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Soviet Union
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Handle via TALENT-KEYHOLE-
COMINT Channels November 18, 1975
ARCHIVAL RECORD
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TCS No. 786/75
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GAMMA ITEM
ORCON/NOCONTRACT
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
November 18, 1975
Sakharov's Prize: The Dissidents' View. . . . . 1
Romania Sends "Observer" to Swiss
Military Maueuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Meet . . . . . . . 5
Polish Party Plenum Due Thursday . . . . . . . . 6
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister's
Tour d' Horizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Albanian Purges Have Not Affected
Top-Level Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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Sakharov's Prize: The Dissidents' View
The award of a Nobel Peace Prize to Andrey Sak-
harov appears to be generating a degree of cohesive
activism among members of the Soviet dissident commu-
nity that may give the regime pause, at least over
the short term. In the longer term, however, the
dissidents' prospects remain grim.
Last week, 37 dissidents of differing philo-
sophical stripes joined in issuing a statement con-
demning the regime's refusal (as yet unpublicized by
Soviet domestic media) to permit Sakharov to travel
to Oslo next month for the award ceremony. The dis-
sidents pledged support for Sakharov and charged
that the regime's action is proof of its "fear in the
face of the unwavering movement of civil thought and
morality" in the USSR.
The document is the second public declaration of
support for Sakharov and his principles that the dis-
sidents have put out in as many weeks. The first,
signed only by a handful of the most prominent names,
was made public on October 30, evidently in response
to the publication by Izvestia of a statement by 72
members of the Academy of Sciences condemning Sak-
harov and the Nobel Committee.
The declarations, both of which may have been
drafted and organized by writer Andrey Amalrik,
brought together such figures as reformist, Marxist
historian Roy Medvedev, sculptor Ernst Neizvestny,
former general Petr Grigorenko, poet Aleksandr Ginz-
burg, members of the official writers union Vladimir
Kornilov and Osip Cherny, and Larisa Bogoraz, wife
of writer Anatoly Marchenko. Also among the signa-
tories were Jewish activist Vitaly Rubin and mathe-
matician Vladimir Albrecht. The latter is the sec-
retary of the Moscow branch of the London-based hu-
man rights organization Amnesty International--a
November 18, 1975
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Sakharov's Prize: The Dissidents' View
The award of a Nobel Peace Prize to Andrey Sak-
harov appears to be generating a degree of cohesive
activism among members of the Soviet dissident commu-
nity that may give the regime pause, at least over
the short term. In the longer term, however, the
dissidents' prospects remain grim.
Last week, 37 dissidents of differing philo-
sophical stripes joined in issuing a statement con-
demning the regime's refusal (as yet unpublicized by
Soviet domestic media) to permit Sakharov to travel
to Oslo next month for the award ceremony. The dis-
sidents pledged support for Sakharov and charged
that the regime's action is proof of its "fear in the
face of the unwavering movement of civil thought and
morality" in the USSR.
The document is the second public declaration of
support for Sakharov and his principles that the dis-
sidents have put out in as many weeks. The first,
signed only by a handful of the most prominent names,
was made public on October 30, evidently in response
to the publication by Izvestia of a statement by 72
members of the Academy of Sciences condemning Sak-
harov and the Nobel Committee.
The declarations, both of which may have been
drafted and organized by writer Andrey Amalrik,
brought together such figures as reformist, Marxist
historian Roy Medvedev, sculptor Ernst Neizvestny,
former general Petr Grigorenko, poet Aleksandr Ginz-
burg, members of the official writers union Vladimir
Kornilov and Osip Cherny, and barisa Bogoraz, wife
of writer Anatoly Marchenko. Also among the signa-
tories were Jewish activist Vitaly Rubin and mathe-
matician Vladimir Albrecht. The latter is the sec-
retary of the Moscow branch of the London-based hu-
man rights organization Amnesty International--a
November 18, 1975
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The more pessimistic majority see the Kremlin
as willing to use Sakharov's case to make even clearer
than before that the CSCE agreements cannot be cited
by the West to press for change in Soviet domestic
policy. They also point to the Soviet leadership's
recent retrenchment on doctrinal issues as an indi-
cation not only of pre-congress closing of ranks,
but also a reaction to perceived exploitation of hu-
man. rights by some in the West to sabotage detente.
In this atmosphere, the dissidents see their future
as dark. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 18, 1975
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Romania Sends "Observer" to
Swiss Military- Maneuvers
Romania has again broken ranks with its East
European allies, this time, when it sent an "ob-
server" to Swiss military maneuvers last week. Bu-
charest apparently wants to demonstrate the importance
it attaches to CSCE confidence-building measures and
to underscore its determination to resist Moscow's
demands for greater conformity within the Warsaw Pact.
Originally, all five Warsaw Pact military at-
taches accredited to Bern--including the Soviet--
indicated they might attend. Moscow had second
thoughts, however, apparently fearing it might set a
precedent for inviting western observers to Warsaw
Pact exercises. The Soviet attache asked the Swiss,
who have long invited observers to their exercises,
if they extended this invitation specifically to ful-
fill CSCE obligations.
. The Romanians probably calculated that it was
easier to break ranks on the "observer" issue when a
neutral state held the exercises. Bucharest may also
have felt that Soviet equivocation about attending
the Swiss exercises presented a convenient opportunity
to be present. Last month the Romanians did not send
an observer to NATO maneuvers in West Germany, al-
though there were earlier signs that they would. At
the time, a Romanian diplomat noted the "repercussions
would be too great," and alleged the Soviets were
"twisting arms."
later said that Romania hoped
for more "national"--not NATO--invitations in the
future when "moments were more propitious." He sug-
gested that the West "bombard" the East with as many
maneuver notifications as possible in order to get
the Soviets to comply. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN/ORCON)
November 18, 1975
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Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Meet
Communist sources say the meeting of Warsaw Pact
defense ministers now being held in Prague is "rou-
tine and of no special significance." The two-day
session, expected to end today, will probably con-
sider past and future training exercises. The last
similar meeting was held in Moscow in January, and
the ministers have usually timed their annual ses-
sions for the winter months when exercise activity
slackens. The recent meeting of the Warsaw Pact
military council in Bucharest was also routine, and
set the agenda for the current meeting. (SECRET NO-
BORN)
November 18, 1975
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Polish Party Plenum Due Thursday
The Polish Party Central Committee meets on
Thursday to complete plans for the seventh party con-
gress which convenes on December 8. Some changes in
Politburo membership wi~l probably be made at the plenum
or, more likely, at the congress, but no major altera-
tions in the Gierek leadership or its policies are
expected.
Those members of the Politburo most likely to
be dropped are Franciszek Szlachcic, who was removed
from the party secretariat in 1974 for excessive
nationalism and personal ambition, Cultural Minister
Jozef Tejchma, and former planning chief Mieczyslaw
Jagielski who has lost some of his extensive in-
fluence after a severe heart attack.
The plenum will probably focus on how to pro-
ceed with raising food prices and coping with the
persistent meat shortages that have caused wide-
spread grumbling since early this year.
The Politburo's decisions on these sensitive
economic issues will be explained to local party
officials, but they will probably receive little
if any publicity in the media. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 18, 1975
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Czechoslovak Foreign Minister's Tour d'Horizon
Foreign Minister Chnoupek's major foreign policy
speech to the Federal Assembly on November 11 was less
sycophantic toward the Soviets than his last major par-
liamentary address on October 13, 1972.
Despite the decreased adulation accorded the
Soviet Union in his recent address, Chnoupek paid
proper obeisance to the basic tenets of Soviet for-
eign policy, including the "Brezhnev Doctrine." In
short, he said nothing to which Moscow might object.
The differences between Chnoupek's speech this
time and his earlier one probably are a result of a
growing sense of self-confidence of both the regime
and the foreign minister himself. Although Prague
has not completely shed the pariah image it gained
in the post-Dubcek period, its foreign policy has
scored major successes over the past three years.
Chnoupek, with some pride, emphasized Czechoslovakia's
increasing acceptability, as he ticked off the number
of foreign contacts, new international documents, and
countries with which Prague has established relations.
Chnoupek takes personal credit for the "foreign policy
successes" achieved since he became foreign minister
in December 1971. In fact, he appears to have done
so well that, by some accounts, he is slated to move
up into the party presidium.
On balance, Chnoupek seemed to be promoting an
image of a sovereign country that follows a co-
ordinated foreign policy. His personal style and
polish may have made some elements of the address
appear newer than they were. Parts of his speech
were clearly aimed at the foreign diplomats who were
conspicuously invited to attend. His remarks on the
implementation of CSCE, foreign trade offices in
Czechoslovakia, and the reunification of divided
families were deleted in the local press coverage.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
November 18, 1975
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Albanian Purges Have Not Affected
Top-level Hierarchy
The widespread purges that are reportedly
sweeping the Albanian bureaucracy have evidently not
affected the top party leadership. On November 17,
a special session of the People's Assembly met to
draft a new constitution. All Politburo members
were present, including party chief Enver Hoxha--who
is still politically very active despite whatever
ailments he may have.
Opening speeches at the assembly session strong-
ly suggest, that Hoxha will obtain ratification of the
reform measures he had apparently adopted in order
to strengthen his own and the party's hold over the
government's administrative apparatus and to reduce
excessive bureaucracy.
On the eve of the session the party's official
paper, Zeri I PopuZZit, published a lead editorial
written by Ramiz Alia, the Albanian party's chief
ideological spokesman. Alia's ringing endorsement
of Hoxha's policies clearly signaled to the party
faithful that regardless of their unsettling effect
on domestic and foreign policy the recent personnel
changes have the endorsement of top leaders. (CON-
FIDENTIAL)
November 18, 1975
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