JPRS ID: 9036 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L_/90~6
,
- 16 April 1980
- USSR Re ort -
p
= MILITARY AFFAIRS
- ~FOUO 10/80~ .
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- FB~$ FOREIGN BROADC~4ST INFORIIlIATION ~ERVICE ~
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JPRS L/9036 ! -
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1G April 1980 ;
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USSR REPORT ~
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MILITARY AFFAIRS i
_ (FOUO io/so) ~ -
CONTENTS PAGE ~
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Book Excerpts: Pa.rty Commissions in Armed Foz�ces ~
(A. Z. Shcheglakov; PARTIYNYYE KOMISSII PRI POLITORGANAI~i
l1RMII I FLOTA~ 1979) oo ...............o.....,............... 1
T~ri~;tneer Support; Soviet Review of NATO Methods
(Yu. Korolev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Oct 79)...0 46
Air ~uper.i.ority: Soviet Review of NATO Concepts -
- (Yu. K~.rtenichev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRF~IIYE, Oct 79~ 53 '
Cruice MLse~.:l.c~~c: iovic~t Review of U.S. Ma.teriel
~ ( V. K.irsr~n~v; .7.,ARU}3E7,~iN0YE V(7YENNOYE OBOZRIIVIYF, Oct 79 j~i
_ Cont~nts of 'I'OREIGN NIILiTARY REVIEW', October 1979 ~
(7ARUBEZHNOYE VOYE"'TdOYE OBOZRFNIYE, Oct 79) ..o 60
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BOOK EXCERPTS: PARTY COMMISSIONS IN ARMED FORCES
- Moscow PARTIYNYYE KOMISSII PRI PQLITORGANAKH ARMII I FI,OTA in~~~Russian 1979
pp 1, 2, 3-22, 151-160, 161-181, 182-a83
[Book compiled by Maj Gen A. Z. Shcheglakov)
[Excerpts] Title Page:
Title: PARTIYNYYE KOMISSII PRI POLITORGANAKH ARMII I FLOTA
(Party Commissions Under Political Organs of the AYmy -
and Navy).
Compiler: Lt Gen L. P. Vakhrushev
Publisher: Voyenizdat
Place and Year of Publication: Moscow, 1979
= Signed to press: 30 Nov 78
Number of copies published: 26,000
Number of pages: 183
Annotation
This book describes party commission experience in mobilizing Army and
- Navy commwiists to successfully perform the tasks set for the Soviet Armed
Forces by the CPSU, and the forms and methods used by political organs to
direct them. The authors analyze the organizational and the ideological-
indoctrinationa"1 work of politica:. organs, party commissions, primary
party and Komsomol organizations. The book also contains the answers to
certain questions on party work.
The book was written for the party and Komsomol aktiv of the Army and
Navy. ~
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Contents Page ~
In the Party-Political Work--Good Quality and Effectiveness,
, by A. Yepishev 3
With Demandingness and Sensitivity b~ A. Vakh~ushev 23
For Party Commissions--Constant Attention From Party Organs,
by I. Mednikov 35
Improve Work Forms and Methods, by N. Kleshchevnikov 47
The Main Obj~ctive of Inspections--Practical Assistance,
by I. Pokhlopko 57
The Most Important Thing is the Work Performed in the Party -
Organizations, by Ye. Razzhivin 66
Into the Party Ranks--The Worthy, by A. Andriyasov~ 76
The Communist is Tempered In the Military Work, by V. Kamerdin....... 82
Developing a Sense of Responsibility, by V. Pervushin................ 90 -
On A Volunteer Basis, by Yu. Skvortsov 100
Be More Active In the Indoctrination of Future Officers, ~
by N. Gavrik 107
A Personal Case is Being Discussed, by A. Zubashev 116
_ Consider Appeals Promptly and Carefully, by V. Koltashev............0 128
- The Party Penalty--An I^doctrinational Measure, by A. Moshchev....... 139
We Are Building the Baykal-Amur Mainline, by F. Bondarenko........... 151
Advise for Secretaries and Members of Party Commissi~ns 161
Party Commissions Under Political Organs, Their Authority
and Duties........~ 161
_ Accountability of Party Commissions 166
. Assignments for Members and Candidate Members of Party
Commissions i67
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. Does the Party Commission Have the Right to Accept a
Candidate for Membership in the CPSU if the Primary
Party Organization Has Re~ected Him? 168 _
t~
How Long is a Recommendation for Acceptance Into the CPSU
Valid? 168
What Is A Personal Case? 169
- Is A Personal Case Instigated for All Infringem~nts by a
rommunist? 169
In What Instances and Wha~ Material Is Submitted to the
Party Commi3sion on Infractians by Communists? 170
_ What Is the Procedure for Considering Cases of Infractions
by Communists in the Party Commissions?.~~,. 171
- Does a Communist Have the Right to See Documents in the
File on His Infracrion? 173
How Do We Conaider Requeats for the Restoration of Party
Membershi.p for Those Who Have Not Met the Deadline for
Submitting :~n Appeal?........~ 173
Should Party Commissions Consider Requeats for Restoration
of Party Membership or a Change in a Party Penalty if it ie
Submitted by Communists Who Are Relatives, Acquaintances,
or Friends of the Individual Brought to Accountabil~ty by
the Party? 173
- If A Primary Party Organization GYVes a Communiat a Reprimand
but the Party Commissinn Considers the Putiishment Too Mild, -
Not Appropriate to the Gravity of the Infraction Committed,
Does the Party Commission Have the kight to Reqcest the File
- on the Communist`s Infraction for Consideration as a Control
Procedure at its Session?..........~ 173
Do Par+ty Penalties Specified by the Charter of the CPSU Apply
to Candid~te Members of the Party? 174
Is Temporary Expulsion From the Party for a Certaia Period
Permissible? 174
- May a Communist Who Has Dropped Out of the Party Through a
Loss of Organizational Ties With It Be Reatored to Membership
in the CPSU? 174
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May a Primary Organization Bring a Member of an Elected Party
Organ to Accountability? 175
- May a Communist Who Has Committed an Infraction Simply be
Removed From the Party Organ Without Being Given a Party Penalty? 175
Is It Mandatory to Issue an Announcement th3t a Party Penalty -
_ Has Been Lifted? 175
What Documents Must Go Into the File on the Lifting of a
Party Penaity from a Communist? 176
By What Procedure Do Party Commissions Consider Announcements
on the Lifting of Party Penalties From Communists? 176 -
Whicn Party Commission Should Consider the Question of Lifting
- a Party Penalty if the Communist has been Transferred to Another
'Unit After the Primary Party Organization Has Made the Decisiczn?. 177
May A Party Commission Verify Reports on Deficiencies on a ~
Communist's Service Performance? 177
From What Date is a Penalty Period Calculated When the
Communist's Punishment Has Been Changed as a Result of an Appeal? 178
Considering the Personal Cases of Communists Who Have Committed _
Infractions Punishable Under Criminal Law 178 ~
May a Member be Expelled from the Party in his Absence?.......... 179
What is the Period Specified for ConsidQring Personal Cases?,.... 179
Is It Mandatory that a Communist be Brought to Party ~
Accountability if a Disciplinary Measure Has Been Imposed
Upon Him? 180
May Improprieties Committed During the Review of a Communist's
Personal Case Be Used as the Basis for an Appeal? 181
Must Individuals Who Have Accused a Communist Without Justifica-
tion or Have Investigated His Per4onal Case Without Objectivity
Bear Party Accountability? 181 -
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PARTY-POLITICAL WORK--GOQD QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS
- [Chapter by Army Gen. A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate
of the Soviet Army and Nsvy] '
'fiie Soviet people have entered the seventh decade in the glorioue hietory
of the Soviet 9ta[e fil.led with strength and optimism. A~limate of
political activity reigns in the nation, a climate created by the annivEr-
eary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and of the Soviet Armed _
' Forces, by the newly ratified Constitution of the USSR and by decisions
_ coming out of the December 1977 and the Ju1y and November 1978 plenuma of
the Party Central Committee. Fulfilling the historic plans produced at the
~ 25th Congress of the CPSU, urban and rural workers are attempting to sucess-
fu~ly complete the tasks specified in the lOth Five-Year Plan.
The Soviet nation's Armed Forces, who have celebrated their glorious 61st
annivarsary, are proceeding in single formation with the entire Soviet
people. This national holiday represented a review of the heroic deeds
and feats of the defenders of the hameland of October, who have demonstrated
their selfless loyalty to the socialist homeland and constant readiness to
- defend socialism's revolutionary conquests. From the pinnacle of the six
- de~ades during which our army has t~igilantly stood its combat ~atch, all of
us see with special clarity the brilliant perspicacity of V. I. Lenin's
- statement to the effect thax any revolution is only worth something if it
is able to defend itself.
- In the contemporary situation, the party continues to be guided by Leninist
principles on defendi.ng the paople's revolutionary conquests. Directing
the building of communism in our nation, it thoroughly analyzes the real-
ities which have developed in the international arena and takes into thor-
ough account the world situation and the military preparations of -
reactionary forces. Faced by the military threat emerging from Che
imperialists, the Soviet state is forced to improve its defenses. The
Greeting from the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium o` the USSR
Supre~ne Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers to fighting mPn of the
valorous Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, which was read by Comrade L. I. '
Brezhnev at a formal meeting in honor of the glorious anniversary of the _
= Army and Navy, laid emphasis upon the follawing: "The essence of our mili-
tary policy is everything for an effective defense, nothing more. The
Soviet Union has never armed for the sake of armament and never has and
never will be the instigator of an arms race. Everything which the Soviet
people are doing in the military area is done to make ourselves and our
socialist friends secure from attack, to prevent aggression. And today,
- we have reason to be proud of what we ha~~e achieved in this respect."1
Thanks to the concern demonstrated by the party and to the selfless labor
of the people, our Armed Forces naw have everything necessary reliably to
defend the creative labor of the builders of communiam. Patriotic duty
prompts the fighting men to master military affairs well, to learn the
combat equipment and weapons to perfection and to remain constantly at a
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high level of combat readiness, a level ir.suring an immediate rebuff to
any aggressor. The advise, recommendations and instructions given by
- Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
gnd chairman of the Preeidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in s~.~eeches to
the workers and the defenders of our borders in the Far East during a trip
to areas of Siberia and the Far East, and in his speeches at the 23rd
Komsomol Congress and a formal meeting in Minsk, were received by the
- personnel as a mandate from the Party and the people to continue reliab 1~
defending the revolutionary conquests of socialism. _
Successful resc,lution of the complex group of problems involved in main-
taining the Army and Navy at the proper level of combat readiness is
achieved by strir_tly observing the Leninist principles underlying party
leadershi~ of the Armed Forces. This refers to unity of political and
military leadership, theoretical and practical unity in the work of mili-
tary cadres, augmentation of the Party's influence upon all aspects of
- Army and Navy life, maintaining close ties with the masses of fighting men
- and relying upon their experience ir.. military ~rganizati~nal development.
Ttte Leninist principles underlying leadership of the Armed Forces are
_ creatively developed in the work of the USSR Defense Council headed by
Marshal of the Soviet Union G~mrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of
the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USS?t _
Supreme Soviet. Military cadres are constantly aware of the firm leader- ~
ship exercised by the Party Central Com~nittee and of its concern for
strengthening the national defense, which is accomplished to a~3ecisive
degr~e by maintaining the Army and Navy at a level which meets the demands i
of today.
Lenin's Party directs comnanders, political organs and party organizations
to do everything possible to see tr.at all steps taken to build up the
comb at capability of the :~my and Navy are based on precise fulfillment of
the requirements set by the CPSU Central Committee, the SoviEt government
~nd the USSR Minister of Defense. Further improvement of the work per- -
formed by military cadres in this area calls for increasing the effective-
ness of decisions made on matters of combat readiness and combat and -
political training, and extending the Party's influence upon the life of
the troops and the fleets.
Combining the functions of political leader, organizer and indoctrinator
of the masses in its work, the Party links the development of theoretical
principles in the area of Soviet military organizatianal development with
their realization. It provides cadres with the tools of Leninist method-
ology for understanding and resolving problems of protecting socialism`s
- conquests and teaches them to analyze the aggregate of develo~.ments
characterizing the balance of class forces in the world, the interrelation-
ship between war and the era and the interdependence of factors insuring
victory in a modern war.
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As it develops revolutionary theory, the CPSU devotes a great deal of
attention to analyzing problems of war and peace and to the ~reation of
Eoreign political conditione conducive to the building of co~nuniem in
our nation. The Party~s conclusions on the need to build up the Soviet
Union's defense capability and to increase the combat strength of the
Army and Navy, which were contained in anniversary materials d~voted to
the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socislist Revolution and the
glorious anniversary of the Armed Forces, are of real importance to use
' The chapter on def~nding the socialist homeland, which was included in
the Constitution of the USSR for the first time, is filled with enormous _
theoretical and political meaning. A profound understanding on the part
of all fighti~g men of the tasks set by the Party for strengthening the
national defense and of the constitutional requirements defining the duty
of the Armed Forces to the people are now the most important character- -
- istic of awareness and of a good state of combat morale on the part of
the fighting men.
The level of effectiveness of the Party`s leadership of the Armed Foxces
is refle cted in the flexible selection of military organizational forms
and in the anticipation of the nature of a possible war and methods of
conducting it. The CPSU teaches us t4 take a creative approach in _
definfng the most correct ways of preparing the Army and Navy and of
training and indoctrinating the personnel, relating them closely to the
~ situation as it develops.
Theoretical prfnciples, like past experience, cannot alwa,ys provide the
answers to questions advanced by life and by the practica.l military work.
We muat seek new forms and methods for the combat training and indoctrina- _
tion of the personnel. In the contemporary situation, creativity and iano-
vation are becoming the pattern of thought, the standard for the daily
work of commanders and political workers and the leaders of Party and
Komsomol organizations, who implement Party policy. A scientific and
creative approach contributes to the development of cou~on views on troop -
training tasks and to the improvement of the material and spiritual
constituents of the army's fighting strength.
Improvement of the Army and Navy's fighting power and of their combat readi-
ness is determined to a crucial degree by the level of party-political work,
which comprises the most important area of the multifaceted work performed
by the CPSU in directing the Armed Forces. "Party-political work with the
personnel and their ideological conditioning," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has
noted, "have always been and remafn a powerful weapon of our Army. The
pawer of this weapon has been tested in the heat of battle. It frightens
our enemies even naw."2
Party-political work is the scientifically-based ideological and ~rganiza-
tional work performed by military councils, commanders, political organs,
Party and Komsomol organizations, by all communists in the Army and Navy =
to impl~ment the Leninist Party~s policy in the Armed Forces, to
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indoctrinate the fight~ng men ~n the principles of Marxism-Leninism, to
moUilize them to perform their sacred duty in an exemplary manner. It
embraces an extremely broad range of issues pertaining to all aspects of
the training and service ~f the personnel and to their moral-political _
and psychological preparedness to defend the homeland and the entire -
- socialist commonwealth. Party-political work, as Ma~shal of the Soviet
Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, pointed out in his report
"Sixty Years Guarding the Conquests of the Great October Socialist
Revolution," "is a special kind of weapon. It never becomes obsolete."3 _
The substance and the main focuses of party-political work in the Army
and Navy are determined today by the tasks put forth and performed by the
Party to imFrove the Armed Forces and by the peculiarities of the domestic -
and inte r.iational situations, as well as by the specific conditione in
which the troops live and perform. Commanders, political organs, Party
and Komsomol organizations, all the fighting men, are naw concentrating ~
_ mainly upon studying and implementing decisions coming out of the 25th
CPSU Congress, the principles and conclusions set forth by Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev in the Accountabiltty Report of the CPSU Central Committee to
= the congress and in his works and speechcs, and the requirements contained
in the new Constitution of the USSR. L. I. Brezhnev's ~remorlrg "Malaya
zemlya" [The Little Land], "Vozrozhdeniye" [The Rebirth] and "Tselina"
[The Virgin Lands] constitute a p aaerful means of ir.tensifying the
_ i.deological conditioning of the personnel. They teach us to live and work
in a Leninist manner and instill good party principle and loyalty to the =
heroic traditions of the Soviet people.
Effectiveness in party-political work is characterized by how completely
- it takes into account the peculiarities of the contemporary stage in the
development of our Armed Forces. At least four such specific features can ~
be identified.
In the first place, the building of developed socialism and the transition
of the state of d~ctatorship of the proletariat into a state of all the
_ people have produced considerable changes in the social essence and the
character of the Armed Forces. Their common-societal nature has become .
firmly established, and their int~rnal function has com~ to an end.
The external function of the Army and Navy h as expanded and gained new
substance. The tasks involved in strengthening the Armed Forces are now
determined exclusively by the existence of imperialism and by the military
danger emerging from it. The Constitution of t~e USSR stresses the fact
= that our Armed Forces are intended for protecting the socialist conquests .
and the peaceful lab or of the Soviet people and the sovereignty and terxi-
- torial integrity of the state. `
The social and political foundations for the ~tion`s defense capability
have become even strcnger under developed socialism. The high level of
- maturity of public relations, the equalization of classes and socisl groups, -
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the incr.easing friendship among the peoples of the USSR and the entrench-
_ ment of communist ideology and socialist patriotism and internationaliam
in the massea, all these processes which have developed in our society ~
have directly affected the strengthening of the state's defense strength. -
They are prcducing internal solidarity and unity among personnel of the
Arnied Forcea and comradely mutual relations among the servicemen and among `
' command personnel and tt?e rank and file.
ImprovQd social and political relations have in recent years produced a
- further strengthening of the social base for providing the personnel f or
the Armed Forces. This has resulted to a considerable degree from the ~
systematic growth of the working class, the increased portion of machinery
- specialists among kolkhoz and sovkhoz w~rkers, and other processes occur-
ring in the nation's social development. Right now, almost two-thirds of
the fighting men in the Army and Navy are members of the working class, -
, who embody the best social and ideological and moral qualities of the
people. The kolkhoz youth entering the forces are making considerable
progress in the political, cultural and technological respects. The
- nur,iber of inembers of the intelligentsia is growing. The fact that the
different classes and social groups making up the Soviet society have
- moved toward equality is increasing the social uniformity of personnel in
the Army and Navy and their moral-political soli.darity, which is benefi~ing -
the combat readiness of the troops. '
The common-societal makeup of our ax~my is demonstrated by the fact that
' representatives of more than 100 of the nation's nationalities and ethnic
groups serve in its ranks. Unlike the multinational makeup of the -
- bourgeois armies, socialist multinationality strengthens and unifies the
military teams. The whole system of training and indoctrinational work
_ performed in the units and on the ships and the organization of the army -
life of the ~nultinational military teams are subordinated to indoctrina- -
tion of the servicemen in a spirit of military comradeship and fraternal
_ friendship among peoples. The joint military work brings the fighting men -
_ together and contributes to mutual ideological, intellectual ,qnd cultural
enrichm~nt. :
' As a result of the adoption of universal secondary education and the ful-
= fillment of decisions adopted by the CPSU in the areas of higher, second- ~
ary and vocational and technical education, the Armed Forces are receivin~
youth with 2 higher level of ideological and political cond~.tioning and
intellectual and physical development. Practically all the youth joining
the Army and Navy today have a partial or complete secondary or a higher
education. As a rule, every third draftee has a specialty acquired in a
- DOSAAF training organization.
The Leninist principles underlying the popular nature of the Armed Forces
of the USSR and unity of the army and peo~le are embodied in the con- ~
stantly strengthening ties between the personnel and urban and rural
workers, scientists, cultural workers and artists, the student youth and =
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, war veterans. Soviet fighting men are active in the nation`s social and -
political life and help perforn: important national economic tasks, without
detrinient to the work of strengthening the nation's defense.
In the second place, the increased indactrinational role of the Armed
_ Forces is taken into account in party-politica.l work. As they serve, "
the fighting men develop the qualities of a social builder and a skilled
defender of the new society. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 25th _
: CPSU Congress, "the youth ~oin the military family without achooling in _
life. They return from the army as graduates of the schaol of persever-
ance and discipline, with technical and vocatic,nal skilla and ~olitical
- preparation."4
- Everythin~ possible is done in the Army and Navy to see that the years
spent by the youth in the military ranks provide them with a real school
of ideological and political indoctrination, courage and good moral
- qualities. Strict regulation order, obsertiance of the fighting men`s _
legal rights and satisfaction of their spiritu3l and personal needs and ~
requirements increase the ir.doctrinational effect of the entire structure
of army life upon them. Commanders, political organs, Army and Navy com-
- munists strive to utilize the enhanced material possibilities to ~mprove '
the everyday li,fe of the personnel, to see that the military barracks is
a good place in which to live, to think, to rest and relax. Upon return-
ing to their labor collectives, f ighting men released into the reserve
- set examples of good citizen~hip and organization and a conscientious
- attitude toward their assigned job.
A third characteristic of Soviet military organizational development lies
in the fact that our Armed Forces are deve_lopeel as an inseparab le part of
the combat fraternity of armies of the Warsaw Pact nations. Socialism's
= collective defense is a common pattern in the building of socialism and
an important international task, a task performed through the joint -
efforts of the fraternal armies. There is close cooperation in the -
perfection of their mil.itary skill and in the training of the fighter-
internationalists who serve to the motto: "Class Brothers--Brothers In
- Arms." They are joined by a oneness of political, economic, ideological
and strategic military principles. The fraternal armies are outfitted with
modern weapons, have generally the same type of organization and regularly
exchange combat, operational and political training know-how.
In the fourth place, the role of the Soviet Arned Forces as a bulwark of _
universal peace, as a factor restraining the aggressive endeavors of tr~e
most reactionary circles among the imperialist powers, has increased today. -
Our foreign friends, honest people throughout the earth, can see the true
goal of the bourgeois propagandis ts, who are attempting to conceel the anti- -
popular natura of the imperialist armies and attempting to distort thz
historical mission of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
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Contrary to the slan~erous assertions made by bourgeol.s propaganda, the
Soviet Union will never take the path of aggression. It will never take
up the sword against other peoples. The strength of the Soviet Armed
Forces restrains the imperialists from unleashi,ng a war, from initiating
- new military conflicts.
As the military councils, the commanders and political organs perform the
_ taeks assigned them under the Party's leaderahip, they are expected to `
; utilize in the"ideological and organizational work among the fighting men
those superiorities which the society of developed socialism possesses,
the common-societa~l nature of the Soviet state, its military organization.
The combat capability of units and ships and the ~onstant combat readi-
ness of the personnel depend in great part upon the style of their work, -
upon how consistently and strictly they imglement Leninist principles of
party lea3ership of the Armed Forces. ~'he 25th CPSU Congress set great
- demsnds for the modern leader, who must organically~ combine party minded-
- ness and thorough cou~petence, discipline and the ability to rely upon the
collective and to indoctrinate the men. -
The CPSU strives to see that party-political work is constantly enriched
_ with new substance, forms and methods, which correspond most completely t.o
the specific sftuation and to the tasks being perfor~d by the Army and
Navy. On this level, we might mention the basic features characterizing -
the i.deological and organizational work of today's commanders, political
organs, Party and Komsomol organizations.
First of all, these include inseparable linkage of paxty-political work
with the common party and state tasks. In the contemporary situation, it
is performed with the Party performing a growing leadarship role in ~
military organizational development, a fact reflected in the thorough
development of questions of military policy, in the scientific determina-
tion of the most important trends in the development of the Armed Forces
and in the organization of the party-political work perfornned with the
_ personnel. The Party's Central Committee provides us with precise guide-
lines and makes political work in the Army and Navy goal-oriented and
effective.
In recent years, the scientific approach has been more extensively adopted
at all levels of Party development in the Armed Forces. Processes and
~ phenomena occurring in the forces are b~ing more thoroughly analyzed. -
New trends, patterns of development and qualitative changes occurring in
- the personnel, weaponry and methods of conducting combat operations are
being taken more thoroughly intn account. In light of decisions coming
out of the 25th CPSU Congress, many current issues of Party development
_ have been worked ~ut more thoroughly in the materials of scientific and
pxactical conferences of leading political workers of the Army and Navy,
as well as at theoretical conferences conducted in the anniv~rsary year
, in the districts, groups of forces and fleets.
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Narty-poli.ticnl work h~1s become more effective and ~,ts in[luence upon the .
qualit~~tive periormance of tasks required by combat readiness has been
exptlll(~@CI considerably as a result of the incre~sed demands set by the
CP~~U Ce?itrril Comm[ttee. Politicat organe und Party organizntione are
utilizin~ their intrinsic work forms and methods to interrelate their ~
work more purposefully with the basic problems involved in training the
forces and fleets. Considerable experience in party-political work was
acquired in the Ground Forces, for examnle, in the process of bringing -
them to a state of c~mbat readiness and performing long marches. There
- has been a marked increased in the amount of attention given to the
- moral-political and psychological conditioning of the personnel. '
~ The work prdctices of political organs and ~arty organizations in the
Strategic Missile Forces have been enriched, especially the work
performed with personnel standing combat watch. Its effectiveness is
graphically demonstrated in the stability and high level of readiness of
. the combat teams, in the good performance of geriodic technical servicing
and the maintenance of the missiles in a state of readiness for immediate
combat employment.
Party-political work performed in the National Air Defense Forces to ,
insure that the personnel standing combat watch and all of the complexes ,
and control systems are at a high level of combat readiness has become ~
more effective and purposive. Party influence upon the performance of -
tasks involved in mastering the new equipment and improving the air train-
ing of the personnel has increased in the Air Forces. Political work
performed in the fleets themselves, on long naval cruises, has been stepped
up in the Navy.
In accordance with directions issued by the 25th CPSU Congress, the
effectiveness of party-political work performed to maintain the troops and
naval forces in a constant state of combat readiness has become an
extremely important criterion by which we evaluate the multifaceted work
of political organs an~ Party organizations. The main efforts are
focused upon developing in the servicemen a scientific outlook, the
moral-political and psychological qualities necessary to achieve victory
in modern combat, and political awareness as an extremely important
f actor in the srruggle for a high level of combat training.
, There is prob~bly no issue involved in Arm~ and Navy life, the resoluticn -
of which does not require further improvement of party-political work,
whether it pertain to indoctrinating the fighting men in a spirit of
Soviet patriotism and socialist internationali.sm, insuring a high level of
combat readiness, mdtivating the personnel to master the weapons in an
exemplary manner or strengthening the sole-command principle and military
discipline. Commanders and political T~orkers are expected to follow in -
all matters the instruction of V. I. Lenin, who emphasized that the
nation's defense preparation raquires not a single outpouring of effort
but "lengthy, intense, extremely determined and disciplined work on a mass
scale."5
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The Party line of improving quali,ty and effecti~veness in all areas of
the public work also Eully determines the nature of the work performed
by poliCical orsans and Party organizationa i,n the Armed Forces. The -
reaults of the combat and political training demonstrate the successful
fulfillment of 1978 training plane and programa and the realietic nature
_ of the ~ccialist commitments accepted in honor of the anniversary of the
Soviet Army and Navy. The Party'~ appeal to work better today than _
yesterday and better tomorrow chan today is also finding concrete embodi-
ment in the life of the Ax~my~ and Navy.
During the past training year, f~ghting men of the Army and Navy achieved
new successes in the combat and political training. The field, air and
naval training of the personnel of einits and ships improved, and numerous
- practice missile launchings, bombings and artillery and torpedo firings
were skillfully performed. The rank of initiators of socialist competi-
tion was held high by excellent units in the different servicea of the
~ Armed Forces, which set an example of sdflessness in the training, of -
purpose and persistance, for all.
Commanders, political workers and Party organizations see their main task
as one of making the training and indoctrination more effective, making -
- efficient use of training time and fulfilling comb at and politi~~al train-
- ing plans on a high level. The ability to rnobilize the personnel to fully
complete training plans and socialist commitments is now regarded as one
of the most important indicators of maturity on the part of commanders and
political workers and of aggressive actian on the part of Party
- organizations.
Political organs and Party organizations are increasingly concentrating
their attention upon specific types of cambat training and tactical, fire
and special training tasks and are exerting a more competent influence at
the ranges, airfields and training centers. There is a great deal to be
_ learned in the work performed to master the combat equipment and weapons.
The skillful employment of tools for actively influencing the mastery of
combat e~uipment by the personnel, such as assistanc2 in the creation of a -
_ modern training base and the development of efficiency and inventions work
and military-technical propaganda, has a positive influence upon tihe
effectiveness of party-political work.
L{fe moves forward, however, and creates new demands. What was considered
an achievement yesterday can no longer satisfy us today. It seems that
_ we must extend and improve the differentiated approach to each category
of servicemen and give maximum consideration to the specific tasks involved
in their combat and special training.
It is impossible not to notice the fact that in some units there is a
certain gap bEtween the generally correct and substantive measures con-
ducted on the unit scale and the work performed in the subunits themselves,
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where, strictly speaking, the foundation i.s laid for the combat readiness
and solidarity of the m~litary teams. Improving the level of indoctri- "
national meaH~ires in the company and battalion is one of. those reaerves
- which make it posstble for commanders and political organs to make the _
combat training more effective and to strengthen military discipline.
A struggle for effectiveness and quality requires the ability to encourage
and disseminate truly effective and beneficial initiatives, to eliminate
everything hampering innovarion. On i.his level, it is extremely impor-
tant to further increase the effectiveness of socialist competition and -
make more practical use of the competition as a pawerful means of
developing social activeness in the men.
The organization and direction of competition calls for a constant search
for forms, methods and techniques of stimulating creative initiative in ~
the fighting men, which are most appropriate to the given moment and to -
the nature of the tasks being performed by the unit and subunit and to the
specific characteristics of the personnel. Ostentation, loud publicity
and commitments not backed up with practical deeds and real achievements ,
are alien to it.
_ The further strengthening of military discipline is one of the issues
requiring the constant attention of commanders and political organs.
The present state of discipline makes it possib lP for the fight3.ng men ~
- to perform their comba+t watch in an exemplary manner, of course, but
this in no way gives us the right to forget that there are still defi- _
ciencies in this area.
Some commanders, political organs and staffs are still dealing with
problems of discipline without any sort of system, spasmodically, mainly
after a violation has been committed. Undesirable effects are resulting
from the inability of cer~ain comrades to analyze the full complexity and
the multifaceted nature of a problem related to a human being, to his
awareness, morality and psychology, and the ehanges taking place in the _
personnel. The steps taken in this area are frequently limited to -
meetings, conferences, inspections and the recarding of deficiencies, and
as a rule, this does not always alter anything in the life cf the units _
or help the matter to the proper extent.
I believe that advances in the further strengthening of discipline will
soon be evident if all the cormnanders an:? political workers will improve
organization and order at all levels and the individual indoctrinational
work performed with subordinates, be thoroughly aware of the situation in
the barracks, see that the honor and dignity of the servicemen are
respected and that their reques*s are satisfied, and take prompt action
in the case of unwholesome atticudes. We need to be stricter in imposing -
service and Party penalties upon those who conceal violations of military
- di,scipline, thereby themselves hindering the creation of a moral atmosphere -
~
which contributes to the development of an individual spiritually rich and
morally mature.
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One important way to strengthen militaxy discipline lies in strictly
adhering to the Leninist princ:~ple of single-command and raising the
commander's prestige. Maintaining the prestige of this or that officer,
nuturally, does not depend entirel~ upon the political organs or the
military community. Moat important are his own activities, his personal
conduct and the example he sets in the observance of Soviet laws, mili-
tary regulations and communist moral standards. When an officer violates
these, conducts himself in an unworthy manner and commits violations, he -
loses the moral prestige of a leader. We must be extremely demanding and
etrict with such commanders and political workers.
Intensifying Party inf luence upon all aspects of Army and Navy life and
- upon the training and tndoctrination of the personnel means making active _
_ and complete use of the abundance of ineans and methods of ideological work
in the interest of building up moral strength. Extensive and regular
_ explanation of CPSU policy and theoretical interpretation of our practical
deeds effectively contribute to the indoctrinaticm of ideologically
mature fighting men thoroughly aware of thefr sacre3 duty to defend the
homeland and the conquests of socialism. There are great possibilities
for the development of good combat morale in the troops i.n the thorough
study of 25th Party Congress matexials, the reports and speeches of _
Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee -
and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the
Constitution of the USSR, which is conducted throughout the system of
political training for tY:a personnel. Political organs and Party organiza-
tions have begun devoting greater attention to the substance of ideological
me3sures, to the thorough clarification of current problems of Party theory
and policy and to linking the material studied to the life of the nation
and the Armed Forcea.
- A certain amount of positive experience has accumulatPd iri the Army and
Navy in the comprehensive organization of indoctrinat n, in which
propaganda, agitation and the reality and the social milieu surrounding
the fighting man all contribute to the development of the individual and
help to inc~ .ase his political awareness and moral matu:tty. The taslc of
improving ideological work remains urgent, hawever.
In the Army and Navy collectives one still encounters violations of -
discipline, our society`s moral standards of life and the requirements
contained in regulations and the oath, that is, events indicating poor
indoctrinational work in certain units and subunits. And one of the
causes of this situation lies in the fact that some political organs do a
superficial ~ob of analyzing the complex system by which knawledge is
converted into the convictions of the men and motivations for their con-
duct, into tiieir deeds and actions, structure ideological and political
indoctrination in a general manner, do not react promptly and effectively
to daily events and give inadequate consideration to scientific recommenda-
tions on ways to develop a higfi level of political awareness in their
practical work.
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_ When the Party stzesses the need to mak~ ideological work more efCective,
it is also referring to a stepped up ideological struggle in the world.
Artempting to slow the victorious advance of socialist concepts, impe- -
rialist reaction is intensifying its dissemination of bourgeois views and
_ various types of antiscientific '~theories." Its stress is on ideological
warfare, demagogy, misinformation and the distortion of such basic Marxist-
T..eninist principles as the dictatorship of the proletariat, socialist
_ democracy and proletarian internationalism. ~
Attempts by bourgeois sociologiats and Maoists to revise scientific views I
on the nature, the causes and the sources of wars in the modern era and j
- key aspects of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army should also ;
be considerF3 in the overall context of the contemporary ideological ~
i_
struggle. An attack is being made ir. this manner upon the world perspec-
tives underlying the policy of the CPSU and fraternal communist parties in '
the area of protecting the conquests of socialism. !
- ;
Tempering the fighting men in a spirit of communist ideals and developing ~
- intolerance for bourgeois and revisionist ideology in the people fortn the
crucial nrerequisite for successfully co~:nteracting ideas and views alien ~
_ to us. The task is one of seeing to i,t that every serviceman thoroughly i
understands the course of world development and its prospects, correctly
analyzes events occurring in the nation and internationally, from class
standpoints, and consciously performs his constitutional duty with respect
to providing armed protection of the Soviet homeland.
Party commissions of the Army and Navy have a large role in the accomplish-
- ment of the complex tasks involved in making party-politicat work more
effective. Positioned ut the fo naard edge of the struggl~ to increase
Party influence upon all aspects of Army and Navy life, they are making an -
- important contribution to the improvement of the organizational and
ideological work of Party ~rganizations and to the strengthening of Party
~ and state discipline and are doing a great deal to increase the demanding-
_ ness applied to commanders and political workers, to all communists of the -
units and ships, for the implementation of Party decisions w~th respect -
to strengthening the national defense.
An analysis of the more important focuses of Party commission work should
place the primary emphasis upon demonstrating constant concern for improv-
ing the qualitative makeup of those becoming CPSU members or candidate
members. Party commissions, of course, are charged with the function of
considering Party organization decisions on questions relating to accep- _
tance into the Party. The strict performance of th~.s function makes it
possible to fill CPSU ranks with fresh forces from anong those servicemen
who have earned the recognition of the entire team by handling their mili-
- tary duty in an exemplary manner. -
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tae give due credi,t to the ~arty commi,ssions for the fact that golitical -
organs have increased their control with respect to fighting men pre-
paring for Party membership. Their decisions in these matters are based
primarily upon the need to step up Party influence in the subunits, where -
the tasks directly affecting comhat readiness are performed. Last year,
_ almost four-fiths of the n~w CPSU members were serving in line units or
on ships. Party organizations are becoming especially strong in the
services of the Armed Forces and troop arms, which