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July 3, 1975
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WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Commodity Issues: Dialogue of the Deaf . . . 3
Portuguese Military Leaders Seek to Avoid
Power Confrontation with Security
Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
July 3, 1975
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The developed countries in the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development are hav-
ing trouble agreeing on how to cope with the the
demands of the developing states on a better deal
for their raw material exports.
The developing states, for their part, are
not taking any initiative to moderate their de-
mands that are embodied in the declaration for a
new international economic order and the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The
situation adds up to a deadlock that could inten-
sify the quarrel between developed and developing
states at the special session of the UN General
Assembly this fall. It could also derail an
attempt to convene a new conference of oil pro-
ducers and consumers.
At the recently concluded first meeting of a
high-level group established by the OECD minister-
ial council to discuss commodity issues, the dele-
gates put off until fall--after the special UN
session--any further discussion of possible re-
plies to developing countries' demands for a new
deal on trade in raw materials. The delegates
could not agree on a general approach and indivi-
dual objections stymied those specific proposals
that were floated. The debate followed expected
lines:
--the French urged development of commodity
agreements.
--the Germans rejected commodity agreements
and pushed for an earnings stabilization
program for developing states with some
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similiarities to the earnings stabiliza-
tion plan which the EC has inaugurated
with 46 developing states in Africa, the
Caribbean and the Pacific--Bonn wants the
IMF to fund the tab for a global scheme.
--the Australians endorsed both price stabil-
ization through commodity agreements ahd
earnings stabilization to pick up the
slack.
The high-level group agreed to study several
specific commodities but insisted that the selec-
tion in no way bound the OECD countries to support
these markets. Selected were: rubber, copper,
cocoa, hard fibers, tea, jute and sugar.
Earlier in the week the members of the Inter-
national Energy Agency met and reaffirmed their
support for reconvening a conference of oil pro-
ducers and consumers. These states--18 of the 24
OECD members--came no closer, however, to agree-
ing on substantive ways to meet the developing
countries' demands on raw materials. In the ab-
sence of concessions in this forum it is unlikely
that the producer/consumer conference can be re-
convened before the special UN session or the OPEC
experts conference at which new oil prices will be
set.
The dialogue of the deaf which is blocking
progress on any front in relations between rich
and poor states was clearly reflected in the meet-
ing between a representative of the West German
government--one of the most conservative industrial-
ized states--and the President and oil minister of
Algeria--the firebrand of radical developing states.
The German official is on a good-will tour
of those states involved in the Paris energy con-
ference of April and intends to demonstrate Bonn's
"genuine interest" in the resumption of an energy
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conference and in finding ways to close the gap
between the positions of the developed and develop-
ing states.
The Algerians reiterated their usual stand
that they do not intend to play their trump--oil
and oil prices--in the absence of concessions
from the industrialized states. The German count-
ered that the industrialized states cannot be ex-
pected to play their own trump--their technological
know-how--without concessions from the oil pro-
ducers and softening of the developing countries'
demands. The meetings were polite, though criti-
ism of Germany was sharp, and both sides expressed
"grave concern" for the state of the world economy,
but the concern is evidently not yet sufficient
to generate movement on matters of fundamental
principle. (Confidential No Foreign Dissem)
July 3, 1975
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25X1A
Portuguese Military Leaders Seek to Avoid Power
Confrontation with Security Forces
The Portuguese Revolutionary Council has re-
versed its decision to turn the Catholic radio
station--now occupied by leftwing workers--back
to the Church, and backed down on a train fare
hike that had drawn a storm of protest.
The decision to return the station to the
Church--announced on Tuesday by Prime Minister
Goncalves and Information Minister Jesuino--led
to a bitter outcry by the station workers and
several extreme leftwing factions. The Council,
apparently sensitive to criticism from these groups,
decided instead to nationalize all radio stations
and to open the airwaves to "all forces," including
both the Church and the workers.
The Council's decision followed an all-night
session and is not yet backed by proper legisla-
tion. Until the decree-law is completed, the
Catholic radio station will remain in the hands
of the military commission that has run the station
since last March.
The Church hierarchy, having threatened a
break with the government if the station is not
returned to ecclesiastical control, is not likely
to accept the Council's decision in silence.
If military leaders had backed the first
stand and decided to remove the workers by force,
they would have risked a clash with the increas-
ingly independent security troops who might have
refused to carry out the order. The Council cannot
risk such a challenge to its authority at this time
and is apparently backing off from any such con-
frontation.
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The current wave of social unrest in Portugal
is mainly attributable to extreme leftwing groups,
some of which are closely connected with the se-
curity forces and its commander, General Otelo de
Carvalho. The extremists have discovered that, in
many cases, pressure tactics will get them what
they want. In the case of the continuing negotia-
tions over control of the Socialist newspaper
Republica, for instance, both the Socialist manage-
ment and the Communist-lining workers reportedly
are ready to reach a compromise in order to end the
dispute. Union members sympathetic to the extreme
left, however, appear to have split with the Com-
munists and by refusing to modify their position,
have further confused the situation.
If the discussions remain deadlocked, the
government may be forced to impose a solution.
Information Minister Jesuino has hinted that set-
tlement of the dispute may again require the
government to assume control and appoint military
officers to the editorial board. Jesuino also has
announced that the government intends to create a
state press agency to regulate all newspapers and
plans to reduce the number, size, and distribution
of papers "because of salary and paper cost increases."
The Armed Forces Movement has come under in-
creasing criticism by the far left and reportedly
has become the butt of a growing number of popular
jokes. The unwillingness of the Revolutionary
Council to take a stand and then to stick by it
only adds fuel to leftwing charges of governmental
weakness.
The extremists are also sniping at the Communists
who are being criticized for their reluctance to
speak out against the military government. The far
left seized on the hike in train fares--effective
July 1--to accuse the transportation minister, a
member of the Communist Party, of initiating "anti-
worker" policies. The minister, who charged the far
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left with being "out to get him," was overruled by
the Revolutionary Council at the same all-night
session that decided to take over the Church radio
station.
These instances of the Revolutionary Council
backing down in the face of opposition points up
the Armed Forces Movement's susceptibility to pres-
sure as well as its desire to appear to be on the
side of the workers. The policy reversal also
illustrates the shifting majority within the
Council.
The US Embassy in Lisbon has identified three
factions within the 30-man Council and has estimated
their comparative strength as follows:
--Communist sympathizers, numbering six led
by Prime Minister Goncalves.
--Left Nationalists; the largest faction,
with 13 supporters, led by Admiral Rosa
Coutinho and General Otelo de Carvaiho.
--Democratic Socialists; nine adherents led
by President Costa Gomes, Foreign Minister
Antunes, and the chiefs of the three armed
services.
The newly formed 11-man central committee of
the Revolutionary Council--charged with overseeing
the Council's daily business--does not seem to re-
flect this power balance. The moderates, or demo-
cratic socialists, appear to have placed five
members on the central committee, as compared to
four for the left nationalists, and only one for
the Communist-leaning group--Prime Minister
Goncalves. One committee member appears to be
an independent.
Numbers do not tell the whole story, however,
as is evident in the seemingly contradictory state-
ments and decisions issued by the Council. The
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factions align differently on various issues and
only a few of the members are solidly committed
to any particular line. The US embassy credits
the moderates strength to the prestige and power
of persuasion brought to the deliberations by such
officers as President Costa Gomes and Foreign
Minister Antunes. The pro-Communist group benefits
by being able to bring a unified world view into
a group that is frequently marked by indecision
and confusion. The left nationalists, on the other
hand, may be the most flexible, and both Admiral
Rosa Coutinho and General Carvalho carry consider-
able prestige. (Confidential)
July 3, 1975
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