
pumping-up power generation. Particularly, in the past, large capacity
batteries for lead leveling have not been in practical service although
_ small ones for emergency power sources are util~zed. Yet, the potential
practical use of a large capacity power storage system is said to be ever
increasing in recent years because of the advancement of the technological
developmen.t such as an inverter realized with the progress of the develop-
ment of batteries which work under a new system.
Cells utilize the electric energy which is generated when a metal vulner- -
ab le to ionization is dipped in the electrolyte. Among them, the one which
can repeat the cycle of recharging after the charged and stored energy is
discharged and spent is called a secondary cell.
- The most popularly used secondary cells are, at present, lead cells. Lead
cells are said to have been technologically completed, and there is only a
little room left for improving the energy density on the basis of weight.
Specifically, the-theoretical energy density of the lead cell is 167 whr/kg,
for practical use, 30-40 whr/kg level. Due to this disadvantage, studies -
for the development of new cells having a high energy density are vigorously
pursued using various cambinations of materials.
According to a review of the research project for the new cell power
storage system started by the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology,
they are planning to develop new cells using sodium-sulfur, zinc-halogen
and redox as experimental subjects, and will select the most suitable type
for a power storage cell among these trial models sometime by the end of
fiscal year 1986.
A sodium-sulfur cell is the term designated for a cell which uses dis-
solved metal sodium for the cathode and dissolved sulfur for the anode,
and its theoretical energy density is 760 whr/kg, for practical use,
150-200 whr/kg. On the other hand, a zinc-halogen cell is the term
designated to a cell which uses zinc for the cathode and chlorine or bro-
mine for the anode, and the plates of the cell are made of inactive base
material, such as graphite, to which the said materials are adsorbed. A
theoretical energy density of 834 whr/kg is said to be developable.
35
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ltedox cells are the ones being researched and develaped by the General
Electronic Technology Research Institute of~the AITS starting from f is- -
- cal 1975. It is a secondary cell which works under the system where an
aqueous solution of chemicals (redox system) different in oxidation con-
dition is fed into a flow type electrolytic cell by a pump to charge and ~
discharge electricity.
These three types of the technological development to be pursued concern-
_ ing the new cells. In parallel to this pursuit, system technologies
such as methods to connect to the electric system, cell connection struc-
ture, operation and maintenance control within the electric system and in-
verter (AC-DC exchanger) will be developed so that systematized electric
power storage will be established by f iscal 1985 or so. For the develop-
ment of this system technology, it is planned to set forth the research
for practical use using a lead cell as a sample. Although this ce11 is
said to have been technologically perf ected, the system technology will -
be developed without lagging behind the new cells by using the lead cell
For the time being, since this cell appears to be the shortest distance
- to a practical use power storage cell. Additionally, the agency intends
- to explore the pos~ibility of improving the lead cell itself. _
By f iscal 1986, the interim technology evaluation of a total power
storage system that combines the said new cells and the system technology ~
will be made, and the demonstration tests will be operated aiming to bring
the system into practical use by fiscal 1990.
The practical system will be a 20,000 kwhr (20 megawatt) class, and the
AITS considers this capacity to be a"scale which can meet the power needs
of approximately 20,000 general households," and it is highly promising as
a community energy supply system starting from the latter half of the
1980's.
Meanwhile, looking at the state of the technological development in vari-
ous countries across the seas, research is in progress in the U.S.A.,
West Germany, Switzerland, etc: Especially in the U.S.A., where suitable
sites for the construction of large-scale pumping-up power generation
facilities are scarce due to the aspects of geographical features and the
- environmen tal protection, large-scale research and development projects
are programmed at a federal level.
Presently in the U.S.A., more than 10 research agencies are conducting
technological development pertaining to the various batteries such as
_ lead cells, to begin with, sodium-sulfur, and zinc-chlorine. The
"BEST project," which stands out as the core of these research activi-
- ties, was planned jointly by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
of the Department of Energy (DOE), started in 1974, and the power companies.
This plan is a technological development plan relating to a power storage
- method which sustains the same function (load leveling) as the pumping-up ~
power generation that is said to ~upply excess power stored during off-peak
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peak hours, by installing a large-capacity battery. The test facility �or
the pro3ect is already ~nder construction, and it is scheduled to be com-
pleted in the next fiscal year.
Construction of this facility is in the hands of the Public Service Elec- -
tric & Gas Co of the U.S.A. which provides power and natural gas, and the -
total building area is approximately 2600m2 consisting of 3 battery test
rooms, a data collection room, a DC bus ventilator, an inverter, a control
room, etc. Especially, all three battery test rooms are constructed to
house a battery of 2.5 megawatts, 20 megawatt/hr and a maximum 1000v rating. ~
The project~ is double staged, the development of lead cells se;:viceable in .
shcrt-term and the development and demonstration of new cell system service- �
able in the latter half of the 80's.
A. Internal Structure of Sodi~um-Sulfur Cell
r
_ ~ ~ � e Key: l. seal
2. sodium
1 2~ 3. alpha alumina
~-n' tF~1~7~. ~ 4, metal vessel
~ ?JL7~
4 I 5. sulfur-carbon
_ = 6. beta alumina
- : t
~5 - = F
~ ~,�~~~-1~~� = ~J .
^ q - - -
_ ~~~:t = I~ b~
~
~ ~
B. General Diagram of Zinc-Hydrogen Chloride Cell
~
l~q~? ~
~ -2) Key: l. stack
~ r 2. reformer
~ _ ~
- 3. hydrogen storage vessel
:
i:~ .h ~ ~ ~ 4. electrolyte sink
~ ~ ~ 5- P~?P `
6 . ~ 6. heat exchange plate ~
~ o i . .
J
.:~~~:.y -
~~~1~~~ ~ 3 ~lc~l~~~~!
~
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1979
37
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SCI~;NCE AND TECHNOLOGY ' I
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JDA, FUJI ELECTRIC DEVELOP CALCIUM HYDRIDE-AIR FUEL CELL ~ ~
Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 27 Nov 79 p 16 I
- [Text] Research on the utilization of inetal hydrides is being popularly ;
conducted by various strata of society. Now, the Electric Machine & '
Equipment Laboratory (chief, Tatsushi Sugimoto) of the First Laboratory, ~
and the Technical Research & D evelopment Institute (director, Kazumasa ~
- Kimura) of the Defense Agency haye developed jointly with the Central ~
Research Institute of the Fuji Electric Co, Ltd (president, Fukushige i_-
Shishido), a metal hydride-air fuel cell using calcium hydride, which is i
one type of inetal hydrides as a source of hydrogen. According to this !
;
- invention, a cell is structured to use hydrogen ob tained from the hydroly- ~
sis of calcium hydride and airborne oxygen as "fuels." Studies on metal _
hydride-air fuel cells such as t?iis type are not well known, and may have ~
been conducted so far only by the U.S. Army. It seems this case was the ~
very first attempt in our country. The experimental device's rated output !
_ is 240 watts, which is still not very much. However, after successfully i
acquiring the anticipated perf ormance, they are planning the challenge oi ;
making a 1-kilowatt device in the next fiscal,year. Sugimoto and~his group ~
are thinking of using the cell first as a power source for mobil communi- ~
cating machines to replace the conventional direct current engine genera-
tors. The f uture progress of this cell is very promising because of its ~
potential use to store, for instance, excess power during the night time. i-
i
The most abundant subterranean resource of our country is calcium carbo-
nate. The metal calcium obtained from this calcium carbonate transf.orms '
to calcium hydride when heated to 200-300�C under a hydrogen atmosphere. j
This calcium hydride characteristically releases hydrogen readily ~and be-
comes calcium hydroxide (slaked lime) when it contacts with water. � , ;
The new fuel cell developed at this time stores hydrogen, which serves as ~
a fuel in the form of calcium hydride, and electricity is obtained when-
ever required by feeding the electric cell the hydrogen generated from the . ;
= reaction induced by adding water to this compound.
~ ~
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The device consists of a hydrogen generator component and an electric
cell, and its structure appears as illustrated in the diagram. To be
concrete, pressurized water is allowed to flow out from the bottom of e
_ the reactor f illed with calcium hydride granules of soybean size to in- _
duce the reaction of calcium hydride wihh water. Since this reaction is
exothermic, water immediately transforms into steam. When the reaction
of the calcium hydride with the generated steam advances, a 100 percent
- hydrogen which absolutely contains no steam comes out from the top of the
reactor.
Hydrogen pressure can be controlled to a constant pressure by figuring
the proper amount of the water to be f ed. However, hydrogen pressure.is
f urther regulated by a pressure gavernor before the hydrogen is led into
the electric cell. .
The electric cell is constructed by ~ultiple stacks of single cells which
are designed to hold electrolyte between both positive and negative porous
electrode plates (the cathode is made of nickel and the anode is made of
carbon) and to feed hydrogen and air from both sides. The experimental
240-watt model has 20 stacks of single cells. In the cell, water is pro-
duced along with the generation of electricity, and theuretically, the
electrolyte gradually thins unless this water is withdrawn. However,
according to a clever balancing configuration, it is so designed that the
water is transformed to steam by heat, and the steam escapes into the air
which is f ed through the porous electrodes.
Sugimoto and his group have constructed two types of 240-watt trial models, `
an alkali type which uses a 30 percent caustic potash solution as an elec-
trolyte and an acid type which uses 100 percent phosphoric acid as an
electrolyte (dimensions: 60cm x 40cm x 40cm; weight: the former--
approxi.mately 60kg, the latter--approximately 52kg) to conduct a perform- _
ance test. They reported that the actual output reached by the alkali
type was 290 watts in output and 0.7 volts in single electric cell voltage,
and by the acid type was 141 watts in same and 0.6 volts in same, and that
the electricity was generated for approximately 2.5 hours when 500 g of
calcium hydrid~ was used. Up to date, they have operated the cells for a '
total of 400 hours.
Because of these results, Sugimoto and his group consider the invention
satisfactory and practical, and expressed their desire to nurture the
device for use as an outdoor pow er source along with the hydrazine-air _
fuel electric ce11 (a 3kw model has already been completed) which is
being developed in parallel to this fuel ~ell.
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7'1~~ ~1~~k~~Jci~~~~~~~1'
~~~~w~ ~ ~
~nt~sQ:�~ t ~c~
, , ~ ~
~ ~
~ a~ : . 1~ ~
ee ~
~K - 9
~/~�4d.
. ~
7 ~c# ~ ~
!2~~ 7'
- il.~ y %t~?~
:k?~
1~
%7 it!!~3S
~ _ ~~S 4t ~
Diagram: General Diagram of Alkali Type Metal Hydride-Air Fuel Cell
Key: 1. electrolyte tank 6. reactor
~ 2. hydrogen 7. air pump
3. pressure governor 8. water tank
4. air 9. air blower
5. cell 10. heater
. COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha Tokyo Honsha 1979
8940 ~ -
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