O.I.R. CONTRIBUTION TO SE-22: CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE U.S. COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BURMA. OR THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 21, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SE INFORMATION
Febrmry 21, 1952
O.I.R. CONTRIBUTION TO
SE-221 CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE U S. COURSES OF ACTION
_ TH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA. BU1M, OR THAILAND
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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SECURITY INFG TIONN
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I ? PRIOR TO ANY IDENTIFIABLE CHINESE COMMUNIST Lit:
LITARYINTLRV ,.r1T [oN
IN INDOCHINA FURMAi OR THAILAND:
A. What is the likelihood that the United Kizqgd.om_Francey
ustEa a4 New Z a 1 nd would a rP i.n , c yr ncA t0
,o i Ja;t}i time Un, tee States 3.n tal.~in,,~ m _l j~ ? ~r* ~ounter-
t~ct can _. n t Comrm,u~ Cerra in the ew*rerit of an
identifiable Ch-Tie-'e , '~?t:Si'utti_s militarm iVerventicn
c z.~1 aN, Surma or Thy Qand s
Le-n- Mall
T.e Uni.te4 Kingdom, Although the UK would probably agree in
advance to consult with the US in taking some kind of 'military action
against the Chinese Communists in the event indicated, it would not
give blanket preliminary agreement to such action against Communist
China itself or readily join in it, for the following general reasons:
(1)
The UK continues to view the Far East as a region third in
importance, after Western Europe and the Middle East, to
the preservation of major Lritish world interests and security;
(2) The UK will generally fear that military action against Communist
(3)
(4)
the British apparently fear =-- especially the Laborites -- " 9
that the US A now prepared to follow a "hard" policy toward
Co nunist China which is substantially similar to the Mac-
Arthur viewpoint favoring direct action against the mainland
of China.)
hsna$ once agreed upon in advance and than instituted, will
prove impossible to limit and will probably load to World
War III;
The present official British inclination will be to avoid
hard and fast commitments to the US in advance and to insist
upon deciding what cons' .tafe;s appropriate supporting action
on the basis of the facts of each given situation; and
In reaching any decision the UK government will be strongly
influenced by prevalent parliamentary and public opinion,,
(At the present ttmej; Pritish.on:nion is increasingly
critical of US actions and statements concerning the Far En +
TC"' SECR'+"C
SEf UkZT?' TN C?,iLAT.TON
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On the other hand, the Conservative government and possibly a
majority of the people would view a Chinese Communist attack on any
one of the countries named as a more serious threat to world peace
than the aggression against the Republic of Korea. The attacks would
be interpreted as fairly clear indications of a Chinese-Soviet in-
tention to "roll up the carpet" in South Asia, even at the risk of
general war and possibly with the calculation of precipitating the
war. Even more sobering to the British would be the realization that
once the Chinese Communists launch an attack at any one of the
threatened countries, the British position in Malaya is in great
jeopardy, unless the attacks can be localized and defeated. How-
ever viewed, the situation created by Communist attacks on South
Asian countries will pose bigger policy problems for the British
than the Korean war has posed. The present evidence indicatess
however, that the UK government, while not optimistic about Chinese
Communist intentions toward South Asia, is, at the same time, not yet
prepared to make any formal com:itments to the US covering all the
possible courses of action outlined in this problem.
Australia and New Zealand share the British alarm about the
possibility of spreading conflict in the Far East, but because their
stake in regional security is greater and their dependence on the US
for security is paramount, they would be much less inclined to
challenge US military counteraction in principle. It is doubtful,
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however, whether either country would give prior support to any of
the courses of action outlined in I-A,
Fgancg, Despite admitted Chinese Communist aid to the Viet
Minh in technical aid, equipment, and troop training, official French
policy is still one of the "no provocation" of Communist China, and
the French desire to avoid, if possible, an open clash with the
Chinese which, they fear, would lead to a major war,
The French Goverrim nt, however, would probably agree in
advance to military action against Communist China in the event of
a full-scale invasion by the Chinese Army of Indochina and possibly
Thailand, because of its contiguity to Laos-.
The French would
strenuously oppose the extension of such an agreement to cover Burma
buf, might consent if BuTmi wore included in a broad agreement
covering all three areas, Such a concession would be made by the
French, however, solely to assure US-UK support in the event of a
major Chinese Communist military invasion of Indochina and to prevent
the development of a US-UK alliance from which France would be ex-
cluded,
2. P gb hIe rg4nQ ns to ~ ECaFfic 5 nrop?~. a]-;s
a, M iitar cou~.t ergots _Tm teci to re eTli she
agress1cn he t -aa in 1c . t. occu Assuming any prior
agreement at all, the UK, Australia, and Now Zealand would favor this
course more than any other, It is consistent with their desire to
localize conflict, wher