PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ATTACHED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000900070004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 29, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

1TAN90,RD FORM NO. 64
0
ApproTHS?1~
# 6239
.
ice Memoran
DOCUMENT NO.
TO : Assistant Director for National Estimates
FROM Assistant to the Director
SUBJECT: Presidential Address Attached
Soviet intentions, you might wish to cormnent on it.
3. We have been asked to make an early return o the draft to
2. Because it ventures into a. discussion of possible or probable
delivery in the event of a breakdown in negotiations at haesong.
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THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE DECLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED.
29 August 1951
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
a OECLASSIW! D
CLASS. CF1ANGED To: TS 3
NEXT REVtEW DATE;
AUTH: y
OAn 4 RIV+EMR,
The attached standby address has been prepared for Presi ential
2003' 0#CL~ T0M70004-6
SATES GOVERNMENT
 ..
Approved For Release 2003/
CONFIDENTIAL
30 August 1951
SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Standby Address for Presidential Delivery in the
Event of a Breakdown in Negotiations at Kaesong
REFERENCE: Memorandum of Assistant to the Director, 29 August 1951.
1. The draft assumes that the Communists will so act that it will be
plain to all that they have broken off the negotiations, but that there
,will not have been a new offensive. Ile believe any such clear-cut break-
off action is unlikely. In the recent bombing incident, the Communists,
clumsy as they were in fabricating the incident, were clever in avoiding
the onus of a definitive break. The USSR has generally been extremely
careful to avoid the appearance of breaking off negotiations, and the
Chinese Communists during the civil wax generally renewed hostilities not
after any definite break but while talks were still going on or when they
had been tacitly allowed to drop. in our view the two most likely con-
tingencies are:
(a) That the Communists will allow the talks to-fade away, per-
haps to the point where no further meetings are scheduled, but without a
formal break-off. In this case, a Presidential speech throwing the blame
on the Communists or warning them against Starting a new offensive would
presumably be more guarded than the present draft.
(b) That the Communists will launch a major offensive, claiming
that the US/UN disrupted the negotiations and possibly employing other
arguments connected with the Japanese Peace Treaty. In this case, a
Presidential speech would necessarily deal with the actuality of renewed
aggression rather than merely with the threat.
2. The second half of the draft (from the 2nd paragraph of page 7
on) deals with the risk of war with the USSR in highly generalized terms,
including reference to present Us policies but also carrying a strong hint
of unspecified US offensive action (e.g., the 2nd paragraph of page 12 and
the closing sentence of the draft). We suggest that initially emphasis be
given to the UN determination to reach its objectives in Irea by whatever
means are required, including the military moves already covered in pages
9-11 of the draft. Instead of stressing the possibility that Communist
China might engage in aggressions elsewhere in Asia (which is not regarded
as likely in US intelligence estimates), it would be better to emphasize
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2 80R01731 R000900070004-6
 App ~e ,Fjp,-Re, Icase'22003
that the probable intensification of the war in '1~orea is liI.ely to lead to
full-scale war between the UN/15 and Communist C??ina. Thereafter, the re-
sponsibility of the USSR and the risk of general war between the US and
the USSR could, be considered, along with a statement of whet the American
people must do`to meet this situation.
3. It is noted that no part of the draft is addressed directly to
the fighting men in Korea. Explanation of the situation to these men ap-
pears vital.
4. On pages 5 and 6, reference is made to lDroduction of "heavy
weapons, ammunition, or airplanes" in Communist China. Since Communist
China does produce some ammunition, it is suggested that this read: "heavy
weapons, artillery, tanks, or planes." (Note that there are two references.)
5. On page 7, reference is made to Communist capabilities:
(a) If reference is made to possible further Coimxunist aggression
in Asia (see comment 2 above), from an intelligence standpoint an early at-
tack on India appears unlikely, though it may be desirable for policy
reasons to refer to such an attack as an eventual possibility. We suggest
the wording: ". . . against Indo-China, Burma, and the rust of Southeast
Asia."
(b) The possibility of attack in Western Europe might be empha-
sized more, together with an explicit statement that tho Soviet Union is in
a state of war-readiness both in Europe and in the Far East.
6. From the intelligence standpoint, it seems unwise at this time,
when the emphasis should be on resistance to aggression, to suggest that
the real American objective is the reduction of the Soviet orbit (pages 12
and 13).
25X1
=IILISAM L. GER
Assistant Director
'dational Estimates
Approved For Release 2003/
R01731 R000900070004-6
 25 1OURCE: CIA CONTROL NUMBER: 23
DATE OF Au 51 DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED: 29 Aug 51
COPY NUMBER (S) : Orig LOGGED BY: mars
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