JPRS ID: 9461 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060042-6
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 42
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L?9461
30 December 1980 _
West Euro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 54/80)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVIC~
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JPRS L/9461
~ 30 December 1980
~ WEST EUR~PE REPORT
(FOUO 54/80)
CONTENTS
TH~ATER NJCLEAR FORCES
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Perspective on European-American Relationa, Western Alliance
(Alfred Grosser; THE ECONOMIST, 29 Nov 80) 1
UNITED KINGDOM ~
,~'a' Effect of Northern Ireland War on UK NATO Commitment
= (Vicente Talon; DEFENSA, Jul 80) 3
~ ENERGY ECONOMICS
ITALY
Danger of ENEL Overtaking Private Electric Power Companies
(Marino Maesaro; IL SOLE-24 ORE, 4 Nov 80) 6
COUNTRY SECTION
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Moderate Settlements Foreseen~ in Coming Wage Pacta
(Heiko Tornow; STERN, 13 Nov 80) 9
ITALY
Poll of PCI Local Leaders on Party Line
(Nino Ciravegno, Roberto IppoliCo; IL MONDO, 7 Nov 80) 11
Parties Discuss Mounti.ng Problems in PubJ.ic Sector
~ (Donato Speroni; IL MONDO, 7 Nov 80) 16
Lack of Funda To Implement Industrial Reconversion Law
_ ~IL MONDO, 7 Nov 80) 1~
Law for Reconversian, by Davide Paolini
- Insiat on Leasing, Nerio Nesi Interview
- a - [III - WE - 150.FOU0]
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Federmeccanica Study on Future of Longevity~Pay
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 1 Not? 80) 22
Plans, Objectives for State Railway System ~
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 8 Nov $0) 28
� y.
-b-
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THEATER NUCLEAR FOP.CES _
PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, WESTERN ALLIANCE
London THE ECONOMIST in English 29 Nov $0 pp 81-82
[Review of book "The Western Alliance" by Alfred Grosser published by Macmillan,
375 pp]
[ Text ] W~th Ronald R~agan soon to replace European-American relationship, as th:s _
Jimmy Cartcr at the White House, no book makes ~lear, has been affected both
more appropriate time could hav~ been by the circumstances of the time and
ct~osen for the publicadon of this study of almost as much by faulty and one-sided
European-American relarioris since the perceptions and sub~ective images of an-
second world war. Its author, Alfred other people that are Far from realiry. _
Grosser, is professor of politica; sciance The issues which have divided the
in Paris, an authority on Franco-German United States and its west European
relarions in particular and a respected partners in this period are certainly
and regular commentator upon world weighty enough: tariffs, Suez, the role of
affairs in Le Monde. The subject which the dotlar, the Esosidon of Israel, arms
he has ~hosen for tt~is present book is, limitation and so on. But what needs
arguably, too vast and complez for any ~mmediately to be shown-and this Pra
' individual to encompass; but if anybody fessor Grosser does very-well-is that -
can get close to doing it, Professor Gross- these disputes have to be placed in their _
er can. The result is a detailed account ~ntext and set against the factors which
which ought to be on the bookshelves of make for close des betwecn each side of F
everybody interested in oontemporary af- ~e north Atlantic: the shazed assump-
fairs. And it ought, furthermore, to be tions of the western liberal~ order, the
required reading for those members of interpenetration of their ecanomies and,
the $ritish government who have to hag- above all,, the common concern about
gle with their EEC counterparts in Brus- Russian policy. Yet even when the unity _
sels one week and sign defence deals in of Nato has appeared assured, there are
Washington the next. tansions under the surface caused by the
The structure of the book is basically fundamsntal disparity of power within
chronological rather than thematic-a the alliaxce. Thus, as Professor Crrosser
� sensible arrangement, since Professor observes: "Every westein European
Grosser shows that it is the received statesman exper~ences two contradictory ,
traditions and the historical presumptions feelings [on military defenceJ: sarisfaction -
= of each individual state in the westem that the United States exists, and annoy-
alliance which has conditioned its hand- ance that the life and death of his fellow
ling of contemporary pr~blems. De citizens depend in large measure on the
Gaulle's anti-Americanism in the 1960s, decisions of a foreign and distant presi- -
to take a prime example, was not just dent". The western alliance, like many
' caused by dislike of the war in Vietnam other relation~hips, brings a mixture of
and by economic rivalry but also by a advantages and disadvactages to each
- cuttural aad ideologicai antipathy to- partner.
wazds American capitalism which was What the author also makes clear is the
already strong in Fraace in the 1930s. The differinQ reactions o~ the individual west
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European nations towards the United
States. Here, becsuse of his brcadth of
knowledge, Professor Grosser is in his
element, describing, for eaample, the
Italian stance over a certair. issue in a few
sure paragraphs ar..d tfien moving easily
on to the Dutch. Above all he concen-
trates upon France and Germany, partly
because this is his own fieid, but mainly
because he argues that those two aiun-
tries ~have, as it were, been "the two
- centres of gravity in ~he history of west-
ern Europe but also the two extreme
instances of the various situations and
forms of conduct in relstions with the
United States". Britain, although impor-
tar.t, was and is "not at the same levei"
he argues. As a result his chief focus is
upon the myths and realitics which sur-
- rounded the men in power ~n Paris and
Bonn, and why they have treated the
United States in such different ways.
~ This, ultimately, is why Professor
Grosser's book, which already has been
- very successful in France and Germany,
deserves to be carefully studied in Britain
- coo: 5ecause it should remind a govern-
ment, snme of whose members still think
of the "special relationship" and others
of whom believe that Britain is "fully
European", that neither assumption is to
- be found in Washington, Bonn and Paris,
where different penpectives preva~l. At a
tiroe when-who can foretell?-the west-
ern aUiance might again be under strain,
it is as well that Britain's rulers and
' informed opinion should know where
Britain stands in the complex, multilater-
- al web of European-American relation-
ships. Professor Grosser's book will cer-
tainly help them get their bearings.
COPYRIGHT: The ~conomist Newspaper Ltd, London, 1980
- CSO: 3120
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES UNITED KINGDOM
EFFECT OF NORTHERN IRELAND WAR ON UK NATO COMMITMENT
Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Jul 80 pp 26-30
[Article by Vicente Talon, DEFENSA special correspondent in Ulster: "The Non-Stop
Guerrilla War"]
[Excerpt] Vicente Talon is an expert on the Northern Ireland
problem, about which he has even written a book, "Guerra en
Irlanda" ["~Jar in Ireland"], (San Martin, Madrid, 1971). He
. visited that area for the first time in I968, when the Catholic
resistance movement was just beginning in an absolutely peaceful
andjustified framework, which failed because of the intransigence
of the authorities, the behavior of the much-feared "B Special"
police, made up entirely of Protestants, and the excesses of the
union sector, which was reluctant to give up any of its privilege~.
- Since then, Vicente Talon has made several trips to Northern
Ireland, during the last of which he wrote this report for DEFENSA.
Difficulties for NATO
The problem of this nonstop guerrilla war is having serious repercussions with respect
to the military commitments signed ~y the London government, which trained its forces
to fight within the NATO system in a classic or nuclear war in Europe, but not to
waste them on an uprising. To understand the gravity of the situation, we must bear
in mind that for a unit to spend 4 months in Ulster means to find itself 6 months
away from its normal training program. This is because, as I have already said,
there is a 2-month preliminary training period and, once the e~per~ence is finished,
all the men have more leave than is advisable. If it is remem~ered that a unit
passes through the U].ster "sieve" on an average of every 2 years, the time loss is
trc~ly serious.
One military specialist had this to say on the subject:
"Many infantry units have not carried out the required training in support weapons
for several years, and they are rapidly losing the skill to use these weapons
efficientl.y. Once it is completely lost, it will be necessary for them to spend
many years recovering it, especially since many of the best instructors ~re reaching
~ retirement age. Something similar happens in the arti~lery regiments, many of which
have been converted into infantry and have had very little opportunity to carry out
special training in the weaponry. Perhaps mu~h more dangerous than losing that
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practice with the weapons is the loss of training in all weapons. The infantry com-
panies have not been adequately trained with their own support weapons, let alone
additi.onal weaponry; nor have the ranger-type troops. In my own case, my brigade
was not supported by its own artillery regiment in any exercise for a little oveT 2 ,
years, and they had to bring in other regiments for training.
"Armored regiments, as well as artillery and engineer regiments, have been used in
the role of infantry, and although a change of air can indeed be beneficial, the
continuation of that policy presents dangers which a.re all too obvious. Here.,
again, training in all weapons has been seriously reduced, with very grave consequences."
Although that paragraph is somewhat confused, there is not the least doubt that it
reflects perfectly the reigning problem, as well as the negative effect the Northern
Ireland war is having on England, on the one hand, and on the Atlantic Alliance,
on the other. Gen Sir Harry Tuzo, who first commanded the British expeditionary
troops and who later was named deputy supreme commander af NATO in Europe, has -
already said: "The retuoval of our troops �rom Germany for 7 months is very serious,
and we cannot contemplate it with equanimity. It affects the discharge of our
military priority, and our allies are aware of this."
Impelled by the necessity to withdraw from Ulster, at a11 c~sts, and knowing that
the prerequisite for this is to defeat the IRA [Irish Republican Army] first, the
British army is looking for a shortcut and is resorting to the use of pressures
- which are indefensible from an ethical point of view, not disdaining any means to
- break the morale of the Catholic people as well as the shax�p fighting spiri~t of the _
IRA provisionals.
The men of Spearhead Battalion, those of the Special Airborne SPrvice (SAS) and many,
many others have left behind them a~tring of actions that they justify, doubtless,
by the well-known slogan: "My country, right or wrong." Because they are fighting
for their country, or. so they bel~..eve, the soldiers from London have carried out-�-and
are carrying out--a harsh policy. In April, 1977, the Dublin government presented
to the European Court of Human Rights, headquartered in Strasbourg, a detailed list
of more than 200 cases of tor.ture committed against Catholics ~y members of the
expeditionary forces. In that document it was de~nonstrated that England is guilty
of that cr une, carried out systematically on a large number of people, and that in
addition torture has become a mere administrative practice.
'These serious charges were basically admitted by the British attorney general, who
spoke or almost inevitable mistakes by the army in its efforts to stop the violence.
A former member of the Special Airborne Service stated before the Court of Human
Rights that 250 officers and noncommissioned officers are trained annually on the
basis of experiences in Ulster, .i.n what is called "thorough interrogation." The
program is carried out with the participation of volunteers who, bef~re being used
as guinea pigs, must sign a statement couched in these words: "I hereby state that
I am offering myself voluntarily for a practical interrogation exercise and that I
expect to receive a simulated example of the type of treatment an enet~y might
inflict upon me without hesitatiun if I were captured in time of war."
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- The f ormer English commando agreed to tell about what happens in those centers
- because he had been told that when one reached the limit of his resistance, he had
only to give some slight indication to have the experiment suspended. However,
when he gave that indication, they igr~ored him and continued to torture him. Someone -
commented, "If you die, we will put you on the list of traffic fatalities."
It is difficult to know how many members, or suspected members, of the IRA have lost
their lives while having inflicted upon their persons the latest Briti.i? discoveries
in the f ieZd of sensory attack, but tne number, according to reports, cannot be
small. However, huge resources have demonstrated that they are incapable of stopping
- the development or continuation of the guerrilla war. The IRA, in spite of the fact
- that its men were not trained in any military academy, remains where it is. Nobody
or nothing has succeeded in budging it.
_ The discouragement is not in its camp, but in that of its rivals, who find themselves
powerless to get out of the Ulster quagmire.
COPYRIGAT: Ediciones Def ensa, S.A., Madrid, 1980
8%35
CSO: 3110
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ENERGY ECONOMICS ITALY
DANGER OF ENEL OVERTAKING PRIVATE ELECTRIC POi9ER COMPANIES _
blilan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 4 Nov 80 p 5
[Article 'oy Marino Dtassaro: "Energy and Finances in Danger for Private Industry"]
[Text] Uncertainty about the renewal of hydroelectric concessions
btilan--T!ontedison, Cogne, Falck, Alcan Aluminum, hatior.al Linificio and Canap~.ficio
(Bassetti group), Caffaro, Burgo, Cantoni: these are some of the best known public -
and private companies w}iose hydroelectric plants will be expropriated at the end of
January unless the law is changed. (These plants have a nominal total power of
182,789 kilowatts.) They would be lost to ENEL [National Electric Power Agency]
without much in return. Some municipalities are also involved in the matter; among
them are the electric power companies of Turin and Milan.
After meetings at the ministry of industry on 23 September and 10 October and a
colloquium (se~ IL SOLE-24 ORE 21-22 Oct 80), the issue is still to be defined,
~lthough only 90 days remain until the concessions fall due.
If the issue is left unresolved, what effect will it have on the life of this industry?
tVe put the question to one of the people involved: Vittorio Fontana, general manager
of,var_ional Linificio ancl Canapificio (S main plants; 2,000 subsidiaries, and a total
bill of 70 billion lire).
"If I may use a figure of speech to express the idea, we may say that these companies, -
especially the medium and small private ones, will get a big kick in the balance -
- statement, one that will endanger their stability." -
It is a fact that many of these firms were chosen precisely because their electric
power is available; the a~~erage cost of production is presently between 6 and 10 lire
per kilowatt hour. Without these plants, ENEL would be paid 45-50 lire a kilowatt
hour. To give an idea of the size of the problem, a company like Falck w~uld find
its costs increasEd by at least 27 billion lire, but National Linificio and Canapi-
ficio would have increased costs of 2 billion lire.
~ Qut the reasorisfor