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Kissinger to his recommendations and is loolkinh to you
for some rind of playbacn.. For another thin-, the letter ::lay
reflect evidence of concern about the ade' uacy of intelligence
support which Andy +,--iay have picked up around the White House.
In any event, his recommendation is the cot-apara
tively simple one that you tarps. to Henry and try to get so __3e
coherent statement fro,m hi a about the real reaction in the MSC;
staff to intelligence support and, if there Is any distatisfaaction
with this support, specifically what Henry thinks the deficiencies
really are.
I judge fro n our conversation Monday that there is
no reason for confidence that a conversation with Henry will
produce any very specific or helpful reaction. On the other
haud- I th n,:: e.11 wodid a ree that the - :.ost :serious def c.ency
7 January 197 1
%,,C==,+IO RANDUNA, FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Coin,-, tints by-Andrew ' 'arshall
on the Intelligence Process:
Attached is the letter fro.i Andy ' ar ball w ich I mentioned
at lunch on Monday. Andy rye r.ees a nu.=zyber of somewhat interrelated
co - ,taints and record, 3endations which can be su y"narized as follows:
a. National, zsti mates. He suggests the need for a
review of the estimating process to determine whether estimates
are really responsive to the needs of decisionmrmakcer-~ and
adequately synchronized with the process through which NSS ys
are for xulated. (He points out, correctly, that NSSI.4s
function, to a certain degree, as intelligence documents. )
On the face of it, this is a startling proposal in view
of the fact that Andy has been working just short of a year as
a consultant to the White House on precisely this subject. The
fact that he should ~.vrLte this letter at this time suggest:, for
one thing, that he has given up any hope of getting a reaction
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c. The Need for :x ended Intelli43encc facilities.
Andy mai:es quite a point of the fact that the intelligence rer uire
nts are going to increase and become more co: ,plicated just
at the time when budgetary cutbacks are bound to impose a
squeeze on estimating as well as collection facilities. He points
out the need for -xraintaining an appropriate balance between
analytical and collection activities and also for outside support
for adequate funds.
All of this cjas without saying. Conceivably Andy
:-right think up some better way of articulating our needs and
developing the basis for a r :yore persuasive case to the Office
of Management and Budget and the Congress. I see no har a
in talking to him about this, particularly as he has close friends
in the 014B.
b. Reorientation of Collection ro 7ris1.li. Andy suggests
the need for re-examination of the priorities and objectives of
intelligence given the existence of strategic parity between the
i. S. and the Soviets and the attendant potentialities for rather
broad-scale ,- ischief -eaaKing throughout the non-Bloc world
which may result from Soviet political and conventional nilitary
initiatives.
in the intelligence process is the absence of feedback. No
harm peri-raps would be done by asking Henry once .-more for
11 cs reaction to 11 -?3. you could tame the occasion to tell him
that you are concerned with the necessity for raking, sure
that an effective and continuing dialogue is carried on between
the intelligence co mnmunity and policy-=jailers, and that jou
are prepared to appoint somebody fro=-rn the Agency to work
with whomever he cares to designate to see that arrangements
exist or are developed to per: it such a dialogue.
This problem is already in band as a result of
study of priorities.
/s/ 'John A. Bross
JOHN A. BROSS
D/DCI/NIPE
cc: DDCI
DD/ I
D / ONE
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Mr. John B oss
2430 E St-feet, N. W.
Washin on, D. C. 20505
(U) Here are a few thoughts you might consider passing on to
Helms. I am not sure that they are any farther developed than
a few evenings ago at your house. Perhaps being put down on
paper they are more clearly stated and of more use to you. Let
me say that if Dick wants to expand on what I have to say in
the next few paragraphs, I would be delighted to talk with him,
or to write a separate and longer piece on each of the two areas.
(S) As you will remember, I suggested two general areas that
Dick might want to open up with Henry. The first of them would
be the possible value of a systematic review of the way in which
the Intelligence community now supports the National decision-
making process. The notion here is that the NSSM process has
been running for some time now and seems to be stabilized as a
mode of operation. It has generated a new interface between the
decisionmakers, their staffs, and the Intelligence community.
In the meantime the national intelligence process leading to
the NIE's continues to run along with some adjustments to respond
better to the expressed desires of the top decisionmakers. It
might, therefore, be useful to have an assessment of how the
process is working; how it might be changed to better serve the
top decisionmakers. There are a whole series of issues that
would naturally arise in such a review. The future role of the
Board of National Estimates. The role in the NSSM process of
,he new DIA estimates element. Possible changes in the inter-
face between the decisionmakers and the community to improve
communication of customer needs, and community capabilities.
C"OV v~-- Ao c7an-14al contains G.t4arrnat{on affrocting the national defense of the United ?.ate~ WiWain ;ac, Of
Ccwniontx3tr Qs;v:c, Ti7te Ya U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation .,: wilich ir: .^=Le cJ