JPRS ID: 9421 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Document Page Count: 65
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9421 ~
1 December 1980
~ _
st Eur~o e Re ort
We p p
(~OUO 50/80) -
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JPRS 7G/9421
1 December 1980
~
WEST EUROPE REPORT
_ - (FOUO 50/80)
CONTENTS
COUNTRY SECTION
FINLAND
Korhonen Discusses Country's Goals for Madrid GSCE Conference
(Kei~o Korhonen; EUROPA-ARCHIV, 25 Oct 80) 1
FRANCE
GERDSM Studies, Refines ASW Techniqu~es ~
(Jean Mitault; ARMEES D'AUJOURD`HITl, Sep 80) 9
ASW Rapid Detection, Countermeasure Methods Explained
(Jerome Denavit; ARNiEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Sep 80) 13
New Aspects of Aerial Electronic Warfare
(Jean-Ma.rie d,e Carpentier; ARMEES D'A.UJOURD'HUI, Sep 80) 24
ITALY
` ,
Forlani I7iscloses New Government's Economic Program
(IL SOI,E-24 OAE, 23 Oct 80) 30
Text of Proposed Legislation for Aid to Chemica'1 Industry
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 22 Oct 80) 39
SPAIN
Government, Politicsl Party Programs To Combat Unemployment
(CANIDIO, 5 oct 80) 49
~
- a - [ III - WE - 150 .FOUO]
- r+~n ~r. ~rrt~-- � rOr nAt~ v
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COUNTRY SECTION FINLAND
_ KORHONEN DISCUSSES COUNTRY'S GOALS FOR MADRID CSCE CONFERENCE
Bonn EUROPA-ARCHIV in German 25 Oct 8Q pp 625-634
/Article by Dr Keijo Korhonen, undersecretary of state for political affairs at the
Finnish Ministry of Foreign affairs, from September 1976 to May 1977 foreign minis-
- ter in the government headed by P.rime Minister Martti Mietttuten:"The Madrid CSCE Con-
ference as a Challenge ta Neutral Finland"I
/Text/ The Madrid CSCE /Conference on Security and Cooperation in EuropE/ cannot be
dealt with as an isolated event; we m~st consider it in its historic context. Ten
years ago European modern political history passed through a significant period. In
the ,years 1970-1973 the proceas of settling the heritage of World War II had some
- noticeable results: Treaties were signed between Bonn and Moscow, Bonn and Warsaw;
the Four-Power Agreement on Berlxn stabilized and clarified the status of the city,
- ~nd the basic treaty was concluded by the two German states. At the same time it
was agreed to begin arms limitation talks in Vienna.
These general developments were coupled with the effort to organize a conference on
- security and cooperation in Europe. This concept, initially markadly "Ea~tern," re-
ceived definite impetus in spring 1969. At that time the Finnish Government defined
its attitude to the pxoposal. Finnish opinion held that the concept of the confer-
ence was to be backed with the proviso that it should be well prepared and all the
governments involved attend. In May 1969 the Finnish Government proposed thst, *aith
the consent of the governments involved, a preparatory meeting should take place in
Helsinki. Following long drawn-oat and difficult talks the regresentatives of
35 governments met in November 1972 in DipoZi near Helsinki. '~his meeting in turn
led to the first CSCE at foreign minister level in summer 1973. The next 2 years
passed with negotiatiQ,ns in Geneva, and in late July/early August 1975 the conference
of senior representatives of the countries responsible for Europe :net in Helsinki.
- At the end the Helsinki final act was signed.
The Helsinki Final Act From the Finnish Standpoint
Considered after the event, the 1975 final act was a genuine achievement. Now that
the general conditioa of international affairs with respect zo campror.:ise and media-
tion has deteriorated, we would be well advisEd to recall that which was achieved
S years ago, On the one hand the Helsinki final act settled the political legacy
of World War II and thus served as a kind of substitute for the still outstanding
peace treaty. On the other it became the basic document.of international behavior
relating to Europe and, at the same time, provided a framework for the peaceful
~
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- cooperation of the European countries. In all postwar histoYy we cannot find a
con;parable example of success by a11 the governments responsible fnr Europe for
arriv~.ng at a negotiated result which could justly claim the description peace po-
licy.
That which now appears to us logical and inevitable was actually the consequence of
thorough and painstaking effort. The basic prerequisite for the realization of the
final act was careful diplomatic preparation which--in the case of Geneva alone--
lasted for some 2 years. The work required a tremendous amount of patience, readi-
ness to compromise and the wish to acknowledge facts as they are. Both sides had
to be ready at all times to accept the premise that the real basis of negotiations
was represented by the national interests of the countries involved. These, even
by definition, compete with and differ from one another. In the cour~e of the
= negotiations there was occasion to empnasize that the governments involved were
mainly responsible for the talks and the result. Admittedly, all these efforts
w~re backed at th e time by a favorable international atmosphere conducive to cooper-
ation.
" The Helsinki final act makes little sense unless we remember that it is a diplamatic
document by the governments involved and, in essence, represents the sum of care-
fully balanced results and compr.omises. A~ the natioaal :nterests of the various
governments differed, tre advantage of one was often a concession by the other, and
vice versa. It seems to me that tnis basic fact was insufficiently stressed in the
discussion following, especially in recent years. Nevertheless,the outstanding fea-
- turE~ of the Einal act is compromise, and that is the key for understanding its ap-
plicability. A b alanced whole was created from the final act by difficult diplomat-
ic labors lasting many years--and only thus could it be made viable.
Evident advantages arose from the rea~ization of the final act for the national in-
terPSt of Finlanu which is outside ~11 military alliances and pursues neutrality.
From Finland's standpoint it was an advantage that a comprehensive acc~~rd had been
realized, which included the mosc important principles affecting European security.
It must be accounted an achievement that ali governments involved participated in
t!'!is consensus, in other words a1.1 the countries which, compelled by the facts, are
responsible for the security of Europe and the success of European cooperation. db-
viously this does not concern only countries which are geographically European, it
also affects the United States and Canada, though they' are located outside Europe.
The Helsinki final act immensely strengthened yuropean political sta~ility and the
status quo in Europe, and that t:aturally responds to Finnish interests. Moreover,
all elemer.ts of cooperation which are progressive and also flexible must--from the
Finnish standpoint- -be judged potentially beneficial.
It has been characteristic of the policy of the Finnish Government that the develop-
ment of. security and cooperation in Euror~e was considered a long-term process. From
the Finnish aspect thi~ involves constant contacis, thP maintenance of constant
ne~otiations and a constant dialog. This process has a broad topical as well us a
lang temporal dimension in the form of consecutive events, meetings and special con-
ferences. It is character istic for Finland's mF:ntal~ty to cons?der such affairs
frum a long-term aspect. Finla.nd zs aware that the development of security in
Europe and the advarce of European cooperatian are issues requiring a great deal of
- time, a~~d it understands that they also call for much patience.
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The final act was never thought of as.cor:clusive. The assumption of constart fur.rh-
er advances is linked to it both structurally ~r.d textually. The potential pursuit,
appraisal and analysis of the overall development of events in Eurone is therefore
an integral part of the procesa. Just as the Belgrade Conference of 3 years ago the -
Madrid Conference ~s necessary to keep alive the dialog and the negotiations. The
temporal dimension of the development of security and cooperation in Europe con- -
fronts us with tl-.e quection whether it might not be possible more meaningfully to
organize this process and better strt=cture it without adopting unnecessarily cumber-
some institutional stel~s. It would be appropriate thuroughly to think out this is-
sue at the Madrid Conference.
It was an essential feature of the final act that, in a certain sense, it related to -
- states, in other words that it was realized by the sovereign states of Europe rather �
tiian by groups of states. This has sometimes been criticized as clu.:.sy and ur.real-
istic. Nevertheless it is entirely logical: It signifies recognition of the variety
of peoples in Europe and the range of European cultural phenomena as the wealth of
Europe. We are certainly not using an empty phrase by stressing that the 1975
Helsinki final act was an agreemznt among sovereign and indepenc.ent European coun-
tries, not among power blocs or ~conomic associations.
From the beginning some difficulties beset the Helsinki final act. The apparently -
greatest wa~ that of arousing undue and even false expectations. If too much is ex-
- pectPd of any event, howe~~er important, nonfulfillment is liable to produce irrita-
tion, and this in turn weakens one of the crucial prerequisites for further progress�
An affirmative atmosphere. A second weakness, more or less inherent in CSCE, is
its international linkage. After all, the final act affects "ail gcvernments re.-
sponsibla for the security of Europe." This scope inevitably links Et~ropean devel-
opment with that of the international sup~rpowers. At times when relations between
them ar~ tense and insecurity general this global linkage means that rhe entire
Europeun process is wlnerable. Recent months have furnished many examples.
It i~ another intrinsic weakness of the final act that a voluminous document, the
result of well balanced compromises, offers tempting possibilities for us~ as a -
pnlitical weapon for ephemeral purposes. Insr.ead of noting the preliminar~ defects
in the implementation of the final act it would be more useful with resgect to the
CSCE to ask what has so far been achieved, As in every political process achieve-
ment is ttie onZy proper criterion by which to judbe the value of the CSCE.
On ttie ottier hand the achievement can be appraised only against the background of
t}~e starting point and by taking into account the time factor. Human rights ar2 an
excellent example. The diplomats who had labored in Geneva for 2 years were well
- aware that they were building a kind of verbal bridge. Everybody reaL zed that dif-
ferences in interprPtation were inevitable. The causes are self-evident and relate
to past history. Western cultural tradition interprets human rights mainly as the
~ liberation �rom something, the protection of the individual against the arbitrary
power of society, explicitly the protecti~n of the individual against the state.
- ~astern political culture in the modern socialist countries interprets human rights
(on the basis of a strong historical heritage) as righ ts to something, such as the
right to work, medical care and education; these are ultimately granted at the dis-
cretion of the state. 1fi is dichotaray of interpretations is inescapable and profound;
we cannot possibly escape it.
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For politicaJ. practice it is after all decisive that the Helsinki final act is a
document produced by 35 gove.~rnments and its application and intCrpretation therefore ~
~ up to thuse gove:nments. The result of the Helsinki fin~l act and ir.deed the en-
tire CSCE prucess is sometimes criticized in the West European discussion. It
woi,ld be only appropri.ate to remember that each year and month of peace in Eur~pe
is an achievement, and so is eacr dimension of increasing economic cooperation
and mutual dependence--especially when it transcends the limits of the various so-
cial systems--, moreover each expansion of human contacts and co:nmunications, each
reunited family. What has taker. place in Europe is a positive development although, -
c~f course, this is not due only to tt;e CSCE. Conversely, while it is not possible
to identify the CSCE related development as such in isolation of other developments, _
w~ may well ask whetiier life in our part of the globe would not be far more peri-
lous and difficult without the CSCE process.
- Expectations Regarding Disarmamen.*. and Security
1'he considerations cited here largely determine the expectations harbored in Fir:-
land with respect to Madrid. On the other hand we do not want to be either foolish-
ly optimistic or unduly credulous regarding the future of our Continent. Finland
is a northern country and champions the status quo in Europe. As far as we are
concerned the process causing us the greatest anxiety at this time is the steadily
increasing quantitative and qualitative xearmament in Europe. In particular the
new technical dimensions of the arms race and the new and dil too noticeable
qualitative standard arouse new and unprecedented misgivings. From the conceptual
an~le alone this make.:, "crisis management" even more difficult and hazardous,
especial.ly because this part of the wor.ld is the most highly armed region on earth
ancl will cuntinue to be so. Not to mention that, despite the ongoing European -
_ disarmaMent and Arms control talks, no adequate ~:ounterpoiae to the rearmament
trand is discernible.
At the negatiations about the Helsinki final act a consensus was achieved on a,
- brieF but significant appraisal of disarmdment relating to this part of the world.
As this p~ssage ten:~s to be auoted far ~r,ore rarely than many other section~ of. tlie
final act, it may be rewarding to cite it verbatim. In the first bas~:et (issues af
security in Europe) of the final act the military measures to build confidence are
followed b;r section II, "issues relating to disarmament." It reads as follows:
"The participating countries acknowledge their common intFrPst in efforts to lessen
the military confrontation and encourage disarmament, directed at complementing po-
litical detente in Europe and strengthening its security. They are convinced ot
the necessity to adopt effective measures in these fields, which--by their extent
and nature--will represent steps for ultimately achieving general and cotaplete dis-
- armament ;aith strict and effective international supervision, and which are to
resulC in strengthening peace and security in the world ds a whole." -
Subsequently section III, "general reflections," reiterates some principles which
the participating countries promise to uphold when pu�rsuing tre stated goals. These
include the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of securi.ty,
respect for the security of all states participating in the CSCE, which represents =
p~rt of kheir sovereign equality. It is also in the i~nterest of each country parti-
cipatin,; in the CSCE by suitable means and at the appropriate level to obtain infor-
mation about ongoing di~armament talks, and these countries tiave a right to expect
_ their views to be taken into account. '
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When the countries participating in the Conference on Security and Caoperation in
Europe approved the ab~ve passage.of the final act, they accQpted a.specific role
in view of t~:e disarmament and arms c~ntrol neRotiations touching upon Europe: A
kind of follow-up activity.
Ttie Finnish Government holds that it might be one of the tasks of the forthcomin~;
Madrid Conference to continue the follow-up activities on this basis, in other
words to pursuF the di:cussicn ~n the progress achieved in :he disarmament talks.
This Finnish opinion was indicated (in connection with the disarmament talks) in
the first committee of the U.N.General Assembly in autumn 1979 (A/C.1/34/PV.9).
The Finnish Government assumed that multilateral and comprehensive taiks on disarm-
, ament in Europe could take place in any chosen forum, but that the Madrid Congress
would afford the best opportunity. After its latest contacts with the other govern-
ments involved the Finnish Government has arrived at the conclusion that, for most
people, the CSCE process would indee~ be the natural context of such follow-up
activity.
For that concept the Finnish Government is using the working term disarmament pro-
~ gram for Europe," but this term should not be ~~sed inflexibly. My government thinks
it would simply be desirable and necessary to have a kind of clearing house talks
o,i this topic and multilaterally as well as comprehensively deal with th.e present
_ status of Curopean disarmament negotiations and arms control generally. To be
aimed for in this case would be a consensus on tlie principles to be pursued, ~iie
metliuds and approaches to bP used as well as the areAS to be considered in all onRo-
_ ing nnd possibly future disarmament negotiations relating to Europe. Fvidently re-
l~vant here are the quoted statements of the final act on the acquiaitiun of infor-
mation and the consideration of the views of all countries involved in tlie Confer-
ence on Security and Coopera~ion. Rearmament in Europe and European disarmament af-
fect all CSCE countries, but niany of these are not involved in the disarmament r.e-
gotiations, however much they may concern their own fate.
Of course the CS~.;E talks should not prejudice the current disarmametit negotiations.
Finland hopes for every possible success of all these negotiations, especially the
SALT talks and the Vienna negotiations on arms limitation. A multilateral approach
to the issues should encourage, not hinder settlement. Obviously mere demonstra-
tions and declarations cannot advance the settleinent of such sensitive issues which
directly touch upon the security of each country.
The Finnish Government has pursued this realistic appr_oach whenever talks have been
conducted about a European disarmament program. On the one hand France, backed by
many West European couritries, on the other the socialist countries of Europe have
lately submitted proposals for the convocation of a special European disarmament
= conference. The Finnish Govei�nment welcomes tt?is idea as such and hopes that an ap-
propriate agreement by the governments concerned will emerge as soon as possible.
At the same time Finnish opinion holds that, in the present situation in particular,
tl~e road to the convocation of a disarmament conference is agt to be long and stony.
The Madrid CSCE negotiations should encourage this process. In the Finnish view
- ti~e comprehensive clearing house talks about the general principles and guidelines
of a European disarmament program (cited earlier) may represent a necessary--even
indispensable--element of the process to implement the concept of a European disarm-
ament conference.
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The follow-up work ta be done at th~ 3isarmament negotiations in connection with .
the United Nations--iierE I remind of the work in the Geneva ciisarmament committec~ -
as well as and in particular the first committee of the U.N. General Assembly--, is
considered by the vast majority of the world's population to be a legitimate and ir.- _
diapensable element of the global disarmament process, though it~ weaknesses are -
- full well known. I~ is therefure ~uite logical that we need a paral.lel follow-up
forum for Eur~pe, tile most heavily armed region of the world. The CSCE process is
the most obvious.
The Finn?.sh Government does not intend to forget one of the basic concepts of ttie -
- Helsinki final act: lfiat there is a reciprocal balance between the various elen~ents
and various baskets, and that the final act represents a~,?hole. It does not intend
to propose that the disarmament talks should dominate the Madrid Conference. How-
ever, such talks should have the status appropriate to them in the work of the con-
ference, if for no ~ther reason than that, xn Finnish opinion, the problems rele-
vant to Europe witli regard to the arms race have become really urgent in the past
few years. -
On the Procedure of the Madrid Confereace -
As to the Madrid Conference in general, Finland consider~ it crucial to observe on
the one hand the long-term aspects described by me at the beginning of this article
as inherent in the process, and on the other the circumstance that the CSCE negotia-
tiozis ::ire ~iot an isolated event but ar. integral part of the general international _
situ~tion.
Jiist now when keeping free the channels of international communications ha~ become
both harder and ;nor~ impcrtant, the CSCE may serve to keep contacts aiive. We are
quitc justified in claiming that, regardless of the sexious differences between _
national interests, it is in the best interest of any CSCE country to be concerned
aUout the continuing piirsuit of the CSCE proces~ and even in the most difficult pos-
sible situation to see to it that this continuity is not lost. The "worst case ana-
lysis" of eventualities in regard to the Madrid Conf~rence--interesting for purely
theoretical reasons--would still mean that the Madrid Conference should at least be
able to arrive at a decision about its own succession and thereby the continuation
of the CSCE process.
Tlie 1977-1978 CSCE Conference in BelQrade has been much cri.ticized, and not wirhauC
justification. Still, the result was not so poor as assumed early on, under the
- impression of inflated expectations. Nor should we forget that we may reap in
Madrid reap the full benefit of the lessons learned in Belgrade. At least we know _
very well that the mistakes possibly made in Belgrade are not to be repeated in
Madrid.
~n immense volume of new proposals (~nore than 100) was submitted in the course oi -
the Belgrade Conference. Many involved important and significant ideas, But tile -
sheer. weight of numbers in Bzlgrade was too great for tr~em to be dealt with in any
meanins~Eul manner within the time available. Moreover it turned out to be a major
obstacle that no cut-off date had been set for the submission of new proposals, ~o
that some were tabled as late as the very end of the conference.
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It is the view of the Finnish Government that this mistake should not be repeated.
- In fact it is vi*_ally necessacy for the proposals to be submi~ted to be as concen- _
~ trated and far reaching as possible. Also they ahould be actively backed by more _
- than one participating country at the time of submiasion. We should try severely
to limit new proposals. It woulct be mast desirable for the major proposals to be
submitted in the initial stage of the conference; if at all possible by a specific
date. The Finnish Government, for its part, is prepared to adapt to this kind of
;~rocedure and plan its own pruposals accordingly.
The discussion on imple~entation will be the one most sensitive in politicaL terms.
It is evident that the spirit and tExt of che Relsinki final act and the entire
nature of the CSCE process presumes an open and free discussion on the. succ~ss -
- achieved by the respective governments in implementing the decisions of the final
act. However, the sub;ect matter ar.d tena.rof the discussion must be kept at a
- level of moderation and the facts appreciated. I do not believe that the national
interest of a single CSCE country is served if the discussion is handled merely as
a propaganda weapon, the use of which is dictated by the current international situ-
ation. On the contrary, it is bound to be in the general interest that the discus-
sion of the implementation of security and cooperation in Europe is carried on while
bearing in mind both long-term benefits and common goals.
At the same time I would like to stress that, in the opinion of the Finnish Govern-- _
ment, the critical discussion on the implementation of the final act should certain-
ly not be restricted, let alone prevented, in Madrid. However, as we are dealing
with a conference of 35 sovereign governments, we must appreciate that, from its
own standpoint, each government is the only competent suthority to decide and accept
responsibility for the implPmentation of the final act. It would therefore be de- -
sirable for the discussion of the implementation to be mainly a kind of clarifica-
tion af attitudes on the basis of independently initi.ated "challenges." It is con-
ceivable that each government may preaent a written summary of the implementing pro-
cess as carried eut in its country, and that this document serve as a starting
point for the subsequent discussion, although it certainly should not limit it.
On the Role of the Neutral and Nonaligned Countries Participating in the CSCE
As early as the negotiations preceding the 1975 conference and, in particular,
during the Geneva working session, it became customary for the neutral countries of
- Europe in their bilateral consultations to discuss the issue of the organization and
procedure of the conference and later--together with the nonal.igned countries--the
question of the agenda also. Z'his cooperation between the nEUtral and nonaligned
- countries has groFm into a vital and beneficial element of the CSCE process. The
nonaligned countries (Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Liechten-
stein, San Marino, Cyprus and Malta) each pursue rather different defense policies
and, given their political and geographical location, find tl:emselves in very dif-
fer~2nt situations. Common to them is the fact that they are not part of any mili- -
tary alliance and that, consonant with their interests, they endeavor to mediate
and arbitrate any conflicts.
The Finnish Government holds that cooperation between the neutral and nonaligned
countries should benefit the totality of the Madrid Conference. Of course this is
not mc~ant to imply the establishment of a new political bloc in Europe--such an
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idea would be 2.bsurd because the differences between the.countries concerned are far
- too great. It is our intention, however, that the respective countries should--inso-
far ds the situation allows--jointly ~onsider how best t~ serve the conference in
its search for a consensus. Obviously the neutral and nonaligned countries cannot
~ obligate themselves to achieving a joint neutral and nonaligned recommendation in
every circumstance and on every topic. However, the steady maintenance of contacts
between these countries hR~ already assumed the nature of a f irm trad ition. Fin-
land will of course continu~ to be involved.
It has also turned out to be useful that the four neutral European countries--
Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland--werE in touch with each oth er from time
- to time concerning issues affecting the problems of security and cooperation in
Europe, both in order to exchange information and comments. For Fin land this type
_ of cooperation is as much a matter of caurse as the fact that the neu tral countries =
of Europe do not a:pire to represerit a third European power concentration. At this
point let us note that the Nordic countries within the CSCE are anoth er natural
point of reference for us, which will be operative in Madrid also.
Among the subatantive issues dealt with by the neutral and nonaligned countries
those measures which promote confidence already loomed large in earlier CSCE phases.
The total concept of ineasures for promoting confidence as known in connection with
security and cooperation arose as a kind of byproduct of the disarmament talks
during the CSCE preparatory stages; however, this infant conceived more or less
accidentally has turned out to be rather lusty. Despite their relative modesty the
results achieved by the final act with respect to measures to promote confidence
are genuine. It is to be expected that the neutral and nonaligned c ountries wi.ll
be specially interested in the further advance of the measures to promote confidence
at the Madrid Conference alsc~. If at all possible they will submit joint and real-
istic proposals on this topic, which might well be approved by the major military
powers. It is too early yet to comment on the problem involved in Che textual and
action-related relation of the measures i;o promote confidence within the CSCE pro-
cess to those measures to promote confidence cited by FRance in particular in its -
proposals on the convocation of a European disarmament conference. Th e measures
suggested may in part be the same, some may be entirely differEnt. Differences may
also emerge in the philosophy of the measures for promoting confidence. These are
issues which, in the opinion of the Finnish Government, shou ld be dea lt with in a
multilateral context and, above all, within the frameworic proposed by Finland for
the concept of a European disarmament program_ -
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Verlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH, Bonn
11698
- CSO: 3103
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE ' _
GERDSM STUDIES, REFINES ASW TECHNIQUES
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Sep 80 pp'48-49
~Article by Naval Engineer Admiral Jean Mitault*~
- ~Text~ The special wanships used in ASW jantisubmarine warfare)~ must be `
armed with effective weapons systems capable particularly of detecting an
enemy submarine, ~.o~~tifying it, determining its position and speed, _
displaying the elements needed for a cormnand decision, and in the last
analysis carrying out the action of the final attack.
- The ASW Group of the STCAN ~Technical Service for Naval Construction and
Ordnance~, which comes under the DTCN CTechnical Directorate for Naval
Construction~,is directly respor~sible for the conducting of stuclies,
development and fabrication of ~1SW equipment. In this task it relies for
, support on specialized stuc~y:organiaations set up within and outside the
arsenals of:
- --the GERDSM tUnderwater Detection Studies and Research Grou ~ of the
Toulon DCAN ~Directorate for Naval Construction and Ordnance~, whose
specialty is underwater detection;
--the GESMA ~Atlantic Underwater Studies Group~ of the Brest DCADI, whose
activities are devo ted entirely to mine warfare;
*Having entered the Ecole Polytechnique in 1947 and graduated from the
Ecole Nationale Superieure du Genie Maritime in 1953,~ Naval Engineer
Ac7miral Jean Mitault has devotQd much of his career to weapons and
weapons sys~ems. He has participated in numerous programs (Malafon,
Masurca, Mer Mer 38, Crotale Naval) as engineer in charge of studies,
plans or testing. For 7 years he headed the Atlantic Underwater Studies
Group. 5ince 1976 he has headed the ASW Group of the Technical Service
for Naval Constructien and Ordnance.
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~ ~
1'Vl\ VL'lLI~lAL UJL' Vl\L1L
- --the "studies" subdirectorate of the Saint-Tropez ECA1N ~expansion
= unknown~, devoted to the full range of studies relating to torpedoes. -
- We shall try te provide an idea of the activities of these organizations
from the stanc7point of one of them: the GERnSM. _
An Entire Studies Organization Dedicated to Underwater Detection
_ Created in 1946, the GERDSM is located a few kilometers east of Toulon.
Its installations are situated just outside the little port of Brusc in
a pine forest on the southern shore of the Sicie Peninsula.
First of all it orients and conducts studies on sound propagation, on
ocean noises and those produced by the ship itself, on signal Processing
and on electroacoustical systems.
When these studies, which are of an ongoing nature and seek to respond to
long term general needs, have react,ed a sufficiently advanced stage, it
becomes necessary sometimes, before dec;iding to pu!: out a new operational -
equipment, to go through an intermediate stage called "exploratory devel-
opment," which includes the design and testing of a maquett.e or ~f an
experimental prototype ttiat is very close to being an operational madel
to provide a maximum o: operational anc3 technical data and to better
~ssess the costs of future equipment. The GE~ASM has the entire respori-
sibility for carrying out these projects to their full realization. One
of the most spectacular of these is certainly "Carmorant," a deep-towed
sonar project for surface ships. .
After the Navy command has defined .a precise operational requirement,
development begins on the needed equipment. Based on currently available
knowledge and the results of its studies and of its long-term projects,
_ the GERDSM draws up the technical specifications, selects s~ppliers,
awards contracts, and monitors closely the design of the equipment, proto-
types, production models and production. It then conducts the necessary
technical testing and participates in their military evaluation together
with the Navy's Applied Studies Commissions.
The process that begins with researci~ studies and ends with the evaluation
of a new system is an extremely long one: More than 25 years separates
these two phases in the case of a major system.
Artother characteristic of underwater detection is that it is totally
specific to the Navy. The possible needs of other armed services or of
the civilian sector are, for all practical purposes, nonexistent or too
narrow to warrant the studies and applied research required to satisfy
military needs. The GERDSM must therefore maintain and develog its
knowledge of the sea environment, the structures of ships, and the entire
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range of acoustic, signal processing and data processing techniques. Its
field of activities is therefore vast and the GERDSM relies as much as
possible on ex3sting specializaticn outside its own organization: within
the DGA ~Genera]. Delegation for Weaponry~, ONERA ~National Office for
Aerospace S:.udies and Research~, industry and universities. _
A Glimpse of Some af Its Specialized Technical Fields
Transducers use the electroacoustical properties of crystals and ceramics
' that enable the conversion of underwater sound pressures into electrical
currents and vice versa. Transducers may be said to be to sonar what
antennas are to radar. In this field, the G~RDSM carries on research
studies on transc7ucers, specifies the active piezoelectric materials that
enter into their construction--currently ceramics--specifi.es, orders and
tests transducers and their assemblies in antennas.
The sea is an extremely ~apricious and complex environment, and a know-
ledge of the propagation of souna in water is fundamental to defining and
specifying long-range detection equipment. The GERDSM carries out ~inder-
sea acoustics measurements expeditions and compares measured data with
the calculations drawn from mathematical models. These models, thus
refined, ar.e used to predict the range of detection equipment in service
or under design, as well as to define the principal.characteris~ics of
future equipment.
Transmitters must, in very compact form, supply the enormous powers (many
hundreds of kilowatts) needed by the transducers. The GERDSM has attained -
a high deqree of expertise in the field of thyristor transmitters.
Sonar must detect submerged objects and give their position, their speed
if possible, and their identifying elements. The GERDSM conceives anii
contracts for the production of receivers that must maximize the usability
of the signals receiveci by the transducer, and of equipinent for displaying
the required information in the form best suited ~to the needs of the
operators and the staff.
Noise constitutes a special sector of the GERDSM's activities, in wnich
the GERDSM performs the functions of a measurements service for the naval
architect, who conceives the ship, as well as those of a research organi-
zation that, by~ expanding the knowledge of noises and of the phenomena
- that produce them and contribute to their propagation, contributes to the -
_ improvernent of the noise characteristics of warships and to the improve-
ment of the pe~rformance of French detection equipment. The GERDSM has two
acoustics testing sites--one at Brusc and the other opposite Cap Ferrat-- -
that enable the taking of ineasurements on n~ises radiated under water,
using hydrophones (transducers specially designed for recept�~on) moored
at the bottom of the ocean: The ship being tested follows a marked-out
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aV~~ Vl'i'1ViLLJ VN~J VL\La
course, and a land station registers, analyzes and interprets the signals
thus collected. The GERDSM also has equipment specially designed for
noise measurements aboard ships, which, with the preceding measurements,
enable the detection of acoustic abnormalities in ships and the orienta-
- tion of noise reduction work.
Staffing and Installations
The GERDSM staff consists of 277 persons, 47 of whom are engineers,
physici~ts, mathematicians, electronics specialists and mechanics special-
ists.
For underwater acoustic measurements, the GERDSM has a substantial infra-
structure that is unique in France:
--acoustic chambers,
--laboratory lighters situated on the artificial lakes of Castillon and
_ Chaudanne,
--testing ships.
It aiso has a calculating center designed to carry out scientific calcula-
ti~ns and to rapid}.y analyze noise measurements, an~l a richly endowed
documentation service containing some 15,000 works.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 - Revue des forces armees francaises "armees d'e~ujour.d'hui"
9399
CSO: 3100
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COUN'TRY SECTION FRANCE
- ASW RAPID DETECTION, COUNTERMEASURE METHODS EXPLP.INED
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Sep 80 pp 50-53 '
CArticle by Lt Comdr Jerome Denavit*~ ~
~Text~ Detection equipment and weapons have been developed together since
the advent of tY~e threat constituted by the submarine. With the ASDIC
~sonar~ of the last war there was the ASW ~antisubmarine warfare~ de th
charge dropped from the stern of the frigate. Later, there came HF ~high-
_ frequency~ sonar and the homing torpedo. The 1970's saw the V 23/V 43
combined and the arming of the heavy A5W units with the "Malafon" missile.
Enhanced knowledge of ti~e.oceanic.environment together with tech~ological
advances are leading to the attainment of the objective of the surface
naval and air forces:�rapid detection and fast countermeasures.** _
Detection Equipment
Sound remains and will rem~.in for a long time to come the sole purveyor of _
underwater information capable of enabling acceptable performance. Detec-
tion equipment is therefore a converter of sound energy into electrical
energy and, and vice versa, and must be capable of:
* Having entered the Naval Academy in 1964 and graduated from the ASW
School in i972, Lt Comdr Jerome Denavit served as ASW officer notably
on the destroyer "Vauquelin" and the corvette "Georges Leygues" and as
instructor on the "Jeanne dlArc." After having commanded the oil
tanker "Punaruu" in the Pacific, he now fulfills the functions of
deputy chief of the Weapons Section of the Underwater Weapons Systems
Bureau of the Admiralty.
The problems related to detection anc] attack of a submarine by another
submarine are not dealt with here. The submarine, however, thanks to
its high-performance, quiet-operating equipment, can play an essential
role in ASW and will take on even greater importance in this respect
with future improvements in its means of cooperation with surface
naval and air units.
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~
--receiving the noise radiated by an underwater source (passive system),
ur of transmitting a wave at a given frequency and receiving the reflected
wave from an object (active system);
--processing the received signal to render it usable by an operator.
The first underwater detection equipments,�developed beginning in 1918,
- were essentially of the passive ty~e. But the noise emitted by an under-
water source was very frequently masked by ambient noises. ~his, active
systems were quickly preferred and presently equip the navies of the big
- powers.
The considerable advances realized over the past 10 years in the field
- o� electronic signal processing (amplification, extraction, analysis)
and in knowledge of the environment have brought about the realization of
very-high-performance passive equipment, especially for reception at very
low frequencies.
The technical solutions--a summary glimpse of which is given in Table T--
must taka into account physical phenomena involved in underwater s~und
propagation. Among those that most affect equipment performance, we must
cite:
--molecular agitation in water, requiring a lowering of operating frequen-
- cy and hence an increase in size of the sonar;
--reverberation owing to environmental heterogeneities, the effects of
which are detrimental at higher transmitting powers;
--inherent noise ~f the carrier vessel itself, which, at higher speeds,
alters the performance of the sonar;
--the slow speed of sound in water, which limits the rate of sonar infor-
mation and hence imposes a highly computerized processing of the signal.
_ Whatever its type, therefore, a sonar is necessarily a bes* compromise
among parameters of range, power, cost,
French industrialists and the STCAN ~Technical Service for Naval Construc-
tion and Ordnance~ have attained a degree of exgQrtise in the field of
on-board LF ~low-frequency~ sonar that no other ~ountry disputes. In
particular, the combined DUBV 23-DUBV 43 has been a success that out-
classes most foreign equipment. This combination is installed aboard the
- "heavy" ASW ships: destroyers, frigates and corvettes. Over the medium
term, the Navy could equip most of its combat ships with passive linear
arrays, if current tests confirm expected performance, to complement their
ey~ellent active equipment.
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ASW Weapons
Increased ranges of detection on the one hand, and speed and maneuverabil-
ity characteristics of modern submarines on the other, demand the use of
long-range and accurate ASW weapons. The ideal ASW weapon should have the
following essential characteristics:
--a broad range of coverage and terminal homing,
--high transit speed and a high degree of silence,
--a powerful military impact.
Table 2, analyzed from the viewpoint of these criteria, shows that the
ideal weapon is difficult, i:~dPed impossible, to achieve. The best com-
promise must be found among ~'.1 these parameters.
The Navy has been equipped with short- and medium-range weapons.
Depth charges: The ASW.depth charges with which sea patrol planes are
eq~iipped are especially effective in shallow waters.
Gunnery weapons: (Rocket launchers, mortars). These are short-range
(3,000 meters) weapons, especially suited to shallow waters (where close-
range detection is common) and characterized by great ease of utilization
and low cost. The 375 ASW rocket launcher is standard equipment on all
"d'Estienne d'Orves"-claes destroyers.
~'orpedoes: Heavy (L3 and L5) torpedoes are used by surface ships, light
_ (L4, MK44, MK46) torpedoes by sea patrol planes, and Malafon missiles by
sur f ace sh ips .
It is to be noted that the speed of torpedoes (between 25 and 35 knots) is
inadequate to attack high-performance submarines. This is why the Navy
currently has under study a new light A6W torpedo (NTL 90) to be used by
. planes and helicopters of the Naval Air Force. Eventually,-it is to be
delivered by a missile that will enable surface ships to attack fast and
at a distance.
Study Commissions and Testing Ships
Between the initial requirement-analysis phase and the final delivery of
an equipment off the production line, an elapsed time of 10 years has been
Iound necessary for laboratory studies~ technical tests, acceptances and
operational evaluations. Certain developmental phases requirE the
participation of the applied studies ~commissions , which come directly
under the Admiralty, for which they act as technical and operational
arms. ASW involves three commissions:
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--the CEPOC ~Commission for Applied Oceanographic Studies~, which con-
tributes to knowledge of the oceanic environment, participates in the _
compilation of the albums of sound fields published b~r the SHOM ~expansion
unknown~
--the CEPASM ~Commission for Applied Studies on Underwater Weapons~ and
the CEPSM CCommission for Applied Studies on Submarines~, responsible for
oversight of weapons and underwater detection equipment in service aboard -
surface ships and submarines, for oversight of studies and development of
_ future equipment,...
These commissions, made up of very few men, are indispensable cogwheels
in the circulation of information between ships, the technical services
- and the Admiralty.
The finishing touch on weapons and underwater detection equipment, however, _
cannot conceivably be applied except under operating conditions in actual
use of the equipment, installed aboard surface ships, submarines and
aircraft. This is why all Navy units are, at the beginning of their active
service, put through an operational evaluation by specialists under the
aegis of these commissions. Additionally, ~wo ships are detached from
~ the destroyer squadron forces and devoted exclusively to ASW experimental
activities: the "Aunis," a completely refitted cargo ship, which between
1972 and 1977 enabled the carrying out to its conclusion of the Cormoran
project (feasibility study on a CAS ~reliable acoustic path~ sonar), and
whicti is currently involved in the development of a new sonar prototype; -
and the "Agenais," a fast destroyer on special detachment for the past
year, aboard which initial tests are being conducted on a towed passive
linear-array system.
The hostile natural environment in which ASW equipment must operate exacts
a heavy penalty in the search for high performance. The enhancement of _
detection ranges and improvemenL of the effectiveness of weapons require
constant human effort and financial outlays to find the best compromise
between the constraints imposed by installed equipment and technological -
capabilities. .
The results obtained in recent years in the field of ASW equipment cannot ~
other than encourage the continued pursuit of the efforts undertaken.
Only thus can our Navy hold the posi~tion it>has attained in the oceanic
game being played by the major powers.
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Table 1- Underwater Detection Equipment =
1
gqW1p pE CQQIJE C}~6Yl~L D~ SIJR~+ACE tionu ~es limitE par
la coadition~ du mil{su
procha de la aurfaoe et ptr le bruit du porteur.
- -
DES ~MARNS ( 2) Ponh : S krrs (1 S bn chrnal dt ~wfact).
~ 4) Sonec tr~a 1' ' lee conditiow du miiteu
SONAR REIIAORaUE CLASSaIJE proche de la eud'ece et par le bruit du porteur.
On ~e~na ~ portk en iminer~eant plw pro-
,,.,;�r , r. ~ fondhneat la sonu.
lii�,r=='~_ yy
~ � Ponh: 10 km.
7
SONAR A RffLEXION BIJR LE F011D Perenet d'aquiver la ioaes d'omtm du wnor
de coqu0. mai~ ~u prix de puiaancas Enorcnee
,y i~. `~w,~ w pour cempenser la peroa duae i ta rcAmrion -
' 4: 1i;~~~ ~ ~ur te fond. Ce ayetbme implique une p~rfdte
conn~ieiana dea fonde.
Portet : ?3 lan
SONAR A~011E DE OONVERGEIIICE ( 9) -
Permet dee di.ta;tion~ 1~ ~r~ di~nnca
~ maie eat luQement tributairo de~ aoe au
' i ~ tmbiontes.
Ponk : 30 km en MEd/tarcnnfe
60 krn tn Atlantique
~/T7///////
~ La tran~aacteurs ablf[~fnmaree, l trb~ ara~?ae
son~~~
. profoadeut (2 000 en Mbditerran6e, 4 000 en
Sii~tii~:Ct.;~~~ :L"!~k' ~~�;';:s'~ ~ AtIi11t1Qt1C~dpAtDIEStE[ILIIDCCOYVORUiOtOWG
,'~.'.j(ti av:y-~~~ .�';~,,~.~L' .e:~1. itld~Efld61![0 dEb 61C88 t~lOCflllQllW.
'~'vw '.r 't ~:3f~~ik~.. ~
~'y%:~ti�'
.t~._... ~G__4W +,._..s i;::.~~ Ce type d'Equipement at trbs eacombraat II a
bt~ expbrimente conjointement par lea U.S.A. ~
et la Francx avec te projet . Corn?oran
Portee : 20 d ~0 km. "
(12) (13)
FL~TE E~B.F (PASSIF) I.ea eatmnea x prlxentenc ~oua ta forme d'an `
cible immer~e de ~nnde lonQue~r d remorque
tres loia du bitiment Ce type d'bquipameat esc
I preaque compl~t effr~nchi de~ bruite
rayonnee par le rert~orqueur. _
Porrie ucomptk : SO d!00 km.
Tableau 1: bqnipecoeats de d~41on wuamaeim
[Key next page]
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vit�i.vicau aiva: Vl\LL
Key to Table 1(preceding page):
1. Hull sonar with surface channel.
2. Maximum submarine submersion depth.
3. Sonar very limited by surface environmental conditions and by noise
of its own ship. Range: 5 km (surface channel 15 k;n).
4. Conventional towed sonar.
5. Sonar very limited by environmental conditions close to surface and
by noise of its own ship. A gain in range is achieved by deeper sub-
mersion of sonar. Range: 10 km.
6, Seabed reflection sonar.
7. Enables avoidanc~ of hull sonar shad~w zones but at the expense of
enormous amounts of power needed to make up losses owing to reflection
from the seabed. This system requirES perfect knowledge of the seabed.
Range: 25 km.
8. Convergence zone sonar.
9. Enables detection at great distances but is largely dependent upon
environmental conditions. Range: 30 km in Mediterranean, 60 km in -
1ltlantic.
10. CAS ~reliable acoustic path~ sonar.
- 11. The transducers are immersed at very great depths (2,000 meters in the
_ Mediterranean, 4,000 meters in the Atlanticj and Qnable total coverage
� independent of thermal contingencies. This type equipment is highly -
cumbersome. It was tested jointly by the United States and France -
under the Cormoran project. Range: 20 to 40 km.
12. Very-low-frequency passive linear array. _
13. The antennas are assembled in the form of a very long submerged cable
towed very remotely from the ship. This type equipment is almost -
entirely immune to noises radiated by the towing ship. Anticipated
ranqe: 50 to 100 km.
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- Sonars In Use By French Navy
Ships Sonars Frequencies Principal Characteristica
Frigates ~UBV 23 low Hull sonar in bulb - scanning
Corvettes
ASW squadron Variable-immersion towed sonar -
destroyers DUBV 43 low scanning
~
Avisos A 69 DUBM 25 meaium Hull sonar in fixed dome
_ Avisos DUBA 3 high Retractable hull sonar - direc- �
tional
- Destroyers SQS 17 me~ium Retractable hull sonar - scanning
DUBA 1 high Hull sonar in fixec7 dome - direc-
Tartar-class tional: �
destroyers DUBV 24 l.ow Hu11 son~r in fixed dome - scan-
ning
Super-Frelon DUAV 3 medium Variable-immersion sonar - scan-
ning
WG 13 DUAV 4 high Variable-immersion sonar - direc-
tional
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~ v~~ v~L r.V~~~~ V~/v V~~Y~
TABLE 2- Search for ldeal ASW We3pon -
Weapon Characteristic Intended Pu~.~~+ose Problems
Short minimum range Attack late-detected Low propulsive power �
submarine -
Long maximum range Attack submarine at High propulsive power, .
_ outer detection limit hence wei~ght - Guidance
necessary unless power-
ful explosive charge
High transit speed Rapid delivery of High propulsive power,
weapon hence weight -:Radrated
noise (torpedo)
Homing Accuracy of final Noisy homing equipment
- trajectory .
Silent operation Surprise the submarine Inaccurate final trajec- -
tory - Slow speed (tor-
pedo)
Powerful explosive Destroy submarine or High volume of charge
charge put it out of action at expense of propulsion
and electronics
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