SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION IN NORTH KOREA (REFERENCE TITLE:(Classified)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000600060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 5, 1961
• Content Type: STUDY

SECRET
Sanitized wArpproved For Release : CIA-RD9 S02 Aq~6,90060001-7
5 April 1961
OCI No. 1190/61
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF. STUDY
SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION IN NORTH KOREA
25X1A
(Reference Title:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
Sanitized - Approved Fo0r Nne : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDP'? S00427A000600060001-7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
S INO-SOVIET COMPETITION IN NORTH KOREA
This is a working paper, the first of a series examining
Soviet and Chinese relationships with other components of the
world Communist movement.
Because the November 1960 conference of the Communist
parties resolved few if any of the important disagreements
between the two principal parties of the movement, because
a significant number of important parties (both bloc and
non-bloc) supported the Chinese in varying degrees in the
Moscow discussions, and because the procedures set forth in
the 6 December declaration for the conduct of the world Com-
munist movement would seem actually to encourage "polycentrism"
in the movement, it strikes uc as worth while to try to
assess Peiping's potential as a competing center. We hope
in these papers, inter alia, to assess the possible conse-
quences of attraction to Peiping--by parties and elements
of parties--for the policies of the parties: e.g., whether
a bloc party may decide to organize communes, or a non-bloc
party may be encouraged to try to overthrow a bourgeois
25X1A nationalist government by violence.
We are grateful to other analysts of OCI--in particular
25X1A to of China Division--and
of the Current Support Staff of ORR for
comment on this a er. We would welcome further comment--
addressed to who wrote the paper, or to the
acting coordinator of the Sino-Soviet Studies Group.
25X1A
Sanitized - Approved For, iq': CIA-RDP79S00427A000600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized 44pproved For Release : CIA-RDIWS00427A000600060001-7
Victimized by its strategic location throughout history,
North Korea appears once again to be the scene of competition
for dominant influence between its powerful neighbors. Devel-
opments during the past three years indicate that the issues
involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute have exercised.a profound
effect on the Democratic People?s Republic of Korea.. As a
contiguous Asian country confronted by similar problems in
both domestic and foreign policy, North Korea has constituted
a prime target in Peiping's drive to win acceptance of its
more radical approach to the domestic construction of Commu-
nism and its more militant approach to international Communist
strategy.
The appearance of Communist China's commune and "leap
forward",programs in the summer of 1958 injected an. element
of discord into Sino-Soviet-North Korean relations which per-
sists to the present day. Attracted by the Chinese preten-
sion to have discovered a special road for Asian countries
leading to the early achievement of socialism and Communism,
the Pyongyang regime embraced a whole series of Chinese Com-
munist policies and programs in the summer and fall of 1958,
even to the point of flirting with the heretical commune or-
ganization.
Imitation of the Chinese example began in June when it
was decided to launch a mass movement for construction of
small industrial installations combining "native and modern"
technology. A far more significant step was taken at a
September central committee plenum which inaugurated North
Korea's "flying horse" program of economic development and
the simultaneous amalgamation of some 13,000 collective farms
into 3,800 political-economic units of township size. In
a major policy speech of 20 November, Kim Il-sung revealed
the extent to which these programs had been inspired by the
Chinese Communist model,
First, Kim disclosed that the rationale, scope and ob-
jectives of Pyongyang's "flying horse" program were nearly
identical with those of China's "great leap forward." Even
more suggestive of Chinese influence was the clear implica-
tion that North Korea was incorporating salient features of
Communist China's commune program into its own reorganization
Sanitized - Approved Fc, Te : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized Approved For Release : CIA-RD''9SO0427A000600060001-7
of rural society, including the commune system of distribution
featuring the "free supply" of commodities determined "accord-
ing to need." In a subsequent address, the North Korean leader
appeared to endorse Peiping's claim that China constituted a
model for the underdeveloped nations of Asia.
In the face of obvious Soviet displeasure with its defec-
tion, Pyongyang then appeared to abandon its plan to emulate
Peiping by "advancing to socialism and Communism with flying
leaps." On the occasion of Communist China's tenth anniversary
celebration in October 1959, however, Kim Il-sung once more
spoke out vigorously in defense of Mao Tse-tung's unorthodox
programs. The North Korean leader's declaration of support,
in conjunction with the East German delegate's even more candid
acknowledgment of China as the model for Asia, posed anew the
threat of an emerging Asian bloc of Communist nations looking
to Peiping for inspiration and guidance.
Following his abortive October conference with Mao in
Peiping, Khrushchev apparently decided to resort to more force-
ful measures designed to pressure Communist China and its bloc
supporters back into line. North Korea's participation in an
unprecedented top-level bloc conference on agriculture in Mos-
cow, which almost certainly leveled criticism at China's com-
munes, was an indication of continued susceptibility to Soviet
pressures and, perhaps, of growing disenchantment with Chinese
programs as a solution to its own agricultural problems. Ap-
and at the subse-
parently reacting to pressures applied here
quest Bucharest Conference, Pyongyang studiously ignored
existence of China's communes throughout 1960.
In part responding to this development and in part pre-
paring for the impending summit conference in Moscow, Peiping
began to exert a number of countervailing pressures in order
to maintain its position in North Korea. Caught in this cross-
fire, North Korea's attitude towards Communist China's dis-
tinctive program of socialist and Communist construction dis-
played marked ambiguity. By increasingly stressing "the in-
dividuality of North Korea's revolution," it appeared that
Pyongyang aspired to a position of neutrality in the deepen-
ing Sino-Soviet controversy over the "correct" road to social-
ism and Communism on the eve of the Moscow Conference in
November 1960.
Sanitized - Approved FoiS &&W : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized approved For Release : CIA-RDt 9S00427A000600060001-7
The Sino-Soviet dispute on international Communist strategy
has entailed equally disturbing consequences for the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea. A number of developments in the
spring of 1960 appeared to cast serious doubt on the efficacy
of Khrushchev's detente policy and to lend substance to Pei-
ping's view of a rising tide of revolution in Asia. The North
Korean response to these developments revealed grave apprehen-
sion over the growing rift in Sino-Soviet relations and a con-
sequent desire to remain neutral, and, at the same time, a
continuing predilection for Peiping's more militant line in ap-
proaching its own number one foreign policy objective--the uni-
fication of Korea under Communist rule.
The dominant tone of Kim Il-sung's important Liberation
Day Speech of 15 August 1960, which launched a new propaganda
drive for the "peaceful unification" of Korea, was one of
struggle and militant appeals for direct revolutionary action
in South Korea. Communist China's high-ranking military mis-
sion to North Korea in October reiterated a number of Chinese
positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy, stressed
the parallel between South Korea and Taiwan, and asserted a
special relationship between China and Korea which appeared
directed as much at the Soviet Union as-at the West. The up-
shot of this new initiative was to swing Pyongyang even more
solidly into line behind Peiping on two key issues of the Sino-
Soviet dispute.
On the eve of the Moscow summit conference in November
1960, North Korea appeared to be following the lead of Com-
munist China in opposing Khrushchev's policy of relaxing in-
ternational tensions. What is more, the considerations prompt-
ing this decision appeared to be strikingly similar to those
animating Peiping. As a country with unsatisfied territorial
claims, it could only view friendlier relations with the West
as tending to freeze the status quo. As a have-not nation
determined to industrialize at maximum speed, it favored ex-
ternal tension as a justification for sacrifice and a goad
for production. And as one of the satellites plagued by fac-
tionalism and purges, it appeared firmly committed to the pre-
Khrushchev model of Stalinist totalitarianism.
Developments at the Moscow Conference and after tend to
confirm the existence of strong ideological bonds between
Peiping and Pyongyang. Fragmentary reports on the proceed-
ings of this conference indicate that North Korea provided
Sanitized - Approved For M TCIA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized - approved For Release : CIA-RDPSO0427A000600060001-7
valuable support to Communist China on a number of issues in
the Sino-Soviet disputes The credibility of these reports
is enhanced by subsequent North Korean editorial comment on
the hybrid documents issued by the Moscow Conference, coMs,?-
mentary which has slighted Soviet-inspired passages for those
expressing the more militant Chinese line. In view of these
pronouncement,it was not surprising that Peiping featured
North Korean commentary on the Moscow Conference above that
of any other nation in the bloc.
Equally revealing have been North Korea's pointed declara-
tions of friendship and support for Albania, the East European
satellite which has consistently backed Communist China in the
Sino-Soviet conflict and which, accordingly, has aroused Soviet
ire. Most important of all, North Korea has explicitly recog-
nized Communist China as co-leader of the Communist bloc fol-
lowing the Moscow Conferences Bgr referring to "the socialist
countries led by the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's
Republic," a 12 December editorial in the official organ of
the Korean Workers Party appeared to be announcing the arrival
of a new stage in infra-bloc relations. In view of its pre-
vious record of sympathy and support for Communist China,.'it
was f itting thit N.4,rth Xore?a ;.;shoul,d. reir.ea.I. 'w 'a:t. was ?. pe.xha.p. ;
the mn t" ignifidant.;;re.su.lt csf:~the.:.MoscO i ConfereflCe t:he .
&mergenc' ' of '1polyeeiitrist1 as, a realit-y.'-WLt'hiriithe in.t.er.-
n.ational. Communist movement.
Sanitized - Approved For ReIS RI'A-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 Sanitized - Approved For SECRET: CIA-RDP79S00427A000600060001-7
Particularly the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's
Republic are not only our great brother countries but
also our closest neighbors. The firm unity with the
peoples of the two countries is an important guarantee
for all victories of our people. --KIM IL-SUNG, 15
August 1960
Victimized by its strategic location throughout history,
North Korea appears once again to be the scene of competition
for dominant influence between its powerful neighbors. As this
recent statement by Chairman Kim II-sung suggests,
the
Commu-
nist regime in North Korea was apprehensive about
the
mounting
crisis in Sino-Soviet relations in the summer and
fall
of
1960.
What it did not reveal is that the issues involved
in
the
Sino-
Soviet dispute had already exercised a profound effect
on
the
domestic and foreign policies of this Asian satellite
for
a
period of several years.*
Broadly speaking, the Sino-Soviet rift has emerged as the
result of two fundamental attacks launched by Communist China
against the traditional position of Moscow as the undisputed
leader and arbiter of doctrine within the Communist bloc. The
first challenge, the appearance of Communist China's commune
and "leap forward" programs in the fall of 1958, provided a
distinctive Chinese road to socialism and Communism which di-
verged sharply from Soviet precedent and experience. The second
challenge took the form of a vigorous attack against Khrushchev's
"peaceful coexistence" strategy for leading the bloc and inter-
national Communism to a final global victory. Both challenges
were accompanied by the implicit claim that Mao Tse-tung, as
the foremost living Marxist-Leninist theoretician, was uniquely
qualified to provide ideological and policy guidance to the
world Communist movement. They were also accompanied by the
*Ali ough this article focuses on developments since 1958,
it is reasonable to assume that Sino-Soviet friction over North
Korea dates back at least as far as the Korean War. Limitations
of space as well as lack of data preclude treatment of this
earlier period.
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized .. pproved For Release : CIA-RDFW9SO0427A000600060001-7
only slightly less grandiose pretension that Communist China
was uniquely qualified to lead "the countries of the East"
and, by extension, all the underdeveloped areas of the world,
to socialism and Communism. As a backward Asian country and,
what is more, a vital buffer area along China's northeastern
frontier, North Korea has constituted a prime target in Pei-
ping's drive to win acceptance of its more radical approach
to the domestic construction of Communism and its more mili-
tant approach to international Communist strategy.
Domestic Construction of Communism
The appearance of Communist China's commune and "leap
forward" programs in the summer of 1958 introduced a new
element of discord into Sino-Soviet-North Korean relations
which persists to the present day. Conceived as the instru-
ment for achieving rapid economic and social development
leading to the early advent of the Communist society, the
commune epitomized a distinctive Chinese road to socialism
and Communism with special applicability to the underdeveloped
nations of Asia.
The main outlines of the Chinese ideological challenge
were present in a 16 July Red Flag article entitled "Under the
Banner of Chairman Mao." It wash ere that Mao Tse-tung was
credited with discovering in the commune and "leap forward"
programs a special road enabling China to accelerate social-
ist construction and to realize Communism "in the not distant
future." Moreover, he had done this in accordance-with Le-
nin's injunction to "the Communists of Eastern countries" to
"creatively develop" Marxist theory "in the light of special
conditions unknown to the European countries... realizing that
the peasants are the principal masses." The implication was
strong that Mao had solved the special problems of socialist
and Communist construction which confronted all Asian countries.
Communist China's "special conditions," which have been
summed up by Chairman Mao in the phrase "poor and blank," are
usually identified as an impoverished agrarian economy, a
shortage of arable land relative to population, and cultural
backwardness resulting from past imperialist oppression. In
the Chinese view, a program calling for total mobilization of
all available resources was necessary in order to break through
Sanitized - Approved For FM TCIA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 Sanitized - A roved ForMOU CIA-RDP O0427A000600060001-7
these barriers to industrialization and modernization. As the
radical social organization designed to implement this program,
the commune was expected to perform the following economic
functions: centralization of control over all means of produc-
tion in the countryside as a first step toward "all-people
ownership" (i.e. state ownership); mobilization of the peasants
to implement a "mass line" of industrial development featuring
the "native" production of iron and steel; extension of more
effective controls over peasant consumption through the commune
mess hall and the "free supply" system of distribution (hailed
as the beginning of the Communist system of distribution "ac-
cording to need"); and intensive exploitation of human labor
to a degree unknown in modern history. In addition, the com-
mune was expected to perform various ideological functions which
were to play an equally indispensable role in China's leap to
modernization. The very term "commune" connoted--intentional-
ly so--an advanced status on the road to Communism. Pleading
special conditions, the Chinese Communists undertook to substi-
tute moral and psychological incentives--the early attainment
of Communism--for material incentives as the major stimulus
for production. The claim of priority in the march to Commu-
nism was stated explicitly: "Tomorrow we shall build a paradise
of happiness never before attempted in history--Communism.*
Communist China's pretension to have discovered a special
road for Asian countries leading to the early achievement of
socialism and Communism evoked an enthusiastic response in North
Korea. Deviating from its traditional role as a docile Soviet
satellite, the Pyongyang regime embraced a whole series of
Chinese Communist policies and programs in the summer and fall
of 1958, even to the point of flirting with the heretical com-
mune organization.
Imitation of the Chinese example began in June at a Kore-
an Workers Party plenums At that time it was decided to launch
a mass movement for construction of small industrial installa-
tions combining "native and modern" technology--a movement
which followed closely, both in time and content, Communist
China's "mass line" of local industrialization. Even the
25X1A
or an extend discussion of this first ideological
challenge to Moscow, see "The Commune, The
'Great Leap Forward', and Sino-Soviet Relations."
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Re ease : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 Sanitized - Approved For R~a~ef IA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
propaganda slogans were the same, including exhortations to
rely on the "activism and creativeness" of the masses in a
campaign of "all the people operating industry," The next
and far more significant step was taken at a September cen-
tral committee plenum which inaugurated North Korea's "fly-
ing horse" program of economic development and the simulta-
neous amalgamation of some 13,000 collective farms into 3,-
800-political-economic units of township size. In a major
policy speech of 20 November, Kim I1-sung revealed the ex-
tent to which these programs had been inspired by the Chinese
Communist model.
First, Kim referred to his people as "poor and uncul-
tured" (calling to mind Mao Tse-tung's characterization of
China as "poor and blank") and, as such, compelled to engage
in a "bitter struggle" for a "leap forward" in economic de-
velopment which would permit .,catching up" with the more ad-
vanced socialist countries of Europe. As a capsule state-
ment of the rationale of Communist China's "great leap for-
ward" program, this could hardly be improved upon. Next,
Kim advanced claims for North Korea's "flying horse" program
of economic development which bore a striking resemblance
to the "leap forward" pretensions in Communist China, Pyong-
yang had already "solved" the food problems and "within two
to three years"--the same time period featured in Chinese
propaganda--food was to become "extremely abundant." An ac-
celerated program of agricultural development based on mo-
bilizing the peasants and a similarly spectacular develop-
ment of industry would lead to completion of the stage of
socialist construction and initiation of the "transition to
Communism" within four to five years.
Even more suggestive of Chinese influence was the clear
implication that North Korea was incorporating salient fea-
tures of Communist China's commune program into its own re-
organization of rural society. Kim placed heavy em4hasis
on moral, rather than material, incentives as the stimulus
for production, holding forth as the reward for "bitter
struggle" the realization of Communism "in the not distant
future." He disclosed that North Korea was contemplating
establishing "comprehensive, Communist, all-people ownership"
(i.e. state ownership) in the countryside, another basic
characteristic of China's commune. Even more striking, he
revealed that Pyongyang was considering introducing the com-
mune system of distribution featuring the "free supply" of
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 Sanitized - Approved For ReISM A-RDP79SO0427AO00600060001-7
commodities determined "according to need." Kim made this
point in the form of a conversation with a peasant woman
during a visit to an agricultural cooperative.
When I asked her how she would like it if all
textile products, rice and everything else were sup-
plied free
of
charge; if the peasants were placed
under the
same
wage system as the workers; and we
proceeded
thus
in the direction of practicing the
Communist
principle of distribution along with the
socialist
principle of distribution at the same
time; she replied that that sounded simply wonder-
ful
The very same cooperative visited by Kim had already estab-
lished, according to a 28 November People's Daily article,;
most of the collective livelihood institutions of China's
communes, including public mess halls, nurseries, kinder-
gartens and sewing teams.
Immediately after this remarkable speech, Kim 11-sung
spent three weeks in an extended tour of Communist China.
The rectipient,:of signal honors and popular demonstrations
throughout his visit, the North Korean leader responded with
an enthusiastic endorsement of Communist China's unorthodox
programs which by now were, to a significant extent, those
of his own country. Asserting that "the two countries of
Korea and China ...are advancing to socialism and Communism
with flying leaps," he made the following laudatory appraisal
of China's communes.
We are very much interested in the communiza-
tion movement.... As a result of setting up public
mess halls, nurseries, etc., you have achieving col-
lectivization not only of production but also of
livelihood; this means that ...you have advanced a
step towards Communism.... We will certainly pass
on to our peasants the great results you have achiev-
ed from your commune movement. Also we will strive
hereafter0.0to strengthen our mutual cooperation in
building socialism and Communism.
Kim's endorsement of the Chinese model was made_even.moreex-
plicit in a 10 December speech after returning to North Ko-
rea, when he hailed the Chinese programs as "an example of
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized -improved For Release : CIA-RDPPJS00427A000600060001-7
the creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the realities
of their country and a particularly good example for social
ist revolution and construction in countries which were back-
ward and under colonial oppression in the past." Emphasis
added)
It is important to assess the significance of this de-
velopment--the Chinese initiative and the North Korean re-
sponse--as viewed from Moscow. Whereas the argument of
"special conditions" had been advanced earlier to justify
the deviation of "national roads" to socialism (e.g. Poland),
it was now being advanced to justify a separate and distinct
road (what is more, a short cut) to both socialism and Com-
munism for the entire continetat_ tif.'Agia-:or even, by extension,
for all underdeveloped areas of the world. By implicitly
denying the validity of the Soviet model for the special
problems of economic and social development in Asia, the
Chinese were in effect staking a claim for hegemony over Asian
Communism, and the North Koreans, by acknowledging a Chinese
prototype for the underdeveloped areas, appeared to have recog-
nized this claim.
The Soviet reaction revealed a thorough appreciation of
the fundamental nature of Peiping's challenge. In rapid suc-
cession, the Russian leadership attacked China's. premature
attempt to introduce distribution "according to need" as "un-
workable" and as "discrediting Communism;" the Chinese under-
taking through the commune to move rapidly to "Fall people
ownership" as a violation of "economic laws;" and the Chinese
pretension to be in the vanguard in the march to Communism as
a vulgar manifestation of "equalitarian Communism. ?' By an-
nouncing Russia's own accelerated program of Communist con-
struction featuring a highly developed "material and technical
base" and by stressing that rapid progress of the "economi-
cally backward countries" was dependent on Soviet aid, it was
made quite clear that the Soviet Union intended to determine
the pace and order of bloc progress to Communism and that Khru-
shchev, not Mao Tse-tung, would solve the "problems of Marxist-
Leninist theory connected with the transition from socialism to
Communism."
Soviet denial of the Chinese claim to have discovered a
special road for Asian Communism was sharp and unmistakable.
The strategy was first to stress the "general laws" of Marx-
ism-Leninism which have universal application and then to as-
sert the validity of the Soviet model, as the embodiment of
Sanitized - Approved For FOB@M7CIA-RDP79SO0427AO00600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized *approved For Release : CIA-RD1?99500427A000600060001-7
these laws, for both Europe and Asia. In a 6 November speech
in Peiping commemorating the October Revolution, Soviet Am-
bassador Yudin emphasized that both "Europe and Asia," in ac-
cordAnce with Lenin's prediction, "must sooner or later" fol-
low the "correct" Soviet road. The Draft Theses of Khrushchev's
Report to the 21st Party Congress were even more explicit
V. I. Lenin foresaw that the Soviet Union would
exert chief influence on the entire course of world
development by its economic construction. Lenin
said: "If Russia becomes covered with a dense net-
work of electric stations and powerful technical
equipment, our Communist economic construction will
become a model for the future socialist Europe and
Asia. (Emphasis added)
Although the Soviet counteroffensive was directed pri-
marily at Communist China, many of its strictures applied to
North Korea as well. In the face of obvious Soviet displeas-
ure with its defection, the North Korean regime appeared to
abandon precipitately its plan to emulate Peiping by "advanc-
ing to socialism and Communism with flying leaps." At the
Soviet 21st Party Congress in late January 1959, Kim Il-sung
pointedly described his country as proceeding "along the road
to socialism',', with "the rich experiences accumultLted by the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people al-
ways serving as a guide in all our work." At the same time,
the North Korean regime continued to imitate Peiping's "great
leap forward" by claiming "miraculous successes" in produc-
tion and by adhering to hopelessly unrealistic long-term goals.
As late as mid-August 1959, Deputy Premier Kim I1-still spoke
of doubling grain output and either tripling or quadrupling
industrial output by 1964-650
Responding to a new Chinese initiative in the fall of
1959, the North Korean regime once more spoke out vigorously
in defense of Communist China's unorthodox programs. After
a period of relative moderation and retrenchment, Communist
China's leadership had launched a spirited counterattack
against Soviet criticism of the commune and had reiterated
the claim that China constituted a model for the underdevel-
oped nations of Asia. In articles celebrating Communist
China's tenth anniversary on 1 October 1959, Foreign Minister
Chen I asserted that "all oppressed nations and peoples...
see in the Chinese people their tomorrow", and party secretary-
Sanitized - Approved For R6f?EILIA-RDP79S00427A000600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized - Appwved For Release : CIA-RDP79 427A000600060001-7
general Teng Hsiao-ping declared China's experience in "rap-
idly getting rid of poverty and backwardness" to be "an ex-
ample of going over from democratic revolution to socialist
revolution in a colonial and semi-colonial country and of
transforming a backward agricultural country into an advanc-
ed industrial country." Emphasis added)
In marked contrast with the Soviet and most East Europe-
an-.delegations attending this anniversary celebration, Kim
Il-sung predicted "new and greater achievements in the great
leap forward and people's commune movements;" hailed them by
implication as "a great contribution to further developing
Marxist-Leninist theory and enriching the experience of the
international Communist movement;" declared that his country-
men "always learn from your achievements;" and asserted that
"no force can break 00.the friendship of the Korean and Chinese
peoples based on common ideas and aims," This declaration,
in conjunction with.the-even more candid acknowledgment of
the Chinese model by East German delegate Herman Matern (who
hailed the commune "as an example ...for the millions of Asian
peasant masses"), posed anew the threat of an emerging Asian
bloc of Communist nations looking to Peiping for inspiration
and guidance.
Following his abortive October conference with Mao Tse-
tung in Peiping, Khrushchev apparently decided to resort to
more forceful measures designed to pressure Communist China
and its bloc supporters back into line. As noted subsequent-
ly in an official Chinese party letter, the Soviet leader
publicly attacked China's foreign and domestic policies on
four separate occasions in the fall of 1959? On 1 December,
for example, he launched a polemical, if oblique, attack on
China's commune and "leap forward" programs in addressing
the Hungarian party congress, characterizing them as a "dis-
tortion of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism on the building
of ssocialism and Communism" resulting from "conceit , 0 o and
mistakes in leadership..." This public criticism was fol-
lowed almost immediately by a North Korean decision to halt
temporarily its own "flying horse" program, with 1960 desig-
nated a "buffer year" in order to correct deficiencies in
agriculture and provide a much needed breathing spell in its
economic development programs
Another Soviet countermeasure was the convocation in
Moscow in early February 1960 of an unprecedented top-level
Sanitized - Approved For Rel RZ1A-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized - App oved For Release : CIA-RDP79960427A000600060001-7
bloc conference on agriculture. North Korea's participation
in this conference, which almost certainly leveled criticism
at China's communes, was an indication of continued suscepti-
bility to Soviet pressures and, perhaps, of growing disen-
chantment with Chinese programs as a solution to its own agri-
cultural problems.* The absence of China and North Vietnam,
usually regarded as oriented to Peiping, and the fact thatza
speech delivered by Khrushchev on this occasion has never been
released suggest that this was the first of a series of multi-
lateral conferences convened by the Russian leader in 1960 for
the purpose of "isolating" Peiping within the ranks of the in-
ternational-:Communist movement.
The pressures exerted in February were redoubled at the
now famous Bucharest meeting of world Communist parties in
June. According to reliable accounts of the proceedings of
this conference, Khrushchev subjected China's domestic pro-
grams to a sweeping indictment. After citing Peiping's "con-
tempt for material things," the Soviet leader attacked the
the mass iron and steel campaign as a
communes as a: fake,,
mistake, and the "great leap forward" policy as indefensible
in both theory and practice. Voicing an even more serious
objection, Khrushchev accused the Chinese of "wanting to force
their concepts on others."
Apparently reacting to the pressures applied at these
conferences, North Korea proved to be an early casualty,
among those who had defended Peiping's heretical programs.
In marked contrast to previous laudatory appraisals, North
Korean commentary throughout 1960 studiously ignored the
existence of China's communes. A striking example of this
new subservience to Moscow appeared in Kim Il-sung's message
of greetings in observance of China's eleventh anniversary
celebration on 1 October. Whereas a year earlier he had
proclaimed the vitality and creativity of this radical social
organization, the North Korean leader now felt constrained
*Attracted by Communist China's claim to have doubled
grain production in 1958 by means of a revolutionary high-
yield agricultural technology, the North Korean regime had
followed Peiping's lead by reducing planted grain acreage
in 1959. Instead of the anticipated increase of 35 percent,
however, grain output in that year dropped nearly 10 per-
cent.
Sanitized - Approved For Rel 22R IA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 Sanitized - AppWved For Relea e TIA-RDP79W0427A000600060001-7
to enter into the Soviet-sponsored conspiracy of silence by
ignoring the people's commune in his congratulatory message.
In part responding to this development and in part pre-
paring for the impending summit conference in Moscow, Pei-
ping began to exert a number of countervailing pressures in
October 1960 in order to maintain its position in North Ko-
rea. First was the grant of a loan of 105 million dollars
to finance deliveries of equipment and technical assistance
for industrial development. With this new credit, Communist
China's total assistance to Pyongyang since the end of the
Korean War now exceeded that of the USSR. Coming at a time
of stringency in China's own economic development program
and of similar sizable loans to Outer Mongolia and North
Vietnam, this extension of aid indicated a new effort to
compete with the Soviet Union for influence *..ith.:the , Asian
members of the bloc.
Next was the dispatch of a high-ranking military good-
will mission to North Korea in late October for a joint
celebration of the tenth anniversary of China's entry into
the Korean ware Politburo member and chief of mission Ho
Lung utilized this occasion to attack the "'modern revision-
ists" (an epithet directed at Moscow at this stage of heated
polemics in the Sino-Soviet dispute) for their "bitter envy
and hatred of our country's construction achievements,"
their "vain attempt to isolate China" and, more pointedly,
their "vain attempt to sabotage- the ,the friendship and unity"
of China and Korea. Even more suggestive of a continuing
struggle for influence in North Korea was a curious passage
in the report issued by deputy mission chief Lo Jui-ching
on returning to Peiping. By contrasting China's consistent
"wise" policy of "showing respect" for the leaders of North
Korea with the "non-Marxist-Leninist" practice of "great
nation chauvinism", he seemed to imply that other bloc na-
tions had been guilty of intervening in Pyongyang's internal
affairs o
Caught in this crossfire, North Korea's attitude towards
Communist China's distinctive program of socialist and Com-
munist construction on the eve of the Moscow summit conference
displayed marked ambiguity. On the one hand, succumbing to
Soviet pressures, it had disavowed the commune not only as a
model for North Korean emulation but even as a legitimate form
for building socialism and Communism within China itself.
Sanitized - Approved For ReI 1 TA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized -Approved For a ease : CIA-RDP7 0427A000600060001-7
On the other hand, there were indications that Pyongyang still
subscribed to a number of the premises underlying Communist
China's neo-Stalinist hard-line program of economic and social
development.
The North Korean regime continued to endorse China's
"great leap forward" and to implement, although at a somewhat
reduced tempo,.its own "flying horse" program,* There was
continued stress on an integral feature of these related pro-
grams--the construction of small-scale local industrial in-
stallations combining "native and modern" technology. There
was continued reliance on moral exhortation and revolutionary
zeal, rather than material incentives, to stimulate rapid ad-
vances in production and construction. In keeping with Kim
Il-sung's discovery (after Mao Tse-tung) of "the decisive role
played by human consciousness in developing the productive
forces," political indoctrination designed "to mobilize the
masses" continued to receive top priority in all phases of
the country's development program.
Most significant of all was the growing tendency to
characterize North Korea's domestic policies as the product
not of Soviet experience but of Kim Il-sung's "creative ap-
plication of Marxism-Leninism" to. the special conditions of
his own country. By increasingly stressing "the individu-
ality of North Korea's revolution," it appeared that Pyong-
yang aspired to a position of neutrality in the deepening
Sino-Soviet controversy over the "correct" road to socialism
and Communism on the eve of the Moscow Conference in November
1960.
*The new seven year plan unveiled by Kim Il-sung in Au-
gust 1960 signaled the resumption of North-Korea's forced
draft development program conducted at "flying horse" speed.
The goals of more than tripling industrial output and in-
creasing grain production (which has remained stationary for
three years) by over 50 percent still appear highly un-
realistic.
Sanitized - Approved For Rele 1?TA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 Sanitized - Apvoved For A , T CIA-RDP7 0427A000600060001-7
International Communist Strategy
The Sino-Soviet dispute on international Communist strategy
has entailed equally disturbing consequences for the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea. Although couched in ambiguous
doctrinal terms, this. acrimonious public debate has reflected
very real and broad differences over policies to be pursued to-
ward the non-Communist world, with Khrushchev advocating a
relatively gradual long-term policy of victory through "peace-
ful coexistence" and Mao Tse-tung countering with a more ag-
gressive, high-risk policy promising quick gains in Asia, Af-
rica and Latin America.* Despite uncertainty and equivocation,
the North Korean response to these divergent views since the
fall of 1959 has revealed a marked predilection for Peiping's
more militant line in approaching its own number one foreign
policy objective--the unification of Korea under Communist rule.
North Korean divergence from Khrushchev's foreign policy
pronouncements first came to light in September 1959 when, in
contrast with a prior Soviet declaration of neutrality, Pyong-
yang proclaimed itig "full support" for the Chinese People's
Republic in the Sino-Indian border dispute. Despite occasional
statements admitting the possible value of East-West negotia-
tions, North Korean commentary after Camp David displayed open
skepticism of one of the principal ingredients in Khrushchev's
"peaceful coexistence" policy--his contention that a growing
number of Western leaders, specifically including President
Eisenhower, were sincere in their desire to reduce interna-
tional tensions, Echoing Chinese Communist views, Pyongyang's
propaganda in October charged that the United States "plans
to solve the Korean question by ware" in December launched
abusive personal attacks against the.American President; and
in January 1960 characterized the President's State of the
Union Message as a "document of aggression and plunder, reek-
ing of gunpowder."
25X1A
*For an extended discussion of this second ideological
challenge to Moscow, see "The Sino-Soviet Dis-
pute on World Communist Strategy (Autumn 1959 to Summer _1960).
Sanitized - Approved For ReIS I1A-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 Sanitized - Approved For R? gTCIA-RDP79'900427A000600060001-7
A number of developments in the spring of 1960 intensi-
fied the Sino-Soviet dispute on bloc strategy, In April Pei-
ping launched a public attack on the theoretical rationale of
Khrushchev's foreign policy by reviving Leninist dicta on the
inevitability of war, the intrinsically aggressive nature of
imperialism, and the need for direct revolutionary action to
promote international Communism. The South Korean riots and
subsequent overthrow of the Rhee government in April, the col-
lapse of the summit conference in May and the violent Japanese
demonstrations in June appeared to cast serious doubt on the
efficacy of Khrushchev's detente policy and to lend substance
to Peiping's view of a rising tide of revolution in Asia. At
the same time, the Bucharest Conference in June revealed to 25X1C
other bloc parties for the first time the fundamental nature
and disruptive effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Khrushchev utilized this occasion to ac-
cuse the Chinese party of "disloyalty and insincerity," of
employing "Trotskyite methods," and of pursuing a "bellicose"
foreign policy. The Chinese countercharges were equally bit-
ter, including the allegations that Khrushchev had supported
anti-party elements within Communist China, had attempted to
coerce other bloc parties, had been guilty of "revisionism
and right opportunism" and had treated the Chinese "as ene-
mies." The North Korean response to these developments re-
vealed grave apprehension over the growing rift in Sino-So-
viet relations and a consequent desire to remain neutral, and,
at the same time, a continuing affinity for Peiping's mili-
tant policy of unremitting struggle against the West in Asia.
After a significant delay, the Korean Workers Party is-
sued a brief communique on the Bucharest Conference which
balanced a declaration of "full support of the peace-loving
foreign policy of the CPSU based on Leninist principles of
coexistence" with an immediate reminder that United States
imperialism, the "sworn enemy of the people," remained in-
herently aggressive. More informative was Kim Il-sung's
lengthy Liberation Day speech of 15 August 1960 which launch-
ed a new propaganda drive for "peaceful unification" of Ko-
rea. Advocating a confederation of North and South for joint
development of the national economy, the North Korean leader
betrayed the propagandistic nature of this proposal by of-
fering to rescue "our South Korean brothers from starvation
and poverty" and contending that "socialist construction and
the happy life of the people in the northern part of the
republic are exercising tremendous revolutionary influence
Sanitized - Approved For Re a tEMA-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 Sanitized - Ap, oved For Zke e s: CIA-RDP79000427A000600060001-7
on the South Korean people." This stratagem, paralleling
an earlier confederation scheme advanced by East Germany,
conformed nicely with the Soviet prescription of final vic-
tory through "peaceful competition" and Khrushchev specifi-
cally endorsed it in a 23 September address to the United
Nations General Assembly.
The dominant tone of Kim's speech, however, was one of
struggle and milita xt appeals for direct revolutionary action
in South Korea. Employing Chinese Communist invective, he
depicted United States imperialism as "the most atrocious
enemy of mankind and vicious enemy of the Asian people;" as
"intensifying the arms race and aggravating tensions;" and
as scheming to establish in South Korea "a military base for
provoking another war." The only solution was "an anti-
imperialist struggle" of the South Korean people, encouraged
and abetted from the North, to compel "the United States
aggressors... to withdraw." After drawing a parallel between
South Korea and Taiwan, Kim asserted that "our people, join-
ing forces with all Asian people, will, struggle for the with-
drawal of the aggressive United States army from the whole
area of Asia.."
Communist China's high-ranking military mission to North
Korea in October, noted above in the discussion of domestic
policy, made much of this community of national interest. In-
deed, when coupled with the charge that "modern revisionists"
(i.e. the USSR) were attempting to "isolate" China and "to
sabotage the friendship and unity" of China and Korea, General
Yang Yung's blunt assertion (in a 24 October People's Daily
article) of a special relationship between Ch"Un-a an Korea ap-
peared directed as much at the Soviet Union as at the West.
China and Korea are separated by only a river.
They are as dependent on each other as the lips and
the teeth. What is concerned with one of them is
also concerned with the other. The security of China
is closely connected with the survival, of Korea.
In addition to reiterating a number of Chinese positions
in the Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy, the Chinese military
spokesmen took sharp issue with an earlier judgment of Khru-
shchev that the United States was "not seeking a military
conflict" in Korea. Chief of mission Ho Lung on this occasion
characterized "the United States aggressors in South Korea"
Sanitized - Approved For ReIgkETA-RDP79S00427A000600060001-7
 SECRET
Sanitized - Ap"oved For Release : CIA-RDP79 O427A000600060001-7
as "bent on...unleashing a new aggressive war, attempting
once again to invade the Korean Democratic People?s Republic...'
annexing the whole of Korea...and launching a new world war....
The upshot of this new initiative was to swing the North
Korean regime even more solidly into line behind Communist
China on two key issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute, First was
the open espousal of Peiping?s charge that the "modern revi-
sionists" were engaged in "covering up the aggressive nature
of imperialism, beautifying imperialism and...denying the uni-
versal legality of socialist revolution." Next was the en-
thusiastic seconding of the Chinese view.that revisionism, not
dogmatism and sectarianism as maintained by Moscow, constituted
the most serious ideological deviation within the international
Communist movement, The reasoning advanced for this assess-
ment by Vice Premier Chong Il-yong was instructive. Within
North Korea itself, revisionist elements had engaged in "coun-
terrevolutionary plots" against the Korean Workers Party in the
past and were still considered a clear and present danger. As
a consequence of carrying on "socialist construction amid the
fierce class struggle against United States imperialism...and
domestic counterrevolutionaries," it was necessary to "arm the
working people with hatred against imperialism and class ene-
mies and bring them up as self-sacrificing and ardent revolu-
tionary fighters."
Thus on the eve of the Moscow summit conference in Novem-
ber 1960, North Korea appeared to be following the lead of
Communist China in opposing Khrushchev's policy of relaxing
international tensions. What is more, the considerations
prompting this decision appeared to be strikingly similar to
those animating Peiping. As a country with unsatisfied ter-
ritorial claims, it could only view friendlier relations with
the West as tending to freeze the status quo. As a have-not
nation determined to industrialize at maximum speed, it
favored external tension as a justification for sacrifice and
a goad for production. And as one of the satellites plagued
by chronic factionalism and purges, it appeared firmly com-
mitted to the pre-Khrushchev model of Stalinist totalitarian-
ism.
Sanitized - Approved For Rel RJ5 A-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7
 Sanitized - App,Cpved For R2'Ig eIA-RDP79WD427A000600060001-7
The Moscow Conference and After
Developments at the Moscow Conference and after tend to
confirm the existence of strong ideological bonds between Pei-
ping and Pyongyang. First, it appears significant that Mao
Tse-tung and Kim II-sung were the only Communist Party leaders
in the bloc who did not attend this summit conference. Next,
fragmentary reports on the proceedings of this conference in-
dicate that North Korea provided valuable support to Communist
China on a number of issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute, either
by endorsing Chinese positions or by failing to endorse the
opposing views advanced by the Soviet Union, The credibility
of these reports is enhanced by subsequent North Korean edi-
torial comment on the hybrid documents issued by the Moscow
Conference, commentary which has slighted Soviet-inspired pas-
sages for those expressing the more militant Chinese line.
On the overriding issue of peace or war, neither the 12
December party editorial on the Moscow Appeal nor the 24_De-
cember party resolution on the Moscow Declaration mentioned
Soviet formulations: on "the "horrors of modern war" or the
crucial alternative confronting the bloc: "either peaceful
coexistence or a nuclear war of extermination." Other Soviet
passages in the Moscow documents were either completely ig-
nored (the cult of the individual, problems of Communist con-
struction, long-term economic competition and negotiations
with the West) or acknowledged perfunctorily (peaceful co-
existence, general disarmament and dogmatism). By contrast,
these authoritative party assessments of the Moscow Confer-
ence echoed long-standing Chinese contentions in the Sino-
Soviet dispute over international Communist strategy.
A major theme was the odious and inherently aggressive
nature of United States imperialism, "the sworn enemy of man-
kind," which was "intensifying the arms race, international
tensions and provocative war schemes" and "running wild pre-
paring for a new war...in South Korea." Contrary to the
views of the "'modern revisionists" who.sought to "emasculate
the revolutionary spirit of Marxism-Leninism,,,to.garnish
imperialism in every way" and to spread "illusions about the
imperialist aggressors," it was necessary to wage a militant
struggle to "inflict blows on the imperialists, bring pres-
sure on them and bind their hands and feet." An essential
ingredient in this struggle was "fanning the flames of the
Sanitized - Approved For Rele sc ii -RDP79S00427A000600060001-7
 Sanitized - Apimoved For KefeaRse:CIA-RDP79600427A000600060001-7
national liberation movement" and in particular "fanning the
flames of the anti-American and national salvation movements...
for driving the United States imperialist aggressive forces
from South Korea." In view of these pronouncements, it was
not suprising that Peiping featured North Korean commentary
on the Moscow Conference above that of any. other nation in
the bloc.
Equally revealing have been North Korea's pointed declara-
tions of friendship and support for Albania, the East European
satellite which has consistently backed Communist China in the
Sino-Soviet dispute and which, accordingly, has aroused Soviet
ire. In an unusually laudatory article in late November, the
semi-official government organ Minju Chosen asserted that "our
two countries are very close to each other, like real brothers,
because of common ideology and aims" and that "no force on
earth can break the invincible friendship and solidarity be-
tween the Korean and Albanian peoples." The address of the
North Korean delegate to the Albanian party congress in mid-
February 1961 contrasted sharply with that of his Soviet coun-
terpart. Whereas the Russian representative attacked the Al-
banian party leaders (obliquely of course) as "renegades...
foaming at the mouth in fits of hatred and hostility against
our party," Pak Kum-chol praised the Albanian Workers Party
for "firmly preserving the purity of Marxism-Leninism" and
once again hailed the "invincible friendship and solidarity
formed between our two.peoples and two parties."
Most important of all, North Korea has explicitly recog-
nized Communist China as co-leader-of the Communist bloc fol-
lowing the Moscow Conference. By referring to "the socialist
countries led by the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's
Republic," a 12 December editorial in the official organ of
the Korean Workers Party appeared to be announcing the arrival
of a new stage in intra-bloc relations. In view of its pre-
vious record of sympathy and support for Communist China, it
was . fitting. that North- Korea should: 'reveal_ what was
perhaps the most significant result of the Moscow Conference--
the emergence of "polycentrism" as a reality within the inter-
national Communist movement.
Sanitized - Approved For Re A-RDP79SO0427A000600060001-7