JPRS ID: 9163 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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JPRS L/9163
25 June 1980
- ~1SSR Re ort
p
_ MILITARY AFFAIRS
CFOUO 12/80)
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~TPRS L/916 3 -
25 June 1980
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 12/80)
CONTENTS
General Kiryan Interviewed on Afghanistan
(Mikhail Mirtofanovich Kiryan Interview; PANORAMA, 18 Feb 80). 1
Book Excerpts: Tank Troops' Employment in World War II
(STROITEL'STVO I BOYEVOYE PRIMENENIYE SOVETSKIKH TANKOVYI~i VOYSK
V GODY VELIKOY OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNY, 1979).......e............ 4
Book Excerpts: Automating Control of Artillery Operations
(B.D. Lebedev, N.I. Myakin; VOPROSY AVTOMATIZATSII UPRAVLENIYA
BOYEVYMI DEYSTVIYAMI ARTILLERII, 1979) 61
- a - [III - US5R - 4 FOUO]
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GENERAL KIRYAN INTERVIEWED ON AFGHANISTAN
Milan PANORAMA in Italian 18 Feb 80 p 61
[Interview with Soviet General Mikhail Mirtofanovich Kiryan, by Carlo Rossella,
date and place not given]
[Text] Maj Gen Mikhail Mirtofanovich Kiryan is a member
of the Red Army General Staff. PANORAMA talked with the
general on the Soviec intervention in Afghanistan, on
the international crisis, on detente, and on the likeli-
hood of a re~iewed arms race.
Question:~ What is your view of the international situation'
Answer: Very complicated. However, if you recall the imme-
diate postwar period, there is nothing new about it.
Question: The Americans say it's a11 the Soviets' f ault, that
it was t'~e Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that started it.
Answer: Lies. Carter hds been looking for a pretext for some
time now.
Question: And so you gave him one.
Answer: Right now, there is an organized campaign under way on
that pretext, to put the Soviet Union in a bad light. That's r
why the situation has deteriorated.
Question: What does the USSR think will happen now? -
AnswF;.~ : We are wat�..�liing events calmly, without hysteria. The
' one ~;hiiig tliat wo.rries us is that this might undo al1 the work
we tiave done so far on detente.
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Question: Might the Soviet Unxmn's calm just now have something
to do with its military superiority vis-a-vis the West?
Answer: That's not the way it is. During the SALT II negotia-
tions, everybody was convinced that we did have parity. Cer-
tainly we have no~t been able to change the balance over t he past
6 months. In the course of the negotiations, we weighed and
calculated, along with America, all the possible risks. We are
still ready to work out the respective divisions. Americ a,
though, doesn~t want to do that, and talks of Soviet superiority.
The truth is that NATO controls millions of inen in Europe. And
_ I can tell you that, in Europe, the USSR does not have t he capa-
bility of fielding and maintaining an army of e7ua1 strength.
~ And now, of course, there are the cruise and Per�shing mi s siles...
Question: Does this mean ~chat since the cruise missiles and the
Pershings will be deployed in the NATO counties, the USSR will -
have to produce similar weapons in order to balance European
theater forces?
Answer: Even if we don~t go directly to Pershing-type or cruise _
missiles, we are going to have to spend money on new weapons
and come up with systems to offset the ad~ersary's effort s. And
we do not like that, at al.l. We prefer to spend our maney on
peaceful undertakings. We cannot, however, surrender our secu-
rity.
Question: Was the intervention in Afghanistan undertaken by the
USSR in defense of its own security?
Answer: We went into A�ghanistan because we were asked t o come
there by that country~s legitimate government. Had we not moved
in, with our limited contingents in very short order, the Ameri- _
cans would have been in Kabul. Tn what form? There is no tell- -
ing. A].1 we know is that when the American military att ache saw
uU coming, he broke down and wept in the airport waiting room.
Question: When will the USSR pull out of Afghanistan?
Answer: When there are no more threats on Afghanistan's borders.
Question: Things are gaing to drag on for a while there, since
_ the Americans, the Chinese, the British, and the Pakist a;zis have
decided to support t hP Muslim guerrillas.
Answer: We do not call organized gangs gu.erri~las. Unt il such
time as the Afghan army is able to liquidate such foreign-or-
ganized gangs by itself, Soviet troops will hare to take a hand
in the struggle against such gangs.
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Question: Does that mean that the SoviPts are already fighting
against the Afghan guerrillas?
Answer: As of now, Soviet troops are not taking part in the
fighting, because the big groups now being trained acro~s the
borders have not yet entered the field. There are only scat--
tered bands there now, and the Afghans can handle the situation.
Question: What losses has the USSR Guffered? Is it true that
there was fighting with regular units of the Afghan army right
after [your] ai~rival in Kabul?
Answer: There have been no battles against Afghan units. When
Lhere is fighting there are men killed, and nobody has seen any
bodies. Our troops have occupied certain positions, and they
do not leave them. During the night, at first, bandits attacked
scattered soldiers. There was, however, nothiii; you could call
actual fighting. In the Afghan army, which is made up of inen,
there have been desertions. For that matter, the Americans had
their agents in that army, and some of them matT be there still.
The Afghans have a lot of work cut out for them in getting their
army into shape. But they will manage. We hope that Afghani-
stan, thanks partly to our help and our advice, will soon have
an army capable af defending its own borders by itself. When
that day comes, there will be no need for Soviet troops in Kabul.
Question: That is both a hope and an assumption. But what if
th~ngs should go differently?
~ Answer: There is a lot of talk about America's supplying arms to
Pakistan. There have even been references to the atom bomb.
Against whom would Pakistan use weapons like those? There's
more to it, though. If the government of Afghanistan succeeds
in controlling the border, well and good. But if the United States and
China continue to arm the Afghan gangs and Pakistan as well, or
should they intervene with expeditionary forces as aggressors
against Afghanistan, there will be retaliatory response from the
Soviet side. Then the situation will really be aggravated, and
may lead us to consequences difficult to predict as of today.
_ COPYRIGHT: 1980 Arnoldo Mondadori Editore S.p.A
6182
CSO: 3104
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BOOK EXCERPTS: TANK TROOPS' EMPLOYMENT IN WORLD WAR II .
Moscow STROITEL'STVO I BOYEVOYE PRIMENENIYE SOVETSKIKH TANKOVYKH VOYSK
V GODY VELIKOY OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNY in Russian .1979 signed to press
18 Oct 79 pp 1-7, 40-44, 77-79, 95-96, 111-113, 148-151, 183-184,
204-206, 245-247, 274-276, 305-307, 334-415
[Excerpts from book by group of authors edited by Mar Armd Trps 0. A.
Losik, professor, "Stroitel'stvo i boyevoye primeneniye sovetskikh
_ tankovykh voysk v gody velikoy otechastvennoy voyzy" (Organi.zational
Development and Combat Employment of Soviet Tank Troops in the Great
Patriotic War), Voyenizdat, Moscok, 1979, 15,000 copies, 415 pagesJ
[Excerpts] The authors: Maj Gen Tank Trps I. Ye. Krupchenko, Doctor of
Historical Sciences, Professor, Honored Worker of Science of RSFSR---
- director of the group of authors (Introduction, chapters 4 and 5,
Conclusion); Engr-Maj Gen (Res) L. V. Sergeyev, Doctor of Technical
Sciences, Professor (part of Chapter 1); Col N. A. Kireyev, Candidate of
Military Sciences, Docent (chapters 2 and 8); Col M. P. Dorofeyev,
Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent (~hapter 3); Col A. P. Antonov,
Candidate of Military Sciences (Chapter 6); Col N. G. Andronikov,
Candidate of Military Sciences, Docen~ (part of Chapter 7); Col I. M.
Kravchenko, Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent (part of Chapter 7);
Col S. V. Kolokol'tsev, Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent (part of
Chapter 9, appendices 1 and 2); Col (Ret~ V. S. Novikov, Candidate of
Military Sciences, Docent (part of Chapter 9); Col B. P. Lebedenko,
Candidate of Military Sciences tChapter 10); Col A. A. Belousov (par~ of
' t:i~dpter 11); Engr-Col (Ret) A. P. Pervushin, Doctor of Military Sciences,
Professor (part of Chapter 11); Capt lst Rank (Ret) Z. V. Grebel'skiy,
l;andidate of Historica~ Sciences, Docent (part of Chapter 12); Col (Ret)
Ya. V. Kuznetsov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent (part of
Chapter 12); Engr-Col V. I. I~'fedv~dkov, Doctor of Technical Sciences,
Professor (part of Chapter 1).
The uook is intended for the reading masses. It tells of the organiza-
tional development and combat employment of Soviet tank troops in the
Great Patriotic War, analyzes methods of conducting combat operations,
and examines problems of employing tank combined unit~ and forma.tions in
different kinds of warfare.
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Table of Contents
Introduction 3
Chapter Development of Armnred Equipment 7
1. Production of Tanks and SAU [Sel.f-Propelled Artillery MountsJ 7
2. Production of Wheeled Vehicles 38
Chapter 2. Organizational Development ot Tank Troops 44
1. Changes in Organizational Structure of Tank Troops i_n
July 1941-March 1942 44
2. Jrganizational Development of Tanlc Troops in 1942 50
3. Further Impr.ovement in Organizational Structure of Tank Troops
in 1943-1945 59
Chapter 3. Training Personnel for the Tank Troops 79
l. Training Officer Cadres 79
2. Training Junior Tank Speci.alists 90
3. iraining Reserve Subunits in Reserve Regiments 93
Chapter 4, Employment of Separate Tank Units and Combined Units for
. Direct Support of Infantry in the Attack 96
1. Principles ~f Combat Employment of Tanks for Direct Support
, of Infantry 96
2. Character of. Combat Op~rations of Separate Tank (Self-
Propelled ArtiJ.lery) Un:its and Combined Units in Perietrating a
Deliberate Defense 107
Chapter 5 Employment of Separate Tank (Mechanized) Corps and Tank
Armies for Exploiting Success in Offensiv~ Operations 113
1. Place, Role and Missions of Tank Armies an3 Separate Corps in
Offensive Operations 113
' 2. Planning and Preparation of Combat Operations 122
3. Commitment of Tank Armies (Corps) to Battle 133
4. Operations of Tank Armies (Corps) in the Operational Depth 137
Chapter 6, Meeting Engagements and Battles of Tank (Mechanized)
Corps and Tank Armies 151
_ 1. Conditions for the Origin of Meeting Engagements and Battles
and Their Characteristic Featlires 151
2. Organization of the Meeting Engagement and Battle 161
3. Conduct of Meeting Engagements and Battles 170
- Chapter 7. Assault Crossing of Water Obstacles by Combi.ned Units and
Formations of Ta.ik Troops 184
1. Conditions for Assault Crossin~ of Water Obstacles 184
2. Organization of Assault Crossing 189
3. Accomplishment of Assault Crossing 191
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rux urrl~ltu. u~~ u1VLz
Chapter 8. Employment of Tank (Mechanized) Units, Comb ined Units and
rormations on the Defense 206
1. Conditions for Units, Combined Units and Formations to Assume
~ a Defense and Their Combat Missions 206
2. Organization of Defense 212
3. Planning Combat Employment of Combat Arms and Aviation 228
4. Combat and Logistical Support 232
_ 5. Conduct of Defensive Actions 236
Chapter 9. The March of Tank Units and Combined t1nl.ts 247
1. Role of Marches in Combat Activities of Tank Troops 247
2. Conditions for Making Marches 249
3. March Capabilities of Tank Units and Combined Units 256
4. Or ganization of the March 25$
5. Support of the Marcb. 263
Chapter 10. Control of Units, Combined Units and Formations of
Tank Troops 2~6
1. Control Entities 2~6
2. Control and Communications Fa::ilities 282
3. Control in the Offensive 283
4. Features of Control on the Defense 303
- ~hapter 11. Technical Support of Tank Troops in the Battle and
Operation 307
l. Or ganization and Status of Technical Support to Tank Troops
at the Beginning of the War j~~
2. Development of Repair Facilities and Evacuation of Armored
Equipment during the War 310
3. Organization and Accomplishment of Technical Support 323
Chapter 12. Party-Political Work in the Tank Troops 337
1. Re ali~nment of Party-Political Work in Connection with the War
That had Begun 337
2. Party-Political Work in Defensive Engagements of 1941-1942 342
3. Party-Political Work during the Offensive by Soviet Forces in
1943-1945 352
_ Conclusion 370
Appendices:
1. Panzer Forces of Fascist Germany in World War ~I 380
2. Tank Forces of United States and Great Britain in World LJar II 395
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Intr.oduction
Tanks ha~~e been placed on pedestals as ete?-nal monuments to the unpar?J_-
leled courage and heroism of Soviet tankmen in Podmoskov'ye, Volgcg~-_~d,
, Kalach, Belgorod, Kursk, Kiev, Minsic, ~Jarsa~~~, Berlin and Prague, iiz ti~e
I~Songolian steppe and the mountains of :~ianchurta, and on squares an~]
streets of many other Soviet and :COrezgn cil.ies.
There is probably not a single major city liberated by Soviet tr~ops
- located in the former ttleater o� militar.y operations, the name of which is
not written on the colo~s of some tank regiment, brigade or corps. -
Soviet tankmen won immortal fame by their unparalleled courage and rriass
heroism. Our people and the peoples of f rarernal socialist countries have
immeasurable gratitude for them. It is this gratitude that is reflected
in the annual celc~ra~icn of Tankmen's Day, established in 1945 in recog--
nition of_ the ot~tsranding services oi tank troopsl in the Great Patrivtic
War and the achievements of tank builders in outfitting the Soviet Ar.n~ed
Forces with armored equipment.
The tank troops are a component of the Soviet Army, formed by the
Communist Party for defending the achievements of Che Great October
Socialist Revolution.
The Communist Party and V. I, Leain personally attached enormous imPor--
tance to technical outfitting of the Soviet Armed Forces, and they
defined the role and place of tank troops within them. Analyzing condi--
tions for waging contemporary warfare, Lenin concluded that it was
impossible to win victory without equipment and without the ability to
employ it in fighting an enemy. He pointed out that in war "the oi!e cat~o
wins is the one who has the greatest amount of equipment, efficiency. -
discipl.ine, and the best vehicles..."2
Lenin`s thesis on the role and importance of technical equipment f.or_ _
rPinforcing the Army's combat might was the basis of activity by the ~
party and government in technical outFitting of the Armed Forces of tlie
Soviet state, including the basis for creaeing and developing the r_a.nk
troops.
1. The official designation ~f thi~ combat arm has changed several t:inies
in the Soviet Army. When it originated, they caere called "armored
forces~~~ in t.he 1930's the designation of tank troops cYianged four
times--"mechanized," "motor-mect~aniz~d," "Cank" and "armored" r.roops~
In the Great Patriotic War (from late Z942) they were called "arznoted
arid mechanized troops." This ritl_e was retained until 1955. T.he -
term "armored troops" eYi~ted from 1955 ~hrougli 1958. The present
designation of "tank troops" was defined by 1959 regulations. F'or ~he
r.eaders' convenience, the moclern designatiun of this combat arm---
"tank troops"--is used everywhere i_n the book.
2. Lenin, V. I. "Polnoye sobraniye socxlineniy" [Complete CoIJ_ected
Works], XXXVI, 116.
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r~n ~rrl~trw u~n ~~vLx
Soviet tank troops covered a long and glorious path in a comparatively
brief period of history. They grew from small-sized armored detachments _
of the Civil War period into a powerful, indegendent combat arm, which
during the Great Patriotic War became the chief striking force of our
ground forces.
There was not a single major battle in the last war in which tanks did not
take part. Their mass employment in close coordination with other combat
arms and aviation determined the exceptionally high dynamic nature of com- _
bat operations and gave Great Patriotic War operations a maneuverable
character and great spatial scope.
Soviet tankmen honorably performed their sacred duty to *_he Motherland in
the Great Patriotic War. There were 250,000 tankmen awarded orders and
medals for courage and valor, over 1,150 tankmen were given the title Hero
of the Soviet Union, and 16 of them received this title twice. Con~ider-
ing the great .role played by tanks in the war, the party always shawed
constant concern for their development and improvement. That was the case
- in the first years of Soviet power and prior to World War II, and that was
~ the case during the war years.
The Communist Psrty ar~d Soviet government pay great attention to the
development of tank troops under present-day conditions as well, proceed-
ing from the assumption that even in a nuclear missile war the ground
forces will play a lar ge part. Together with motorized rifle troops, the
tank troops comprise the basis of ground forces today. -
Thanks to their high resistance to nuclear strikes, tank troops are
adapted to the greates t extent to conducting highly maneuverable and
daring actions under these conditions. In this regard the tanks not only
are not aging weapons, but they are even the most promising weapons of the
ground forces. The experience of recent local wars indicates that tanks
continue to play an important role on the battlefield under conditions of
, combat operations by conventional weapons as well.
In evaluating the past of tanks and considering the changes which have
occurred in military affairs in the postwar period, it can be boldly said
that there will be a further increase in the role of tanks as weapons and
of rank troops as a combat arm.
The fact that it is tanks that permit, on the one hand, exploitation of
results of nuclear missile strikes against the enemy in the shortest time
periods and to the fullest extent and, on the other hand, that substan-
- tially reduce friendly losses against such enemy attacks.,gives the right
to examine them as the basis of contemporary ground forces and as one of
the most important means for waging land warfare.
It is as a result of the increase in the tanks' role in modern warfare
that they have been given great attention in the pages of the Soviet and
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foreign press In recent y~~ars. Almost all authors recognize and consider.
i:umpletely natural the fact that the tank is becoming the most impc~rtant
means for conductin~ combat operations.
'I'he. problE~n: of organi�r.ational deveiopment of tank troops is linked
clirectly with principles of their battle and operational employment, since
it is generally known that the forms cf troop organization are di:ectly
dependent on the methods of. conducting combat operations.
It becomes fully apparent in this regard that a correct, scientifically
grounded so].urion to problems of further development of tank troops w~_11
have a determining influence on the resolution of problems of organizing
and conducting a conternporary engagement and operation. -
The imaginative use of conclusions from past experience can be of great
help in solving problems of the combat employment and organizational _
development of the tank troops, since this will permit a deeper percept:ic~n
- of processes occurring In present-day military affairs and a clearer
_ understanding of the ine~~i tability of changes in the theory and pr~actice
of conducting combat oper~tions and in the organizational development of
armed forces. -
The combat experience gaiiied by the Soviet Armed Forces in such a diffi- -
cult and lengthy war as the Great Patr.iotic War represents our i.nvaluable
property and one of the important sources of further development of Sc~~~iet~
military science.
Based on what has been said, the asthors attempted to study and g~~ner;tli.-r_e
the exper9.ence of organizational development and combat employment: of
S~~viet tank troops in the past war and thus help ofPicers and generals c~F
the ground forces take advantage oF concl~isi~:ns from t}1:LS experience in
- the practice of. troop combat and political_ training.
TFie chie.F content of. this work is a demonstration of the CPSli's guidi.~lg -
rc~l c in developing tlic Soviet tank troops :~s well. as an analysis of th�_].I:
organizational development and the practice of their combat employment
durin~ the Great Pat.riotic War.
An appendi.x to the book provides appropriare reference clata on tank troops
of Germany, the United States and ~ngland during ~�7orld War II for a com-
parative analysis of the combat features of equipment and organizati.anai. -
forms and methods of combat employment of Soviet and fore:ign tank troops. -
P~irty and govertiment decisions on military matters, archive documents,
off icial. manuals, published militar.y-theoretical and military-historical.
works, as well as memoirs of Soviet military leaders and veterans of. the
tank troops are the bas~i.s used in writing this monograph.
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Chapter 1. Development of Armored Equipment
fhus by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, new models of tanks--the
heavy KV [type of heavy tank], the med ium T-34 and the light (amphibious)
T-40--already had been completed and placed in production in the Soviet =
Union. Only the production of the light T-50 tank had not been adjusted.
In the opinion of some military leaders, it was to become the primary tank
for the 5oviet Army.
Unparalleled in scope and ferocity, the war required the organization of
mass production of armored equipment. This became one of the primary
tasks in realigning the Soviet Union's industry to provide the troops
with combat equipment. Failures of the f irst period of the war led to the
need to evacuate tank-manufacturing plants into the depths of the counrry
in late summer and early fall of 1941. This complicated even more ti?e
supply of armored equipment to the Army.
The country's industrialization carried our. during the prewar five-year
plans in combination with the mass labor heroism of the Soviet citizens,
- inspired and led by the Communist Party, permitted evacuating the populace
and industrial enterprises tothe eastern part of the country under very _
serious conditions of military operations and creating a high-capacity
production facility for the manufacture of armored equipment in the
shortest periods of time.
The T-34 tank was the basic tanic throughout the war. Its combination of
high combat qualities, simplicity of design, and adaptation f or repair and
reconstruction under field conditions contributed to this. -
The heavy KV and IS [Joseph Stalin] heavy tanks were a successful supple-
ment to the medium tanks as a means of qualitative reinforcement of the
"firepower-armor protection" complex.
Despite the f act that light tank production was stopped in 1943, they
played their part in the first 1'~ years of the war, when the production of
medium and heavy tanks was not yet developed in the requisite numbers.
Self-propelled artillery mounts (SAU) received extensive development in
the latter half of the war. The Soviet SAU's of this time essen tially
were turretless tanks created on the basis of light, medium and heavy
tanks. This permitted developing vehicles in short periods of time which
had more powerful weapons in comparison with the tanks on which they were _
based. Production of SAU in the f inal two years of the war made up a
considerable percentage of the total production of tanks and SAU.
The development of all types of tanks and SAU in the war years is charac-
terized by a consistent reinforcement of their firepower and armor protec-
tion. Firepower primarily was increased by increasing the caliber of main
guns and the initial velocities of the pro3ectiles. The lattpr increased
primarily through an increase in the charge weight and maximum pressure of
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090049-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094449-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE O1vI,Y
powder gases in the tube. Armor-piercing shells with tracer arid HE frag-
_ u~Entation she]_ls w~re the primary types of projectiles for the tank and
SAU main guns. Subcaliber armor-pi_ercing shells wiLh tracer. we_e deveJ_-
oped during the war to increase armor-piercing action, first i'uz the 45-mm
gun (acceptecl in the inventory on 1 Apri1 19G2) , then for t~~e 57-~nm and ~
76-mm guns (accepted into the inventory in April-rlay 1943) arid f.ix~ally for
the 85-nun guns (at the war's and) .
The reinforcement of armor protection followed the 7_:ine of