NIE-61; CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST CONTROL OVER THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT* (REVISED STAFF DRAFT FOR BOARD CONSIDERATION)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000800010020-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: June 9, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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SEA U ':IL I!RMATION.
9 June 1952
SUBJECT: NIE-61z Consequences f Communist Control over the
Indian Subcamtinent* (Revised Staff draft
for Board Consideratio i)
To estimate the strategic sequences to the West and to the
Soviet Bloc of the establishment of Communist control over the IndiEv,
Southeast Asia having previously come under Carrmuni.st control. Whether
or not the subcontinent is likely to came under Communist control
MILITARY CONSEQUENCES
is a question beyond the scope of this
A. Effect on Western Militalzy Capabilities
1a Establishment of Ca.at control over the Indian sub-
would have ti almost no effect on the present military
continent
For the purposes of this esti e.e, the Indian subcontinent will be
taken to include India, Pakinw Afghanistan, the border states
of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan a and Ceylon a
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t RET
strength of the Western powers, other than the relatively
minor we of Preventing further British recruitment of Gurkha
troops in Nepal, and possibly weakening the morale of the
6?000-,odd gurus now serving with the British in Malaya.
The forces of India and Pakistan, the only two militarily
significant powers of the area, are not now available to the
West as a result of the non-involvement policies being pursued
by the two governments. Moreover, these forces, though large
in comparison to those of their non-Ccwrn nest neighbors,*
far weaker than those of Communist China and the USSR and, in
any event, are currently tied down because of the Kashmir.
dispute. From a purely military standpoint, they are not a
significant deterrent to Communist military expansion, in the
neighboring areas of Southeast Asia or the Middle East.
2. Communist accession to power in the subcontinent would,
however, be of ",same potential significance in eliminating
the'present possibility that India and Pakistan might align
themselves with the West militarily, either before or after
the outbreak of a general war. Pakistan has repeatedly
suggested that it might be willing to participate in Western
defense arrangements if the Kashmir dispute were settled
* For a summary of subcontinent military forces, see Annex A.
ECRET
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satisfactorily, and it in possible that even India might
eventually be induced to participate in Western defense
arrangements. The military assets which a subcontinent
allied with the West could provide include:
and heavy bomber range of major industrial and governmental
centers in Soviet Central Asia and the interior of Ca nuiuni st
China. Communications and other facilities are adequate
for maintenance of large-scale operations from these basese
a. A large number of excellent airfields within medi
b. Major facilities for the maintenance of communications
between Western Europe and the Far Fast and for the logis-
tical support of possible military operations in the Middle
or Far Est.
e. Forces in being totalling approximately 650,9000, same
1,504,000 trained reservists, and a vast reservoir of man-
power. Western military planners would like to obtain some
Pakistani force for the defense of the Middle' East. Although
most of the remaining forces in being (including Indial s and
Pakistan's small naval and air forces) would probably have to
be left in defeive positions at home in the event of Indian
and Pakistani participation in a -war on the side of the West,
-3-
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they might to a limited extent tie down Communist troops
in the Central Asian area.. The subcontinent's manpower
reserves, trained and untrained, would be useful to the
West to the extent that manpower rather than equipment
was the significant factor Limiting the expansion of
Western military strength. Some Western logistical support
would be required regardless of the extent to which sub-
continent military potential was used; although the sub-
continent can itself supply significant amounts of small
arms and amunitions it is dependent on outside sources
for most other major items of materiel.
B. Effect on Soviet Bloc Milita Capabilities
3. Caamunist control of the subcontinent would increase the size
of the military forces available to the Soviet Bloc and would
provide it with an additional base of operations strategically
located with rspect to the Riddle East and Southeast Asia and
to the main line of ccusunications between Western Europe and
the Far East;, It is unlikely, however, that the Soviet Bloc's
military capabilities would be significantly increased, at least
for many years to crmme
4. The immediate effect on Soviet Bloc military capabilities
would almost certainly be small. The particular circumstances
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under which the Communists achieved power might well entail
heavy troop requir nts for internal security duty, reluctance
to fight for the Communists on the part of many of the present
troops, and combat losses of men and equipment. Even if these
adverse effects were largely avoided and sizeable forces in
being were thus made available for possible aggressive operations
against Southeast Asia and the Middle East, the usefulness of
these forces, except possibly on political grounds, would be
limited. The Chinese Communists and the USSR respectively can
already muster a preponderame of force for operations in these two
areas, Moreover, Communist use of subcontinent forces against these
areas would be subject to serious operational limitations, inasmuch
as: (a) the land routes available for such operations traverse
extremely difficult mountainous terrain and would involve Major
logistical problems; and (b) shipping for use in amphibious or other
seaborne operations would be difficult to assemble and highly
vulnerable to Western naval attack. While control of the subconti-
nent's air and naval bases would put the Communists in a position to
attack essential Western communications through the Indian ocean,
as well as possible air and naval targets in Southeast Asia and the
Middle East, present subcontinent air and naval forces would be
almost completely inadequate for such a purpose and could be
readily neutralized by Western farces., .
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5. Even in the long rum:, the chances that a Ccmmu d t sub-
continent would contribute significantly to over-all Soviet
Bloc military capabilities are small. ,Although the USSR
would have an opportunity to exploit the subcontinent's
military potential much as it has that of Cc miunist China, the
Soviets would probably be deterred froze doing so by the follow-
ing considerations
a, A large-scale buildup of subcontinent military forces
and installation would require a heavy investment in
technical and material assistance, either through direct
supply of military end-items or through development of
the subcontinent's now limited mar industry. This invest-
ment could be made only at the expense of military and
econamic requirements elsewhere in the Bloc which are
likely to remain pressing for many ,years to cane,
b. Dif ficul tier of access and control would make a Soviet
investment in subcontinent military power a risky one.
Unlike Communist China, the subcontinent has no major
overland canmunloations with the rest of the Soviet Bloc
and would therefore have to be supplied almost entirely
by sea, In the event of war, the subcontinent military
establishment's supply lines would thus be gravely
vulnerable to Western naval interdiction.
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Any a~ c? res cal buildup of the subcontinent rr i11tarj
establ..ish .ntQ especially oue which lessened the enb-
caontinant a#s dependeraoe on vulnerable supply lines , would
-u akm the controi hick the USSR itself could er srcise
?er the
dur
u:;i.d t,ffer little strategic gain to
A!Ad above, difficulties of terrai
quote alternative forces wou e
;e it na di t e:.xcept possi,bl.y on political ground-
?r ; use l?r , a Conti ngg xrrs ? x?om the subcontinent in either
,3 uthE`zst a
OMP
iliddle I asto the only areas irA wu'hi., ::h
au without a marked change in the
63 In ?vi mi c-5" these, factors, the Soviet, contribution to
,-;ont: nera military strvn h woui..d probably be limited. The U SS
cs:c d 1:3e e1 sec tied to provide some assistance in building up ,;
oahcorrdnent go ar^mad:.'cdroear and sir irsiustriesq but on .y to,-1110
t: xter.t of intornal se~.ur it, ai defense requirements The TI ;,SPA
would prc b;h :? y urttex!aar'?i.te some limited expansion of subbonti L"ant
it and naval forces, possibly providing some interceptor en
groom. attack airy. ,., as well as patrol crafts coastal.
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submarines, and other light naval equipment similar to that it
has supplied to Communist China and North Korea. The Soviets,
however, would probably not wish to build up subcontinent air
strength significantly, particularly in the absence of uninter-
rupted supplies of POL, and would almost certainly be unwilling
to commit major naval units to the Indian Ocean area.
II. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
A. Effect on the Econc nic Position of the West*
7. The area of the Indian subcontinent is currently important
to the non-Communist world as a major source of several strategic
raw materials and of a giber of widely used trough less critically
important items. The principal commodities involved are as follows:
a. Manganese ore--India currently supplies about 25 percent
of the non-Communist vaorld's consumption of manganese ore,
which is widely used as an alloy for steel, and about 35
percent of that used by the US. Since the Indian product
is almost all markedly superior in grade to that obtainable
elsewhere and thus its importance
is greater than the percentage figures given here would indicate.
This section is based largely on an EIC contribution to the forthcoming
NIE?56, Likelihood of Loss of Important Economic Resources in Selected
Foreign Areas.
India also has unequalled reserves of monazite sands, from which thorium
(of potential use for atomic energy) and rare earths can be obtained,
and also is a source of beryl, of same strategic importance in beryllium
copper. Although India has thus far prohibited the export of monazite,
it has entered into negotiation for its sale to the US. India restricts
the exportation of beryl and the US has been able to obtain only minor
amounts.
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b, Mica-.India is virtually the sole supplier of the more
critical classes of Look and sheet; muscovite mica, which
is used in manufacture of vacuum tubes and other communi-
cations equipment., boiler gauges, and oxygen breathing
equipment.
c. ara~te---Ce71on is now the only significant non-
Communist source of I .gh grade amorphous lump graphite, which
is used in manufacture of carbon brushes for electrical
equipment.
d. Jute and Jute products--India and Pakistan furnish
virtually all the Jute and Jute products which enter world
trade. Jute is the principal material used in bags and bale
coverings for transport and storage of bulk comnodities like
grain., fer?tilizera cement, and cotton.
e, other products---India is the chief world supplier of
premium quality k anite, which is a high grade refracto 7
used in electric furnace linings, electrical and chemical
porcelain,, and spark plugs; furnishes about 75 percent of
the world's supply of high grade shellac; and provides about
a quarter of the world's supply of opium for medical purposes.
India and Ceylon together produce close to 85 percent of
the tea entering international trade and about two thirds of
the black pepper. Ceylon is a relatively minor source of
rubber for the non-;Communist world,
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8. If the Communists gained control of the subcontinents
the prineipa.1 stratee gio materials listed above would
- #vit*bly be unav-a3.la e- to the west in wartime and might
vaM be dried uzlel' cO]4 MW aonditio 3 as x.31. The
Cc eta would probably ocntixn38 to export less critical
items like tea, black Mpa s and possibly jute in excluMp
for food stuffs and other products not nw subject to
Western ztport c c tro $. In additions they might initially
be willia to continue; supplying strategic materials like
messes micas and graphite to the 'West if the latter
withheld the export oottrols now in force against the other
Cos muL1st coun .es; . ilr the 1086 of the petroleum products,
machinery, and other controlled items which the subcontinent
now obtains from the West in exchange for these strategic
raw materials would impose a considerable strain an the
econc+a y of the suboonti nt, Bung a mt or change in
the aver-an pattern at Rat-West trade, h r, a gradual
drying up of the subeottt3nent's trade with the West would
J y }
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almost certainly -fie l71 ce v* ft the West mmbft to develop
sources of critical. V ateri ale and the
C t t a n inlets $ n - t 1 0 4 ee attempti^^lt~ to movee toward
greater self-8ufflcie _ aeon a temporary modus
vivendi would be out of the question if the USSR considered
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the demial of strategic materials to the West of suffi-
cient importance or if the US and its allies went ahead
with Imposition of export oontral s.
9. Denial of the eubc atinent's products to the West as
a result of a Communist accession to power would require
considerable readjuatmSnts an the part of the US and its
LL
allies. e `
a'n~it aai"+ttie a
Nevertheless, the West would have
to sped time and money in developing generally more expen-
sive and qualitativei r lose satisfactory alternate souraeap
would have to develop substitute materials in some casoa,
and would hme to accept same reductions in quantity or
quality of output until these adjustments had been made.
10. The impact on the West of the denial of the subcontinent's
strategic uateriWa1s would depend an the extent to which
stockpiling goals had been achieved and alternate sources
expanded at the time that the suboontfnent's resources
were out off. This irct would almost certainly be serious
at any time up through 1954. The present outlook with
respect to the principal strategic c c naoditie$ named above
is as follows:
SECRET
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a. !4 riganese a m -.. he US could maintain its own steel
production by drawing on its manganese stockpile, which
was 45 percent complete at the end of 1951 and probably
sufficient to most an Western manganese requirements
now supplied by India for about two and a half years.
Ib eroer, a major redistribution of US stocks would
have to be made to avert a sigificant reduction in
steel output in the other Western cou tries, in which
little stockpiling has taken place. In the long run,
adequate supplies of n nagonese could be obtained from
other sources--notbly Draxi, the Gold Coast, South
Africa, Belgian OM W# and Augola--vbere sons expansioe1.
of facilities to meet the Increasing deana d for n ngaarssssse
is already taking plc o- . An increase -In output Guffi-
cient to meske up for the loss of Indian masnganasse and
permit reconstitution of the stookpile would probably
not, however, be possible for s ral yews In view of
m i power and equipnent shortages, transport, and loading
facility bottlenea es, and va z1.ows , other problems. In
any event loss of the superior Inc> I = ore would require
adjustments in su?etallurgical pracrtioe,entailing some
lose in rate of produoticii and higher caste.
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be os-Loss of the Indian supply of block and sheet
mica would require drastio ooneervation measures in
the US, where stodq213ng is only about 20 percent
oa q fete, and even more atsingent curbs on ooneu iptioex
in the other Western oauntriee, here etoekp .ee are
virtually nosnziat et. Stocks now in the M of these
critical classes of mica represent about a yaw's supply".
Development of new mates would be very costly and the
effort being made to develop substitutes cannot be
expected to shoe usable results for several years.
c, G~rsh its,.- .arse Cay1on is the on3y source of higb
grade amorphous lump graphite, the US would have to
draw on its stockpiles. notably for such ri gaarous uses
as carbon brushes in bigb titude aircraft, and modify
specifications for other c -itemie where inferior grades
of graphite might possibly be used. Although the US
stockpile v us clone to its goal of 3,356 metric towns
at the and of 1951, that level represented only about
a quarter of tkyldnte annual. exports.
d. 3utetee and lute troduaft--The loss would be serious,
involving far-reaebing conservation measures and oostly
adJustmente, esp eci ru1ly for ooumtscies like those of
Western Europe where substitutes are less readt3
available and would involve faareign exchange problems,
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e, anent of synthetic subatitut3a
for Indian its is won umder, vay, and the lose of
,the median product should cause no serious difficulties.
Lose of Indian shollao t u d involve higher costs and
widespread inoamvvnience since different substitutes
would have to be developed for most of the various
uses of she1 e. Loss of radian, opium would in=ouce
the UK, which has obtained most of its supply frcam
the subcontinent,.
Effect on Vie Eaanamic Position of the SouS.et Bloc
3.1. At least in the abort runs Caamnaa ist control of the
subcontinent would provide few economic benefits to the
rest of the Soviet Bloc and might moll prove to be an ec momio
liability. The USSR would probably hasten to exploit ind Ear s
thorttm -bearing monazite for atomic energy pa-poses,, and
the Moo as a whole amad probably use the limited amarcnta
of rubber, cotton, and cottm textiles available, as well
as moderate mnounts of mica, grahpite, iron and manganese
ores, beryl, and jute products. Namthelese, the amount
of goods that the Soviet Bloc could absorb would be relate
tively wall, in terms both of the euboontinent's present
-14i.
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exports and of total Soviet Moo ooneunptiaai, and the stray-
tegio gain to the B].oa--except possibL,y with respect to
monazite-4tould be limited,
12. The extent to which a Communist subcontinent would
represent an economic liability for the rest of the Bloc
would depend in the short run in part an the extent to
which the auboaazt3nent oantimied to obtain present imports
from the West, and in part on Communist ability to cope
with the major internal readJustmants. arising frcxn the
transfer of political and economic power to a Communist
regime, The cutting off of major Western imports would
impose a heavy etc strain on the subcont ent which
the USSR would have difficulty in relieving,. Just as the
subcontirnnt's principal exports are realities for which
the Soviet Bloc has no great immediate need, so its prin-
cipal. present imports--notably petro1eu products, machinery
and other metal manufaet mees, industrial. chemical a, and
foodstuffs--are items which the Oo tiist world cannot
easily epem. The USSR's willingness and ability to make
up for the loss of Western products would be sharply
limited by competing demands within the Bloc, by the grave
shortage of shipping facilities, and by the general concept
that it is each Communist regime's responsibility to
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achieve economic goals through use of its own resources
rather than through gr*nts and loans from the USSR. The
Soviet Bloc would probably thus be willing to suppler the
subcontinent's most urgent import requirements only to
the limited extent that the subaontinsnt itself contributed
goods needed by the Soviet Bloc, Although a subcontlt
Camnunist regime could probably, under these circumstances,
maintain itself in power by adopting extreme measures# it
would almost certainly exert strong pressure on the USSR
for substantial econmic assistance.
13. Action with regarV`to the subcontinent's food Supply
would be particularly urgent. Although the Soviet Bloc
maight be able to ship about e m l1ion, tons of grain and
Burma might be induced to provide another million tons,
this total would rWrese nt only about half or less of the
grain which the area has imported annually in recent years,
Localfs would probably occur despite ruthless methods
of crop cofloction? If the Cmnunists were sufficiently
well entrenched to clash tith religious sentiment,, they
might be able to save an additional million tons of grain
now consumed by monkeys and cattle,
14, Industrial output would almost certainly decline.
Although the USSR and Rumania could theoretically provide
~16"
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much of the six mill iori metric two of petroleum now obtained
from the Middle East for internal consumption, lank or
tankers would probably permit the shipment of only insigni-
ficant amotmta to the subcontinent. Despite possible con-
version of oll-burning; equipment to coal, which lB plenti?
ful in the subcontinent, bottlenecks in production would
almost certainly result. The denial or the spere parts and
other capital equipment industrial cheiaicala, and miscel-
laneous metal products previously obtained from the West
would impose further curbs on industrial output.
15. Under these circumstances, the prospects of a C waist
subconttnont'e becoming a major center of Communist economic
power appear exceedingly remote. Although the subcontinent
has huge manpower reserves, the basic raw materials needed
in heavy industry, and an extensive existing productive
plant, large--scale exploitation of these resources would
require considerable t1me and tremendous capi~,bai investment.
On the basis of. the Jal nese experience, an industrial conplex
of the order of that existing in Japan. and i nchuria at
the start of the World War II might theoretically be achieved
in 15 to 20 years. However, such a rate of development,
which would require the importation of capital equipment
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of the order of half a bVUon dollars annually, would
clearly be beyond the t ties of a Commmist regime
in the subcontinents, which would probably be cut off from
the major Western sources of capital equipmentp could
expect only limited assistance from the USSR, and would
probably be confronted with aerfous problems of internal
economic adjustment as won. Although it is probable
that an Improvement in ? gricultural output and an expansion
of certain critical industrial facilities would eventually
be ? chieved, the genera pace of econocio development would
almost mtalnly bo extx sly Blow.
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M. POLTrICAL Jt)ID P SYCk Ob iCAL CONSEC?UETCF$
3.6o The establir hffient o Cc rmnist control over the Indian wit-
continent
W~UtU41 sad pe, io -, it to the
S 9440m BIO4 vi -v. e a Wt
u .
sad closely
,e T st th i t ~a ~ ~ ~ : ', the.,
fo al ~ eC 4 j `at $ con?titute
A= OatreVwould be a es .am blow to Western prestige through.
out the world,, would grew strer. then the Cc nurdst claim to speak for
the noorkawhite peoples of Asia and Af'rica* and we uld. have a profound
shock affect t1woughont the Middle and Par East.
17o The specific effects of a Cownunist accession to power in the
subcontinent would depend on the circumstances
low,
r which the C.uista gai n d control. s
the ;fact tc ',the &;d*
atbm-t i WAS
to would
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the ~asi 'cif a pb ?of face W3et tsar t ? +eii` envy o rtne
t&h $6via't or ",Cb3.nese mist
16'r by the effort cods indite C i t eledte ta, and so
tics. and g ogi 1 -1 ssio r .woul 6e cori .#
ou foxev
cox
*fie
otbep` `area s get ~`" existing
.efie, afn re , prcupst i.on vith
18. In general, however, the following political and prycholo cal.
consequences could be expected, regardless of the circumstances under
which the Communist assumption of power took places
t morn, I Conan uenOes
(1)
Western morale would be dealt a he n7 blow and that of
the Cctunists, both inside and outside the Soviet orbit,
would be strengthened. The ve of
loss of China 9-2-LIM&A' )a would
create tine impression that Carmi .sm was we is, n o Ma
"wave of the fut" which would soon engulf all Asia
and eventually the rest of the world,
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(2) The ,Pere s aad poltticaX Ie~av?rah3. 3'! of
the Soviet in interaati polit ce would be
greatly it reueed, with fivVnatim anted to the Ott
of Sovi4d allies and the tions y der Cast
tb ' fr m the tai'
organ cation
(3) w tern efforts o compete i r the friendship and
critic f13y *sired. the lose of Ia m s, P& d titan,
and
Ce 1oit the g h would to res almost
he hm-wU 940M
" ' of ' te of Asia would be
-s - -- - -- --ca r
(4) Ot1'A9r/=UW1G t&3 . had fonw-d the, .nd of Wis
in espousing Involvement 3$ a
+avob]e to the
by ernes in bpeoific Areas
+ iv l in the rsstt-t t struggle would be
ad to - e the e3. t%rn *n under ci rcuieta,,C
(1) outheast Asi.*-~.opport ties for Cummrdst subversion
would be ir, a poaeible political deterrent to
Cc I9ni st OV agpmasior would be raaoved, and the
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will of the present non..Ccmannnlst gvvenianents to
resist the spread of Camp would be gray
weakened. The alma shaicj govearnaent of Bum w mad
probably fall. varier Ccmuzist damination in fafr]y
short order, traugh a canbination of appeasenert on
the part of the govamnent and increasing subversive
and guerrilla activities on the part of the Cos t iet s e
Beene of i ta weeiaieee and exposed position, Thailand
which is not aligned with the West, would almost
inevitably switch to a pamunist policy unless
strong Western support were forthcoming and might do
ad even if t h support were proffered. The situation
in Indochi would deteriorate rapi dlys even If the
French continued to fights and a mater Waster."
military co !Eibnent would be required to prevent the
loss of the country to the 'Vietminh or the breakdown
of internal order. C unist activity in 1n.y possibly
with the support of the now pro-British Indian caamunity,
would Increases probably resulting in the virtual
cessation of rubber prodw.tion. Although the l' .ayes
Tearing tian by the Chinese and I ti.an minority
camnnu Mees would probably cont&zme to support the
British, a cca Ldsrabl greater
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md.li.tary ccrmitment would be needed to maintain
control. With the collapse of the idea of a f1third
force" in Asia., Indonesia would almost certainly fall
gender Canrnist domination unless convinced by vigorous
US action that by aiming itself with the West it
could obtain adequate protection against Communist
(2) Near and Middle Fast-T a Arabi states and Iran, which
have tended to regard the UK or, Israel in the case
of the Aral a, - as a more immediate threat to their inters ate
than the USSR, would be confronted 9,aiti a forceful
exa -iple of Camnun1st power and with greatly increased
dangers of subversion and diplomatic intimidation,
Gppo tunit3es for subversilo acttvi by local Ccmnuniat-
li groups and Soviet agitation among minority groups
like the Kurds would almost certainly increase, wbile
sentiment for aDpeasa,eI t of the Soviets would probably
g wmnong opportunist elements in the ruling groups.
Under these circumstances the existing goverrjoents
tjould have to take same sort of a stand, Whether they
would adopt aaui successfully carry through a strong
proMM7estexn policy or succumb to the various pro-
Comr ist and pro appeasement forces would depend on th
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(3)
extent to which existing differences with the West
could be smoethed over, and on the extent of their
control over their armies and other security forces,
and on the amount and timeliness of the political,
economic, and military support he ItTest was prepared
to give them. S er intcz'nal perturbations would
take place in Isr'aalm but the dominant political groups
would probaU y remain mere or less committed to the
Western side. Although the Greek Comm .sts would
probab Ljr seek to egloit the no situation, both
Greece and Turk r would prcibab3y remain fishy allied
with the Wes
d
The non st Far East -4A.1thaugh J%= would
basicali3r viish to retain its alliance with the U5,
its feat's for its security, its sense of isolation
from the other major powers of Asia, and its incentive
to trade with the Ccmz=. list bloc would increases
T Japanese would be more eager thaw ever to rain
a sttvng international position independent of the
/West and, abould Western actions fail to ca3m their
fears about their cm security, might serious3y conside*
a : apps-oacbamnt with the Canuunists The goverment
of the plan p old undergo similar qualms but,
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being less capable of acting
independcnt],pa would
probab]y concentrate on obtaining additional military
commitments from the US. Australia and New Zealand would
probab]y increase the pace of their own defense efforts ,
but would probably remain reluctant to make firm
commit ments to participate in defense of the Middle East,
South. Korea. and the Chinese National ets would remedn
dependent on Western help and vaould time have little
fzeedom of action..
(/i) Western LluropePopaw fears about the West's ability
to halt the sp sad of Cwmmimm where in the -mwld
would be strengthened, The 3ov'erauments of the UK and
France would pl obabl,y cone under strong pressure to
abandon the costly and difficult attempts to hold
on to DIdDebina and Malaya in order to comeftrate on
defense of their metropolitan territory,/ Even so,,
public conf'idee in the defensibility of Western
Europe might became more difficult to achieve, -particularly
in France auca. Italy Trith a eidy large Lamm .st
parties0
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