D/I, USAF, CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-36 BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001100010004-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 25, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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2$ MAY 1951
U30, COITTRIBUTIVI TO NIFF1.6
BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF ..THS PRESENT =M.
-*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File*
I, ?STAIR-44W. ADD ,7.7,07,Aly cApp4,77,.E1 OF, TILE BTRIZZ,22UNLOIT
B, cants,Lejle4iingtortlas
1? Bt:rraeoe Air Foray (BAY)
(a) .11,mear,t119..9,mapizatien and Dimaktisa,
The BAF has a utntagth of 50 aircraft of uhich 33 are
khBeigned to tactics" uniten
laofow of fhb docarand ry 3'47.. has
AIRCRAFT STREITOTPel,GANIZATION ,p,mgaiddi,5,1 nat
JR fn hal i',U r,Y-3
TRVING AND TACTICAL UNITS 0 a (-XX: ;15
i,..t ,,a,,4 !", 1 a
TRAIIII/IG 10 Titter Moth
,......2.9x.rord Trairdit it contains .?1.?ii-i:a
Tata j7I paie i 3-- Ala.,%d 51 ft
ig,0,, 1...S.012.40U 14 Oxford Bomber (Modified, ttainere',
3 Atiet?or
1 Spitfire
4 Conzial
. 11 'Dakota
ToLal 35
Al]. unite of the 3AF lcoated at lanalz,don Airport9 Pangtoc
(b) Peroonnel St:,.:Atte4
OFFICARSINLISTID 1;111
fiLiakla IN sRAngla mg.,. - 4.1:1 amaugi
PILOTS
22
e
7
2
ilo
NAVIGATORS
mums
2
.
2
2
3
7
A.
ALL OMER'S

TOTALS
23
14
. 412
140
:91
The total personnel strength of the Butaese Air Force is 591 of *Aiceh
39 are Officers and 29 are P12.0460
-
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`terr
(a) eneEellikettifrit.
The majority of the thirty-one principal airfields of
Burma have been abandoned or ere ured infrequently* with a consequent de-
terioration of the air facilities. The prineipal base of the Burmese Air
Force ie Mirgaladon Aireere, near Rangoon, where the entire air force is
based, Occaeionally airfielde farther north, ouch as those at bleikti3a
and Lashio, are used for Usetted air support of uround troops operatiug
against insurgents ir, these areas. Lighting, servicing, repair, and radio
facilities are non-exietent exeept at a few of the major airfielde thet
are being used by the PO eel eivil airline
In the event of a Chineae Communist invasion of Burlap
the airfield complex in the vicinity of Meitkerina, the airfields along the
Irrawaddy River, and the airfields la the vicinity of Rangoon would memos
considerable tactical and etrateeic impertanoe. It is estimated that they
could be restored to limited operational use after considerable rehabilita-
tion.
(d) Combat 7.ffeetiveleel
An integral part of the rum:ease Army, the Burmese Air
Force is organized into a headquarters, one tactical squadron, and a training
school. All matters of organizaeion and training are guided by a 25-31 man
British Mission under the direction of 8 Britiah officers*
? Equipment of the BAY consists of British 'world War
trainers, trainers mediae for bombing, traeeports? and one Spitfire Aghter
aircraft. British supervised maintenance is considered good with VEITCsleimr,
ability at an estimated 70 percent. Serviceability would be extremely limited
other than at Mingaladon Airport. Fuel must be airlifted to forward buses
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and hand pumped into the aircrat. Due to the almost cpmplete lact of atnteu
name facilities and equirenont, a few days of intensive operations trot for-
ward bases would undoubtedly find the ineommiesion statue of aircraft
unsatisfactory. There ie no military assistance scheduled for the BAF by the
United States at this time.?
The capabilitiee of the rOrMOSO Air Force are lialtad to
small-scale support of grovad troops and tactical reconnaissance. Agalnat
insurgent forces, these capabilitiea are fairly effective when they cart be
employed. In the event of a Chinese Communist invasion, it is eetimated that
these capabilities would be. of negligable value. ?
Seaaonftl. weather conditions severely limit all air opera-
tiros, particularly during the late sumaer and early autumn months.
(e)
The Burnam, Air Force is considered loyal to Genera%
Na Win, the Supreme Commander of the limed Forces, and the degree oftle BAF
political reliability will be determined by this relationship.
C. Caoabnitieeslmilita?ea.Sarcenw4a_.ti/_estvi41AfiLandcom14oel
ineur ant oeeragens e_aLm.,...Larsainsc;Aaea?)
1. Against individual and combined insurgent operations.
At present, the Burmese kir Farce is too small and ineactive
to take a decisive part in the operations being conducted by the Burma as
Government against the varioui insurrectionary factions. Some air supeort
of ground troops is provided through light bombing and strafing operations.
The BAF also has a limited capability for tactical reconnaissance. &sever,
the capabilities of the BAF against individual and combined insurgent
operations are only fair.
iL-
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2. Against, direct ChineseCoHlauirtst invasion*
Asnuming an attack by the Chiaese Communist Air Forces
Burmese Air Force would have only a negliaible defensive Capability 1;.,ace
it is .composed primarily of traiaer and transport aircraft and haul no early
warning system, GCI, or anti?aircraft defense. Factors of distance, however.,
offset this vulnerabiliay.
U o CAPABII,ITIES AND 111..quir4ptis TATE =LIM, 4.IIISURG
The DUMAS? :Insuraent forces have no air capability* There is no
evidence that the Chinese Caamuniste have furninhed any air aid to thal
insurgenta, eithor in tae fora of air support, or material aid. If in the
future the Chinese Communist Air Force should farrxtsh air support for
Burmese insurgentep it is eatimri.ted that the CCAF ',Clad experience may
operational difficultiee ale to the terrain factor and the guerrilla !attire
of the inaurgent operational.
III. CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINF1 gogunstImpT "D E Diugaug
INDIRECTLY
Ao Chineee Communist. capabilities to .211o2k..11a,neri 4t iical
asgl_tares.
Ira/ouch as the I3urraese imeargenbe do not possess* and probv:aly
will not develop, an air capability, Chimes Comunist air materiel staX
technical assistance is not conaidered.
B. C....a..:_tkauff the Ctintee
aseuminasent cormaitmentere.
The Chinese Communist Air Force is esiiimated to have approximately
860 aircraft available at present, and additional aircraft could be made
available by the Soviet Air Force if the need should arise. The bulk ef the
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aircraft available to tha Chineee Communists are auxTently located in Uorth
China and Manchuria. Aircraft could be redeployed to prepared airfietds in
southeest China for operations ega.inst Burma, but the logistical conelderae.
tions involved mould be a serious limiting factor.
There are nine Chinese Oneenuniet airfields mdthin 120 miles of
the Chime/Noma border mhich, it repaired .end maintained, could be used by
fighters and ground attack aircraft in support oi the Burmese ineurgexts or
Chinese Communist ground forces. Three airfielde in the vicinity of 'Cunming,
230 miles from the Burmese border, could be used for bombing operatials
against north and Central Burma, SQM8 airfield construction and reheoili-
tation have been reported in southweetern China, but there is no evidsace of
stockpiling of POL and other aviation supplies sufficient to support tmajor
air effort.
In view of the above and its ceereitments easewherso it is (estimated
the Chinese Communet Air Force mould only be capable of very limited air
action against the Government ce! Duna, either in air support of the tureen?
insurgents or the Chinese Coramuoist ground forces. Use of transport viircraft
for supply operationo would be a particularly practicable form of aaa4stance
although Limited in scope,
In view of the limited nature of Communist air action in Ka.sa to
date, redeployment of Chinese Communist aircraft without including jevet to
airfields in southwest China could be effected without affecting aubeeeetleerey
the present type of Communist military operations in Korea. However, redeploy-
ment of any signifieant proportion of the OCAF for action against Berea,
would remove much of the preeent threat of large-scale Communist offensive
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air action in Korea; and reduce air defensive strength in eastern China and
Manchetria.. Logistical support er the Chinese Communist Air Force in operations
against Derma, even for short-term operations* would be seriously handicapped
as ce result of the Korean operations.
IV. al=12.?.9.......OLUUMST MTh/71011S TalARD BURMA
B. Korea on Chinese Cqinunist inteta.
The effect, if any, of the war in Korea on the long term intentions
of the Chinese Coarainlists towari Burma is unknonrei However, if prior to the
Korean war, the Chinese Coruneriets were contemplating early aggre5eiV3 mili-
tary action against Burma? the present lack of evidence of preparations for
invasion indicates at least the poetponement of such aggression.
E. Probable press and.taa.
Chineae Comnerniet ground strength in southwest China has retrained
relatively stable since ths outbreak of the Korean war. However, in view of
the extensive involvement of Chinese Communist military forces in the Korean
conflict* the consequent logistical strain, and. the serious losses Bartered
by their ground forces, it is estimated that their over-all capabilities for
offensive action have been severely curtailed to the point where they ere
not planning open military moves against Burma in the near futures Present
Chinese Commulist tactics with respect to Burma appear to be more in the
field of subversive activity, to which limited air supply operations vould
be a useful adjunct. Increased activities of the Burma Consunist Party and the
Mama Workers and Peasants Party reflect the intensified Chinese Communist
efforts in subversion and propaganda*
V. CONCLUSIONS AS TO F $ URVIVAL OF THE PR4ENT BURLIES2A2M.
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So long as the insuvaunt forces do not receive outside aids it is
estimated that the Burmese Gowteminent will be able to maintain its prosent
military position.
D. kaintt-ine?Muen?Ir97PALEit*L44-412-ct-gittl...,28t
The chances Of suceese of the Burmese insurgent forces tvoulebe
considerably increased by Chinese Communist materiel and training ass: stance
Although plans for such assistance have been eported/I there has been no
evidence that the plans have been implemented* Chinese Cammunist comult.-
ments elsewhere have probably been the most important if fester on any
such aid which may have been contemplated* In summary, it in estimated that
the chances for ultimate success of the insurgents will be in proportfon to
the degree of aid which may be furnished them by the Chinese Communists*
C. Aoinst insur7ent7 foreelAALALA....gOmmunist 410
It is estimated that the present Burmese Government vould be
defeated quickly and overthrown in the event that the Chinese Communitts
provided the insurgent forces with substantial direct military aemixtence.
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