JPRS ID: 9104 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080041-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 41
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9104
. 21 ~tay 1980 _
(~lear East~ '
North Africa R~ ort
p
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cFOU~ 18iso~ -
FBIS ~OREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9104
- 21 Niay 1980 .
NE~R EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 18/80~
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
OrganizAtion of Gafsa Attack Described
' (Souhayr Belhassen, Habib Boulares; JEUNE AFRIQUE, ~
23 Apr 80) 1
Briefs
KGB Involvem~nt 11
Algerian Qadhdhafi.sts Arrests 11
Radio Free Gafsa 12
AFGHANISTAN
Casualties, Death Toll of Soviet Army Reported, Discusaed
(K. S, Karol; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 31 Mar-
6 Apr 80) 13
~ ALGERIA
Abdesaelam's Economic Policiea Under Fire
(Philippe Simonnot; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Apr 80) 16
EGYPT
- Opposition To Normalization With Israel Described
(AL-WAT.AN AL-'ARABI, 21-27 Mar 80) 22
LEBAPTON
Implications of Syrian Accord With Lebanece Regime Explored _
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 21-27 Mar 80) 28
Lebanese Buainesamen Buy Foreign Currencies
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 21-27 Mar 80) 36 -
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 F~UO]
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CONTEhTS (Continued)
MAURITANIA ~
Briefs
Impending Trial of Harratine 38
_ ADB Loan Agreement for Guelbe Project 38
Islamic Conference Aid 39
Mauritanian-Iraqi Fishing Company 39 -
TUNISIA -
Nation Faces Serious Problems
(Jean-Louis Buchet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Mar 80) 40
WESTERN SAHARA
POLISARIO Won 'Lasting Political, Psychological Victory'
(Raphael Mergui; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 26 Mar 80) 44 _
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS -
~
ORGANIZATION OF GAFSA ATTACK DESCRIBED -
Paris JEUNE AFRIQ'JE in French 23 Apr 80 pr? 40-46 ~
[Article by Souhayr Belhassen and Habib Boulares: "How the Gafsa Coup
Wa8 Organized"J
[Text] On Z7 January 1980, a group of armed men attacked
the ~ity of Gafaa in Tunisia. It was quickly learned that
they had come from abroad; armed by Libya, they had infil-
tra~ed into this part in the South WesC of Tunieia through
_ Algeria. The attack failed quickly. The men of the commando
, were taken before the State Security Court and were sen-
tenced to stiff penalties; 13 among them are etill looki~g
forward to eaecution since their appeals had been~turned
down. Patiently, our correspondent in Tunis reconstructed
the long preparations prior to the "coup" of 27 ~'anuary.
The atory we present here in the following pages is terrible.
It showa esaentially that ell of the persona involved were
trapped and caught in a fatel machine. The reaultant me~s
certainly conatitutea food for thought. It is with thie
- purpose in mind Chat we are publiahing thia story.
Principal Peronali~:ies Involved in the Operation
Mohemed Abdelmalik, alias Shakib, a captain i.n the SM (Algerien Milit~ry -
Security), in charge of the supply caravans going to the POLISARIO
[Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamr~ +~nd Rio de OroJ.
Abderrazzak, a ceptain in SM, the first Algerian "contact" of Esaeddine
Sherif.
'
Beahir Shaarun, secretary-general of the BAL (Arab Liaison Bureau) at
Tripoli, Che Libyen official in charge of suppliea for the POLISARIO
and the "contact" fur Ez~eddine Sherif,
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Amara Dhau Ben Nail, a Tunisian, a refugee in Libya, the meinepring of -
the FPLT (Progreasive Front for Che Liberation of Tuniaia).
Ezzeddine Sherif, a Tunieian, organizer of the Gafsa operation.
- Ahmed Mergheni, a Tunisisn, military commander of the Gafsa operation.
Mohamed Salah Merzuki, a Tuniaian and ~ line-passer.
Ammer Mliki, Tunisian, line-pasaer.
Salgheddine Gram, Tuniaien, refugee in Algeria, "contact" for Ezzeddine -
Sherif in Algiers.
The visit by Algerian President Chadli Bend~edid to hie Tunisian counter-
part Habib Bourguiba on 2 April (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1006)'bad wiped away
the unforCunate effect of the Gafsa attack (an 27 January 1980) on
- relations bpCween their two countriea. Warned from the very first day
onward as to the participation of ~.lgerians in the preparation of the coup,
the authorities in Algiera had aolemn~~;promised to proceed to an invest-
igation. In return, the authoritiea in Tvnis decided completely to conceal
this aepect of the affair, allowing only the part played by Libya to cofle
out into the light of day, Th~e State Security Court, which tried the
defendants in Tunis, sat bett~~d closed doora whenever�.Algeri.a was mentioned.
The deeire not to do anything that could poison relaCions between these -
two neighbors is obvious on both side3. The visiC by Chadli Bendj~did
constitutes striking proof of that. Moreoever, it proves Chat the Gafsa
- affair, started up while Boumedienne was still president, was continued -
without the knowledge of his successor whose good faiCh is not doubted.
Thia might also explain the "dime-store novel" eapect revealed by the
facte in the case. In revealing this to the pul~lic, JEUNE AFRIQUE is
not trying to feed some kind of bitter debate but insCead wishes to help
public opinion learn the necessary lessons from t~is misadventure. Too
many bad habita have been adopted by the intelligence services which want
to play at being sorcerer's apprentice. They have excessive leeway which
in the end cauaes them to harm their own government.
In Chia affair, the Libyana wasCed close to 20 tons of war materiel, the
price of 62 airline tickets, one ton of tea to pay the emug~lera, DM20,000,
_ F60,000, plus 4,000 Libyan dinars in cash. The Algerian intelligence
~ services advanced Che coi~y little sum of $120,000 to the commandos and
four timea 100,000 Algerian dinars to Che smugglers. All of ehat and
~ only a miserable meae to show for it: 48 dead at Gafsa, about 120 wounded,
- considerable maCerial waste and 15 deaeh sentencea. '
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Not only is the regim~ atill in place, but the Gatsa attack triggered a
riee in patriotic f:eelinga in Tunisia where the various opposition groups,
without in any wey denying their demenda, affirmed their solidarity with
the government, their devotion to the country's tndependence, and their
condemnation of foreign intervention; but one must believe that Tunisia,
in North Af.rica, creates the image of an easy target which is why the
~afsa attack was mounted under the surprising conditions which we are
now learning about.
Thet the number one individual responsible for the operation, the Tunisian
Ezzeddine Sherif, after lU years of forced labor and several more years of
wandering from one city to the next and from one country-to another, thovght
that he could get ehe Tut?isian people to rise up with the firat burat ~f
- fire can be explained by hie ignorance as to the ~a~l situation in hia
c.ountry (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 997). Bu~ that the intelligence services of
_ tao neighboring countries, theoretically well ~ntormed, for 2;~ears dere
involved in the rnost detailed preparation of an operation which cost
them tons of arms and considerable sums of money--that is indeed something,
Here we might of course think ot the "Bay of Pigs" where the American CIA -
learned to its dismay that it could not overthrow the regime of Fide1
Castro by landiag a handful of Cuban emigres.
The thing that strikes us above all in the Gafsa atfair is the combination _
of contradictory elements: the long duration of preparations and the
improvisation of the operations as such, the "professional" manipulation `
- of the commando chief by the intelligence services and the blind confidence
which thoae same services seem to have given him the moment he agreed
"to play the game." They could not possibly be unaware of the limitetions
of his capacitie~ as a commander, nor his lack ot knowledge as to whst
~ the situation in the country really was because, at a given mo~nent, he wes
= promi~ed that he would E~e put in contact with opposition membera through�-
out Tu.:isie. Now, it sufficed for that man to announce to hie "handlers',"
in Tripoli or Aigiers, that he had 5U0 men to open up the weapons depots -
and th~ strongboxes for him without any difficulty:
Who fooled the others in this unlike~ly tr~angular operation of dupes?
Ezzedine Sherif, the Tunisian? Beshir~Shsarun, the man in charge et the
Libyan BAL? Capt Mohamed Abdelmalek, alias Shekib, ot Algerian Military
Security? In all ot this hindsight coming out ot this cheap novel, only
, the military specialist Ahmed Mergheni and his lost soldiers, recruited
in Lebanon and Libya, were duped from one end Co the other.
Merg'neni is a fighting man. He knew of course that the issue was to over-
th,row the Tunisian r.egime. But he became involved in the operation only
as a manager of weapons, as an instructor of inen, and as a field commander.
_ rlrriving at Gafsa, he was astonished that he did not find ~he promised
`i00 men whom he thought he wae go~ng to train, organize, and lead in ~
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battle. He carried out his "contract" by occupying the Ahmed Tlili
barracks, outside the city, with his men. But since capturing a military
poat is not the same thing as taking over an entire country, he tried to
escape when he realized that there was no revolt and no fighting men in
Gafsa. He q~ickly understood that the operetion, militarily speaking, was
a bloody failure.
The other three--Sherif, Shaarun, and ShekiU--could not have been totally -
fooled. They apparently, each of them, wanted to play the game to the end.
The first of them believed thaC, with weapons and money from Libya, he
could create a resistance nucleus in Tunisia which taould get Algerian -
political support. Throughout Che entire trial, he kepC repeating that
he was in cahoots with the Algeriens and not with the Libyans, who,
- according to him, werp just the middlemen, The second Lndividual, knowing
nothing about the personality of Sherif, pursued a transparent Libyan .
' policy: ax~ armed revolt, in Tunisia, without any leading political figure,
wovld prepare the ground bett~r for a merger of Tunisie and Libya. As
for the Algerian Shekib, his c8ae appeared more complex. Was he playing
the Algerian game with respect to Tunisia or was he injecting considerations -
- of ~Slgerian domestic politics into his calculations? One is cerCain~y ~
justified in esking oneself this question as one carefully keeps tre~ck of
the operation's preparation.
Chekib became involved in the entire affair early in 1976; he assiduously _
cultivated Sherif for one year, making him work for the POLISARIO; intro-
duced him to Col Slimene Hoffman, of SM; and he hired him on to prepare
the insurrection in Tunisia. And wi~en--after Boumedienne had died--
Algerian policy changed toward Tuniaia and when Slimane Hoffman, in all
_ prob~biliCy, was no longer "in on the coup," Shekib himself continued
(with the approval of just exactly who i;~ Algeria?). More serious than
that--for hia country--he kepr a portion of Che weapons in Algeria, urging
Sherif to perauade the Libyan Shaarun to believe that this cargo had
arrived in Tunisia:
From the very first day onward, we said, in this magazine (No 997), that
_ the role of the Aa.gerians remains yet to be described. From the very
firat day onward, President Chadli Bend~edid assured the Tuniaian emissary
that Algeria was not at all involved. Now, there were entirely too many
specific points, detes, names, weapon ahipments, and money given for
exchange at the office of the president ta accept the idea that the
Algerian intelligence services were completely "out." Was the newspaper
E L MOUJAHID unaware as to who had attacked JEUNE AFRIQUE so grievously? _
If that was the case (end this ia posaible), then the arrest, by the _
Algerian outhorities, of c~ptair~sShekib and Abderrezek 5