SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000100110008-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 1, 1972
• Content Type: PERRPT

Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80T01719R000 0110008-4
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WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS
Week Ending2oMay 1972
NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
For the President Only
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100110008-4
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100110008-4
SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS
1968-1972
Weekly average for each month
500 -
400
300
200,
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1200 1200
1000 1000
800 -'' 800
100%
80
60
as measured by the percentage of
enemy killed by GVN forces re-
mained at 99%, the same level as
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
FEBRUARY 1972 MAY 1972
Weekly data as reported
US BATTLE DEATHS decreased to 8 from last week's
February March Aprrl, May 13.
5 12 19 26
AJiIIIIIIIIA
4 11 18 25
680
b~ucrry March:
8,445
ESE BATTLE DEATHS increased to 504 from the 492 of
Moy , last week. The official total will
change as late reports are received
and will be lower than the figures
released to the press by the GVN.
include two regular, one "gap-fill,"
and 22 special purpose groups
totaling 1,615 personnel. The esti-
mate of infiltrators destined for
Cambodia-South Vietnam since
1 October 1971 is now some
115,800-117,800.
ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS dropped to 482 from the 874 of
February Mar It April May last week.
5 12 19 26 4' 11 18 25. 1 8 15 22 29
6,584
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000100110008-4
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100110008-4
Enemy Activity
The North Vietnamese offensive made no significant headway
during the week, although the Communists remained active in all
four Military Regions of South Vietnam. The enemy continued his
preparations for attacks against'Hue in the north and Kontum in
the central highlands, and he maintained his pressure -- though
at somewhat diminished levels -- on An Loc in MR 3. Action also
picked up in the western part of the Delta as the North Vietnamese
attempted to move more troops from Cambodia into Kien Giang
Province. South Vietnamese counterattacks and defensive efforts,
coupled with effective artillery and air support, have inflicted
substantial casualties on the enemy and appear to have disrupted
his timetable in all major battle areas. In the area north of
Hue, the enemy's attacks of the past few days have at least in
part been efforts to preempt planned ARVN counterthrusts, rather
than the beginning of an all-out attack on that city. Neverthe-
less, further large-scale Communist attacks are possible at any
time in each Military Region, although the particularly heavy
losses which the enemy has suffered around An Loc suggest that
his offensive in this area may have passed its peak.
in Cambodia, enemy activity was light throughout the week.
The Communists continued their month-old campaign to extend their
control over the southeastern border area in order to secure in-
filtration corridors into the Delta of South Vietnam. Enemy
logistics movements into this area have increased, and as noted
above, some elements of the Phuoc Long Front have already moved
across into South Vietnam. In northwest Cambodia, government
forces have made some additional progress in their four-month-
old clearing operation around the Angkor Wat Temple complex.
FANK units in the area have been augmented and ordered to retake
the ruins at "all costs." Enemy forces around Angkor Wat are
relatively weak, and Lon Nol clearly wishes to gain a military
success here which could be publicized before the Cambodian presi-
dential election scheduled for 4 June.
In Taos, only light contacts occurred near Long Tieng as
friendly forces consolidated their positions in the Sam Thong
area. To the south in the Lao Panhandle, friendly forces were
unsuccessful in their initial attempts to clear the Dong Hene
area and to retake Khong Sedone, which the enemy had captured at
midweek. In the far northwest, analysis of recent photography
indicates that all of the Chinese Communist built road network
was in good condition as of late April, with the road leading
toward Thailand motorable to within three kilometers of the
Mekong.
Enemy Infiltration and Logistics
The acceptance of 1,615 NVA personnel during the week brings
the estimate of infiltrators destined for Cambodia and South
Vietnam since 1 October 1971 to some 115,800 - 11.7,800. In addi-
tion to personnel in the infiltration pipeline, it now appears
that the remaining elements of the 325th NVA Division may be pre-
paring to move across the DMZ to join one of the Division's regi-
ments which had already moved into Quang Tri Province. The move-
ment of most of the 312th NVA Division from north Laos back into
North Vietnam suggests that this unit will replace the 325th as
North Vietnam's strategic reserve, allowing the deployment of the
latter to the south.
The North Vietnamese are continuing to ship substantial
volumes of supplies southward to the battlefronts. A heavy flow
of material has been noted moving through the DMZ, from Laos into
MR 1 and the central highlands, and through Cambodia toward COSVN's
areas of operations. At the same time, the Communists are appar-
ently maintaining substantial stockpiles in rear areas of Laos,
Cambodia, and South Vietnam. To handle this flow, the North
Vietnamese have continued to relocate and reorganize major
logistics authorities as well as to prepare for operations into
the rainy season.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000100110008-4
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100110008-4
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000100110008-4