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LETTER TO GEORGE F. KENNAN FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 18, 2002
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 18, 1957
Content Type: 
LETTER
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Approved For Release 201/30: CIA-RDP80RO1731R0005005 4-6 18 May 1957 George F. Kennan, Esq. The Institute for Advanced Study Princeton, New Jersey Dear George: 1 just received your good letter of ,May 6, 1957. While my authority in the mat er of the Lansing papers is somewhat nebulo s, I "-g tae my approva for your use o the quotations br referencejthere o as requeste I am that the papers h ve been of help and I am `sure no one will dispute your right to use them. Faithfully yours, Allen W. Dulle s Director j ~L U&4 t4- WA~ 4 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6 Approved For.Release 2002/01/3*IA-RDP80R01731 THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY May 14+, 1957 Dear W. Dulles : Since Mr. Kennan signed the letter of May 6, I have been verifying citations and sources. I find-there are two items not from the Lansing MSS collection for which we should have permission. One-is a letter from Secretary Lansing to the elder George Keenan, found in the Kennan-MSS (page XVI/27). The other is a telegram from- Sec ary_Lanaing..to Mr. Polk, found in the Polk MSS (page XIK/12). I have inserted these pages in the proper . numerical location. Sincerely yours, (Miss) Dorothy M. Hessman Secretary [Cy to Library of Congress Yale University Library] The Honorable Allen W. Dulles, Director,?Central Intelligence Agency, Washington 25, D. C. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6 Approvecle- Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R*1R000500560004-6 THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY May 6, 1957 I have now completed the second volume of my study of the early period of Soviet-American relat:bis. In this connection, I have again availed myself of the privilege of using the papers of Robert Lansing in the Library of Congress. I enclose the sheets of the manuscript on which material is cited from these papers, or reference made to them; and I am writing to ask your permission for such quotation and your approval of-such reference. I would like to tell you again how much I appreciate the courtesy shown me in making these papers available to me, and how valuable they have been to me in this work. Very sincerely yours, Enclosures: V/1-L.-Is z 3 -~4 VI A/ ' Xii / 30 Xoru/ o -2 1 it /3 - 5-1; The Honorable Allen W. Dulles, Director,.Central'Intelligence Agency, Washington 25, D. C. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R000500560004-6 Approved Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP80R 31 R000500560004-6 I V/lZ ? ? 0 Italian govern nts,_ vhieats desired to make Japan a s adatoryt ' the Powers. ee>rst to the White Rouse a memorandum Of his own on the same s tJect. 3/ The proposal for a Japanese expeditionary farce was contisuinl to be? he wrote,, with varying degree. of earnestness by the Drttisb, 1rnnhi and That a s day Lane ing, still ap lye anaware of the AM"' He rent o to stress, once more, the t mvorable p hologics1 eff+edt tT ter- mention would inevitably have on the Russians. 11,11 isumsia, for t became host -1 Is: "Mere could be the charge that Russia had W n betrayed by her professed friends and delivered over to the yellow rac aee T~Umianfi ait even turn, in their embitterasnt, to syeermuesyr. IdC/ g~x r there any reason to believe that the military effect of a Jspaseese itnt&rvention,. from the standpoint of the 4crld War, would be great., no supplies at Vladivostok .sere not being moved to the interior, and there vas no prospeet of their being moved, in view of the disorganization of the railway.,,lj/ In these ciru rn' A . stenos, ,ire- re istered once more the conclusion he and louse and the Preemident j3 that de-yr. Reading told his on the following day of his visit to Wilson. (I ot:ert :Lansing MS, Library of Conposs, Washington, Desk Diary, Narch 1%,) rt that Lord Beading was discussing this same matter with the President hi.ng in the text of the seeeemorand indicated any knowledge on Lansing's One has here an tntereetini example of the way in which the war in the west dcainated all Allied caloulationse at this time. While the French wars arguing that lack of American consent to intervention would drive Japan into 4eraesaeenyr's arees,ssing was arguing that intervention would have precisely this effect on the Russians. Lena in had by this time received a reassuring report from Admiral Xni,ht shout the Vladivostok supplies. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6 Approved & Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP80R31 R000500560004-6 V/13 MN11s$ '"~.. it would asset umloo and inespeedient to e#u'ppo t the 10"0 bad been r otcin to each other vith such sloseGtonDus regularity over the Past nape intervention in Siberia.",a/fi Ring's teeea?r*Ttd L vas roturned the next day, it boxer the nota- tiori: "With the forego to changing his position was, after all, that the Japanese vere fi r; ng the Pre ideent entirely agrees." fte receipt, on Karoh 44, of the Japanese reply to the ttots,of M*r*b 5 naturally strengthened the "resi4snt in his reluctance to contemplate any such ao 'to the Allies were urging. 'rice argument which had been need as effectively in late February, and vhieh had brought his at one tiles is close anyvsy,jf regardless of Aasrica's attitude. The Japansim *Ply now ? effectively disposed of this suggestion. Lansing and the President were 'bath greatly 1l00eee3. assador z aet _. Morris, was irurtr test to tell the Japanese goverment that the reply v1s "most rttifyine that it removed any possibility of misun4ereteniirg "which might otherwise arise."18/ During the final days of Mauch, appeals for Intervention continued to reach Iansing and the President from many quarters,, other than the Allied gowernents, long message frost Admiral Knight, in Vladivostok, wee reeeived on March 18. It contained no specific reec ation for iasudtate interveeyr- do l but set forth in detail a plan for the allotment of missions aso the sing MS, cit., Box 2 (Confidential Memoranda & 'otes, fpri to December 20, 1918, ino. ) 17/ Se. Vole I, p. 476. ? I?,/ ]rexi Relations,, 1218, kueeaia, Vol. IT, c it., 1915 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6 Approved Foe lease 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP80R0?1R000500560004-6 OWN 0 4111" 8Qv9rttrasr if and when int rvaeuties should rin lly be d9oidsd UPON 192/ Of F+ebsazy in Petrograd, vtrs4 his impre ti. liutlop Wright, now in Yladivosto : eve the Opp** expressed himself as in favor of joint lnterventlon., / Comul Charlae Z. user, in Rarbin, was reporting, that eoaditio"s it Siberia would be e`unbeereb1a ?.. Aces Allies intervene. " ila+ ' nerat 4iilisa g, fo r Ntlitary Attacbf and Chief of the American Miiitarjr Mission at Petro 'ad, called at the Department of State on March dC # ad than set forth his views an paper for the Se0retar7. Be taros sure that a Japanese inv+as ion of S Iberia would throw Buss iris into asrnnn hands. to believed that a moll United States terce, nct1r4 alone, proportionate to the extent that "American initiative and cooperation ..* ffect and would compel tlermany to keep large focus on the eastern front, Mere were, he added, many possible intermediate duos and obviously sole sort of compromise would be necessary. ]loft the onefit would further jolt was received an March 1, when Lord leading brought in certaiw: news .s from Irkutsk about the prisoner-of-v ar altuatJon in Siberia, emanating from the Actin British Vi(e Consul there and from, a Trench intel- 11 j nce officer, Colonal Pichon, t platy t the Japanese Admiral at Vladivostok, who took note of it without ay how freak his post Counselor one of the trip across Siberia, and it will be recalled, was love than a further aessaaips from Kniaiht, of the 443rd, indicates that he shoved his xsthus i m armed without nt tional, ivos ft sZ- !! j. Fore Bal.ati 1914 Basssfr~, Vol. II, op. t?, PP. & -9l. s 1d. , p. 93; telegram of March 49, p.m., from Poking, National archives, State Department File 86l.OO/13Y3 . Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R000500560004-6 Approver Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80*31R000500560004-6 C ?s_Rul roperted a great conceartration of g"man prisoners abaft to tau place at ~it o kr and mentioned the number of 10,000. fortnight before the visit of f'ebster aid hides to that plans.) '*AYic a quite alarmed, and at once sent the 00ssagss to the est- dsst. I ? the reports were true, be observed, this mould plsco the problem rterwetion in a different light../ a idient did not agree. I on *Wh obli you for eendtii t papers to z' so promptly," he replied the next day (larch c4), but I do not find in then sufficient creme for altering our positt . They still do not answer the question I have put to Lord leading and to all others who arse in favor of intervention by Japan, na>eely, what is it to effect and b wr viii it be effiee clone in effecting It? The conditteo of Siberia furnishes no answer. Now, at last, it was Lansing's turn to ar, us. It* went book at the lies idea, with a letter (March 24) in whioh, for the first tt>re, he really owes close to arguing in favor of intervention -? though only on the hoth- es is that the alarming reports about the prisoners were correct. 'real -nt the question as to whether, if the hore was anything to be loat e posed is proved true 3f P a rs a ati to et,, i . eZat#o of the United States: Ienei Pars k_-19_0, U.S. 19k0, Vol. IT, p. 357. jovi+rreseenlt Printing Office, waehin,~tton, tug , ot. it., Diary Blue Boxes, 4: Lanai hd and April 6. ? .6/ Vol. 1 1,0 c i. , p. 7. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6 Approved I$ Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP80RO1 R000500560004-6 v/ 0 ttsight naturally watched the Jepseese landing with the great*" of interest, ^e did not question the goad frith of thee, sa PNee? notion. '-he' Ieendiz aep aared, be wired, to hevee been dictated by nocesxity. But he decided to take no parallel setion at the recent. "Shall, only lend force if our interests are threatened," be wired t the Navy Department teat '! dad ~Yf the landing, , .. which is not the case at prevent, lave informed J'apsuese Admiral of my position and stated that any concerted ai;tian beyond Protection of nationals, must be arranged by our goverroents, l Official Washington, too, was obliged to ask itself whether Admiral d'night should not be instructed to follow suit. The British fimbass*ddW urged or, LWkeing (April 8) that irnetructions to this effect be sit to the ral at once. / There was strong support for this suggestion amorK Lens ing'e ides; but the :Secretary was firmly opposed. The Japs"oe5.British ? leading, he eeeid. in a memorandum to the ?resident of :pail 10, ... in no way affects my opinton as to this Government Is policy. ... T think it would be unwise, in view of the reports we have received,,, to permit tmerican meriies to land. The state of affairs in . uasete proper is in my opinion against such a policy. In this 1 disagree with the Judgeeeeet of Mr, Long, Mr. Niles and others who have this matter in charge in the Department./ l/ rational Archives, Navy Sect:7n; Knight's telegram of April 15, 4 id lbi1., Foreign Affairs Section; tats Department rile L.00/I) CM. 3/ Lone inn `'. sit. a Diary Blue Boxes, Box 2. 'ere is no record of Wilvon s reply to this meaoranduae. The two men had discussed the matter the previous afternoon (tansing's Desk Diary, entry of pr i1. 9). Lansing's pod it ion was obviously fully approved by the President. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6 Approved seiease 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP80R~i1R000500560004-6 $'~ ? Be added, smevhst irrelevantly, "t an entirely srs- ms ible pokey which is opposed to tattal-s'Iaent i -A% the present aarese in a tondetory cs .ctry." On April 15 heading cum .$ to assure the 8ecreter f the pu rsl7"?t al of the British and Jspeneee landings; and on pril 17 the Japanese Mars; d i'fairvre oalied and aeaa d La Mirgt that his gowetrra t was prepearesi to withdraw its am=ines again as soon as C iditiona might perMit. Japanese merinie were nct, howwew+er, in fact withdrerwn. `ihey pe sastned in Vledivo otok throaagbout the seejag weed, patrolling the vicinity of the Japanese Ccrr.:rulate and to some extent the entire city. The Ctaenrunieta hotly resented their preseres, and there was no lack of minor incidents] but the I Bolshevik leaders did not feel strong enough to challenge the Japasnrese ? and ritt.tkh at that time. They therefore swallom4 their irritation and endeavor Al to place on their natural political impulses a rea:trairit sufficient to ovoid provocatt+ n for further Allied action. Very soon thereafter the YladivostoiL situation began to be complicated by a tuber rector destined to have, in the end, a more decisive influence on the affairs of that region than did the presence of the Allied marines. This was the arrival there or the first of the Czech forces trying to make their way from I opeen ]Russia over the Trans-Siberian Rtailwaaw to the Pare iftc and thence, via the United Staten, to the western front, ae * of the Japanese landing was naturally received with most intense ? alarm and suspicion by the Bolshevik leaders in Moscow. It was f$ the beginning of intervention. Lenin at once despatched to the Ti Soviet a message voicing this interpretations Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6 at to adiately after lewmiM of Suwon i vflx//3 btn s . so, barbitne that it night 1 t for h to leave. "Do not ho ld justified,' he Vired to .gobins on (or about) the d4AO in easing you to remain Ion, ,r in Naeov to neglect of .00 proae- caatt,ion of your Jet Oral! wore, bn't 'tthis does not imply * want of &VOMOtatiotm of the service you have Meador" me is bee pi . g ae ewtTta.4 caaac3erxaiag matters iapoartaamb . N to know, and gtvtn 0440 slions and a dvtsm, as well as be$*..a cbaasl of unoffiolel t` ie"ton with the Soviet government. ... ao Robins we himself, by this tits, ccmi2Z' to the view that there was Approved Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP80RC01R000500560004-6 KIEVAN point in his reiaai ning longer in se to without greater eu rt fr= metro 0% To his, the arrival of the 'Jeri RmM briar had *It ye seemed to be a sort of deadline. no and maintained for weekM. that if "csollat4lt ltioxt" could days after the arrival of the new. German ? i sssdor,. Count kirSacb -- to vired Wt be arran Md by May 1, the lowdlate same Vag up, and to the Tess tin ton be*dgyartera of the Pod Cross ... Liquidation American Bed Crass supplies relief sort sin practically complete, pa:osmeaid rot: m all members mission America. Plowing departure about ller; fift"natth. ... By cheer coincidence, both the Department Of State and the VOtIONV& Bed is Cross headquarters had artiyed, at precisely the name time but by wholly i m- pendent proareeees, at the very asee oc esleeion -- gomely, that Robins mat- larave? Sven before this time, there had alsoad ' been signs of too* a xisty in the Department about Robins* pal titan in Moscow. What brot bt this on is not altar. A suggestion contained in it mate received by the Department from the .0/ C.wrming & Pettit, merit. P. 2%. 30/ P. aw. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6 Approved F elease 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP80RO 1R000500560004-6 =MAN ,IIIIA 8ritI, y Mtbassy on aril 19, to the affect that "Colonai hob3 te' directed to t *%%r to the S ovigt , overnesett an d Allied position 4h Intervention anther matters, NW hate cod es as 8 shoals to for 6.Cretary and! -4ossrs, revealing as It VW extent to which Poibir!e was alr t4.- avieet ll a ire le, as the off total united $tatew re prssentat iv. to ? the 6 govrts eft. on p3rd, fwtttartoae, N, pattaae4 had c9bined to Fronds that Robins Vag "cabling to Ih psosz also Fed Craw direct without sstY?e known on taattet political polic y.," and had- told Vrmnots to Oft that such ins to" ow in Rune only throjo the MOSSY ttnaral. Now on *pril 25, the $eermta r State, Ocoer*tn had s i trview with WO Counselor, Fra out of Ibues!a thsu bbd Croce," and a sec of State Wilbur Carr "on Ram Bobbins 0tt104g My son lllobbits "lbw, with A"14 *60t 5.cretsry had before him, it this tile, "Mrs I "quest for a transfer and tic J* -Wood wssaV from. iiullWd about the Inquiaitfvsnses of I end g with regard reason for this recsase.ndnti(n was his essuaption. that his doeu is would be published by the Avierloan gofer Kent lum4iatety upon his own arrival in Wash i ton, and that this would cause the 4oviet goverywnflt to take reprisals Ynlorastioa and the Reed Cross be ordered out of Russia within a fotnight. WtshIn ton recaasasnding that all repreasntat farts of the Cca mitt : to Sierft and his doaursnte. 8ia80n, f hlisncr, never in L on roots to the united states, had (just sent a telegram (April 24) to Ilkis Principals to .31.E Lane tng l , .c +.C it. Approved For, Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R000500560004-6 Approved [of Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP80RM31 R000500560004-6 d? paws* is *mi ntion in Siberia ., In riw of the 9' :st sitn$t1 49 you think it wi.. to G&VA" Francis to uniir through unafftot 1 ohaaDeis in ontatpeg f'r i' ky a request tw to i by vai' of ltu~Na t'k! do not fool that we iAd go furthair' than this at time present tine and r an not sure that this is uncertainty of Trotsky 'e ~r. ... Will you gloss* give se your opinion as to 1 course which 4*"4d be taken?' TO t base eaeuunieations, the Presi t replied on day 20 I do not know what **-spy by way of comment oa these Viers that I have not already a .,r.peatedly. The two parts of this gnrst va (as you properly d1 criminate tl ) suit not and oasm t be cued and discussed together. Semonoff is ah ging the sit- uatt s Siberia vary rapidly., apparentlyl : amd t saleral March and the Stettf e clear and decided In Ibe it opinion that (1) no strong end force to amount to anything o be sent to Murmansk vttho* subtracting just that +h shipping, and tan power from the VOiti0h front, and (2) t evah a subtraction at the itesMnnt ctrl., iez mild t unwise ...',/ Le, Ong, dining that evening;;(May 20) at the British 1'bsbailorr, took the tuaaity to tell rbading that the President 'a views an inter, ration, which had `been expressed on a number of occasions, renamed 'unchanged. / There is northing in thee. interviews between Pending and Lams ing to sag- gent that either man had, at that time, any knwlod8is either of the decisions of the Abbeville meeting of the Supreme War Couno'll, conoorning the routing of a pcrtion of the Cxeche to the northern ports, plan ?? then in process of adoption -- that flowed from the bbeville decision. Fore 15a ft- i I,a i 1920, Vol. Ir (1*)), p. 361. mid. P, 351. ' Lansing MS, o c t , Desk Diary, Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6 1 Approved Felease 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP80R011R000500560004-6 XVI12e. other Allied participation in a pose ibis expedition. xehii thought personally th ai -rican participation, in paaticular, , ould be most velcom* " the Japa.- ness goveriseent, and he eug ested that an a ' acpeditioa compcseq Ut Japanese, Chi. gees, and Americans vould go far to remove -hseian suspicions. Lansing sp$- fleeted to him that he obtain his g rnaeent Is authority to make this 0*ement, which Ishil undertook to do. The talk the turned on the nub of troops required, and haw far an expedition should advence. Lensing ended by iq r$e- ing on his visitor the need for holding (hrnan forces in the Esst, and painted a vivid picture of the danger, in the event of a %rman victory in France, of 0et~eeaieyIs turning eastward and beacming the aietrees of Siberia, / All this was put forward in terms that, would have sounded nothing but famiiiex had they issued, at that juncture, from the lips of Self our himself. Lansing and the President new Ishii a several occasions in the Ruing days. The notations on the Uftter's visits to Lansing's office, as recorded on the Secretary's desk calendar, indicate the subject of discussion (on May 6) as "hie GOT[ ezi n) t ?e desire to control any military movement in Siberia," and (on Noy 11) "impossibility of Japan supplying tonnage to transport our troops to Siberia. "3/ On May 16 the American ,'mbassador in Tokyo, Mr. Roland S. Morris, was able to report back to Washington that discussion, of the entire question of intervention hid been revived very actively in Tokyo within the past fortnight owing -- among other things to a ",report from Ishii to his Government that 33/ DL., PP. 144-145; from Lansing's letter to Wilson of April 29* 34/ Lansing WS, ? c . , Desk Diary. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R000500560004-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles I understand from Mr. Chapin that you had planned to discuss with your brother the possibility of releasing the Lansing papers to the public. Alice is ho'! din a let_te for you ti4 to show to him. it 17 May 57 (DATE) FORM NO. 10 1 WHICH REPLACES MAY FORM BE USED. 10-101 I AUG 54 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560004-6

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