Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79R01012A001500020027-3
Body:
Approved For Relea~2000/09/11 :CIA-RDP79R010101500020027-3
^+~ius? Y ??
?~~~ Z~~C~N ~77~1?~~
CO IDENTI$L
CFNTN~,L ]CI~TE~~,IGEP~CE ACENCX
10 March 1952
~U~~'P; NTE~~9s SW~.~1QS FO~IfiTON 1IV THE E~~3'~YdE~T C4F~'I.TC`r
'TFIE I~if?ffi,F~
To aasesas (~} ~taeden~~ atrate~ic iXn~artance$ (b) its pac??~
cent po~.icy in the EastdWc~st conflict; (c} they ,poaeibiliti?a cf ~
chafe in this ~calicy; and (d} the conse~uea~cec of ~wed?n?s posi=.
t3.on to the ETC po~rersl axed the C~~R~
CC~1VGi~T~ION~
l~ ~~fedon~e laication~ natural and in~a~trial rmcourc~sa,~ grad
e~nciderable m#^1~.tax~ patenti~. ~i~e it rnabe~~nt~.al s~trate~ic
~rta.nce to both A~A.T~3 and thc~ i~~SRo Cf chief i~-~rtancea i~ ~red~:n~~
~tcnti~.l a?ole in the defPnee of Sc~.nc3inav~..~.~, ~articuiar7y ~To~~>
aAr~~?e?v~er~ ~.te ~osition~ ~Yaich flake tkz~r F3~.tic anc~ 1~orth Cer~~~
e~u~.d be v~:~.u~.bl.e either to the Ue~e~R or tl~ag T4~ ~o~ez^~r for air bacee
.rl~r *~~,rr?in~ ~'ac~.~.it~.ec~, and otkaer ~%litary ir~ta~;~.~tior~n
DOLU1/ENT NO. __
NO CliAN(~E IN ~LA85. t ---~_~--__.__
__ a ?~-~ ~~' s=- Cl Dcri;LA;iSti'IED
CONI'IDENTIA CLAS:i. CI-IANGED TO: TS s
NEXT REVIEW DATE; ~9 ~r
AUTH: 70.2
Approved For Release 2000/09/11 :CIA-RDP7~~'Fi~4~-'F~0~3~56
Approved For R Lease 2000/09/11 :CIA-RDP79RQ1~12A001500020027-3
CONP'IDENTTAL
~~ Tae St~edish armed fare?e are at presen~? c~~hle any off'
fi~~hf~#.r,~ delay actians against a mayor Soviet a4tack~ tax the
ath?~r ~taxad~ 5u*ed~n s a a3xeac~ sizeable mi.3.itax~ patential anc~ re~
sciuxaes provide the base far a r~r~Ced ~io~i in Yr~~d3.sh rni,.i~
frame pabiliti e.~ ~ perhap?~ ico the paint r~herep in eaorc3inatian ~ti.th
the f.TQ Northerta Qommand forces9 they coup. successflally aiefex~td
:urge areas oiC Scand~.navia~
~? respite itt~ gro~~Teste~ anc~ a.~timCan~.st outloak~
Ss~eden w3.11 a3.a~st oexNtain~ elix~ to i'~s roa1.~.i.ance~f'~eero polite as
long a.s ~xsssibl.s~ ?~van in event of warms
~o In the. gwent of a Soviet move against ~'iz'i].r~ndA Sc~eder~
~ulcl vest' likely a~lax?ge xts own defense preps.x~ations~ n~..~;ht enter
into e~plor~,tory ~Lt~sry conv~csatic~ns with. tie 3destp and wau~.d re-~
e~-ra~.ne its nix*wa~':3.~l.~.t~, palicy~ Ncawa~Yer~ only ~.~ St~~;den weave c~aetvinaesi
,t the Soviet move fnto ~'iralasad was merely a spring~ard for an.
early i~vss3.on cf Sweden or sXora~y9 would it probably ~+nter ~.nto
limited defense arra~ements ~ri'~h thQ 'J~esto
50 ~io~aever, 5wed~ Might ~oia~ the ~'0 powers in the etr~t of
a Soviet attack an l~or~ if' the Sr~edes traaugktt tha.?C ~iA.'FQ wa~a
~pable of cs~tenr~.x~ imm?~diate l.arge~sssa~.e ~+ssis#.zaz+~ao ~tora~ave~A
aweden wauld certainty fight if attack~ad~
Approved For Release 2000/~~~~1a9c~?P79R01012A001500020027-3
,Approved For Reese 2000/09/11 :CIA-RDP79R0'~0 2A001500020027-3
,CONFIDENTIAL
&~ 'rhe chief unfavorable canr~ec~,ence to the West of Swede~t~a
^all.ianaex~*~
s~au~.d feel ~o:~~-~-11eci bs ~rv3.et pr~es~ure to px~te~st xnc9~?e ~;trot~;~~ awl
t~~n~~x~~ ta~t~ ~~re a~tivc~ mra.~ux?+~s a~ain~'t t~e~at~ern ove~"~'~.i~r~t~ ~. F~.~.
t!~~ oa;~a,? tt~ie ~t~eci~.~h .r~3.z? foar+ce wau~.d be unl~.ltely to ~.x~~ry out. it
~?~,~~:~.oe ttae more ~tz^t m~eaa~ares c~rd~:z"ed by the ~av~rr.~.:~ent, ,!."~~~".~~~
"~~; ~f~~SI~U~1~.~:i ~~" a4~I~7~''v a~~.51~'T~J~ `~.'v fit; N~T~~ ~~ A1~i:
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