NIE-29 YUGOSLAVIA SUGGESTED REVISION, CONCLUSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000700040019-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 1999
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: March 2, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

Approved For Release Z,Q00/08/29 C~P?' 1012A00070004001 9
CENTRAL INT ELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
2 March 1951
SUBJECT: NIE-29: YUGOSLAVIA
Suggested revision, Conclusions
7. If the Kremlin contemplates eventual military conquest
of Yugoslavia, it may estimate that the risks involved in such
action would be less, and the advantages therefrom greater,
in 1951 than at any later date.
. If the Kremlin decides to attack Yugoslavia in 1951,
it may employ Soviet and Satellite forces ,jointly, or Satellite
forces alone with "unofficial"' Soviet support as necessary.
The Kremlin might hope that a joint Soviet-Satellite attack would
achieve such prompt and decisive results as to confront the Western
Powers with a fait accorncli before they could effectively inter-
vene, a that US opinion would not countenance atomic war in
behalf of Tito. The Kremlin probably would nevertheless esti-
mate that the direct participation of Soviet forces would involve
very grave risk of general war. Therefore it probably would
employ Soviet forces directly only if it were fully prepared
to accept general war.
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9. The Kremlin might estimate that an attack by Satellite
forces alone, with only "unofficial" Soviet support, would in-
volve considerably less risk of general war. It might estimate
that the Western Powers would so strongly desire to keep the
conflict "localized" that they would neither intervene militarily
nor attempt to implicate the USSR officially. The Krem lin might
further estimate that even if a Satellite attack provoked vigorous
Western reaction, it could still avoid serious risk of general
war either by calling off the Satellites or by negotiating a
settlement.
10. We therefore believe that if the Kremlin decides to
launch an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951, it will openly employ
Satellite forces only, but will render "unofficial" Soviet
assistance as required. Although the Kremlin might hope and
believe that an attack by the Satellites alone would not result
in general war, it would nevertheless probably estim ate that
such action involved substantial risk of- general war. We there-
fore believe that a Satellite attack would be undertaken only
such risk.
if the Kremlin were prepared to accept s; ?y,
a.].. Although there is no reliable evidence as to whether
or not a decision to launch an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 has
been reached, we believe that the scope of continuing Satellite
military and propaganda preparations and the possible advantages
which the Kremlin might see in such a course of action requires
that an attack be considered a real possibility.
Approved For Release 200MMF 01012A000700040019-9