SALT MEMCON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300070019-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 22, 1972
• Content Type: TELEGRAM

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DI P.?A RTM NT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
R__ raW-WW
Attachment C
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 RS/F:R LP yAF
INFO
SECRET/NODIS A-1
Department of State
U.S. Delegation SALT, GENEVA DATE: November 22, 1972
SUBJECT : SALT MemCon
The attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced
and distributed in accordance with the memorandum
to Mr. Miller, Deputy Executive Secretary, S/S,
dated December 6, 19;1 from Mr. Christopher,
Special Assistant to the Director of the Arms
Con Li.O1 and D s an LL Cllll?- AyC11cy.
Garthoff-Vorontsov MHemCon,
November 13, 1972.
Exempt - 1
FORM SECRET/NODIS
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SALT TWO
SESSION
A- 1
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND '
DATE: 'November 13, 1972
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
TIME: 1:00 to 2:30 p.m.
PLACE: Jean-Pierre Restaurant
SALT Washington, DC
USSR
Raymond L. Garthoff Yulii Vorontsov
DCM, Soviet Embassy
Vorontsov invited me to lunch to discuss SALT TWO. He had returned from
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number of times with colleagues on the Soviet SALT Delegation in Moscow. I
noted that my comments were personal and unofficial.
SALT TWO - Procedural Matters
I noted that our SALT Delegation would have the same composition, less
Ambassador Parsons. Vorontsov stated that the Soviet SALT Delegation would be
identical with what it had been in the latter stages of SALT ONE, as far as
senior delegates were concerned. He remarked that he had met Academician
Shchukin for the first time, and was highly impressed by him. He also remarked
that the Soviet SALT Delegation was very busy preparing for the talks, with
stacks of studies and position papers,
I said that we assumed the first session would end about December 21st.
Vorontsov said that the Soviet side also assumed that the work of the first
session should be completed by then, and that the Christmas holiday was a
natural time to recess. He asked when we thought the next session should
begin. I replied that we did not have an established position. Vorontsov
pressed me, and I said that I personally thought s,umething like March might
be appropriate. Vorontsov immediately said that would be "too late", and that
Moscow was thinking in terms of late January or early February, Again noting
that I was speaking personally and prior to official consideration of the Ques-
tion, and I expressed the view that such timing would be somewhat too early.
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Vorontsov repeated that there should of course be some time for preparations
in January, but that it was important not to delay too long in starting the
important second session.
Vorontsov confirmed that the Soviet side saw-the November-December
session as an occasion for an exploratory exchange of views, and did not
expect to advance proposals. He said that the Soviet Delegation had a long
list of questions it wished to ask the American Delegation. I expressed
the hope that the Soviet Delegation would also bring some answers. Vorontsov
said he hoped we would have questions to ask too, and there could be answers
on both sides.
SALT TWO - Overall. Substance
Vorontsov described the overall task of SALT TWO as. replacement of the
Interim Agreement with a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms.
He asked what I thought the main aspects of that task would be. I replied
that this was what we hoped to consider together in the coming explorations.
I noted Secretary Rogers' statement in his address to the General Assembly
had Lt: LCL1CU to the Lleeu for L"0 L1b 1UCL[].L1 on Vl SCOI)E. of 41LC 'perillcLLLt: L LL U ZE;I
ment, reductions, and qualitative limitations. Vorontsov said that he had
noted with interest the Secretary's statement. Using that statement as a
frame of reference, Vorontsov then launched into a discussion of each of the
three areas, as described below. As to scope, Voronstov said the two remain-
ing areas were bombers and FBS.
FBS
When. Vorontsov thus introduced the subject of FBS, I stated that we
continued to believe that we should. concentrate on central strategic systems,
including heavy bombers, but not FES. Moreover, it was not appropriate to
refer to our FBS and not to Soviet non-central systems, such as medium bombers.
Vorontsov contended that US FBS has a major capability directly against the
USSR, which is not the case in reverse for Soviet non-central systems.
I asked if he was talking about one-way missions. lie replied that our
forward-based aircraft could recover in Turkey, for example. I rejoined that
Soviet medium bombers could attack the US. Vorontsov interjected "and where
would they go?" To which I replied "Cuba". Vorontsov said that was not
realistic. I replied that islands are unsinkable aircraft carriers, and then
noted that the Soviet Navy is now evidently interested in aircraft carriers.
Vorontsov replied that was correct.
Voronstov then declared that perhaps it would be possible to deal with
"FBS" separately in SALT. I asked what he had in mind. Vorontsov replied
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that they do not know how this can be done, but that we need together to find
a way. I repeated that the US continues to believe that non-central systems
of both sides must be considered together, that such systems on the two sides
overall balance out, and that such systems should therefore be left out of
SALT. Vorontsov said it was necessary to deal with the FBS question in SALT.
I asked about the possible relationship of forward-based systems to MBFR.
Vorontsov said that was possible also, but that would not be contradictory.
He asked if I had any proposition to suggest with respect.to MBFR. I said I
did not.
Equal Aggregates and Reductions
Turning to levels and reductions, Vorontsov referred to the Jackson
Amendment, and also alleged that Senator Jackson and his friends really oppose
any SALT agreements. I said that I did not believe that Senator Jackson opposed
any agreement in SALT. As to the Jackson Amendment, it made no chanige in our
position, since its only real affect is to stress equal.levels of central or
intercontinental systems, andthat had been and remains the US position. Vorontsov
agreed. (Vorontsov then remarked, in an aside, that Minister Semenov flares up
at any mention of Senator Jackson and his amendment; he said that Semenov be-
labored him for the stand "his Senator" had taken -- Vorontsov said he had to
rc:-m ~.1 Sr r"
-Sea-ic nov .. thal c that {the .=C on some side and - and Tn.,.7.- .03r.+. -,,a- not "his
on the . - ~.. ..
I stated that the US would insist on an equal aggregate, or equal levels of
central intercontinental systems, however combined. I further stated that this
question might perhaps be considered in conjunction with reductions, including
appropriate reference to the problem of differences in missile throw-weight.
I recalled that the US had proposed the level of 1900 on August 4, 1970, but that
we had not decided whether under present circumstances the level should be the
the same, higher, or lower.
MIRV and Qualitative Limitations
Vorontsov inunediately responded: What about MIRV? He stated: "The
Soviet position on reductions in launchers and throw-weight would be heavily
dependent on the US position on ;NIRVs." I asked if he meant that there should
be a MIRV freeze. Vorontsov immediately objected that there could not be a
freeze with the US having thousands of. 2 MIRVs and the Soviets none. He said he
meant a situation where there were no MRVs. I replied that I thought reduc-
tions would be useful irrespective of NIRVs.
I stated that the question of qualitative limitations was a particularly
complex and difficult one. Vorontsov agreed, but referring to Secretary Rogers'
statement, he asked whether we had in mind a possible NIRV ban, and what other
qualitative limitations we might have in mind. I replied that I was net in a
position to state what particular qualitative limitations might be considered.
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I asked what his reaction in general was to the prospect for qualitative limita-
tions. Vorontsov said that he thought that it all depends on which limitations
and on the background of other provisions.
Phased Agreements
Returning to discussion of the general aim of replacing the Interim Agree-
ment with a permanent agreement, Vorontsov asked whether I. thought this could
be done in one step, or possibly in several steps culminating in a full
permanent agreement. I replied that his question itself contained an answer
by raising the possibility of partial steps along the way to achievement of
a permanent agreement superseding the Interim Agreement. I asked if the
Soviet side was thinking of such steps;, perhaps as "add-ons" to the existing
Interim Agreement. Vorontsov replied in the affirmative. He said that Grinevsky
was thinking about this question and wished to discuss it with me during the
first phase of SALT TWO, since it was better not to wait for what could have
to be hurried consideration. I asked if he had in mind something this spring,
perhaps before May. Vorontsov again responded in the affirmative, saying we
should seek some additional measures for use at the May Summit meeting, and
that it was therefore useful to start thinking about them now.
I asked what Vorontsov and Grinevsky had been thinking about in that
connection. Vorontsov said perhaps in effect, though not necessarily formally,
adding bombers and FBS to the interim limitation on missiles. I did not com-
ment except to observe that I assumed from what he had said that Vorontsov
considered it beyond reasonable expectation to reach a fuller permanent agree-
ment in that period of time. Vorontsov confirmed that he did.
I noted that the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission
was on the "agenda". Vorontsov agreed, and said that he foresaw no problem.
I agreed, but noted that it would be necessary to decide such questions as
the composition of the SCC, etc. Vorontsov concurred, and added "and its
relation to the Delegations". I said I assumed that it could have separate
representatives or involve some of the same people. Vorontsov said that the
Soviet side favored giving a "second hat" to members of the SALT Delegaticn.
SALT ONE
I advised Vorontsov that the US intends to publish the interpretive
Understandings in the US Treaty Series, but intends to register only the
signed ABN Treaty, Interim Agreement, and Protocol with the UN. This would,
of course, in no way prejudice the full standing of the supplementary
Understandings. Vorontsov expressed full agreement, and commented that the
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US had already published the Understandings in its presentation to the Congress
and was at liberty to do so for any internal purposes. At the same time, he
was pleased that the US was not raising the question of including such Under-
standings in registration with the UN, since that would have created a problem.
CCD - CTB and CW
Following our discussion of SALT, Vorontsov asked my view of prospects
for serious attention to a comprehensive test ban at the CCD. I asked whether
the Soviets were ready to agree to some on-site inspections. Vorontsov replied
"certainly not", that verification means were already sufficiently effective and
were constantly improving. He thouglit that Sweden and others would even object
to on-site inspection as unnecessary and "discriminatory" to the other countries.
In any case, the Soviets saw no justification whatsoever for on-site inspections
in connection with a comprehensive nuclear test ban.
I suggested that in that case perhaps there would be more prospect for
progress in the CCD on CW. Vorontsov said US should drop its "exception" for
tear gas. He asked if we had held back because of possible contingent use in Viet-
na T s i d . th t4 as not _i c ra ii, but we thi nk LhaL only lethal C W agents
should be considered. Vorontsov commented that use of tear gas could in con-
junction with other weapons, have lethal results. He also remarked that we
could still use tear gas for internal situations. However, he conceded the
point when I mentioned that it would not be very good to use such materials
in dealing with internal disturbances if we had agreed to ban their use inter-
nationally on humane grounds. Vorontsov noted that the USSR does not use tear
gas for dealing with domestic situations. Ile hoped there would be progress
leading to a CW treaty this coming year, and perhaps a CTB the year after.
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