JPRS ID: 9109 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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JPRS L/9109
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~ 27 May 19~Q
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Near Eas / '
t (~orth Afr~~~ Re o~t
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CFOUO t9/80,
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- JPRS r~/9109
27 May 1980 .
- NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 19/80)
, s-
CONTENTS
l~;yERIA
_ Details of 7-Year Electrification P1an Given
. (MARCHES TROPI~AUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 27 Mar 80) 1
IRAN
Aahraf Seen Planning Shah's Restoration From Iarael
(JEUNE AFRIQi1E, 30 Apr 80) 6
- QATAR F
~aper CoBanents on Giscard d'Est~aing's Viait to Gulf
- (AL-�WATAN AL-ARABI, 18-24 Apr 80) 7
TUNISIA
M'Zali Seen as Poseible Succeasor to President
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE~AFRIQUE, 12 Mar 80) 15
' a - [IZI - N~; & A - 121. FOUO] -
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ALGERIA
- DETAILS OF 7-YBAR ELECTRIFICATION PLAN GIVEN
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Mar 80 pp 678-79 ,
[Article; "A 7-Year Electrification Program To Cover the Whole Country"] -
[Text) Algeria, whoae rate of electrification rose in I978 to 60 percent,
expects to supply the entire country with electricity,over the next 7 years.
To make electricity available to~the 12,000 sma11 villagES scattered across
an area four times larger t~an that of France and inhabited by 9 million
. people, in other words half of Algeria's population, ~~he atate has ~ust
released the equivalent of 6 billion france to f inance a 7-year program.
SONELGAZ (~Tational Electricity and Gas Company) since its establishment in -
August 1969, has had a monopoly on production, transportation and distribution
aa well as on the ti.ransportation of natural gas through secondary pipelines, -
which has been entrusted by the govemment to put into effect this electri-
fica~tion program, which basically covera the rural or desert areas of the
- Algerian south. -
According to the moat recent Algerian statistics on electrification, the
provinces beat siipplied with electricity are Alger, Oran and Annaba, with
~ electrif ication ra~tes exceeding 95 pescent. The wilayas of Bisk,.a, Tiaret or
_ Tizi-Ouzou are clase to the national average, with rates varying between 50
and 60 percent, while those of M'Sila, Ji~el or Tebessa reco~d a rate of only
= 30 percent. Algeria, n everthelesa, with a nationa~ electrification rate of -
60 percent, is in the forefront among the best supplied countries of. Africa -
and the Third World. ~
For Alger3a, making electricity available to all its citizens, wherever they
may 11ve, ie "an act of social ~ustice and answers the right of every Algerian -
to the fulfillment of basic social neede," under the same category as the -
right to work, hous3ng and education, etc. -
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The Ma~or Stages.of Progreas .
Following its indepeadence, Algeria was.restricted in.the f ield of electri-
fication to maintaining and repairing the existing installations. The f irst ~
stepa were nndertaken starting in 1965 until 1970 to electrify~73 areas
(hamlets and villages) t~taling s population.of 1.1 million persons, along
with making, province by province, a complete inventory of the country's '
needs. Because of the limited loans allocated to this pro~ ect, the lack of
qualified peraonnel and the def 3ciency of resources to carry out the pro3ect, ~
only thoae operations considered pr iority were uadertaken. Neverthelese, a
subetantial and aignificant engineeriag ~ob was undertaken fnr 2 years to
' establish a more extenaive electzif icati~n pro~ect that was completed in the
1970-73 4-year per iod. ' ~
_ It was, in fact, starting from the first 4-year plan (1970-73) that rural
electrification in Algeria experienced a leap forward; 480 sites anticipated
by thia plan and 100 others that appeared in the special programs launched at
_ that time to benef it aeveral poor regione were put into operation, supplying -
- 97,000 hames with electricity. The loana allocated to this first electri-
- fication pro~ect~ which required the establishment of~a apecialized company
subordinate to SONELGAZ, reached 213 million dinars.
During the second 4-year period (1974-77), 858 other sites, nearly 220.of
whfch established in Saharaa regions, were put into effect for ~560 million
d~nars, bringing the national electrification rate (relation between the ;
number of c~nsumers and the total number of hames) to 57 percent.at the end
of 1977.
The 7-year plan that was ad~usted to complete the electrification of the rest
of the c~untry, and for which a loan of 5.5 b~llion dinars was made, at an
initial atage dealt with restoring regional balance in electrif ication to
the extent that, for example, the number of sites to receive electrif ication
- is clearly greater isi the east than in the west and in the south than in '
the north. Mox�eover, one anticipatea that electrification of the areae
chosen, apart from their more or less priority status, wi11 be eff~cted in !
clusters~ incluaing, if poasible, the large, average and even remote towna,
_ which will be supplied aimultaneously, Howetrer, at the etart this plan
lesvea out small sites that are too r:emote, which would make the electrif ication '
pro~ect depend on housing pc+liaiea and adjusting it to each region,:according
to the area's spccific features and 13mitationeo ' -
Significant Resources Put to Work
To put its electrif ication progra~n to work, Al,geria from now on has available
all the necessary parts besides loana, Algeria has an organization, SONELGAZ,
- that ia quite e~fective and experienced, prc~vided with capable peisonnel and
- apecialized companies. In.the building ar~a alone,`.SONELGAZ calculates
creating during the next 2.years 4,500 new ~obs, of which nearly 800 will be
, management and building supervisors. Outside of techriical resources as we11
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as t;~ose of equipment, per.sonnel and f~nance, already substantial, that
SONCI.GAZ has available for this~ pro~ ect,� Algeria has the backing, also
eubstantial, if not more so, of tne national company entrusted with producing
electrical and electronic equipment, SONELEC, not to mention the considerable
contribution of an efficient and energetic private sector through subcon-
tracting.
Moreover, local manufacturing is from now on prepar.ed to provide the necessary
equipment. SN Metal produces the metallic posts in its factoriee and intends
to establish a series of small regional factories to manufacture concrete
, posts. SONELEC is ready to fu1f311 the de~aand for transformers, manufactured _
ir. a factory in Azazga, fn Grande-Kabylie, and.for cables in its cableworks,
a considerable pnrtion of which is exported. Lastly, the meters are to be
_ made by a factory which ia in the process of being built in E1-Eulma, in
eastern Algeria.
- In the meantime, such an electrification plan--which involves the electri-
_ fication of 12,000 aitea, the ~oining of 1.2 mill~on homes representing 9
million inhabitants and the.building of 58,000 l~n of average and low tension
and 11,700 conversion etatione, the increased development of the country,
especially in the various manufacturing sectors--calls for building new -
electric power stations, aome of which will be established in the country's -
north and south.
Forecasts point out that the total power installed, which was about 1,276
� megawatta tn 1976, ehould triple ~n 1985 to reach 3,388 megawatts. A].ready
the conetruction of new industrial plants durii~g ttie laet 5 years has required
_ building about 40 high tenaion etatione, while the in~erlinked high tension
network increased from 4,150 lmi in 1975 to 8,050 lam this year. -
To measure the prograss made it is worthwhile to remember that power installed
barely rose to 627 megawatts in 1965, after a 30 percent drop recorded in
the f irst 3 years of independence, with 338 megawatta of the abovP f igure -
thermal in origin~and the remainder hydraulic. Power had been brought to
nearly 750 megawatts in 1970, the start of the first 4-year plan (197G-73),
followed by the launching of the second 4-year plan (1974-77). The increased
development that resulted in all areas of the economy.mude it possible to
_ triple the capability of the means of product3on from 1970 to 1979; their
production capability increased, in fact, from 62y megawatts in 1969 to
1,882 megawatta due to the installation of steam heat power stations in Annaba,
Skikda and Oran, gas turbine power stations in Alger, Hassi-Messaoud, Hassi-
R`Mel, Ghardaia, Ain-El-Baya, Boufarik, Bab-Ezzouar, Touggourt and Tiaret, ~
and dieael power stations in E1-Oued, I11izi, 7~anet, Beni-Ounif, Tindouf,
Taghit, Beni-Abbes and Kerzaz, as well as new gas turbines in the process of
construction at Marsat-El-Had~, TAUggourt and M'Sil~., The electrical
transmission network was multiplied 180.percent from 1969 to 1979; the high
tension network showed an increase of b percent during the first 4-year plan
and 5.6 percent during the s~cond 4-year period.
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Increase in Production and Salea_ .
Production of electricity grew at a more:sustained rate. It increased from
1,462 GWh tacceleration of gravity watt.hours) in 1969 to 5,566 GWh in 1979,
with a growth rate of 12.5 percent during the first pla~1 and 15 gercent
during the second plan, a growth fundamentally secured by the thermal power _
statione (80 percent of total production). -
giergy sales (in GWh) nearly tripled during the last decade--from 1,500 GWh
in 1970, sales reached a volume of 3,600 GWh in 1977 and exceeded 4,200 GWh
in 1979.
The growth of production and consumption of natural gas is evesi more spec-
tacular. The advance deductions of natural gas by SONELGAZ according to
SONATRACH (Algerian National Hydrocarbon Company), which reached 5,~280
million thermal units jn 1969, had doubled in 1974, achiered 18,900 million -
thersnal units in 1977 and should reach 40 million fihermal units 3n 1980. -
_ Natural gas sales by the single SONELGAZ network, which were 2,84 billion ~
thermal vnits in 1970, increa.sed to 8.61 billion thermal units in 1977 and
exceeded 15 billi~n thermal units in 1979. ~
Thie growth in energy production was accomplished because of inveetmente
whose ascending curve is equally mean ingful--scarcely 290 million dinara in
_ 1970, 1.04 billion dinars in 1977 and more than 2.5 billion dinare in 1979. ~
The SONEII3AZ personnel, which was about 5,400 managers, building supervisors
- and epecialized or skilled laborers in 1970, grew to 12,000 in 1977 and 16,900
in 1979.
10-Year Forecasts
The forecasts for this decade show the extent of the effort that Algeria
intends to undertake in seeking its industrialization. The total established
capability for electricity must $row, in fact, according to early figures,
from 2,000 megawatts in 1980 to 4,600 megawatts in 1985 and to 7,500 megaw-atts _
in 1990. Energy productiori will be brought from 6,200 GWh in 1980 to 13,830
_ GWh in 1985 and to 24,000 GWh in 1~~0. Energy sales will increaee fram 5,350
GWh in 1980 to 12,200 GWh 5 years later and to 21,300 GWh at the end of this -
decade, which for all electricity areas will show an average yearly growth of
14.5 percent. ~
Growth rates are greatex in the gas field: the advance deductiona of natura~.
gas according to SONR~TRAG'H will triple from 1980 to 1985 (increasing from
39.b billion ~hermal urtita in 1980 to 103.2 billion thermal units in 1985) _
and wi11 reach a volu~ae of 210 billion thermal units in 1990. Natural ,gas
sales will reach a volinne of 66.8 billion thermal units in 1985, againet 21.5
b111ion thermal units in I980,.and will rise to 144 billion thermal~un its in
1990, which allows us to anticip~ate an average yearly increase of 19 percent.
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~ Investments should reach 8 billion dinara, a~ainat 3.48 billion, to attain 20
billion dinara.at the end of thie decade, which is an average yearly increase
of 19 percent. SONELGAZ persannel will grow from 18,000 persons in 1980 to
32,400 in 1985 and t�o nearly 40,000 managers and laborers in T990, which is
an increase of 8 percent. ~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
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IRAN
,
ASHRAF SEEN PLANNING SHAH'S RESTORATION FROM ISRAEL
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French.No 1008, 30 Apr 80 p 24
[Text] The former shah of Iran is now in Egypt, ostensibly pampered by
President Sadat and his wife. Might he have given up all hope of living
"until the overthrow of those who :~verthrew him?" Certainly not, if one is
to believe some confidential talk emanating from Cairo.
At any rate, his twin sister, the notorious Ashraf--the real man in the
family--is noC only hoping and praying. Both before and after the fall of '
the monarchy, she often accused her brother of passivity and vehemently
reproached Farah Diba with her bad influence on her husband. Supported by
Nixon and Kissinger., assisted by the veterans of the U.S, and Iranian secret
services and able to dispose of tens of milljons of dollars, Ashraf is under-
taking the reconquest of power in Tehran. At the very least, she wants to
take ravenge for last year's humiliation.
Which is her base of opera~ions? Pdot Cairo (she believes that Arabs are
not trust�aorthy). Not the U.S.: the distance is too great. But Israel,
closer to Tehran. ~Ashraf has been in this country for a few weeks. The
Israeli government and its secret services have made available to her vast
_ facilitiea to organize and train some hundreds of Iranians as corunandos.
Moreever, on special authorization from Prime Minister Menachem Begin, -
the MOSSAD {the Israeli inteTligence service) has taicen charge of the opera-
Cions.
Ashraf's commandos hope to initiate activities as early as mid-May, ~ust at
the time when President Carter will consider himself c~mpelled to proceed
, from economic and financial sanctions to military action against the Iranian
Islamic Republic.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
CSO: 4900
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- QATAR
PAPER COr1~SENTS ON GISCARD D'ESTAING'S VISIT TO GULF
_ Paris AL-WATAN AL~ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Apr 80 pp 46-48
:
[Text] Doha, from the correspondent of AL-WAT'AN AL-ARABI.
Qatar produces about haJf a million barrels o� petroleum daily from its in-
land and offshore wells. It exports about 9Er percent of its production,
which b egan inland in 1949 and offshore in 1964.
Since petroleum is an exhaustible substance, Qatar intends to exploit its
natural gas wells and the gases which accompany [the production of] petro- -
leum, as well as [*_o use] the illumination of these gases in an ambitious
industrialization program. ~
AL-WATAN AL-ARABI asked MinisCer of Finance and Petroleum Shaykh 'Abd~al-'Aziz
ibn Khalifah A1 Thani about his government's opinion regarding all of the
basic issues which pertain to Arab petroleum with regar.d to production, prices,
and how these issues reflect on Arab economic relations wit~ the consumer coun-
' tries. ~
With regard to these relations, Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz criticized the position
of the world petroleum companies, the "seven sisters", which bear the responsi-
bility for raising petroleum prices and realizing huge profits and the expense.
of the producer and the consumer.
Nor did he neglect to praise the positive position of France with regard to
the Arabs, commending French President Giscard d'Estaing's role in it and
censuring the Western information media in general for their attempt to dis- _
tort his recent trip to the Gulf.
- I said to the Qatari minister: -
_ ~i �
Q. What aXe the premises and the results of the policy which is being fol- -
lowed in Qatar to devel~p the petrochemi.cal industries?
- A. With regard to exploitations and industries, especially those which have
been and are being carried on in the light of the policy which has been laid -
- down, we have commenced to carry out several pro~ects, foremost among which
- at the present time is the iron and steel produ~tion pro~ect. .
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There is also a chemical fertilizers project, which has begun to recover
ite capital, and there are *he petrochemical industries complaxes, one of
which has been completed recently.
The fundamental purpose of creating and establishing these industries is to
create an alternative national production which will enable us to conserve
- our resources, considering that the petroleum will not last forever.
Here, iri the field of the execution of the plan of industrialization, we are
con�ronted by the [problems of] the basic conversion by numerous steps, deter-
mining the need for production and the capabilit;~ of comprehension, and pro- ~
viding through the creation of training institstes, the human skills for
operation and production.
These are st~ps which will necessarily encounter some difficulties in their
preparatory stages, and the larg~ industrial countries have passed through
comparable conditions. Nevertheless, all difficulties must be overcome to
insur~ continued development and to increase and diversify the national pro- -
duct.
When we had finished preparing and carrying out the majority of the itsms ~
of the plan of heavy industrialization, we turned our attention toward pre-
paring the plan of developing the light industries, and these are now being ~
studied and investigated in their basic items. -
Q. With regard to talk concerning the iron and steel mill, it is being
aubjected to a campaign of distrust concerning the extent of its eff iciency
and profitability for Qatar and the Gulf area. What are the difficulties of
- op~rating it, and how a~e you solving the problem of providing the experts
- and technical manpowe: that it needs?
- A. W~ are not suffering from a lack of experienced men and operating tech- -
s nicians. I consider these statements mere exaggerations, and they do not r
~ apply to the res~t of the heavy industries either.
T.n answer to the Question concerning distrust in the iron and steel industry .
itself, the.re is no cause for uncertainty or stirring up the dust about it. �
It supplies our domestic requirements and likewise answers the requirements
of our sister nations, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and others. In brief, '
it ia a profitable and necessary pro~ect, and is far from being a loss.
- Q. Is there a trend toward reducing the rate of production of petroleum in
Qatar, and ar.e there probabilities of the discovery of new petroleum fields -
- which will augment the quantity of the reserve? -
A. Our petroleum production policy is based on the present annual rat~ of -
production. That applies ~o the present ~ime and the existing conditions,
but, if unforeseen events should occur, they would necessitate a review of
this position, for there will be a discussion of every incident.
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As for new disc~~reriss, there are many expectations of them, and tices~ eVpec-
tations are encouraging. However, they still need to be followed up. -
- Q. Can a screnCer co~ra_nation among the OPEC eountries for *he ~zc~ole~:m -
production pYo~rar.i be set up in accordance with the real nzeds or r;te worlc
market and rhe beneiit of the petroleum-producing countries?
A. I believe tha*_ the time has come for nie to speak on the groduction pro- -
gram, for there must b~ cooperation and coordination for the guicar.ce and _
organizat3on of petroleum production.
Since, as we know, petroleum is a substance which may give out at uny L~ma in
its wells 2nd undarground res2rvoirs, k2 must prepare a progra�,mGd p~troleu~a
policy which will oe in narmony with our domestic requirements an~? tn~ develop-
- ments of thaL pol-'_cy and wnich will guarantee the rzquirements of the world
market, with a cancerr. ror not giving the industrial na~ions a cnanc~ t~ per-
; sist in the gclicy of s*_oring patrnleum in Lheir reservoirs fzr beyond their
requirements. ~
If storage couLinue~ and escalates, it will mean depriving the petroleLm-
producing coun*_ries of their natural right to take advantage of, ti~z c:,calaLion
o� prices, �wnich, as ~cnow, accorupanies thz escalati~n af thz prices of
varioue goacis year after year.
e Iu oLher words, s~~rir:g pe_roleu~ means taking advantage of the opportu:~izy to
= buy it at nominal pr-~ces and realize huge gain~ later on f or those wha store
it at the expanse ot the producing countries.
~ ~de are now eneza~�rinb to create a basis for the production program, 3nC, if -
we are suc~~ss~ul, ~z ~ha17 have realized that ~dvantsge for ourse~ves and
for all oi the GPEC petroleum-producing countries.
Q. Are there studies wnzch determine how long the petroleum will hold out7
- A. Indeea ~thzre are es~i~r~ates, some of which are based on scientific fact5,
and, when ~n2 has acqLainzed oneself with all of these studies, one can s~y
tha[ the pe~~oleum will ~ast for 30 years at the longest.
Q. Is thera co::cen~-ration on projects of exploiting natural gas and Liia gas
which accompanie3 petroleum in Qatar?
A. The fact is that t112 Dukhan field wi11 yield it~~ production for tt7e fir~t
and second stages in the middle of this year, and this will give us ~~n nppor- -
tunity to ent~r into tha Arab market as gas exporters instead ui bazng more
_ depzndent ozi foreign marlcets than ~~e ought to be.
Studies are nou ii~ progress to exploit the largest gas fields in tne ~icrL'n ~
of the country on the 3asis ot tti2 n~ed to exploit all of our natur~l rE~o~arces -
so that our dep2ndence ~riZ1 not remain centered on petraleum alone ;,o d2velop
- the natinnal incom~. ~ ~
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- If we compare gas production to that of petroleum; the gas of the north is
_ cQnsidered equal to about 300,OOU barrels per day. So far as costs are con-
- c~~rned, I have no definite studies on them yet.
_ I am speaking of the exploitation of gas in the light of.a general policy
= which is being prepared and carried out. The rest of the details will then
branch uut from this policy, and the isaue of coets will, of course, be among -
~ them. We have obtained preliminary estimates of the costs of the pro~ect of
- exploiting the Dukhan gas field.
- Q. Have you reached a solution to the problem of producCion in the affsh~re
_ field which you own ,jointly with the emirate of Abu Dhabi and a Japanese
_ company?
A. We have reached a definite result, which I believe will be applied. Haw- ~
ever, the quantity which will be produced from the fielda to which you refer =
- is a modest one. Furthermore, there is a field of [subterranean] water con-
- cerning which we have not reached an agreement with the Japanese because the
costs are too high and we do not need it yet. -
- Nevertheless, there is a general agreement which will enable us to make the
_ �ields to which I refer productive, and the importance of this field, from a -
symbolic point of view, is that it is a joint project between us and the UAE.
Q. Is it possible tu learn the details of this agreement?
A. The most important detail of it is that it employs the principle of shar-
- ing the exploitation and the revenue between ourselves and the UAE. -
Q. Then, ig the issue of stopping production there considered to be at an -
- end ?
A, Up to this time, the issue of stopping production has been applicable to
the deposit of subterranean water only, because, as I have said, it costs too
much and we do not need it. It is now being studied, but we haven'C reached
a final decision on it. ~
Q. Has the estimate of the size of Qatar's ~atural gas reserve been modified
= since the recent investigations which were c~rried out ~ointly with the She11
company in northwest area recently? ~ ~
A, the Shell company is continuing the preparation of studies on this subject.
However, we have not adopted any final decision concerning the choice of the
company which is to undertake the accomplishment of this task, for there are
procedures and auctions which must precede every agreement that ia:,made with -
the companies and there are technical specifications which must be..set forth
in the introduction to the details which precede the agr~ement.
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, What the Shell. ~omgany is doing so far is preparing the studies. These .
_ studies have produced posi~tive results, and have confirmed the presence of~
a gas depoait in Qatar which is 'arge enough to provide a steady output for
about 400 years.
Q. Do you believe that it ie best to link gas pricea with those of petrole~im
: on the world market?
A. The OPEC is ~tudytng this subject and is trying to prepare an outline oE
_ a basis for determining the prices of gas. I believe that the time has com~:
for OPEC te adoot clear-cut measures in this matter, for gas is going Co be- -
came the second basic substance, directly f.ollowing petroleum in importance in
the produ~tiori of energy, It wi1Z be necessary to create a price base for };as � _
so that it will not fall prey to certain companies or be sacrificed to them, as _
was the case with petroleum in the past.
It is not permissible for the situation to conCinue as it is now with regar~i
to the difference in gas prices on the world market. You find it at high
prices tn one place and ~t low prices in another place at the same tine. It -
is an anomalous situation, in w�hich the producing r_ountries pay its price with-
- out any justification.
= Q. What is the anticipated role for gas with respect to industry in Qatar?
A. I bel~ave that gaa wi11 have a principal iole in domestic and light ind~is-
tries. Without gas, we shauld not be able to cr~ate firm and viable industries, _
for it is a basic subs~ance in the field of building industries.
We are now studyin~ an integr.al plan which will be carried out during the
course of 5 to 10 years, the basis of it beir~g to find out the best way to
go about exploiCing the gas. This plan has not been carried out yet, because,
as I said~ we have not yet reached the stage of concentrated gas production.
Q. What is your position with rehard to opening commerce with the "basket
of currencies" to determine the prices of petroa.eum?
A. There has been a flood of questions concerning the issue of the "basket
of currencies", and our answer is that we believe that rne doJ.lar is sti11 the
best currency that we can deal in and w:ith which to se~tle a~~counts.
The "basket of currencies" exists by virtue of the Geneva agreement, but we
must observe that the dollar gives a higher interest rate thai~. any other
_ currency.
There are some analysts who look at the sub~ect from one point of view: they
base their decisions on their consideration of tiie dollar as a currency which
is liable to coiltinuing devaluation. These analysta forget the other side,
that the intereyt rate obtained from dealing in the dollar is higher than that
which is to be tiad from dealing in the rest of the currencies.
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~
In other words, if T should sell part of the petroleum for sterling and
another part for c',ollars, I should find out promptly that the interest rate -
- from dealing with the dollar was greater than that from dealin~ in sterling,
Even though there is a aubstitute for the dollar, there is no problem. The
poaeibility of relying on the "basket oF currE~ncies" exists, and I could rely
on it at gny time; neverthelesa, I declare my conviction that the dollar is
- still the best currency that we can deal in to settle the petroleum accounts. ~
Q. Are those who propose the principle of the "basket of currencies" torn
betwee~~ ~:ie principle of economic liberation from the sphere of the doliar on
one hand and pressure on the U.S. administration to change its position regard-
ing the PalesCine issue on the other hand?
A. I am pleased to assure you that reliance on dealing in the dollar is not
based on any political considerations. We apply the best and most advantageous
economic methods in this fielc;, and political considerations are not applied to
this subject.
There are many exploitations which are done through other currencies in addi-
tion to the dollar; these include the German mark, the Italian lira, the Swiss -
franc, French franc, and others. If there were political considerations, why -
should the idea not be applied to these exploitations, which are present in
the area?
Q. Perhaps the purpose of depending on the "basket of currencies" is to limit
the dealing in the dollar so as to apply pressure on the U.S. administration.
A. If we were sure that stopping dealing in the dollar on the part of the
OPEC area and the Arab nations would have an effective influence on the politi-
_ cal position of the U.S. administration and would accomplish what we want, then
we should never hesitate for an instant to drop the dollar for other currencies. ~
That is to say, if [getting rid of] the dollar should help toward bringing
about a just solution to the Arab Palestine issue--and I believe that that is
_ the object of the question--then we should never hesitate to do so, for the
Arab cause is the basic issue for which we live, to which we devote all of "
our powers, and for which we are ready to sacrifice the last drop of our blood.
Nor do I suppose that the dollar will be an obstacle in the way of our progress
in this direction, because the U.S. administration will be faced with the dif- -
ficult decision if it is proved that the restoration of the Palestinian righC
is bound.up with the U.S. dollar.
Q. How much of the aid which you offer to the Arab countries out of the
revenues from petroleum in Qatar is used?
A. I have no estimate of the rate of aid. However, Qatar employs large sums
in the field of aid and various exploitations which are being carried out in
the Arab countries and in other countries which are marching on the road to
development and building.
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Of course, the Islamic countries are included in these.
Q. What are the most important industrial pro~ects which you are planning
to carry out witt~ the petroleum revenues which are b~ing realized and the gas -
revenues wYiich are anticipated?
A. The most important pro~ect on which our attention is centered at the
_ present time is that af exploiting the gas in the north field. This is one
of the largest prn,jects of ~his nature. -
Q~ What is the role which, in your opinion, petroleum ouglit to play now in
facing the problems of the Arab world?
A. I do not believe that the time has come for us to brandish the weapon of
petroleum as a solution to our problems, either here in the Gulf or in the
whole Arab world.
This leads me to speak of the need to canvert the Gulf area into an area
devoid of international struggles, an area which will not lie under the iuflu-
ence of either of the world currents, the U.S. or the Russian.
When we do need petroleum for a weapon, it should be used to support our
rights an3 o~ur existence, and Qatar will be in the vanguard of those who -
apply whatever measures ought to be applied to attain the desired goals.
Q. It is observed that there are disputes among the OPEC countries, espe-
cially over whatever pertains to the standardization of petroleum prices.
A. There are no deep -rooted disputes.within the organization. The phenomenon
of price differences 1.n recent times has caused t~ie people to look specula- -
tively at the foundation of OPEC with regard to the extent of the firmnes~ of
_ the condition among its member nations. This is a natural speculation, coming
after the prices were standardized in the past and later turned into a col-
lection of different prices. -
Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is a dispute in the ranks of the .
organization which caused new conditions to arise with regard to prices so . -
that the price became diversified instead of single. What brought about this
multiplicity of prices was the petroleum companies known as the "seven sis-
ters", which work to fragment the prices and trading in petroleum so as to get
exorbitant prices before the petroleum goes from the producer to the consumer.
President Carter of the U.S. conf:irmed this fact recently when he said that
these companies realized profits which are estimated in billions of dollars,
- and so the upswing which.took place in price levels was caused directly by -
the methods which the petroleum companies are using.
As an example of what I aui saying, you will find that when a barrel of petro-
leum is sold at 30 dollars in Qatar, it xeaches the markets of Rotterdam, New
York, or London to be sold at 40 or 45 dollars.
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The question, then, is, "Who is buying at 30 and selling at 45? Is it OPEC,
- or is it the petroleum companies?
The answer is that it is the petroleum companies which are engaging 1.1 this
ope.ration. Therefore, the whole blame should be directed at these companies,
the "seven sisters", for they are responsible for the troubles that the world
is enduring, as well as for inflation, thP high cost of living, and the rise
- of prices, eapecially in Europe and the Arab world.
Q. Did the discussions which took place with French President Giscard
_ d'Estaing during his visit to Qatar reault in the signing of certain agree-
ments, especially in the petroleum sector, or in coordination for the develop- _
ment of economic cooperation between the two countries? .
A. I regret to say that the Western information media have taken recourse to
various attempts to distort the aims and results of the French president's
trip to the Gulf~ The fact is that his visit was productive and profitable,
and we are highly pleased with his position regarding the Arab cause. I com-
- mend President d'Estaing.
The mis~eading propaganda has tried to connect the trip with distorted con-
= versations ~oncerning nonexistent agreements, although I ask myself at this
- point, "Why do not positive and fruitful ~oint agreements between ourselves
and France take place?"
~
If we did not give petroleum to France, to whom should we give it then? Who
stands to gain from stopping the course of cooperation between ourselves and
this friendly country? Is it profitable for us to throw obstacles in the way
= of continued cooperation with France and to give c~ur petroleum to the en~mies
of our Arab causes and of our interests and our existence? _
I regret that the French press distorts the truth about the trip of President
Giscard d'Estaing. It would have been more fitting for it to throw light on
- the real results of that trip, which brought dignity and honor to France's
position regarding the Arab cause.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
CSO: 4802 -
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TUNISIA
M'ZALI SEEN AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR TO PRESIDENT
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 March 80 pp 28-29
[Article by Tunis correspondent Souhayr Belhassen] -
[Text] It was not a decree but a simple communique dated 1 March which
confers the nomination of Mohamed M'Zali, minister of national education,
to the functions of "coordir.iator," without any power of signature. There-
fore, for the moment, it is strictly a technical arrangement. Humanitarian
- considerations and a necessary respite for ponderin~ explain why Bourguiba
would not n~minate a new prime minister on the spot; that is, according to
the constitution, his successor designate. By this gesture, all the same,
the head of state puts the education minister "in a state of observation,"
to quote one of his close collaborators.
It is a daring gestur.e, however, which changes "the implicit hi~erarchy
of the government," as a communist teacher put it. In the mind of most
. of the people interrogated by JEUNE AFRIQUE before March, Mr M'Zali was
.the wisest choice among the possibilities, but not necessarily the first.
In consequence of his functions as delegate minister to the prime minister,
Mr Mohamed Sayeh, director of the Destourien Socialist Party came first,
at Zeast on the technical side (JEUNE AFRIQuE No 1000). In fact, en- -
couraged by him, the members of the government tended to turn to him during
the transition week following Hedi Nouira's accident. .
The second person most often mentioned is Mr Habib Bourguiba Jr. His~recent
missions to Presidents Giscard d'Estaing and Carter put him in the first rank
- of succession. Because of the reputation of the first nominee as a repressive
man and of the second as spoilt kid uf the regime, the designation of
Mr Mohamed M'Zali was rpceived with a tinge of relief in all quarters--once
the first surprise had passed.
Well, then, successor or not successor? Nobody can say yet. The coordinator, -
however, has some assets. Young (he is SS), Mr rZohamed M`Zali, sa}~s one of
his colXaborators, "Would more easily triumph in an electoral.campaign on
the American model than in a war of succession."
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riore a fighter than a tactician, ambitious, obstina~e, hardworking, this
Ba~helor of Philosophy (from the Sorbonne) and destourien from the word
go has been rninister six times: national defense (1968-69), youth and
- sporte (1970-71), public health (1973-76), nation~l education (1969-70,
1971-73 and Rince 1976). Authoritarian, enthusiaatic but methodical,
he inepired this remark of one of his colleaguea: M'Zali starte ss a
corporal and finishes everywhere as commander or top of the class."
(JEUNE AFRIQUE N~~. 960)
- A sportsman, he jags his 1000 m thre~ times a week, he is vice-president
of the International Olympic Committee. And--this explains a lot--he is -
loyal to his friends. Did he not lose hi~ post at National Education in -
1970 because he had dedicated one of his books to Ben Salah, when the
latter was expecting to be arrested?
A Palitical Vacuum Hard to Fill
~ Having good relations with all his colleagues in th~ government, he
succeeded in maintaining contact with diverse political currents. And, ~
it is to be recalled, he is the only one who did not personally lead the .
bureau of the "legitimate" UGTT (General Union of Tunisian Workers) of
- Ti~ani Abid. C:Lose to the Arab-Musulman option, he is nonetheless
moderniste "Moliamed ,1'Zali is somebody who makes politics by not making _
any," dec?ared 3 member of the opposition.
An opposition which from the Communist Party to the Democratic Socialist -
Movement by way of the Popular Unity Movement (MIJP of Ben Salah) is
unanimous: "Personalities are of no consequence." "In this new choice
_ of a president, says Mohamied Harmel, secretary general of the Communist
~ Party (banned), there is no indication of a renewal. Post-Gafsa requires
a change which muat be expressed." "President Bourguiba remains the first
accountable for change or no change," adds Mr Brahim Hayder, member of the
- i~fUP. A Social-Democrat received by Bourguiba goes further: "Ten years,
that is plenty. Bourguiba knew it long ago but, considering his age, he
did not dare to envision a government without Air Nouira. Nouira's illness
liberates him at the same time from the pressure imposed by G~.fsa and
P1r Nouira himse Lf."
_ "Tunisia is going through a tricky time," the former prime minister, Bahi
_ Laghdam, tells us. "Is M'Zali to be the scapegoat or will he pass the test
of prime minister with honors? Algerian restlessness, Libya's aggression,
the trial of the commandos where heads will roll, and the social unrest
make a prognosis difficult."
As a man of compromise, Ptohamed M'Zali could be a factor of detente,
internal as well as external. By ordering the reopening of the closed law
and economic sciences faculty and of the engineering school, Bourguiba seems
to be orienting the government in that direction. -
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For the intelligentsia, Nouira was not a refuge but a hope. "The second =
congress," declared a law professor, "proved that Nouira had little
initiative but that he was willing to change. Today, who knows?"
In businesb~ circles, the absence of a certain stability is lamented: "With
Mr Nouira somebody who started an enterprise knew he could carry on without
harasement. Whnt will tomorrow bring?" asks a building contractor.
Several high officials, comgany directors, former ministers and even in- -
cumbent ministers are worried about the political vacuum. "Because of
his age and his experience within and outside the party, Mr Nouira had
an uncontested authority over most of his ministers. Today, whatever
, the successor's per~onality he will be considered as an equal, as far as
we are concerned. It will be all the harder for him to acquire auth~rity,
- as Bourguiba will regard him as a kid and not as an assistant. How is
M'Zali going to put himself across and convince Bourguiba? Because, if -
Bourguiba remains a political animal, he is far removed from the hard
facts of the country."
However, according to a waiter born in Bizerta, to be a candidate for
- succession, "It is enough to be born in Monastir like Mr M'Zali, Mr Nouira
and President Bourouiba." _
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRLTPJIA 1980 �
$696
CSO : 4400 END
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