ZAIRE: INCOHERENCE AND DECAY IN AN AUTOCRACY (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000800050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessnnent
i 'eAlter
Secret
RP 79-10144
March /979
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Na innal Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Zaire: Incoherence and
Decay in an Autocracy
An Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed
on 9 March 1979.
1 -1
come and should be directed to
The authors of this paper are I
I Africa Division, Office of Regional and
Analysis. Comments and queries are wel-
This paper was coordinated with the Office of Eco-
nomic Research, the Office of Strategic Research,
and the Directorate of Operations.
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Zaire: Incoherence and
Decay in an Autocracy
President Mobutu's popularity has slipped badly over
the past two years because of numerous and worsening
economic and social problems. Food shortages, infla-
tion, deteriorating services, and an ineffective govern-
ment plague the Zairian population.
Organized opposition to Mobutu inside Zaire is nearly
nonexistent. The European-based opposition move-
ments are divided and weak. The chief danger to the
Mobutu government would probably come in the form
of spontaneous uprisings in such locales as Kinshasa or
Shaba Region and or another invasion by foreign-
based dissidents.
The President has initiated some reforms but will go
only so far; he is unlikely to uproot the corruption and
ethnic discrimination that has worked so well for him
in the past.
The problems facing Zairian society also afflict the
military. The Army is both the base of Mobutu's rule
and his chief potential threat.
Key military leaders apparently are loyal, but the
Army is incapable of protecting the country's territo-
rial integrity without the assistance of foreign forces.
The Army's loyalty when faced with a serious external
threat or large-scale internal disorders would be
questionable.
Mobutu has improved relations with Zaire's most
important neighbors, but mistrust probably remains.
Zairian dissidents in Angola and Zambia will pose an
even greater threat once the Inter-African Force
departs in mid-1979.
The Zairian economy-the main source of Mobutu's
difficulties-will remain in deep trouble for the
foreseeable future. Mobutu has made some significant
economic reforms, but corruption, inflation, and a
huge budgetary deficit remain serious problems.
The prospects for stability in Zaire are dim-with or
without Mobutu. Without continued external eco-
nomic and military support, the President's rule would
deteriorate even more rapidly.
If his position continues to weaken, Mobutu is likely to
lash out at the United States and other Western
supporters; he also is likely to curtail reforms. There
are no readily identifiable potential successors to
Mobutu, and a change in government in Zaire would
probably be accompanied by a period of internal
disorder. The succeeding regime, however, would
probably continue to look to the country's traditional
backers as its primary allies.
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Zaire: Incoherence and
Decay in an Autocracy
One comes across nothing but extreme misery, infamy,
and contempt, for there is no observance either of.. .
laws or military traditions, but all is besmirched... .
And so much the more are these vices detestable in
those who sit on the judgment seat, prescribing rules
for others and expecting from them admiration...
-Machiavelli
Despite the manner in which President Mobutu seized
power 14 years ago, his main source of strength over
the years has been his claim to legitimacy as the
country's true founder. Mobutu's authority has been
largely based on his historic role in ending most of
Zaire's ethnic and regional strife and bringing about a
modicum of unity to the country; his tight rein on the
government and creation of Zaire's single party; his
personal control of the Army; and his general accept-
ance throughout most of the country and inter-
nationally. Mobutu's position as undisputed leader
reached its zenith in the early 1970s but began
gradually to slip in 1974-75. This erosion has acceler-
ated over the last two years to the point where he is in
danger of losing effective control because of numerous
economic, political, and social problems that he
appears unable to resolve.'
While Mobutu is blamed for many of the country's
difficulties, he is grudgingly viewed as the only leader
capable of holding Zaire together. Many of the
country's problems were festering before Mobutu
came to power, but he has exploited them to suit his
needs and perpetuate his rule instead of seeking to
resolve them. Although the Zairian President can be
credited with bringing the country out of the morass
that characterized the early postindependence years,
he has done little to promote economic development
and political and social integration. Mobutu's attempts
to mold a personality cult and construct even a fragile
national unity have foundered. Corruption and
ethnicity have been the most salient features of his
This paper complements "Zaire: Healing Shaba's Wounds," (RP
79-10033C, January 1979), an Intelligence Assessment that deals
almost exclusively with the threat to Mobutu from Zaire's Shaba
Region-the country's most important and most troublesome region.
I
rule. Now that Zaire has fallen on hard times
economically, the years of neglect, rampant corrup-
tion, and tribal politics may prove to be the crafty
President's undoing.' "Mobutuism"-a term used by
the President to describe Zaire's official philosophy-
has contributed little to the vast majority of Zaire's 25
million inhabitants. I 25X1
Social Disintegration
And Regional Isolation
Dissatisfaction with Mobutu is growing throughout
Zaire, and he apparently is unable to reverse this trend.
The downward spiral in the Zairians' quality of life has
exacerbated the smoldering ill will toward the central
government. The President's inability to deal effec-
tively with the worsening economic problems forms the
basis of the popular discontent. Ethnic divisions remain
a serious social problem, but because of the severity of
the country's economic hardships, class cleavages also
are becoming more apparent. I 25X1
Although the country remains generally calm, the
current nationwide crisis represents the nadir of
Mobutu's 14-year rule. In the capital and in other
regions shortages of basic food staples are common.
Even when available, they are extremely expensive.
Hunger, malnutrition, and disease are widespread. In
Bas Zaire, sometimes referred to as the breadbasket of
the country, drought has resulted in serious crop losses.
Deliveries of foreign food assistance will temporarily
alleviate some of the shortages, at least in Kinshasa,
but the basic problem will remain. Rampant inflation
coupled with the recent devaluations of the Zairian
currency add to the hardship. Expatriate residents in
'In some measure, Mobutu is a victim of his own policies. For
example, the Zairian Army probably has interpreted the President's
discriminatory actions and harsh treatment toward Shaba as giving,
the Army freedom to commit depredations against Shaban civilians.
Even if Mobutu wanted the Army to change its exploitative
behavior, as in the case of returning Shahan refugees, he is hard
pressed to alter the behavior of his troops in the field. In addition, the
fact that the Zairian troops often are neither paid nor fed-largely
as a result of government corruption and inefficiency-means that
the Army has little choice but to exploit the local population in order
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MME ,?hutu meeting last year with
?'-,-neh President Giscard in Paris.
,tire and other longtime observers believe that
~:anditions are at an all-time low and are possibly even
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Fne central government's presence in Zaire's diverse
-ueions, tenuous at best since independence, has
deteriorated still further in recent years. Several of
/lire's regions are so physically and psychologically
__cparated from Kinshasa that they are part of the
country in name only. Deteriorating roads, shortages
x fuel, and limited contact with the capital contribute
m the general isolation and social malaise. Kivu has
,ccn particularly hard hit. Roads between eastern and
western Kivu have been impassable for years. In
addition, all available food is flown to the capital from
k vu and other outlying regions. Instead of looking to
Kinshasa and the central government for assistance
and relief, the capital regarded as an exploiter, and
inhabitants of Kivu ant other rural areas see Kinshasa
as largely responsible C sr their problems. The US
Consul in Kivu reports that in some rural areas the
money economy has disappeared and the population
has reverted to a preca!nnial lifestyle.
Zaire's local and regior,_il governments are largely
ineffective. Mobutu's p-omise in July 1977 to decen-
tralize the government nd grant significant powers to
regional governors and egional economic commissions
has brought little real c range. Many regional officials
are corrupt and income tent and often are outsiders
who may neither speak he local language nor have an
interest in local problenis. Personal and tribal connec-
tions prevail over comps fence and professionalism.
Indicative of Mobutu's ick of concern with regional
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problems-his home region of Equateur excepted-is
the fact that the President's visit to Kivu last October
was his first in nearly two years. Several Zairian
regions continue to suffer because of Mobutu's dis-
criminatory practices.
The government's highly touted "Mobutu Plan"-an
economic recovery scheme announced in 1977-has
thus far had little impact. Despite Mobutu's exhorta-
tions against corruption, military indiscipline, and
economic exploitation, these problems remain. Should
the Mobutu Plan finally get off the ground, Kinshasa's
traditional neglect of the interior will probably con-
tinue. Even with increases in foreign assistance and
rising prices for Zairian mineral exports, it is unlikely
that Mobutu will expand his priorities to include sig-
nificantly increased expenditures for the interior.
While the pervasive erosion of economic and social
conditions throughout Zaire has led to widespread
grumbling, discontent within the country is largely
unfocused. Anti-Mobutu dissident activity is unorga-
nized and based mainly in Europe. The population
remains docile, more demoralized than rebellious. In a
few areas of the country-particularly Mobutu's home
region of Equateur-the population may even be
reasonably content. The fact that most Zairians do not
expect much from Kinshasa probably works in
Mobutu's favor. I
Nevertheless, Kinshasa, with its 2.5 million inhabi-
tants, and Shaba, because of its separatist tradition,
are potential flash points from which a local disturb-
ance could spread and pose a serious threat to Mobutu.
Upheavals in Shaba would also be significant because
the region's mineral wealth is an important national
resource. Mobutu is aware that the level of popular
discontent in both areas is high, and he will move
quickly to stamp out any unrest that could be
contagious. His haste last month to meet with demon-
strating university students protesting poor living
conditions at the national university in Kinshasa is an
indication of the President's concern that public
displays of unrest not get out of hand. The disturbances
in Kinshasa also spread to the Lubumbashi campus,
where the authorities moved quickly to respond to
students' grievances. Mobutu's awareness of the public
mood is also reflected in his decision last month not to
allow the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR),
Zaire's sole political party, to deduct party dues from
worker salaries. In Shaba, the presence of the Inter- 25X1
African Force works in Mobutu's favor, but if the force
leaves as scheduled in midyear, his control of this eco-
nomically vital area may again be severely tested.
Tensions in Kinshasa, Shaba, and Kivu Regions have
also been heightened because of renewed cross-border
threats from dissidents and from anti-Mobutu
insurgents led by European mercenaries.
Political Reforms Unlikely
Basically, "Mobutuism" is a classic example of politi-
cal, social, and economic exploitation. The President's
authoritarian philosophy of l'etat c'est moi has re-
sulted in his ruling the country through a pervasive
system of patronage, graft and corruption, and rewards
and punishments. Indeed, much of the President's
power and the allegiance given to him are direct results
of his personal control of rewards and patronage. In
times of prosperity-when resources were plentiful-
the system probably worked well enough to satisfy the
most important individuals and groups in the country.
In times of protracted economic hardship and shrink-
ing resources, however, the strains created by this
system are such that many Zairians are hard pressed to
survive. Mobutu will continue to pay lipservice to
stamping out corruption and will periodically purge
corrupt individuals, such as the State Commissioner
for Agriculture who was fired last December. The
President knows, however, that limiting the opportuni-
ties for corruption by relatives, cronies, and other
influential military and civilian supporters, will lessen
their loyalty to him.
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au wing the personality
uit in Lubumbashi.
l"he Military: Reflections
Of the General Malaise
iithough Mobutu's loss of prestige and influence is in
.-part related to Zaire's chronic economic difficulties,
nother major factor is the inability of his ragtag army
-
sU protect the country's territorial integrity and main
1:iin effective internal security. The Zairian Army
f,AZ) is more a menace to the country's civilian
Population than a threat to any outside force.
In effect, the Zairian Government is a military regime
with a civilian facade. Mobutu came to power as an
:army leader, and as the Supreme Commander of the
Zairian armed forces he remains the ranking military
figure in the country. He occasionally appears in
Military dress, and in times of crisis such as the Shaba
combat uniform. The \rmy is both the basis of
Mobutu's power and ' ae chief threat to his rule.
Ethnic and regional . aareness and the resultant
tensions are at least prevalent in the Zairian
military as they are it society at large. Most members
of the FAZ, like their civilian counterparts, tend to
think of themselves i' tribal, rather than national
terms. The FAZ, likr: /airian society, has failed to
achieve social integr7ion.
The I-AZ is also bese with problems of recruitment,
leadership, and organ zation. Low morale and indisci-
pline are endemic, largely because of the failure of the
government to provic . basic necessities. Civilians are
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o icers from Mobutu's home region of Equateur and
those from Haut-Zaire. Mobutu seems to be aware of
the problem and has promised to break up the clique of
officers from Equateur who are attempting to under-
mine Babia's position. The President apparently has
complete confidence in his principal officer, despite
attempts by the Equateur group to impugn his loyalty.
them the authority to do so. Babia reportedly is
particularly concerned over the extent of ethnic
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the most serious friction occurs between 25X1 X
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Mobutu with Zairian and Moroccan
troops defending Shaba.
Babia and General Singa, the commissioner in charge
of Shaba Region and a longtime Mobutu loyalist,
undoubtedly would play important roles in the event of
a change in government. They would probably be
challenged, however, by other senior officers. It is
likely that a change in government or even a general
breakdown of law and order in Zaire might be
accompanied by fighting between various military
units, possibly along ethnic lines. At present, the
Zairian military appears loyal to Mobutu, and there
are no signs that senior members of the Army are
sometimes impressed into service; desertions are com-
mon. Corruption at the upper levels, often involving
diversions of supplies and salaries intended for the
troops, has been widespread. Last November, the FAZ
put together a "special guard" to protect a shipment of
United Nations trucks being sent to Shaba to be used
for refugee relief. Despite the "special guard," or
perhaps because of it, the trucks were stripped en
route.
Some senior officers like General Babia, chief of the
Zairian General Staff, would probably like to imple-
ment reforms, but it is unlikely that they will be able to
resolve the most serious issues, even if Mobutu gave
plotting against the regime.
General Babia,
Chief of the General Staff.
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1 j his growing awareness of the possibility of civilian
unrest because of economic hardships, Mobutu re-
cently has taken some further steps to ensure the
loyalty of the FAZ-especially the forces in the
Kinshasa area. Last December he reinstituted the
,'(: mmissary program to make more and cheaper
foodstuffs available to the military and their families.
1'he President's decision to allow the first promotions
,ince 1977 is also related to bolstering morale
r: response to reports last month of a threat by Zairian
issidents to move against Mobutu, the FAZ remains
)rl nationwide alert. The Zairian Government and
Wiilitary probably still believe that some kind of
dissident activity may occur during the next few weeks.
I'lie gendarmerie successfully contained short-lived
3&.udent disorders on the university campus in Kinshasa
.ust month, but the FAZ will have to be careful that an
=crzealous reaction to a disturbance does not exacer-
hate the problem. With the possible exception of those
units specifically assigned to maintain order in the
event of civil unrest in the Kinshasa area, however,
euost of the poorly trained and ill-disciplined Zairian
_mlitary units might not be able-or willing-to
>tntain a large-scale disturbance in one of Zaire's
valor urban areas. Indeed, the loyalty of troops whose
;Might is as bad as that of the civilian population is
doubtful. In a case two years ago, the same gendar-
rrrerie sided with striking teachers.
In the event of armed clashes with organized anti-
Mobutu military forces, the loyalty of the FAZ would
he even more suspect. If the force was sufficient to pose
a challenge to the FAZ or to seize power, many Zairian
troops would probably either desert or join forces with
the opposition. Consecutive defeats at the hands of the
Shaban invaders, purges by the President, and forced
retirements have further undermined morale. General
Babia is reported to fear that southern tribal members
of the military and other disaffected elements in the
Army would support a move against the government.
I le is also concerned that those troops who were
forcibly retired might become sympathetic to the
dissident cause.
Mobutu has done litt to reduce ethnic strains in the
military, and not sure isingly, has exploited them. He
has assigned officers n the basis of ethnicity and has
excluded or limited th -, numbers of persons from
Shaba, Bandundu, art East and West Kasai in certain
military units. The no irepresentative nature of the
Army is largely respcnsible for the tensions between
the military and civili,.ns in Shaba and other areas.
Mobutu believes, how ever, that the lack of Baluba-
speaking troops in the 3" Ith Airborne Battalion was
responsible for this un is good performance during the
fighting in Shaba last May.
The temporary deploy rnent of Belgian commandos to
Kitona, a town some .1)0 kilometers west of Kinshasa,
will bolster the morah of expatriates in the-Kinshasa
area and may boost tHc confidence of the Zairian
forces in the region. Ir the long run, however, the
commandos' presence will be interpreted as con-
firmation of the shaki less of the Mobutu government
and the ineffectivenes of his own forces. Even though
the commandos plant withdraw soon, critics of the
regime can argue witl some justification that Mobutu
is being propped up b? military forces from some 10
countries. These foreir~,n forces are performing a
variety of training anr other military assistance
functions. Despite the array of foreign military in-
volvement in Zaire, th;, FAZ is not likely to evolve into
a capable professiona ' force in the foreseeable future,
and Mobutu may not vish the Army to develop in this
way. Consequently, jr the short term any external
threat to the country, stability will require a foreign
military presence to n aintain order and give the FAZ
some credibility.
The President has rec; ntly begun to implement re-
forms in the bloated n ilitary bureaucracy. Forced
retirements last year r -duced the military by some
8,000. Steps have recently been taken to reduce
corruption in the disbs.rsing of military pay. Mobutu
and his senior comma. Iders apparently have been able
to limit the Army's mi;;treatment of refugees returning
to Shaba. In addition? the Belgians have assumed
control of some of the ogistic support for certain FAZ
units. Much remains t > be done. Some issues, like those
related to ethnic discr mination, probably will remain
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untouched. Other problems, such as the continued
shortages of food supplies, are related to the sorry state
of the economy and therefore beyond Mobutu's
immediate ability to alter.
A Little Liberalism, But ...
In an attempt to lessen domestic tensions and respond
to Western criticism, Mobutu has taken a few steps to
bring about economic and political reforms, but there
are clear limits to how far he will go. His brand of
reform apparently allows toleration of limited open
discussion of issues, but not criticism of his govern-
ment. The MPR is the only political party in Zaire, and
there is no room for opposition within the Party or
government. Over the last year, however, Zaire's
Legislative Council has become increasingly vocal in
its criticism of the regime. According to the Constitu-
tion adopted last year, the Legislative Council has
jurisdiction over a broad range of issues, although it
remains subordinate to the President. Several mem-
bers of the Council have provoked confrontations with
the President to test his commitment to change. In
early 1978 the Council delayed approval of Mobutu's
revised constitution. Some critics have since used the
legislative forum to direct veiled attacks against the
regime by questioning the President's authority and
impugning his integrity on several important matters
ranging from ethnic discrimination in the military to
misappropriations of budgetary receipts.
Last November, the Council held the first public
interpellations of members of the Mobutu government.
Although the questioning of the Prime Minister and
other ministers temporarily boosted the President's
image by appearing to show him responsive to the
Council, the sessions also demonstrated that many of
the country's problems are directly attributable to
Mobutu. At a subsequent meeting between Mobutu
and 50 members of the Council, the President warned
the group that "Zairian democracy" would not allow
them to carry their criticism of the regime much
further. Late last month, Mobutu sent the Council a
letter again reminding the members that the President
is above criticism.)
Mobutu is well aware of the dangers inherent in
political liberalization and may take additional steps to
intimidate the most vocal members of the Council. He
is aware, however, that his reform efforts are being
monitored by the West-particularly the United
States-and that harsh measures against his critics on
the Council would be noticed. Some members of the
Council probably are encouraged by Western pressure
on Mobutu to liberalize his regime. Other Zairians
who have experienced Mobutu's disfavor probably
believe that the President would be significantly more
repressive were it not for US pressure. To his credit,
Mobutu has released some political prisoners and
allowed international relief agencies wide latitude in
assisting returning refugees and inspecting prisons.
Mobutu probably will continue to pay lipservice to
reform, but will stress his concern that it take place "in
a Zairian context," and will react harshly to further
pressure from his Western supporters. The President
no doubt believes he has gone about as far as can be
A breakdown of stability in Zaire could have serious
repercussions in several neighboring countries. In
teams of security, Angola and Zambia are Zaire's
most important neighbors. Although relations with
these countries have improved significantly over the
last several months, Zaire will remain vulnerable for
the foreseeable future to attacks by anti-Mobutu
dissidents residing in Angola and Zambia. The possi-
bility of rebel incursions into Zaire's Shaba Region will
increase after the departure of the Inter-African Force
later this year. Should this happen, it would create
unwanted security problems for both Lusaka and
Luanda on their borders with Zaire. Rwanda and
Burundi are also concerned with the security situation
in eastern Zaire.
sympathizers.
A new attack on Shaba and a breakdown of law and
order there could trigger disorder in Kinshasa. Serious
disturbances in the capital or uncontrolled student
disturbances in Lubumbashi could also provide an
opportunity for Zairian dissidents to initiate Shaba III
or provoke disorder in other regions, such as Kivu,
where the dissidents might obtain support from local
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Despite Mobutu's recent concern that mercenaries
intended to lead an uprising of dissidents belonging to
the Action Movement for the Resurrection ofthe
Congo, we continue to believe that the Front for the
National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) based in
Angola comprises the most serious potential threat to
Mobutu. The continued improvement of Angolan-
/airian relations over the next few months should help
contain the FNLC threat.
Despite the mgeri g mistrust a ween
\'lobutu and Neto and the antipathy between the
tairian President and Zambian President Kaunda, the
three countries apparently are committed to improving
operation on border security. In addition to the
presence of anti-Mobutu dissidents in Angola and
Cambia, the Zairian Government believes that rebels
remain in Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania.
D
l.espite reasonably good relations with several of his
;icighbors, Mobutu has few real friends in Africa.
With the exception of Emperor Bokassa of Central
African Empire, and possibly Rwanda's President
Ilabyarimana, Mobutu is almost universally disliked
and mistrusted, and could expect little in the way of
.vmpathy or new assistance from other African leaders
if he faced serious internal problems or external
lh reats
International Aspects
Of the Zairian Economy
/wire's economy will remain in deep trouble with
almost no prospects for meaningful improvement any
time soon. Foreign exchange remains tight, as one-
third of the country's export receipts are diverted to
>ervice a foreign debt that exceeds $3 billion. Other
lean emergency aid given after the May 1978 Shaba
invasion, substantial financial support from Zaire's
wading Western creditors has not been forthcoming
'Iespite President Mobutu's acceptance of a tough
,economic reform program last summer. The major
stumbling block to ad Jitional assistance is Zairian
reluctance to control wasteful government spending.
The mines in Shaba-Zaire's most important eco-
nomic asset-have pe -formed remarkably well in view
of the rebel invasions A Kolwezi and subsequent
exodus of 450 expatri ites last year. Recent production
estimates provided b~ the Zairians indicate copper
output last year was ~ lmost identical to the 1977 total
of 435,000 tons, while cobalt production jumped to
13,200 tons,compared with 10,000 tons the year
before. Mining offici, Is have improved the cobalt
recovery rate from pr )cessed copper to take advantage
of currently favorable market conditions. Cobalt prices
have risen from $6.8.' to $20 a pound over the last
several months. In ad lition to the production in-
creases, Mobutu mus also take satisfaction from the
fact that Zairians are playing a major role in operating
the Kolwezi mining f.:cilities. The number of expatri-
ates who have return( d to Kolwezi has been less than
expected, despite recr aitment efforts in Paris, Brussels,
and other European c ties. The surprisingly strong
recovery of Shaba's mining complex from the disrup-
tions of the rebel incu -sions in 1977 and 1978 is
unlikely to continue v ithout some additional return of
expatriates and a mot e timely flow of spare parts for
the mining facilities.
Economic Reforms:
A Hard Pill To Swalt, )w
Mobutu has taken see eral measures to wheedle addi-
tional financial aid fr am the United States and other
Western creditors. Si ice July, private banks, which
finance a substantial share of Zaire's consumer im-
ports, have been proh bited from issuing letters of
credit unless they haw cash on hand. At the same time,
foreign exchange allo rations have been reorganized.
Outstanding import b lls are tobepaid off as quickly as
possible and industria I raw materials, essential manu-
factures, and foodstu fs are to receive the lion's share
of the remainder. Exhort revenues-except for cop-
per-are to be deposi ed in Zairian banks rather than
in overseas accounts i i response to widespread adverse
publicity over the disippearance of several million
dollars of coffee receiAs.
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Open copper mine near Kolwezi
in Zaire's Shaba Region.
Mobutu agreed last fall to the placement of expatriate
experts in the Central Bank and promised to abide by
their recommendations. The result has been a series of
devaluations that has reduced the value of the currency
by almost 50 percent since November; such a move
would have been anathema to Mobutu in earlier years
and perhaps is indicative of his desperation. The
Central Bank also announced in December that those
firms that have not repatriated all of their foreign
exchange receipts would have their Zairian bank
accounts frozen until such payments are made. So far,
50 businesses have been affected, including several
owned by relatives of Mobutu. Mobutu has also
dismissed several government officials on charges of
corruption and released some military officers because
of alleged involvement in commercial affairs. Officials
released because of corruption probably will be al-
lowed by Mobutu to ease their way back into other
shady dealings.
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Kinshasa has been unwilling to keep its spending in
i,eck, as exemplified by this year's "austerity" bud-
_eet, which has a government-projected deficit of $350-
400 million. The deficit will probably be in the
neighborhood of $600-700 million. A large portion of
this shortfall is slated for salaries and for Mobutu's
enable slush fund, which he uses not only to pay off
;-) ,+itical and military supporters but also to advance
;iis personal wealth through real estate and other
ieaiings
,.ven if the IMF plan is implemented, other problems
le im on the horizon that could jeopardize the govern-
.,ic;nt's performance and the subsequent availability of
reign assistance. Insufficient manpower will ad-
=rsely affect Kinshasa's ability to monitor the flow of
",ire's foreign exchange holdings, including a
r_,ckdown on improper pricing of exports that reduces
he volume of export receipts subject to taxes and other
,~=;vcrnment controls. In addition, Mobutu continues to
ah10w interest in barter deals involving copper and
xabalt in exchange for imported goods. Such transac-
,,ns are outside the authority of the Central Bank,
ich frowns on these arrangements.
I ,i_ sharp drop in consumer imports and concomitant
,ar;ge in prices are also likely to increase popular unrest
h~at may temper the President's enthusiasm for
ie ntinuing the reform program. Neither will he want
,a,itations placed on the availability of public funds
:Ir his personal use. The biggest question mark,
?,owever, is the status of the Shaba mines. Output this
x ,r is expected to slip to less than 400,000 tons of
,zapper and around 10,000 tons of cobalt. It is only a
1,aul tter of time before equipment begins to break down
irie to poor maintenance and lack of spare parts.
reduction may also be disrupted by fuel shortages,
Which would affect the movement of ore in and out of
iic refining centers. In addition, a major program to
xpand domestic production of refined copper and
.:,,halt is threatened by Zaire's recent decision to
;,incel a World Bank loan, apparently because of the
'flank's insistence on a strict accounting of the funds.
Finally, until Presider:: Neto can guarantee the
security of the Benguela Railroad, Kinshasa will have
to continue to depend ,n the politically unreliable
Zambia-Rhodesia-Sc;.Ah Africa rail line and the
inefficient Voie Nationale, an internal land water
route, for shipping its ninerals abroad.
The debilitating progression of economic reversals,
internal difficulties, ned repeated military challenges
and dissident threats i om without may combine to
deal Mobutu a mortal blow. Although he has weath-
ered crises in the past. the difficulties of the last three
to four years have so eroded his power and prestige that
he is unlikely to regain- the authority or respect he once
commanded. Mobutu s no longer the master of his
house. Without contin ied external economic and
military support his rr le would disintegrate even
further.
The Zairian President is faced with the most serious
challenge of his 14-yec r rule. Even if he survives, the
country's economic an I political decay is so pervasive
and the social fabric s, , damaged that the situation
probably cannot be cc r:ipletely reversed-regardless of
the amount of foreign yconomic assistance provided to
the country or externa pressure on Mobutu for reform.
For the short to medi n term, internal conditions in
Zaire will continue to deteriorate. If Mobutu does not
survive politically, an , ven more rapid deterioration in
the internal situation ,-ould probably occur. A sudden
or violent change in ledership would probably result
in widespread disorder> before a new regime could
consolidate power. Va ious individuals and groups
would initially be cons erned with sorting out new
loyalties and settling ,:)id scores. Any new government
would be hard pressed to unify Zaire or halt the social
and economic decay. `, peaceful transition of power is
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Mobutu's supporters-including the United States---
are criticized from two different sides: Zairian
dissidents blame the West for propping up a govern-
ment that is almost universally regarded as repressive
and hopelessly corrupt, and Mobutu himself criticizes
the West for not supporting him completely and for
encouraging his opposition. If Mobutu's position con-
tinues to deteriorate, his behavior in similar instances
in the past would lead one to expect him to search for
scapegoats inside Zaire and to lash out even more
vociferously at his traditional foreign supporters,
accusing them of "abandoning" him. Mobutu prob-
ably is already suspicious of US intentions regarding
Zaire and may believe that Washington supports some
of his opposition. The Zairian President could also
react harshly against the United States when he learns
that the meeting of Zaire's donors that he expected to
be held this month was never even scheduled.
The President's practice of filling key government
positions with individuals from minor ethnic groups
means that there are very few individuals in positions
of power who could command broad support. If
Mobutu left the scene, there are several potential
leaders in exile who would probably return. But it is
questionable whether any could effectively bring order
out of chaos. Likewise, there are no potential leaders in
the country who, either individually or in concert with
the exiles, pose a viable alternative to Mobutu
Despite the lack of an apparent replacement for
Mobutu, his long-term prospects for survival are worse
now than at any time during his rule. In the short to
medium term, Zaire's prospects for stability are dim---
with or without Mobutu. Without him, the Zairian
military would probably play an influential role in the
establishment of a new government. With the
exception of the FNLC, most of the opposition to
Mobutu apparently is nonideological. Although a
succeeding government might wish to be less closely
tied to the West, Zaire's new leaders would probably
continue to look to the country's traditional supporters
as their primary allies.
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