THE BERIA PURGE AND SUBSEQUENT SOVIET POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100270007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORT

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TEE BERIA PURGE AND SUBSEQUENT SOVIET POLICY
n analyzing the possibility that Beria's arrest might have
affected the course of Soviet policy it is necessary first to
determine the timing of his fall from power and then speculate on
its relation to Soviet policy.
The earliest indication that Beria's power may have been on
the vane weeks before the announcement of his arrest was the un-
explained postponement of the Georgian Party Congress. Called for
25 May, this congress would presumably have ratified the widespread
April reorganization of the Georgian party and government which
appeared to have been engineered by Beria.
Western observers generally consider Beria's absence from the
opera on the evening of 27 dune, coupled with the strange movement
of tanks in the vicinity of his house in the late afternoon, as
indicative of his arrest on that day. On this assumption, it is
o generally considered that the developments in East Germany
provided the opportunity and pretext for his arrest.
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AhMOWMANJOWN.
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There is some evidence, however, that Beria's fall may have
25X1X4
occurred even prior to the beginning of the German riots on 16 June.
reported on 15 and 16 June that company-grade
MVD officers and other unidentified Soviet officers had expressed
extreme concern over some unidentified incident on which they were
anxiously awaiting further developments and news.
In examining the possible relationship between Soria and Soviet
policies, it is important to consider that whatever position Soria
relation to the subsequent course of Soviet policy. It would appear
that the most important factor in Beria'ss purge was the internal
struggle for power with the likelihood, as suggested by the accusations
against him, that he was using the XYD to support a personal bid for
supremacy. It is unlikely that Soria was the prim advocate, in
fined in policy considerations prior to his fall may have little
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sition to his colleagues, of the USSR's "softer" tactics. It
would be more likely that he disagreed with those tactics and thereby
contributed to his downfall.
inside the USSR, the "liberalisation" policy had three par
a new emphasis on increasing consumer goods for the people ;
(2) a seeming de-emphasis of the government's dependence on the
whole repressive system of forced labor, coupled with a promise to
rewrite the criminal code in favor of increasing civil rights; and
(3) a propaganda campaign which reversed the preferential status of
Great Russians by emphasizing that the minority nationalities were
"equals among equals."
Whether or not Beria was a proponent of the new stress on
consumer goods, it appears to be continuing. The Pravda editorial
of 10 July reporting Beria's arrest appeared to put more emphasis
on heavy industry than on consumer goods. On 8 July, however,
Pravda had announced the existence of reserves of 20 billion rubles
in excess of the envisaged annual plan for consumer goods turnover.
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On 14 July, the USSR concluded a contract for 10,000 tons of Dutch
butter -- at least 8 times as much as, that purchased from the
Netherlands In 1952. Earlier it had purchased 6,000 tons of Danish
butter, and the Soviet official who negotiated the contract remaked
that the butter was required in view of the sharp rise in the Soviet,
standard of living.
On 15 July, Australian meat exporters reported that for the,"
first time since the war they had received Soviet orders for
frozen beef, mutton and pork. Butter and meat have been in par-
ticularly short supply in the USSR.
The trend towards emphasis on consumer goods was evident also
he announcement on 17 July of the Soviet plan fulfillment for
first half of 1953. According to this announcement, the
of consumer goods in the second quarter of this year was 23%
greater than in the same quarter of 1952. Moreover, the only
change revealed in the 1953 yearly plan as compared with last year's
was the addition previously mentioned of 20 billion rubles for
production and distribution of consumer goods.
Z
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There have been no indications since Seria's arrest of reversion
to the repressive forced labor system. However, it is extre
unlikely that Beriat, as MYD chief, would have favored governmental
.ons or acts limiting his ministry's functions and
removing trained personnel. Consequently, it is not surprising
that his downfall has apparently not affected this aspect of the
new policy of internal conciliation.
The only ele$ent of the internal "liberalization" which since
Beria's announced arrest may have been modified, if not reversed,
is the anti-Russification propaganda campaign. It is quite possible
that Beria was connected with this campaign since it appears to have
been touched off by the April reorganization of the Georgian govern-
ment and party, which has generally been credited to his influence.
The propaganda line that the minority peoples are "equals
among equals" has been dropped and increasing stress has been placed
on the dominant role of the Great Russian in Soviet affairs. Pro-
paganda related to the Beria case has dominated Soviet internal
output during the past week. Meetings convened throughout the USSR
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to approve Beria's dismissal were greatly publicized. Editorials
consistently echoed the appeches and other material from the 19th
egress and from the vigilance campaign at the time of the
"doctOSt plot." This vigilance theme reappeared on 21 June for
the first time since 20 April.
editorials demand "revolutionary vigilance" against
"enesies cleverly masking themselves in the guise of Communists"
sent in by capitalist states or recruited from the "Politically and
rally rotten elements" of the Soviet population. Unity in leader-
ship is also stressed. The principle of collectivity, which has
received such attention since Stalin's death, is set forth as a
counter to "arbitrary party work." Furthermore, feria is held up
as an example to demonstrate the necessity for party control in all
It is reported that over the weekend, propaganda coverage of
Beria case dropped off practically completely. It is too early
to tell whether this is a trend or a passing phenomenon. However,
together with the comparatively quiet removal of Neshik and Bagirov,
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the two most recent prominent purges, it
great public a
ores of persons .
the purges may be quietly limited to a few high Officials
n g over a long period of time. Such a
would be consonant with the other moderate tactics of the new
gover.ent.,
opaganda charges against the US ?.- that the
US controlled Rhee and was trying to prolong the Korean war, that
tech sad still supports the disaffection in East
raa ?yr and, by
cation, that Ber
to have been tailored to specific situ
a us agent -- all appe,
"or which the grealin
eded an outside scapegoat or a standard explanation.
charges do not as yet appear to affect the over-all conciliatory
d of foreign policy, scow has continued to p'ur-
lieu of reconciliation with countries bordering the Soviet
Orbit.
Turkey, Yugosl
efforts to improve relations
and Iran, the USSR has now moved to resume
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diplomatic relations with Greece. The 20 July announcement
broken off 12 February after the bosbing of the Soviet legation in
reversal of the
anti- ionist campaign which was vigorously pressed during
of Stalin 's life,
Belgrade on 20 July. Last week Hungary, following the earlier lead
d Bulgaria, agreed to establish a joint
signed an
The a1 lluo nce Pe it
and Greece were re
-standing border disputes on 10 July
July that the USSR will grant
$1,000,000 and loud the services of Soviet experts to the UK tech-
program was followed two days later by a dish
to contribute $75.000 to this program. % Us sudden reversal
SSR and Israel have agreed to resin diplomatic relations,
cal culmination of Nos
,v. the new Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia arrived in
of the bloc's previous boycott of those activities reflects l c sCwa's
interest in expanding its international contacts and is
of the general policy of conciliation which the now regime
elaborating since taalin's des
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Two minor gestures in the sa
is s;gae
of exit visas to two more Russian wives
R and lust
the gift of $10,0to Japanese flood relief on 13 Ju
17 July
all concluded since
nd were the granting on 16 Ju:
Ybbs-l rsenberg dam to Austria, under article 35 of the draft state
treaty.
field of foreign trade the USSR has with:
sd agreements virtually tr
trade with France, doubling
greatly expanding that with Greece.
trade agreement with Argentina, t
ce 1947. These new trade
i ngoess to a
ly the result of the Kremlin's new will-
ncreased 4
platinum
nts continu
scan citizens and
.nt turning over the
and timber, pets
Moscow's lead
The satellite gay
fair, denouncing his as an `?isperialist ageut" and
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and unity, Leading editorials have stressed the solidarity of
Additional signs of conciliatory policies in the Satellite*
eB the announcement of aria's ouster have been noted in Rumania
b governments announced new decrees
cancelling cer
farmers. In addition, the Hungarian goverment
announced that decrees providing for an amnres
have held "improvised meetings', to discuss the significance
,chary as proof of the nee4 for increased vigilance
government
azricultural debts o
atives fry 1953 by 10 percent,
camps. and provision for deportees we
omulgstod within
ch: an 11 July of party
,deed to allay
with the 1338, and in gunj,ary factory
ufnston whici
goveernme
a day,
y'' bad aroused aging party rank and file, members
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and cooperative,
ed the delivery
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united and frightened. k
from the extensively "liberal" program which Na
ned a week earlier and subsequent editorials suggest that the
government's policies would be slightly moderated.
issue of the Coaiufora Journal. which carries
summaries of the Nagy and ftakosi speeches, omi
all the references
the alleviation of strict police measures and
ion for peasants to withdraw from cooperatives.
of the speech was made to co Mors more closely to Rakosi
speech which stressed the need for improving production and work
support for the collectivization programs
as plans for improving the standard of living. This watering
ew economic policy" outlined 4y Nagy is similar to
the treatment his speech has received in the 3oviet, Czechoslovak
ish press, and suggests that future concessions will be
well circumscribed.
onomic concessions in Last
y continue. with wages
and the food supply being singled out for improvement during the
-, "
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t few days. a 16 July the Politburo announced scheduled
in the wages of lower paid workers and, according to the
press, large quantities of food are being brought in
lov iet union to conter*ct s
es on the retail market.
ceived promise of further improvement to the food
ply when the East German government decided on 16 July to
sell their surpluses directly to retailers or individuals.
However, strict security measures and steps to strengthen
being carried out simultaneously
ecouomic reforms. The ruling communist party is beta;
socialist elements in a move to strengthen
the hard core of the last German regime.
ustice l mister, heretofore held by an ea-
by the appointment of Frau
Jess communist jurist known for her harshness
days later the
;e, and a few
unced that several persons
June riots had been sectent>?ed to long terms,
12
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some of them life imprisonment. For adopting a lenient attitude
towards the demonstrators, one communist official was fired and
another censured on 19 July. These measures are indicative of the
intention of the USSR to oppose firmly and ruthlessly any further
attempt by segments of the populace to rebel and its determination to
restore governmental authority.
Speeches by several communist leaders have also indicated that
there may be a trend of reversal in the policy of easing the tempo
of work in East German industry. Since the work norm increases were
cancelled on 16 June communist leaders have announced that an
improvement in the standard of living will be contingent on greater
productivity, and workers were generally admonished not to slacken
their pace in the factories.
The 15 July resolution calling for talks on unity between
representatives of East and West Germany is not expected to change
this picture since the proposal does not contain any elements con-
ducive to agreement and thus was probably not intended to have more
than propaganda value.
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conclusion, it appears that the purge of Beria has as
yet had little effect on the main stream of conciliatory tactics,
internal and external, which began with the deaths of Stalin and
must have had the support of the dominant members of the new regime.
The future course of Soviet policy is likely to be determined
more by the exigencies of the situation in the areas of its ap-
plication than by Serials fall. Thus, a return to forceful measures
in Germany, for example, would more probably be governed by the
need to maintain discipline than by the downfall of an alleged pro-
ponent of softness. Furthermore, a shift or reversal of tactics
in one area would not necessarily be followed by an overall policy
change. It seems clear that even now the new tactics are not
being applied with mechanical consistency in all areas; for instance,
no economic concessions have been made
land or Bulgaria. The
gremlin is not making concessions for their own sake but rather
out of a self-interest which seems somewhat more enlightened than
Stalin's.
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poll
.1 T
There has never been any indication that the conciliator
uld be implemented to the injury of the fundamental
aims of comunism. Some of the apparent slackening of the con-
ciliatory gestures in Germany and Hungary may be attributed to the
desire of the regimes to remind the people and reassure the Party
of this fact.
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