THE DOMINICAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000600050004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 13, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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Approved Too
13 December 1965
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
The Vice President
SUBJECT
The Dominican Situation
1. Attached is a memorandum you may find
of interest on the current situation in the
Dominican Republic.
2. A review of recent developments indicates
that the provisional Dominican government has
achieved a fragile stability, and most politically
minded Dominicans feel it will survive until the
elections slated for 1 June. We are by no means
out of the woods there yet, but Garcia Godoy
appears to be dealing with the worst problems
on the left and also to have composed, at least
temporarily, his principal differences with the
military.
'RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment
OCI No, 2954/65, 11 December 1965, "The Dominican Republic:
An Assessment."
25X1 Identical memos to: Walt W. Rostow, Thomas C. Mann & Jack Hood
Vaughn
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OCI No. 2954/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
11 December 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Dominican Republic: An Assessment
1. The provisional government in the Dominican
Republic has achieved a fragile stability after a
turbulent break-in period. Many moderates and con-
servatives both in civilian and military life have
developed a degree of confidence in the regime--
confidence that was badly lacking in mid-October.
The continuing series of concessions made to the
left appear to have helped achieve Hector Garcia
Godoy's purpose--the bloodless elimination of the
rebel-held zone. The government now controls the
country and most politically minded Dominicans
feel it will survive until the elections slated
for 1 June. Under these circumstances, Garcia
Godoy will probably pursue more balanced policies
designed to reconcile the two still hostile fac-
tions that contested the civil war.
2. Nevertheless, the provisional government
remains a government without popular support, bol-
stered largely by the Inter-American Peace Force.
The regime's mode has proven to be compromise but
extremist forces of both the left and right remain
willing and probably able to mount widespread ter-
rorism if they feel threatened. The Communists
have made inroads-most notably in the labor field
and among students--from which they may prove diffi-
cult to dislodge. The same animosities which tore
the country apart in April 1965 remain--magnified
by the revolt itself, but now muted at least tempor-
arily. It remains to be seen whether the present
government can provide the conditions necessary for
holding elections in June of 1966 and whether if
such elections are held the results will be ac-
cepted by the Dominican people without a fresh out-
burst of violence.
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3. In mid-October the regime was on shaky ground.
The appointment of a number of leftists to leading
positions in the government and Garcia Godoy's re-
sponsiveness to rebel demands alienated moderates,
the military and other conservative
oelementstinose
dismay was fanned by the slow pace
arms and reducing the rebel zone in Santo Domingo.
Rumors that the military chiefs were to be replaced,
coming after the ouster of General Wessin,
the military to the point of rebellion. Both the
extreme left and right attempted to exacerbate civil-
military tension.
4. Since then, the short-term outlookihusaim-t proved--a development not all directly l ate ibt 60
to the provisional government. During
days the "unity of the left" has come undone. The
Th
large
Communists have failed to mount effectively
-
e nonnon-
demonstrations and strikes, in part el
Communist left-wing politicians have judged
for the time being, at least, support of the pro-
visional regime is in their best interest. The
failure of a disorganized rightist attempt to
up in Santiago an alternative the pr visiionvl-
government has reduced the appetites
for conspiracy. The firm action of the
Inter-American Peace Force in opening up the rebel
zone capped Garcia Godoy's torturously slow ap-
proach to the enforcement of the peace terms. This
and the quick end of the Santiago conspiracy con-
tributed to the public consensus that the provisional
government will remain in power until elections.
5. Garcia Godoy is now demonstrating that his
regime is capable of governing and at the same time
is increasingly confident of his own abilities. He
also appears to be exercising a closer degree of
control over many of his appointees and is injecting
himself into policy making in such areas as labor
relations. Garcia Godoy's actions in setting
tions for 1 June 1966 and filling vacancies of the
three man electoral board with two moderates have
contributed to a psychological atmosphere in which
many politicians look to the future.
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6. In the field of government staffing, Garcia
Godoy has taken the step of removing the most influ-
ential and objectionable appointee, former Attorney
General Manuel Morel Cerda. Morel's successor,
Gustavo Gomez Ceara, has begun to moderate the in-
fluence of leftists in the legal area. In addition,
Garcia Godoy has given assurances that Gomez will
remove many of Morel's undesirable appointees.
Garcia Godoy has promised other staffing changes
that will prove beneficial--such as the removal by
the Supreme Court of several extremists it appointed
to judgeships and the transfer of Franklin Dominguez,
a militant rebel who is now the President's Press
Secretary. It should be recognized, however, that
continued confidence in the regime by conservative
civilians and the military will be to some degree
dependent on Garcia Godoy's fulfilling these
promises and closely supervising those undesirable
appointees who remain in office.
8. The Dominican military appears to be united
behind the present armed forces' chiefs. Relations
between President Garcia Godoy and the military
leaders have improved but remain tenuous. However,
both right and leftwing political groups have and
will probably continue their attempts to exacera-
bate tension between the president and the military.
The military's opinion of the president has steadily
improved since late October as Garcia Godoy has
demonstrated his ability to govern and shown himself
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not subservient to leftist forces. Garcia Godoy
has also apparently realized that he has little to
gain by precipitously replacing the present service
chiefs and secretary of the armed forces who have
proved relatively effective and loyal under the
circumstances. In any event the presence of the
Inter-American Peace Force, now numbering about
7,000, supporting the provisional government,
severely limits the Dominican armed forces' free-
dom of action.
9. The country's two leading political parties,
the Reformist Party (PR) and the Dominican Revolu-
tionary Party (PRD) are warming up for the national
elections. Although campaigning is supposedly limited
to the period three months prior to elections, ac-
cording to the governing Institutional Act, most
Dominican politicians have now turned their efforts
toward the election. Former President Joaquin
Balaguer, who heads the PR, announced his candidacy
in July and has begun making public appearances and
speeches throughout the country. Juan Bosch's PRD
has still to announce its candidate but it is prob-
able that if the party takes part in the elections,
Bosch will be its candidate, The PRD is presently
undergoing internal strife as former party leader
Angel Miolan and Bosch feud over party leadership.
The third ranking National Civic Union (UCN) appears
moribund and the numerous micro-parties are jockeying
for alliances. The outlawed Communist parties will
probably not be allowed to participate in the elec-
tions.
10. Living conditions, never satisfactory for
the greater majority of Dominicans, have already re-
turned to normal. Santo Domingo's shops, restaurants,
and commercial institutions most of which are located
in the former rebel zone, are now open, but prices
are high. Business, concerns which adopted pro-revo-
lutionary titles during the revolt have now reverted
to their original names, The populace in Santo
Domingo, however, appears restless and without di-
rection. Unemployment and underemployment are high.
Ship traffic to Santo Domingo, the country's princi-
pal port, has resumed but a shortage of storage space
is causing some problems, The demand for consumer
goods, pent up during the revolt, can be expected
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to return the country's trade balance to a deficit
despite the government's efforts and lead to a short-
age of foreign exchange. Living conditions in the
interior of the country were largely unaffected by
the revolt except for temporary shortages of food
and imported goods. Unemployment, estimated at one
third of the labor forces before the revolt, in-
creased as some business concerns suspended opera-
tions and the United Fruit Company terminated its
banana operations.
11. Many of the basic social economic problems
which beset the Provisional Government would have
existed even if there had not been a revolt. They
were exacerbated by the recent strife. It is un-
likely that in the time remaining to him, Garcia
Godoy will be able to do more than make a modest
start toward solving some of them. Nor will the
holding of free elections provide a panacea.
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SEGRET
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11 December 1965
OCI No. 2954/65
Copy No.
83
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: AN ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
DOCU'MFNT NO.
Ntt_ 7 r':- Nti . IN CLASS. t'
c t_r c 'a ED TO: TS S C
1 U,ATr=:
AU 1: HR TO-21 DATE: _ REVIEWER:
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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SFCRJT
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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