FRENCH-VIETNAMESE MILITARY STRENGTHS IN THE SAIGON AREA
Document Type:
CREST [1]
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01443R000300110009-9
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 24, 1998
Sequence Number:
9
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 26, 1954
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
| Attachment | Size |
|---|---|
 CIA-RDP80R01443R000300110009-9.pdf [3] | 72.26 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2
CIA-RDP80R01443R000300110009-9
FRENCH-VIETNAMESE MILITARY STRENGTHS IN THE SAIGON AREA
French Expeditionary Corps strength in the Saigon area
totals about 13,000 troops. This amounts to 14 infantry and
2 artillery battalions, organized into four mobile groups plus
an independent infantry regiment. The mobile groups are com-
posed largely of Moroccan, Algerian and Senegalese troops, and
the independent regiment is also African. The French have in
addition three Moroccan light cavalry battalions, equipped with
half-tracks and armored cars, within an hour's distance of
Saigon, and two airborne artillery and infantry battalions
several miles north of the city.
The Vietnamese army, in contrast, has no units within
Saigon proper. It has, however, 6 regular and 12 light infantry
battalions, amounting to about 12,000 men, in various posts
within one to three hours' distance of Saigon. Four of the 6
regular battalions are cadred by the French or have French
advisers; the remainder of the regular battalions and all the
light battalions have no French personnel. There is also a
South Vietnam National Guard regiment, with some French person-
nel attached, nearby. These troops have no artillery and
armored support.
Approved For Release 2000/08/3,Q : OR01443R000300110009-9
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 I -~ 80R01 443R000300110009-9
It is apparent, then, that the French have overwhelming
superiority in troop quality and firepower in the Saigon area.
They are in a, position to assure, if they so choose, the status
quo in Saigon and to ,prevent the entry of Vietnamese units into
the city. The French, moreover, can exert their influence on
the Vietnamese army in less obvious ways through their control
of its logistical supplies and troop pay. A successful coup
by General Hinh, therefore, would require at least the tacit
approval of the French.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000300110009-9