MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001700210001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 9, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
No Foreign Dissent
15ffl~~ HODUE
5 O
0
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
140
No. 0852/75
September 9, 1975
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No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Ethiopia: African Relations . . . . . . . . . . 1
Bangladesh: Internal Security Concerns. . . . . 6
Sept 9, 1975
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Ethiopia
African Relations
The ruling military council's relations with
black Africa have been on the upswing since they
hit a low point last November following the
execution of 59 political prisoners. Ethiopia's
primary current objective is to win acceptance
of its Eritrean policy. Foreign Ainister Kifle
Wodajo has traveled widely on the continent to
explain the council's position that the Eritrean
conflict is an internal matter. He has had a
measure of success--almost all black African
countries have either announced their support for
Ethiopia's territorial integrity or adopted
a neutral position on the Eritrean question.
Many African governments have reservations
about the council's pursuit of a military victory,
but they have not made a public issue of it.
The deposition of Haile Selassie has not had
a noticeable impact on Ethiopia's status in pan-
African politics. The absence of his personal
prestige--an important factor contributing to
Ethiopian influence on the continent--apparently
has been balanced by the new regime's adoption
of domestic policies that place Ethiopia more
firmly in the African mainstream.
Government leaders and the controlled press
engage in more stridently anticolonial rhetoric
than did their counterparts under the old regime.
The military council, however, has not taken an
active role in developing African policy toward
the white-ruled portions of southern Africa.
Ethiopia supports the efforts of such African
countries as Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zambia,
which are seeking to advance majority rule in
Rhodesia and the independence of Namibia by
diplomatic rather than military means.
(Continued)
Sept 9, 1975 1
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Addis Ababa continues to view Somalia as
a potential military threat, because of Mogadiscio's
claims to the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, inhabited
mainly by ethnic Somalis. Ethiopian leaders have
expressed fears that a Somali move could take
place soon now that Somali President Siad has
relinquished the chairmanship of the OAU. Recent
evidei.ce suggests that Somalia may, in fact, be
preparing to resume its support for guerrilla
operations in the Ogaden. A Somali-supported
insurgency would revive Ethiopian fears that
4ogadiscio ultimately intends to seize the
region and incorporate . it into Somalia. If
guerrilla incursions begin, Addis Ababa will
probably begin clamoring for additional US
military aid, although we would not expect the
hard-pressed Ethiopian armed forces to strike in
retaliation directly into Somalia.
Meanwhile, Ethiopia has put Somalia on the
defensive on the issue of the French Territory of
the Afars and Issas (FTAI). Both Somalia and
Ethiopia have traditionally claimed the territory--
formerly called French Somaliland--because ethnics
from both countries make up the bulk of its
population. Each side is irreconcilably opposed
to the other gaining control of the territory, if
France decides to leave. The military council
earlier this year renounced Ethiopia's claim, however,
and enunciated a policy favoring self-determination
and independence. Mogadiscio also publicly supports
independence for the FTAI, but clearly views
independence as a prelude to incorporating the
territory into Somalia.
At the OAU summit conference in July, Somalia
introduced a resolution calling for the territory's
independence. Ethiopia proposed an amendment calling
on all neighboring states to renounce all claims
to the FTAI. In a clear reference to the Somali
constitution, which alludes to 4ogadiscio's
claim to the FTAI, the amendment also called on
neighboring states to remove all "legal"
claims to the territory from their laws and
(Continued)
Sept 9, 1975 2
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constitutions. Ethiopia's initiative apparently
helped persuade the summit to postpone a decision
on the Somali proposal to locate a sub-regional
office of the OAU liberation committee in
Mogadiscio to oversee the "liberation" of the
territory.
Ethiopia's renunciation of its claim is
mainly a tactical maneuver designed to improve
its position relative to Somalia. Addis Ababa
still has a vital interest in the future of the FTAI,
and will insist on playing an important role in
any moves to alter its status. Ethiopia has
good relations with France, and would be satisfied
with a continued French presence. Addis Ababa
realizes, however, that Paris may not be able to
withstand the growing pressure for decolonization
coming from within the territory, from Arab and
African countries, and from French leftists.
The ruling council has therefore decided to identify
with the independence sentiment, as perhaps the
best means of protecting its interests in the
territory.
The council probably also views the renunciation
of Ethiopia's claim as a means of lessening the
possibility of a military confrontation with
Sol.talia over the territory. Ethiopia's army is
already spread thin fighting the Eritrean insurgency
and lesser uprisings throug lout the country, and
maintaining a sizable force in the Ogaden. Ethiopia
would accept a genuinely independent government
that guaranteed Ethiopia the right to continue
to use the port of Djibouti, but it would fight
rather than allow a Somali takeover.
The council does not want its support for
independence of the FTAI to sour its relations with
France. Ethiopia is fighting a guerrilla conflict
with its own Afar tribesmen along the border of
the territory, and is depending on France to
deny the Afar sanctuary inside the FTAI.
(Continued)
Sept 9, 1975 3
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Ethiopia's relations with Sudan are strained.
The military council believes President Numayri is
aiding the Eritrean rebels, and has criticized him
for giving too much publicity to his mediation
efforts. Numayri, for his part, is unhappy with
Ethiopia's refusal to accept his proposal for an
immediate cease-fire and direct talks with the
rebels.
Relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum
took a sharp turn for the worse in late June and
early July when the Ethiopian press published
exaggerated stories about renewed civil war
in southern Sudan. The Ethiopians claimed 12,000
refugees had crossed the border to escape the
fighting. Addis Ababa probably wanted to raise
the implicit threat. of Ethiopian intervention in
southern Sudan to get Khartoum to reexamine its
alleged support for the Eritreans. Numaryi may
yet be able to act as mediator in the Eritrean
dispute, but no progress is likely for at least
several months.
Ethiopia's relations with Kenya cooled
considerably in the immediate aftermath of the
military's deposition of Haile Selassie a year ago,
but have since been restored to their former
cordial basis. President Kenyatta was a close
personal friend of Haile Selassie and resented
the way he was shunted aside Kenyan officials
at the time were also concerned about the
military council's apparent lack of direction
and its tendency toward radicalism.
The improvement in relations came about
mainly because the Kenyans decided that their
shared security interests--Somalia also claims
large parts of Kenya inhabited by ethnic Somalis--
outweighed other considerations. Kenya has begun
to place new emphasis on its military preparedness
because of Soviet arms deliveries to Somalia.
(Continued)
Sept 9, 1975
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Early this year, Nairobi took steps to
restore cooperation with Addis Ababa within the
framework of a mutual defense pact signed in 1963
that is primarily designed to protect both
countries from Somali military attacks or insurgencies
instigated by Somali-backed guerrillas. A meeting
of the Ethiopian-Kenyan consultative commission
last April went very well; the two sides pledged
to increase military cooperation.
The Kenyans apparently have also adopted a
more benign view of the council's internal
policies. The death of Haile Selassie has removed
a potentially troublesome issue over his
continued detention. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/
BACKGROUND USE ONLY)
Sept 9, 1975 5
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Bangladesh
Internal Security Concerns
The new regime has begun showing signs of
nervousness over internal security.
Last weekend the government rounded up a former
special assistant to the late president Mujib, two
prominent figures in Mujib's now banned political
party, and a superintendent of police. The arrests
were given minimal publicity and, in contrast to
recent arrests under the regime's martial law regula-
tions, no charges were made public. Apparently some
in the new gowernment saw the three civilians as a
possible source of leadership to unreconstructed
followers of Mujib.
In another weekend move, the Dacca regime offered
a general amnesty to those who surrender illegally
held arms by September 13. The effort to round up
the arms came as no surprise. Shortly after coming
to power, the government said the widespread posses-
sion of illicit weapons was one of its principal
concerns. Many former members of Mujib's party still
possess weapons given them by the old regime.
The government's internal security concerns may
have been fueled by the rumored existence of an under-
ground movement of Mujib's supporters seeking revenge.
There are also reports of the recent arrest at Radio
Bangladesh of individuals caught copying tapes of
Mujib's speeches, presumably to be used for clandestine
broadcasts.
We have no hard evidence that any of Mujib's
followers are coalescing into clandestine groups, but
the existence of plotting against the new regime can-
not be discounted. Mujib still had many supporters
at the time he was overthrown even though he had lost
much of his luster in the last. year or so. Some of
his followers may be eager to revenge the coup and to
regain their position of power and influence.
(Continued)
Sept 9, 1975 6
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Finally, the new government continues to have
serious internal problems, including divisions between
contending factions in the officer corps and the un-
resolved role the aggressive young coup leaders are
to play in the government. It would be difficult for
any regime to consolidate its control over politically
and economically troubled Bangladesh, especially an
internally divided government with little of the
massive popular appeal Mujib enjoyed in his early
days. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Sept 9, 1975 7
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Secret
Secret
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