PAGES FROM KENNAN'S JOURNAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000500560005-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: NOTES

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It is worth noting, for its bearing on later events, that this letter,
lihe the record of Lansing*, recent talk with Ishii, made no naltion of any
participation by the British or the Pren-h in each an undertakin
After sending the letter on to the President, Leasing replied to Keenan
that be had read it with special interest lbecause it comes from the hishest
authority in America on Russia."
Be vas net lure, he said, of the visdem of
intervention in Biberia, but be was gratified to find "that your reaction to
the confusion of the situation ie very similar to my own ..." lift could Wm"
frown
." that the subject is receiving very oareful consideration
both as to the policy and as to the physical difficulties c)f
transportation, which on account of lack of ships in the Pacific
are very great. .3?.1/
? In the particular matter of a possible economic ccrnaiasIon, pressure on
the dministration was now beginning to go beyond mere expressions of opinion
and to aesume organizational forma. Is have already noted Vint the end of May
was precisely the time when the League to Aid and Cooperate with Russia" was
threatening most seriously to become active and to generate ideas and proposals
of its own -- a prospect always alarming to the men around Wilson. In addition
to this the War Trade Board, under the able management of Mr. Vance McCormick,
appointed on May 21 a three-man committee (one of the members was Mr. John Poster
Dulles) to short out a program for the resumption of economic dealings with
.7:0 George Kerman has, Library of Congress, Box 8.
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Council appealed to President Wilson to *ppm, the policy, here r.cn.ed
and twos turPoeble it to be canto* into effect before it is too 1st*. glif
This final appeal frost the Airman er Council, reached Washington, and was
holhaud by Reading to the President, on the.afternoon of July 3, shortly before
Lansing1Lehone clan about the Czech eeture of Vladivostok. The time oe deci-
sion had me/ tinselly arrived, The choice -- to the President, at ]a?t- now
seemed reasonably clear.
The next day was the Fourth of July, and one of the hottest. There 11118 an
exilurulaust to mount 'Vernon on the Presidential yacht, 122 WATFLUAlt, Seth the
President stile Leming were aboard, The other guests included a ayenber of repro-
siotatives of various foreign language groups in the United States. It was under-
stood that the President would make a speech at Mount Vernon; and it was thought
by many that he might use this as an ccossion for announcing his decision with
respect to Russia.
Wilson vas courteous enough to his guests, and tried to make than feel at
home in the faze of the sweltering heat. But we may assume that both he and ,
Lensing had their minds rather on Siberian matters than on the steaming hanks
of the Potomac past which they moved, At saes time during the course of that
dab whether before or after the excursion., Lansing found the leisure to draw
uP a nenorandue for the President on the Siberian question. ? It was to deci-
sive recommendation. The seizure of Vladivostok by the Czechs, and their success
in western Siberia had "materially changed the situation," wrote,W "by intro-
diming a sentlm.nta:L element into the question of our duty." There was now an
28/ Foreign Rola 1PlIFt 1918, Russia, Vol. 11, op.ott., P. 246; from Frazier Is
telegram to SMOTATI, July 2, midnight (PP. 2kl-2)46).
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/MOAN
American reapcb1lity to aid them, prslIceed that a supply of arms be
seat to the Czech eeeelienent in Vladivostok, end that sole" troop*. edeadst be
*sot ***stet them in policing the railroad end tallisemming and diaperslog" the
1
Germs
ion prisoners-of-ear who, be Understood, vete opposing them.
Aiding the Czechs vas, after all **entirely different thing frog intervening
on other grounds. gven though same American forces were sent, ors wouloi have to
rely onAlipszt to supply the bulk of the requisite forces.
the intention and the readiness to refrain from interfering in Busoian internal
Affairs, should be made at once. A peaceful coamission of representatisee Of
various phasei of society, 'to-wit, moral, industrial) commercial, financial and
agricultural)* should be sent and should *proceed westward from Vladivostok
following as closely as possible) with das regard to eafety, the Czecho-Sloveks."
Its final destination and function should depend on its reception by tile Russian
people tad on the military resistance encountered.19/
Lensingle memorandum vas presumably seat to the President on the morning
of Priday, the 5th. Later that day the President phoned and said he eished to
see Lansing, Baker, Secretary of Navy Josephus Daniels, and General March at
two ***lock on the 6t14 The meeting took place that Saturday afternoon,
scheduled, in an upper room of the White Meuse, with Admiral Benson also attend-
ing. After se had seated ourselves, somewhat in order of rank)" Oenerel
March later reoorded, the President entered the room with a pad in his hand
and taking a position standing and facing us, read from his pod his views
The emeencement of
kg/ Lansing M680 op. cit? Diary Blue Sores, Spa 2.
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Az A
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thm afternoon it dawned on
the,
the Japanese wo eiste1y tell
them:Jawed goverment' about the American approach and that great mileent-
asrt ''i1 in the meantime, they had beet .1 directly Tr,
Wallington. Se it once exposed these mIlv,tions in a nate to the ETaaidentif
end obtained the Latter's app ?Tel to his av,risi t the British, irenCfi MO
itella nvoys, in etrictest confide
done the 'X'aIlowing morning (Tneeday,
e, cf what had l*ert decided.
LY.9), in three separate isiterv).-
the Jepartment of State.2/ No record of theen interviews is available. There
iu'remon to believe that the reactiem of Lord _NetsdIng in particular, wee one
of outraged sgtoi4aaont, partly ov the moaner in Which the docillen had been
taken, partly because of ionaing's stud'
aUs were to take in the proposed ac ti
in early afternoon there was a Cebinet me tint. Bement
had left, Lansing told the President of Boading'a reaction,
lubbiguity about the pert the western
weft irritated by it. (Wartime strain
after the others
evidently,
weariness was, by this time, breeding
itt characteristic asperities, Wi1eo rd Ma Secretary of Stott had both nOW
worked themselves into a high state of suspicion et British motive, and. resent-
lent of Rritieh pressures in the Siberian problem.) Not long after Lensing had
?etiwaed to his desk at the State De
nt the three Allied envoys (the other
V./0'J inly ballad byAeading for thiu ose) appeared in 54y, demandirt
to know
2/1 Lensing IC38 cit. DeS Diary.
II, OD. tp, 7
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whether the Allied lloweemmenes were not to take part in the
landinglof troops at Yladiveetek or whether it was
ettrAtio. the American] puree*e to confine the enter;rise to
4eneneee and American troops.
Lens ing
4 that he had never sueee te matter with the President
end could see no abject in doing so until Japanese epproval had
at which time the United States lovertment would .glad to con lt with the
western `1.11.0s. Eharp exchanges ettid. Z.nelii ohared that in failing to
eonsult the ilies the Istericans were nI d ing whet bed 'been done to them.-
solves ee many occagions. Feeding found tills statement offensive; end he
insisted that the Allies ought to participate in the initial landing. To this
Lens irkg replied
4... that this seemed to me rather a natter of national pride and
floral:ant then a practical causation; %het I could not understand
why this subject should be raised and that it ehowed to me the
wisdom of the course which we had ten in not consulting all the
Allied Ooverments before we had acted as apparently there would
have 1'en delay in discussing the details 3/
it is impossible to note this says without drawimf: attention to the
extraordinary workings of the serf-can mind in matters of Inter-Allied relations.
tx menthe the Allied govermente had pleaded with the ',hilted States govern-
ment to jtin them in scale action relating to Siberia and had refrained., most
reluctantly, from action of their n while they it d for the linitoi stetia
to mareup its mind. Nov weeb nKtoi, having made its own decision without con
zultirv, them, was determined to act vith ',Ascot precipitation. 'Iwo days was
own too short a time and the need fo 1nts vas cited as juotificetion for not
8 1.1esis Vel. II, op.citt,?
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UMW
COnSU tirq the Allies et ell, 1st haland that, ?re
temptmennrejection of the British wiry it
be ore
fail to mote Lanstne
ntimentel" OWN
te'drawing up his own mbeerandum for the President on 'VT ,
QUIPS-
tion, Lansing had justified the entire change of American pelicy hy the preposi-
tion that the seizure of Ifladiloet the Czechs "had rrterielly ?hammed the
situetien by introducing a gritlimggtel element into the question of .v.t!' duty. "11/
The July 6 desision had cited 'eenttment 1 rds" an dictatin-r the American
action, Wow Lansing
omplained rrecisely that Peading4s attitude vas a matter
of sentiment. More than once, in this etrinoni
is chew.. "1
net disposed," he said,
stion, he reterned to
to corcider the sentimental phase but only the expedient side of
the question. ... I thought expediency should control and that if
expedience was opposed to British prtictpetion that, to my mind,
ended it ...
Sentiment, when it cum to determining Abericer notions; expedience, vhen it come
to , ding the behavior of America's Allies --this is the principle Opt appears
from Lansing's reaction* on this oc,aa ton.
d. Feeding was, for obvious aon unappeased by Lensing position.
iifficalty he was restrained, the following day, from telegraphing to hie
government a stinging report on the 'otter which, the President considered, would
have made a 7i,o0,c1 deal of troutle.i rven without this report, the irritation
In cordon Vas intense, dithout delay, on the 10th, the British goVernment
4/ &lee above p. II/20-21 (ttaiLs are
5./ Lana Ing Wkx Desk t)tary, duly 10.
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411 u1/12
Thte contains the policy of the United E,tatee in :Russia
'which you Sr. to follow. VOA& your step; you will be walking
on wogs loaded with dynamite. Clod bless you and good-bye.
This order was subetantially the only litical guidance3ener 1 5ra $
woe ever to re eive in the promulgatioo of his inteneely delioate and compile'
wee presented to him, utterly
cetnO miseion. That it was, even a the time
t was still further out of date by the time he
ilmiaquate to its purpose, ta
a' ved in Siberia, end that within two writhe after his arrival it had lost all
coroeiveole relevance, IMMO never to oeve ocoorred to him. lie accepted it with
that onquestioning and religious reverence vhich sterling soldiers nermelly bear
rir directives from supreme authority. For one nd e half years .he 'would clino
to the letter of it'with a stubbornness that would drive his Allied colleagues
-1 baleful see-
and eesociate
pidion end hostility anyone who profess d to have s&o4s orders or anyorm who bed
the temerity to question the r ley oe and vied= of his ummolaj
On the game day that General Greve* received these orders,
the President issued to the press a coMmuniqui vbich represented, in effect,
a oarephreee of the key portions of the eldeemimin. On this 81100 day, Jape-
nese and British forces arrived in Vladivostok and began to go ashore. Also on
this day, %wet 3, in ddition to giving General Grevee his orders, the War
Depertmeet directed the Commendino General In the Philippines to despatch to
.11 in n telegram to Polk of Jols 31, Lansing, then on vacation, werned against
Oraves' appointment as commander of the Siberian expediticeo He had beard,
ae said, that Graves ''bos nt the tact and diplomacy to deal with so
delicate a situation 'whey* the Commanding ?nicer requires other than mili-
tary ability. (Polk MSS, owoelS.) Pleinly, no hoed was pala ta this werninda
to despair; and he woold never cease to regard
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