FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000400100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
COMMUNIST FORCES
FIRMED
UNCONFIRMED
CON
bat
C
Combat
PERSONNEL
C
mbat
Com at
Support
om
TOTALS
o
s
li
Personnel
Personnel
Battalions
MAIN FORCE Personnel
on
Batta
9
82,567
VIET CONG 63,164
90
17,553
1,850
PAVN 46,300
78
--
1,200
9
47,500
Sub
553
050
3
18
130,067
Total 109,464
168
17,
,
below
--
160,000
PARAMILITARY 103,600
battalion
level
40,000
16,400
-
TOTALS 213,064
168
57,553
19,450
18
290,067
NOTES: More than one half of the 168 confirmed combat battalions listed are now organized into 2 5X1
32 regiments, of which 13 are Viet Cong and 19 are PAVN. in addition, most of these re i D
ments are suspected 25X1 D The PAVN personnel listed above are those organized only in the corresponding PAVN units.
Those North Vietnamese organized in Viet Cong units are listed as Viet Cong personnel.
The 40,000 paramilitary support personnel are armed political cadres.
ALLIED FORCES
COUNTRY
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
RVN
TOTALS
Army
Marines
Air Force
Navy
Coast Guard
Army
Navy
Marines
Air Force
Paramilitary
157 26 63
280,422
16,204
6,870
6 4 7 13,906
388,497
162 26 63 6 4 7 705,899
42 26 2/3 20
18 9 1/3 12
-- 48 21 189,815
8 11 3 54,904*
33 -- 24 44,279
16 -- 2 21,585*
442
US 32 57 59 50 311,025
TOTALS 60 36
Australia
New Zealand
25X6
2 1/3 39,747
9 5 4,378
1 1/3 149
1/3 -- - 1149
(Ps chological warfare, civil action, and medical teams) ^
25X6
25X6 25X6
OTHER FREE 2 1/3 45,545
WORLD TOTAL 10 5 2/3
97 2/3 63 63 57 1,062,469
ALLIED FORCE TOTAL 232 67 2/3
*US naval air and marine units afloat are included in unit listings above, but not in personnel
total.
GROUND FORCE BATTALIONS AIR SQUADRONS, COMPANIES PERSONNEL
Armor, Engineer
Infantry Artillery Other Support Strike Helicopter Other TOTALS
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TOP SECRET
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12 September 1966
25X1 C
DCI BRIEFING FOR
1. The Free World forces in South Vietnam are
continuing to maintain the pressure on the
Communists which has so far e"d the
development of a major Viet ng o ensive
during the monsoon season.
We have been able to launch a series
of successful "spoiling operations"---
attacks in force into areas where the
enemy has been trying to concentrate
forces for large-scale actions.
1. These operations have not only
kept the Communists off balance,
but have inflicted heavy casualties.
2. One good example was Operation
Hastings, carried out in July in
northern Quang Tri Province. U. S.
Marines and South Vietnamese regulars
attacked units of the 324-B Division
of the North Vietnamese army, which
had infiltrated directly across the
Demilitarized Zone.
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 S E C R E T
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3. In an operation continuing from July
7 to August 2, the allied forces
killed 882 men--by actual body count--
and many more were probably killed by
tactical air strikes. The North
Vietnamese units were forced back into
the demilitarized zone.
B. The North Vietnamese division involved in
HASTINGS---324B--has a strength of ablut 9,000 men,
so it was far from being destroyed. As a matter
of fact, it resumed activity in mid-August,
and is again being attacked in a follow-on
operation, called PRAIRIE.
1. Through yesterday, another 734 enemy dead
had been counted in PRAIRIE
2. These major spoiling operations are good
examples of how the allied tactics have
been able to keep the Communists off
balance so that they cannot launch
major offensives.
The spoiling operations have been successful
largely because the allied forces have such
great mobility, good air support, and
enemy dispositions and movements.
constantly improving inte liI Bence on
a.~r
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C. In most of the encounters this spring and summer,
the enemy has not chosen to stand and fight
as he did in the Ia Drang Valley battle
last november, in the highlands of Pleiku Province.
1. We have to search him out. In addition to
the big sweeps, the allied forces maintain
the pressure with 10 to 15 operations at
all time in battalion strength or more.
2. These probes had led to a number of small
but sharp engagements. aka
II. As a result, the Communists have been taking heavy
casualties, with an average of about 1,550 killed per week.
"he body count for the first eight months this year
already exceeds the 35,400 killed in 1965.
A. The rate of infiltration from North Vietnam,
however, is also greatly increased. Apparently
the Viet Cong are also calling up a larger
number of their regional guerrillas for the
main forces.
1. The Communist main force now has more
than 106,000 men in combat units--1S8
battalions.
2. This includes about 50,000 men in regular
formations of the North Vietnamese army.
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25X1 D
3. We believe that there are 9 North
Vietnamese and 13 Viet Cong regiments.
B. Many of the 158 enemy battalions operate as
independent battalions, or in even smaller
units.
25X1 D
C. This means that the enemy retains a signi-
ficant capability for large-scale operations,
as well as a high level of small actions
against isolated outposts and smaller allied
units.
D. There is no indication that there has been
any radical change in the overall Communist
strategy. That is to attack in force wherever
the terrain and other factors are strongly to
their advantage, and where they believe they
can achieve victories at the smallest possible
cost.
(SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL SITUATION)
I. As for the political situation in South Vietnam,
the mililtary government of Premier Ky continues
to maintain the relatively stable position it has
enjoyed since overcoming the Buddhist "struggle"
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movement last spring.
A. Most recently, of course, the election held
last Sunday has been the center of at.I ention.
The outcome appears likely to enhance the
stability of the regime.
B. The identities of those elected to tJ
constituent assemLlv have no particuLAr
bearing; the significant facts are that
more than five and a anarter million ?enple
registered to vote, and that more than
80 percent of those registered actually
now own-W
cast their b l l of s .
C. This would appear to be an excellent
performance in the light of a call by the
more militant of the Buddhist leaders for
a boycott, and threats by the Viet Cong
against candidates and voters.
1. Incidents of terrorism and harassment
by the Viet Conk; were five times as
high on Election Day as on a normal
day. In general, however, the voting
took place without serious incidents.
2. There may have been some padding of the
rural vote, but observers throughout
the country found no evidence of
official coercion, fraud, or other rigging.
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D. The government, of course, made an
all-out security effort to prevent Viet
Cong disruption of the election, but the
voter turn-out at least indicates that
in areas ere 775 -re is a government
presence less fear of the Viet
00-10-
Cong, and probably less sympathy for their
cause.
F. As for the failure of the Buddhist appeal
for the faithful to abstain from voting,
it points up the weakness in secular
matters of the militants around Thich Tri
Quang who at present control the po!.'cies
of the Buddhist Institute.
II. There are some internal strains within the
military government which might ultimately
cause trouble as the time approaches for the
installation of an elected government under the
new constitution now to be drafted.
A. These strains, however, in large part do
not reflect a refusal by the military to
go along with the constitutional process.
1. They reflect instead the rivalry of
some senior military commanders with
Premier Ky, and their fear that Ky
might dismiss them.
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2. There have also been indications of
some complaints by some junior officers
objecting to alleged corruption of their
superiors.
3. None of these strains, however, appear
so serious or so widespread as to
threaten Ky's position at this time.
(NORTH VIETNAM)
I. As for North Vietnam, the Hanoi leaders appear as
determined as ever to continue the war. They have
rejected all attempts by third parties to get
negotiations started.
III
II. The level of air strikes against North Vietnam has
expanded considerably during the past several
months.
A. The major targets are North Vietnamese lines
of communication, and their POL facilities.
B. The North Vietnamese continue, however, to
be able to move enough men and supplies
through Laos into South Vietnam to maintain
the operations of the Communists in the South.
III. We have obtained more and more evidence in recent
months of the extent to which Hanoi is running--
and taking part in--the war in South Vietnam.
i
A. Captured documents and the interrogation of
prisoners have now identified the man who
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is running the entire Communist war effort
in South Vietnam. He is Nguyen Chi Thanh,
( *NN(,IJEEN CHEF, TAIIN ) a politburo member
of the North Vietnamese Communist Party.
1. Thanh is a general in the North Vietna-
mese Army, and has been its political
commissar. fie left North Vietnam to
take over operations in the South early
in 1965.
2. His two principal deputies are also
both generals in the North Vietnamese
Army, and members of the central com-
mittee of the North Vietnamese Commu-
nist Party.
3. One of them, the military deputy, is
Tran Van Tra, who used to be deputy
chief of staff of the North Vietnamese
Army. Now, under the alias of Tran Nam Trung,
he is listed as chief of the military
affairs committee of the so-called
National Front for the Liberation of
South Vietnam.
4. The deputy who runs the Communist political
organization in South Vietnam is General
Tran Do.
B. That is a good sample of how little identification
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the National Frznt i-or the Liberation
of South Vietnam actually has with the
people of South Vietnam,
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(STATISTICS, SAMs in DRV)
From CS/Pres Vietnam Book)
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20 September l966
MAUON BRIEFING
COM-MUN-TIST CHINA
0
I. The internal political scene in Communist
China has been marked by turmoil and disarray
for many months now. All of the indication-
are that the situation is still unstable,
and there may be further upheavals.
A. For the past month, mobs of rampaging
teenagers of the so-called Red Cuard r:av
kept the coun.ry in a state of disoi'~' ,r
1. They hav:! be( n roaming the stree ~s
of all major Chinese cities,
harassing su pected enemies of :he
regime and o4z.asionally beating then
up.
2. There havf? been a few reports of
extensive vi"lence and bloodshed,
but for the rs,ost part the Red C'iari
appear to be a disciplined and well-
controlled or~,;anization.
3. In the past veek or so, their activities
have subsided somewhat.
B. The destructive an-_ics of these teei?.agers
have tended Co divert public attenticn
from far more important development:.
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v r R r T
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within the party leadership. It appears
to us that the top power structure of the
party is undergoing its most massive
shake-up in the history of the Chinese
Communist regime.
(BRIEFING BOARD, CHICOM LEADERSHIP)
II. Massive demonstrations in Peking on the 18th and
31st of August and on September 15th featured what
appears to be a new line-up of the party's
top policy-making body, the politburo.
A. Mao Tse-tung still dominates the leadership,1
but Defense Minister
Lin Piao has taken
the place of Mao's long-time deputy,
ftv~
Liu Shao-chi.
1. Liu has been tie titular chief of
state. Then has been no announce-
ment that he has lost that position,
and he is still a member of the
politburo, but he has been dropped
ignominiously from second to eighth
place.
B. As for Mao himself, we are not sure just
how much control he still exercises over
day-to-day events, or how long he wil?. last.
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III. Mao's new deputy, Lin Piao, is not in much
better health.
A. Lin is one of the youngest men in the polit-
buro at 59, b=it he has been ill for much
of the past 30 years, probably with
tuberculosis.
25X1 .B
2. His life expectancy is probably not
much more than five years.
IV. Mao, however, appears to have chosen Lin to be
his successor in spite of Lin's frailty. We
think this must reflect Mao's grow
wow"
of other elements of the leadership.
A. Perhaps the most significant aspect of
the recent changes has been the break-up
of the group of leaders which had been
unnin
he past
decade.
1. Liu Shao-chi was the leading member
of that group.
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2. The General Secretary of the Party,
Teng Hsiao-ping, is another leading
member of that group. He has been
weakened, but not as much as Liu.
3. A couple of months ago, in fact,
Teng appeared to have gained in the
shake-up. All that has changed.
Teng is still in the inner circle of
Mao's advisors, but he has slipped
from third or fourth place to sixth
place in the power structure.
leaders close to Lin. and cov_er_nmemt
figures like Chou En-lai, have risen in
importance.
V. For many years now, it had appeared to us that
the leaders of the party machinery--men like
Liu Shao-chi--enjoyed Mao's full trust.
A. They not only had a long record of personal
loyalty to Mao; their radical approach
was also in accord with his.
B. This situation presents us with a
puzzling contradiction, especially in
regard to its policy implications:
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Mao is a marently intent on pushing
through radical program to reshape
Chinesc society. It appears to be so
radical that the party rank-anb i i.1e
could not he trusted to carry it out.
The Re Guard had to be created.
2. There is, therefore, no satisfactory
explanation for Mao's willingness to
turn against his old comrades who
appeared to share his radical views.
3. The government administrators and
economic specialists who have been
retained or even promoted--men like
Chou En-lal, Chen Yun, and Li ! u-chKn--
are the r e.loT ively moderate members of
the politburo.
4. Yet these moderates are now the nen,
who presumably will he helping Mao and
i
Lin Piao to implement the radical ,negra
V1. As I have said, the situation appears to he h ighlv
unstable. The events of the past ten months oust
have intensified the aitagonisms and mistrust
among those leaders who have survived the purge.
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i 0+
struggles and blood, purges.
The possibility has increasdd that when
Mao finally does go, the succession will
be disorderly, and marked by factional
It is also far from clear whether or not
the new leaders are going to institute
any major changes in domestic or foreign
policy.
There has, however, been no change in the
basic hard-line nature of the men at the
top. As a resit.lt, we foresee no abrupt
change in Pek_i;?g' policy of implacable
hostility towaid the United States.
;FOREIGN POLICY)
1. In general, the Peking leaders have been so
pre-occupied with t ?ou',,les at home that they
have been marking time on foreign policy.
Vietnrrn
Ii. On Vietnam, Peking cor nLuos to repeat its
familiar hard line. At th same time, the
Chinese are carefully a;oi.ting any expanc7.on
Of their commitment to neln the North Viet-
r;amese.
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A. The first U. S. attacks on North Vietnam?s
POL storage facilities on June 29th pro-
vided a short-lived barrage of propa-
ganda.
1. Peking triel to convey the impression
that China was more determined than
ever to assist Hanoi in resisting
this new escalo.tion.
2. But the Chinese declarations of
"resolute support" for the Vietnamese
did not exhibit the ring of enthusi-
asm that had marked similar state-
ments on the subject a year ago. The
emphasis was on self-reliance by the
Vietnamese.
B. Peking, however, appears to be just
determined as ever that the North Viet-
namese must continue the war.
1. After the September 7th meeting of
the U. S.:.,and Chinese Communist ambassa-
dors in Warsaw, the Chinese Ambassador
released a statement attacking what he
called the "U.S. peace talks swindle."
Ambassador Want= repeated that China would
support Hanoi against the U. S. to the end.
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C. Those Chinese protests last week abou`:. recent
violations of Chinese air space did not have
any threats of counter-action. For all the
bluster of Chinese propaganda, Peking's
reaction to these incidents has been cautious.
Sino-Soviet Relations
III. The Sino-Soviet dispute has flared up again,
but there is no indication that this marks a
significant change in relations between the
two countries.
A. Mass demonstrations by Red Guards outside
the Soviet Embassy in Peking on Augus^.:
29th and 30th were evidently intended
as a reply to a Soviet diplomatic note
delivered on August 26th which had pro-
tested earlier "acts of hooliganism" com-
mitted by the Red Guards in the vicinity
of the embassy.
1. The Chinese took care, however, to
prevent the thousands of people who
took part in tlYe demonstrations from
getting out of hand and damaging the
Soviet Embassy.
2. This suggests Peking is not willing to
push the Soviets too far.
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B. Peking's most recent blast at Moscow
was a People's Dail article on
September 8th, which accused Moscow
of collaborating with the U. S. to
"sell out the. Vietnamese."
The article called the Soviets
"renegades," "termites of the
working class," and "scum in the
revolutionary ranks."
Moscow has maintained a general posture
of restraint, but the Soviet press is
quoting liberally from criticism of
China in the foreign Communist press.
It has recently sharpened the tone of
its own commentary on China.
1. In recent weeks, the Moscow papers
have also re-printed some of the
more extreme Chinese statements in
connection with the Red Guard, to
let the teen-age antics speak for
themselves.
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
20 September 1966
MAHON BRIEFING
THAILAND
1. You may have noticed some press reports over the
week-end to the effect that the Thai government
had ended the secrecy over U. S. military
operations in Thailand.
A. An American columnist, Richard Wilson,
claimed he had been told by the Thai.
Deputy Defense Minister, Dawee,(Dah-WEE)
that U. S. troops are participating in
joint operations against the Communist
insurgents in northeastern Thailand.
B. The Thai government in Bangkok has
issued prompt and categorical denials
of the Wilson story. We are inclined to
believe that Dawee did not make the
statement, and anyway the denial is
correct.
1. Prime Minister Thanom (Tah-NAWM)
and his Deputy, General Praphat,(Prah-POT)
have both made it clear to us that
they feel the Thai forces can handle
the insurgents.
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2. The Thai government has specifically
rejected any use of U. S. combat
troops in the counter-insurgency
effort.
3. We are, of course, giving them some
advice and support for counter-
insurgency.
IT. The use of bases in Thailand for U. S. aircraft
operating against the Vietnamese Communists
remains an open secret --- neither government
has admitted it yet.
A. All that has been admitted is that the
U. S. has air bases in Thailand.
25X6
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INTEL MEMO: 1595/66, 11 August:
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THAILAND:
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
12 July THAILAND briefing from Global Background Book
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10811
Dien Bier
Phu
A Ph0 617t'?'\
~ntain
Xieng
PLAINE DE Khouang.
JA RRES
00 Miles
SECRET
GULF OF stAM) NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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SOUTHEASTERN LAOS
Muong
Phalane
Muong Nong
Pak Song
,RAKSE
ampassak
)uang I(he
)107
.._923
Bouang
Jam
Phone, . tb
165
vane
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11 July LAOS Briefing from Global Background Book
12 July CAMBODIA, ditto
INDONESIA: 29 Aug _ Briefing
15 Aug Memo for Congressman MAHON
13 July BURMA from global Background Book
STATINTL
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