IRAQ UNDER BAATH RULE, 1968-1976

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000900040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1976
• Content Type: STUDY

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DIA review(s) completed.
Research Study
Iraq Under Baath Rule, 1968-1976
Secret
Secret
PR 76 10070
November 1976
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
IRAQ UNDER BAATH RULE, 1968-1976
NOTE: In the preparation of this study, the office of Political Research consulted
other offices of the Central Intelligence Agency. Their comments and suggestions
were appreciated and used. Resear and analysis was completed in September 1976.
Comments would be welcomed
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TURKEY
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
In the years since the Baath Party seized power in 1968 the party
leadership has consolidated its hold and established a relatively stable
regime in a country long noted for its disunity, instability and high
level of political violence. The position of the leadership has been
enhanced by recent successes-the dramatic hike in petroleum prices in
1973, the defeat of the Kurds and the accord with Iran in 1975. These
advantages have enabled the Iraqi Government to initiate new
approaches to its domestic and foreign policies not feasible in the early
years of its rule.
This paper focuses on these policy approaches and on the forces
shaping the operating assumptions of the Baath leadership in its
decision-making processes. Because of the absence of any comprehen-
sive Agency assessment of Iraq in recent years, a discussion of the
Baathist consolidation of power and the emergence of political, social
and economic policies aimed at preserving internal unity and stability
is presented along with an analysis of the sources of potential political
conflict. The study concludes with an examination of current Iraqi
foreign policy goals and their implications for US interests. The
deliberate isolation of the regime plus the long break in diplomatic
relations between the US and Iraq-relations were severed in 1967 and
it is only since 1973 that a small US Interests Section has operated in
Baghdad-imposed several limitations on this paper. Issues lacking
sufficient and accurate documentation are noted in the text.
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CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTORY NOTE ........................................... iii
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS .......................................... 1
DISCUSSION ...................................................... 5
1. THE SETTING ................................................ 5
II. THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION .......................... 6
A. The Party in Power, 1968-1973 ............................... 7
B. Government by National Front, 1973-1976 ..................... 9
1. The Party and the Government ............................ 10
2. The Kurds and the National Front ........................ 13
3. The CPI and the National Front .......................... 16
C. The Question of Succession: Who will Follow Bakr? ........... 18
III. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION ........... 22
A. On the Economic Front ...................................... 23
1. The Five Year Plans ...................................... 23
2. Nationalization and Industry ............................... 23
3. The Other Side of the Economy: Agriculture ............... 26
B. Towards a Social Policy ...................................... 27
IV. INTERNAL NECESSITY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS ............ 29
A. Relations East ............................................... 30
B. . . . and West .............................................. 31
C. Rethinking Arab Unity ....................................... 32
1. Relations with Syria ....................................... 33
2. Towards an Arab Policy? .................................. 33
3. A View of the Gulf ...................................... 34
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY .............................. 35
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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
Iraq's image in the US in recent years has been that of a potential
troublemaker in the Middle East, a traditional foe of states friendly to
the US, and a violent, often turbulent country ruled by ideologues.
Iraq's relations with the Soviet Union plus its considerable oil resources
provide other elements of uneasiness to Western policymakers. The
image is not wholly inaccurate, but the reality of Baath-ruled Iraq is
changing as the regime settles in. Nonetheless, the complexity of Iraqi
foreign policy and domestic politics is formidable and some aspects
remain obscure.
A prime example of the complexity and reality is Iraqi-Soviet
relations. While conventional wisdom has classified Iraq as a "client"
of the Soviets, Iraq prefers, has followed, and will adhere to an
independent, nonaligned foreign policy where possible and when
advantageous. It is not likely, despite recent turnings to the West for
arms and technological assistance, that Iraq will break its ties with the
USSR and Eastern Europe. A recent decrease in Soviet aid and leverage
will not mean a corresponding increase in American influence. There
will be, instead, a continued reliance on the East as well as a probing of
Western motives and opportunities. Iraq will continue to receive up-to-
date weapons and military training from the Soviets as well as aid in
development projects. However, Iraq will advocate Soviet foreign
policy goals only where they concur with Iraqi policies and purposes.
Prospects for the renewal of diplomatic relations between Iraq and
the US are not good for the near future. Although the Baath
government is encouraging trade and commercial ties with American
companies, it will not grant diplomatic recognition in order to gain
favored-nation status or extended purchasing privileges. Lack of
diplomatic recognition is not a barrier to aid and trade per se. Relations
between the two will depend more on American relations with Iraq's
neighbors-Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria-than on Iraqi desires for US
goods and services.
In Iraq's view, the US exerts great influence on Israeli and Syrian
actions. If the US were to alter its position regarding Israeli-Palestinian
affairs, perhaps even recognize the PLO, then the Baath might respond
and confer diplomatic recognition as a reward. However, major
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American concessions of this type would not guarantee Baath approval.
Anti-American and anti.. imperialist slogans are important and condi-
tioned reflexes in party debates. The government may find itself
restricted by rhetorical limitations.
There is little likelihood of change, then, in US-Iraqi relations,
given the current regime's perception of US policies and given
American support for its allies in the region-Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Israel. Iraq remains outside the periphery of American interests in the
Middle East. The prevailing Iraqi attitude towards the US-cool,
slightly suspicious but not overtly hostile-is perhaps the best that can
be expected, given the fundamental divergence of interests. So long as
Iraq finds it advantageous to bar Soviet military use of its facilities and
to cooperate in maintaining orderly relations among the several Gulf
States, it contributes, albeit inadvertently, to overall US goals in the
Middle East.
Iraq will seek to establish routine and legitimate relations with the
states of the Arab world, the Gulf, the Middle East, and Europe. The
government will seek respectability and prestige through policies which
stress cooperation in Arab economic affairs. This policy is dictated by a
desire to end the country's isolation from the Arab world, to achieve
secure oil lanes in the Gulf, and to promote a measure of regional
stability and balance. Thus Arab solidarity will be advocated in the
confrontation with Israel, in cooperation in Gulf security arrangements
and in establishing Arab regional economic self-sufficiency. This does
not mean that Iraq will adhere consistently to OPEC/OAPEC
guidelines on pricing or marketing its oil. Nor will the Baath disavow
support for Arab liberation and guerrilla movements.
None of the above applies to relations with Syria. Quarrels over
ideology, oil transit fees, Euphrates water distribution, and primacy in
the Fertile Crescent have and will continue to divide the two. Attempts
to subvert the Baathist regime and Hafiz al-Asad will continue as will
support for anti-Syrian groups in Lebanon. However, it is not likely the
two states will go to open war.
Although Iraq is ruled by the Arab Baath Socialist Party according
to party tenets of "unity, independence and socialism," in reality a
more traditional and cautious set of assumptions determines the
regime's policies and actions. "Iraq First," a theme which emphasizes
the unity and stability of the state, the maintenance of the national
self-interest, and the survival of the regime, is as valid for the current
rulers, President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Deputy Chairman Saddam
H :usayn al-Tikriti, as for previous Iraqi governments.
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Unity in Iraq is symbolized by the National Front, a coalition of
Baathists, Communists and Kurds, but real control is exercised by the
Baath Party (BPI). Government by National Front is a fiction; the
Baath leadership has no intention of sharing power or decision-making
with any group or faction. There are no apparent challenges to the
party or the government at this time. Potential sources of opposition
exist in the military, the Communist Party (CPI), and the Kurdish and
Shiah minorities.
The Government of Iraq rules with the support of the military but
is not as dependent on it to maintain that power as were previous Iraqi
governments or as is the Syrian Baath Party. The military is kept
acquiescent through purges, enforced retirements, and constant
monitoring for ideological correctness. Although there is not unanimity
of support for the regime among the upper-ranking military there
would seem to be satisfaction with the regime's recent success against
the Kurds and with the continued supply of sophisticated Soviet arms
and expertise. While solid evidence is lacking, it appears that the
military is not Baath dominated but is incapable of sustaining a coup
against the regime at present.
The impact of the CPI is negligible. Nominal participation in
government has not resulted in a corresponding political leverage. Split
internally over their participation in the National Front and co-
optation by the BPI, the Communists lack the internal cohesion and
external support necessary to any confrontation with the regime.
Although the Kurds and Shiahs represent a numerical majority in Iraq
they will remain a political minority. The Sunni Arabs, only 25 percent
of the population, will continue to dominate the political system, the
party machinery, the officer corps and the government bureaucracy.
This pattern of domination is a reflection of traditional Iraqi politics as
well as of current party loyalties-the politics of recruiting supporters
and making political alliances among family, clan and village
networks. And, while the number of competent professionals in the
government is growing, loyalty to the party and the leadership as well
as a lack of political ambition are essential to political survival.
The government is attempting to structure a "united" Iraq through
the political, economic and social integration of these potential sources
of opposition. The National Front now is the cosmetic political
expression of that unity. The government is also using a "carrot and
stick" approach-new schools and hospitals, housing, agrarian reforms,
extended social benefits, construction of new factories-as well as
threats of arrest and resettlement. The emphasis will remain on
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centralization, not regional autonomy, on the union of north and south
and not on preferential development. If Kurdish dissidence re-emerges,
as it probably will, or if the Shiah oppose innovative reforms, as they
have in the past, then the government will opt for resettlement and
repression.
The Baath Party, then, appears to be in firm control of the country
and Bakr and Saddam Husayn are in firm control of the party. Policies
established by them are not likely to be changed by an alteration in
government or party. If the President and the Deputy are assured of
political power today, it is because of their successful manipulation of
the party, the government and the military as well as their ability to
isolate and eliminate their opposition. Their position has been
enhanced by recent successes-the establishment of civilian control
over the party, the government and the military; the end of the Kurdish
war; and the treaties and negotiations with the Soviet Union and Iran.
However, Bakr is ill and may be out of touch with day-to-day
developments. Saddam, as Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary
Command Council and Deputy Secretary of the BPI Regional
Command, is the actual center of power but the facade of joint rule
prevails. It is probable that on the event of Bakr's retirement or death,
there will be an orderly transfer of power to Saddam Husayn. What is
not clear is whether the loyalties Bakr holds in the military and the
party are transferable. While the military may accept Saddam as a
civilian ruler, they will probably not accept him as President and Staff
General (he was elevated to this rank in January 1976) and Minister of
Defense, a post Bakr now holds. Saddam may have to acquire an
acceptable senior military figure in order to maintain the appearance of
unity and cooperation.
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DISCUSSION
1. THE SETTING
"As a revolution and a regime we are uncondition-
ally biased in favor of the toiling masses, of Socialism,
of Arab unity, of the liberation of Palestine and of the
Arabism of the Gulf. Therefore, who supports (us)
internationally in this stand is our friend and ally and
whoever stands against us and opposes our trends and
legitimate rights is our foe." Saddam Husayn al-
Tikriti.
The political dynamics of Iraq today are an
outgrowth of its stormy history as an independent
state. One of many countries whose boundaries were
determined by great power rivalry and whose govern-
ment was imposed by colonial arrangement, Iraq has
been the scene of power struggles and political
violence since the British occupation of World War I.
Although Iraq attained independent status in the
1930s, first with the end of the mandate and entrance
into the League of Nations, and second with the
renegotiation of its oil and military agreements, Great
Britain continued to exercise a right to intervene in
affairs of state through the 1950s. These arrangements
gave Iraq the semblance of independence and the
fiction of unity under a Hashimite king and Cabinet.
Coups in 1936 and 1941 introduced the military to
participation in Iraqi politics, an element which
would disrupt the stability of the state for the next 30
years.
The emergence of nationalist movements which
were inherently anti-imperialist, anti-British and anti-
monarchist had their effect in Iraq. By 1958, the bulk
of politically-aware Iraqis supported neither the
monarchy, the British connection, nor the govern-
ment's opposition to Nasir and Arab nationalism. A
military revolt of 14 July 1958 led by Abd al-Karim
Qasim overthrew the Hashimite monarchy and the
government of Nuri al-Said and ended the special
status of British in Iraq. It marked as well the
beginning of 15 years of political instability and
disunity.
Under Qasim Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad
Pact, recognized Communist-Bloc countries, and
began to limit relations with the West. Four coups, a
dozen changes in Cabinet and a civil war fought
against the Kurds from 1961 through 1970 contrib-
uted to the political chaos of the period. At the same
time there was a withdrawal from participation in the
politics of the Arab world. In direct contrast to its first
40 years of statehood, Iraq in the 1960s became
increasingly isolated from contacts with both its Arab
neighbors and the non-Arab world.
The themes of disunity and instability were evident
in Iraq's economic and social development as well. To
he an Iraqi in the fourth decade of independence was
still to be in the first instance an Arab, Kurd or
Turkman, a Sunni, Shiah or Christian. Of the
country's 11 million people, 25 percent were Sunni
Arab centered in Baghdad and northwest Iraq, 20
percent were Kurds living in the northeast, and 50
percent were Shiah Arabs living south of Baghdad in
the middle Euphrates region.* The country remained
fragmented among ethnic and religious communities
having only a brief history of cooperation and a
limited sense of national identity. Ethnic groups
continued to live in traditional areas adhering to
traditional practices. The government had done little
to further industrial development, regional integration
or agrarian reform. The political system remained
dominated by Sunni Arab politicians through their
control of access to positions of power in government
and the military. Appointments to decision-making
positions in the government from either the Kurdish or
Shiah "minorities" were rare, despite the fact that the
Shiahs provided 80 percent of the enlisted men in the
military and despite the repeated threats of civil
violence by the Kurds.
* Iraq's population is divided ethnically into 70.9 percent Arabs,
18.3 percent Kurds, 0.7 percent Assyrians, 2.4 percent Turkmen,
and 7.7 percent others. Religiously, Iraq divides between the two
major sects of Islam: 50 percent Shiah, 40 percent Sunni; 8 percent
of the population are estimated to be Christian, 2 percent other.
These are Factbook estimates. There has not been a recent census in
Iraq and none in the past has given an ethnic and religious
breakdown of the population.
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Baathism was a major element in the rise of Arab
nationalism in Iraq. The Baath Party, founded in
Syria in the 1940s, aimed at the political renaissance
of the Arab nation in a unified state based on
principles of economic and social justice. For Baathists
the Arab revolution was to be fought against two
colonialisms: foreign imperialists opposed to Arab
unity and independence, and domestic enemies who
exploited the nation's goods and resources. 'While the
prospect of Arab unity may have had a limited
attraction for Iraqis, the twin themes of independence
and socialism had great appeal. In 1952 the Baath
Party of Iraq (BPI) was founded as a regional unit of
the Baath Party centered in Syria. By 1958 branches of
the BPI had been established in most of the cities of
Iraq.
The Baathists' first attempt to rule Iraq came in
February 1963 with the overthrow of Qasim. It failed
for several reasons. The party was badly organized
and its leaders inexperienced. Once in power, the
Baath had no real program for the transformation of
Iraq, no outline for applying Baath ideology or Arab
socialism to the reality of the country, and little
popular support during its nine months in power.
Rivalries and tensions within the party itself, between
Baathists and Arab nationalists over union with Syria
and Egypt, and between the BPI and the Communist
Party in Iraq (CPI) occupied its energies.
The stage was set for counterrevolution--it came in
November 1963 when Abd al-Salam Arif, a nationalist
officer then in favor of union with Egypt, assumed
power. While Arif was in power Iraq's foreign policy
emphasized pan-Arab and pro-Egyptian themes; in
domestic policy, lip-service was paid to the Islamic
origins of social and political reforms. However, the
factors which had shaped economic and political
realities under Nuri and Qasim continued to shape the
realities of Iraq for five years under Abd al-Salam and
his brother Abd al-Rahman Arif (he succeeded Abd al-
Salam in 1966). Arab unity remained a theory,
nationalization a slogan. Iraq in the 1960s was no
closer to solving its problems of political instability
and disunity than Iraq in the 1950s.
Provincial jealousies in relations with the Syrian
Baath Party (BPS) and distrust over Syria's attitude of
intellectual trusteeship for Iraqi Baathists continued to
divide the Iraqi Baathists from their natural allies in
Syria. In 1966 Michel Aflaq, founder of Baathism in
Syria and titular head of the party, and several Iraqis
were expelled from the Baath Party National Com-
mand, then centered in Damascus. The dispute was
factional, not ideological, although all debate since
this split has emphasized the purity and correctness of
Iraqi Baathism in contrast to the Syrian version. After
the 1966 split the Iraqis reorganized the party in Iraq,
establishing both a regional and a national (pan-
Arab) command and offering shelter to leaders ousted
by Syrian intraparty coups,* The BPI and the BPS
have maintained mutually hostile and exclusive
structures since 1966.
II. THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION
There were two coups in the summer of 1968. On 17
July a coalition of Baathists and nationalists in the
military led by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Major Abd
al-Razzaq al-Naif overthrew the Arif government. A
national front government was established with no
one faction in apparent control. Bakr, a Baathist who
had been Prime Minister in the 1963 Baath govern-
ment, became President of the Republic and Naif
Prime Minister. Of the 26 men appointed to the
government only seven were Baathists.
This "cooperation" was short-lived. Two weeks
later the Baath seized power directly in a second coup
which eliminated Naif and the nationalists. His exile,
and the murder of his Foreign Minister Nasir al-Hani,
marked the end to a policy of seeking restoration of
relations with the East, the West and moderate Arab
countries, and deepened Iraq's isolation. The BPI now
clearly dominated the government through the Revo-
lutionary Command Council (RCC) whose members
were Bakr and four generals, all Baathists: Hardan al-
Tikriti, Salih Mahdi Ammash, Sadun Ghaydan al-
Ani, and Hammad Shihab. Bakr became Prime
Minister as well as President of the Republic and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; Hardan
al-Tikriti and Ammash were appointed Deputy Prime
Ministers. Baathists were given control of key ministe-
rial posts, including foreign ministry, interior, educa-
tion, health, labor and social affairs, culture and
information. For the next several years, the BPI would
* In Baath organizational structure, national connotes the pan-
Arab world and regional connotes a specific country. The BPI
National Command, composed of Iraqi and non-Iraqi Baathists,
handles inter-Arab affairs; the Regional Command is the most
powerful organ of the party in the country, its members "elected"
by a regional congress with candidates usually selected or
encouraged by the party leadership.
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move to consolidate its power while maintaining
control of a "progressive" Iraq attuned to Baath
principles of unity, independence and socialism.
A. The Party in Power, 1968-1973
The important thing is not to assume the
power but to keep it .... Taking over the power
is a simple operation that can be executed by a
group of adventurers and military coup amateurs
at the right time. But interaction with the masses,
expressing their interests and aspirations, can only
he carried out by ideological revolutionaries ....
The Arab Socialist Baath Party, Iraqi Region,
"Wa`i al-Taliah" ("Awareness of the Van-
guard"), September 1968.
Although the BPI contained both a military and a
civilian faction at the time of the July coups, the
military dominated the politics of the party and the
state. From 1968 through 1973 the energies and
ambitions of these two factions were absorbed in
intraparty conflicts and power plays, conflicts which
disrupted Iraq's search for stability and development.
A series of purges beginning in 1969 altered the
position of the military in both the government and
the party and projected the civilian faction and a new
leader, Saddam Husayn al-Tikriti, to power. First to
be accused of plotting against the new regime were
those in favor of pan-Arab union; this was followed in
January 1969 by a purge of top military commanders.
One month later a major spy network allegedly
headed by high-ranking military and government
officials was uncovered-the government claimed it
was being encircled by a conspiracy of the CIA,
Zionism, the Shah of Iran, and the Barzani Kurds.
In the next four years Bakr and Saddam Husayn
were able to isolate and eliminate their rivals for
power and consolidate their control over the party and
the government. In November 1969 the power base of
the government was shifted considerably with the
addition of 10 civilian members of the party's
Regional and National Commands to the RCC. The
shift, engineered by Saddam Husayn and Salih
Mahdi Ammash, then Interior Minister, limited the
influence of the military in the politics of the Republic
and broadened the base of support for the government
among party members. Saddam Husayn, already
Deputy Secretary of the BPI Regional Command, was
appointed Deputy Chairman of the RCC; he could
now assume Bakr's duties and powers in the event of
the President's absence or incapacity-a powerful
position for the head of the party's civilian faction.
Bakr and Saddam next took advantage of the rivalry
between Hardan al-Tikriti and Ammash, both mem-
bers of the RCC and both Cabinet Ministers holding
powerful positions, to remove their two strongest
opponents. In April 1970 Hardan and Ammash were
sworn in as Vice Presidents of Iraq. Six months later
Hardan was dismissed from office and exiled; a year
later he was assassinated in Kuwait. Ammash survived
politically until 1971 when he was removed from all
positions in the government and the party and
appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union.*
Purges in the armed forces, the party and the
government continued. They were explained by the
leadership as necessary in order to unite the country,
to strengthen the party, and to end Iraq's external
isolation from the Arab world. In fact, the purges
revealed the basic instability of Iraqi politics, the
ascendancy of personalities and the lack of any real
issues in defining either political actions or actors. The
purges were precipitated by various crises, both staged
and real: Jordan's war against the Palestinian fe-
dayeen in 1970, the Kurdish war which ended in
1970, support for a national front and willingness to
cooperate with Communists and nationalists. At first
Bakr, Saddam and Ammash were aligned together
against Hardan in a military-civilian clash; then Bakr
and Saddam opposed Ammash in an interparty
struggle for power. And the positions of the actors on
the issues were never consistent-Saddam favored
both war and negotiation with the Kurds; Ammash
reportedly both favored and opposed Communist
participation in the government. The only survivors in
these scenarios were the President and his Deputy,
Bakr and Saddam Husayn.
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr was born in Tikrit in 1912.
The son of a farmer, he graduated from Baghdad
Teachers College in 1932 and taught for several years
before entering the Royal Military College in 1938.
Bakr, already a Baathist, was a member of the Free
Officers Movement and participated in the 14 July
1958 revolution. He was then appointed to the Court
* In a system where transfer to the Foreign Ministry can he
tantamount to exile, Ammash was appointed in a series of
demotions as Ambassador first to the Soviet Union, then to France
and finally, in June 1975, to Helsinki. Ammash has been
indiscreetly vociferous in his criticism of the regime and was
implicated in what may have been a coup attempt in January 1976.
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Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, President of Iraq
It. Gen. Saddam Husayn aI-Tikriti, Deputy Chairman of
the RCC
of Martial Law but two months later was arrested by
Qasim for plotting against the regime. Despite several
"retirements" from 1959 through 1961, Bakr's career
in the military advanced, his promotions based on
merit rather than political influence. He was involved
in plots against Qasim in the early 1960s and was
named Prime Minister following the February 1963
Baath coup. When the Baath were ousted in
November Bakr was appointed Vice President under
Prime Minister Tahir Yahya al-Tikriti. The position
was nominal and abolished the following January.
Refusing to accept either a foreign assignment or exile
in Beirut, he "retired" from politics. Following the
1966 Baath Party split with Syria, Bakr and Saddam
helped reorganize the party in Iraq. Bakr thus had
already acquired much experience in both military,
government and party affairs before the coups of 1968
which brought the Baath to power in Iraq.
Saddam Husayn's rise to power offers some contrast
to that of his "uncle," Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr.*
Saddam was born in Tikrit in 1937. He attended
secondary school in Baghdad but did not finish his
studies at law college. While a law student he took
part in the unsuccessful Baath assassination attempt
on Qasim in October 1959. Saddam then fled the
country, returned for the 1963 Baath coup, and fled
again when that government fell in November. He
returned in 1964 to participate in a plot to assassinate
President Abd al-Salam Arif, was arrested and
imprisoned for the next two years. In October 1966
Saddam was elected to the Regional Command of the
BPI. Two months later, he was expelled in the same
purge as Bakr. Saddam helped plan the coup of 17
July 1968, although the extent of his involvement is
unknown. A civilian, it was through his leadership of
the BPI military bureau that he began his real rise to
power. In 1969, Bakr appointed Saddam Husayn
Deputy Chairman of the RCC and Deputy Secretary
of the BPI Regional Command. Thus far, Saddam's
experiences had been those of the conspirator, the
would-be assassin, the underground achiever. Until
his appointment as "the Deputy," he had had no real
administrative or governmental experience, a fact
which helps to explain his political behavior once in
power.
The Kazzar Coup of 1973. The years from 1968
through 1973 were a crucial period for the Iraqi
Baath. Waves of secret arrests of Communists, left-
wing Baathists, Jews and foreigners continued amid
revelations of countless plots, again imputed to the
CIA, the Zionists, the Shah. In 1970 nearly 100 people
were hanged as spies in Liberation Square and a
* The relationship is one of marriage not blood. Bakr's daughter
is married to the brother of Saddam's wife.
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reporter for the Christian Science Monitor could write
in understatement that "Fear was rampant." Yet, at
the same time, the government wrote a new constitu-
tion, instituted a series of land reforms, negotiated a
Kurdish settlement, and attempted to heal a four-year
old rift in relations with Baath Party founder Michel.
Aflaq. Stirrings of a foreign policy could also be de-
tected-Iraq became the first Arab country to
recognize East Germany and a delegation was sent to
the Soviet Union. Some measure of stability and order
was being restored. However, the purges were not yet
over. An abortive coup in 1973 set the stage for further
readjustment of the party and the government.
In June 1973 President Bakr was in Eastern Europe
concluding a series of economic and cultural agree-
ments. On 30 June, the day of his planned return,
Nazim Kazzar, the Director General of Public
Security, arrested Minister of Defense Shihab and
Minister of Interior Ghaydan. When an apparent plan
to assassinate Bakr failed, Kazzar took his hostages
and fled for the Iranian border. Shihab was killed in
the escape; Ghaydan wounded. Kazzar surrendered.
Little is known of the background, motives, or
leaders of the coup attempt. That it was a bid for
power is clear; whose bid it was remains unclear. It
may have been engineered by Saddam Husayn. He
had appointed Kazzar, a Shiah, Director of National
Security in November 1969 and Kazzar remained a
supporter and close friend of the Deputy. The coup,
thus, may have been intended as a means of
consolidating Saddam's power over the military by
eliminating the generals and Bakr himself. Or Saddam
may have been the object of plotters who opposed his
growing power and his stance on the Kurds, the
fedayeen, or the Soviet Union. Leading military
officers were known to be dissatisfied with govern-
ment policies on these issues and to favor taking
drastic action against the Kurds and in support of the
fedayeen. However, the army remained loyal to the
government during the coup and foiled the attempt.
Kazzar had set several conditions for the release of
his prisoners: that the Iraqi Army be sent to the
Palestinian battleground, that military action against
the Kurds be resumed, that rightist leaders be removed
from the government and the party, and that the
dominant role of the Regional Command of the BPI
be given to the National Command. The last two
demands were used to implicate Abd al-Khaliq al-
Samarrai, party theoretician and rival of Saddam, in
the plot. Kazzar and 35 others were executed; Abd al-
Khaliq's death sentence was first commuted to life
imprisonment, then to exile in Algeria. The BPI was
purged of Samarrai supporters and in August, two
months after the coup attempt, Bakr delegated to
Saddam Husayn full responsibility for holding party
elections that fall. From November 1973 through
February 1974, 250 military officers were "retired,"
i.e., replaced by pro-BPI officers most of whom were
supporters of the Deputy.
The coup attempt had other far-reaching political
ramifications. With the death of Shihab, only Bakr
and Sadun Ghaydan remained of those officers who
had made the 1968 revolution. Ghaydan was demoted
a year after the coup from Interior to Communica-
tions Minister and the military was thus excluded
from top policy-making positions in the government.
Saddam Husayn and the civilian wing of the BPI
Regional Command emerged in full control of both
the party and the government. Bakr remained the
focus for military support, however, as a possible
counter to the growing influence of the civilians and
Saddam Husayn. In addition, the President now
assumed the post of Defense Minister while the RCC
issued a resolution decreeing decisions of the President
of the Republic and the Defense Minister to be final.
The Cabinet was reorganized a year later, given
budgetary and administrative responsibilities, and
several members of the Regional Command added to
it. By November 1974 the members of the RCC and
the Cabinet with few exceptions were Baathists.
B. Government by National Front,
1973-1976
The purges plus the constant reshuffling of military
and civilian personnel were meant to stabilize the
regime and consolidate support for Bakr and Saddam
Husayn. However, the constant rumors of plots and
the repressive tactics utilized by the regime had
alienated and frightened many political moderates.
Party members to the left of the government
continued to demand rapid nationalization of indus-
try and drastic economic and social reforms. If the
regime were to survive, the internecine strife which
had marked its history thus far had to stop. If the
government were to receive the foreign military aid
and developmental assistance it desired, the appear-
ance of political unity and stability was crucial. In the
fall of 1971, sometime before the Kazzar coup, the
Baath government adopted a different tactic to
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consolidate support for the regime and stabilize the
system. President Bakr announced on 15 November an
"historic opportunity for the progressive national
patriotic forces of the country-the National Action
Charter." The Charter guaranteed "all the democratic
freedoms of the people," a national assembly and a
permanent constitution to be approved by public
referendum. More important, it called for art alliance
among the BPI, the CPI and the Democratic Party of
Kurdistan (KDP) as the "foundation stone of the
national coalition." However, neither the CPI nor the
KDP indicated a willingness to subscribe to the
National Action Charter or join a national front
government. Discussions among the parties dragged
on for almost two years.
In July 1973, one month after the Kazzar coup
attempt, Bakr and the pro-Moscow Central Commit-
tee of the CPI, in a show of national unity, signed an
accord which called for the creation of a council of
ministers, the establishment of a national assembly,
and the formation of a national front. Talks with the
Kurds for a similar agreement continued but the KDP
refused to join either the negotiations or the front. The
intention of the BPI in setting up the National Front
was more cosmetic than cooperative. Despite the
agreement with the CPI, power and policy emanate
neither from the Front, the RCC, the Cabinet of
Ministers nor the party per se. Rather, power is
exercised directly by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, President
of the Republic, Chairman of the RCC and Secretary
of the BPI Regional Command, and Saddam Husayn,
Deputy Chairman of the RCC and Deputy Secretary
of the Regional Command. They, in turn, are
maintained in power through their control of the
party, the government bureaucracy, the military and
the secret police.
1. The Party and the Government
The relationship between the party and the
government is a symbiotic one. The relationship was
defined shortly after the 30 July 1968 coup in a party
manifesto:
... the Party apparatus must be made to
understand the relation between the role of the
Party and that of the regime, and distinguish
between the former as a vanguard organization
and the latter as an executive arm (government).
The role of the Party today differs by necessity
from the role of the government, not on general
principles and relations with the masses but with
regard to the difference between official position
and Party position .... As for the Party, its role is
to guide the policy of the regime and make plans
for carrying out the policy. "Awareness of the
Vanguard."
The party monitors and supervises the government on
two levels. First, a monopoly of power is maintained
through the appointment of members and sympa-
thizers to key positions in the administration, the
military, the police and intelligence agencies. Party
members dominate the RCC and hold all important
ministerial and diplomatic posts. Party members also
staff the various committees of the RCC which
"follow-up" government decisions, e.g., the Follow-
up Committee for Oil Affairs and the Implementation
of Agreements. On the provincial level governors and
important administrators are chosen from party ranks
and serve to make Baath influence felt throughout the
administrative apparatus.
Secondly, party power is exercised through the
various bureaus within the organizational structure of
the BPI Regional Command which implement leader-
ship decisions. These include a peasants bureau, a
workers bureau, a students bureau, a cultural bureau
and a military bureau. The first four direct the
activities of "mass" organizations of peasants, work-
ers, and the like; they are used to mobilize the efforts
of their members and to indoctrinate them in the
party's line.
The role of the military bureau is crucial to the
regime. Its members include the Commanders of the
Baghdad Garrison and the Republican Guard Brigade,
both important factors in the making and unmaking
of past Iraqi governments. Control of the Guard and
the Garrison is essential to the regime. Also important
is the Baath intelligence bureau which is concerned
primarily with internal security, foreign political
subversion, assassination and information gathering; a
component of the Baath intelligence bureau, the Jihaz
al-Hunayn or "Instrument of Yearning," is responsi-
ble for arrests and interrogations. The party bureaus
and all government committees are directly responsi-
ble to Saddam Husayn. Party discipline is maintained
through periodic purges from the government and the
party, indoctrination courses for the military, and
occasional reorganization of the civil services and
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armed forces with recruitment of new members from senior party officials chosen in January 1974 at the 8th
party ranks. Baath Party Congress. They are the party in micro-
cosm-for the most part young-average age in their
In October 1975, in order to implement "the theory 30s to 40s-with little experience outside the party,
of joint struggle . . . for revolutionary change" the men who held no positions before the coups of 1968
Peoples Army was created, replacing the Baath Party and whose status within the party depends on factors
National Guard. The Peoples Army could play a other than professional competence or merit. Most
greater role in party and state affairs than its members of the Regional Command have degrees in
predecessor, however. The avowed purpose of the new law, education or medicine; all hold high government
militia is to protect the party and the government as posts and have served in party ranks for many years.
well as to assist the police and the armed forces Nor is much known of the Baath recruitment
"in carrying out their national and pan-Arab process. The party has traditionally appealed to
duties"-this as distinct from the regular army's educated and professional people, particularly univer
mission of protecting the people and the state. The sity students earning degrees in engineering, law,
"national" function of the force, estimated to number medicine, government and education. New recruits
from 30,000 to 100,000, is as much to protect the are still sought in the schools and universities and
Baath leadership from the military (and the CPI) as it special assistance is offered to students and young
is to cooperate with it. The "pan-Arab" aspect, officers joining the party; the party has also estab-
Army interpreted, could include use of the Peoples lished youth cadres in the provinces with the emphasis
Army in Lebanon to assist pro-Iraqi fedayeen and in on "correct" training and party indoctrination. While
the Gulf to support Arab Liberation Front activities. party membership is a necessary tool for advancement
Although the government's intentions regarding use and promotion to any important post, the ramifica-
of the Peoples Army are still unclear, the fact that it is tions of membership in terms of education and general
employment opportunities are not clear.
paramilitary lines and is being
..l
ong
in weaponry and guerrilla warfare even a Christian in the government, the Baath Party
tactics, leaves open the possibility of its use externally in power today represents a continuation of the
as well as domestically. It is conceivable, as well, that pattern of Sunni Arab dominance which has charac-
the Peoples Army could be used in the event that an terized Iraqi politics since the mandate period.
intraparty power struggle develops. It is headed by Recruitment for party membership and leadership
Taha al-Jazrawi, Minister of Housing and Public roles in the government still is most frequently from
Works, member of the RCC and a senior official in the towns of Tikrit and Samarra north of Baghdad on
the BPI Regional Command since the 1960s. the Tigris River, and from Anah, Hadithah and Hit,
northwest of Baghdad on the Euphrates River. The
Little is known of the size and composition of the political center of gravity, thus, is a triangle encom-
general Baath Party membership. In the 1960s the passing the Baghdad-Mosul-Anah region and exclud-
party was of necessity small and clandestine with its ing the Kurdish region in the north and the Shiah
members being primarily young civil servants, teach- tribal areas in the south. However, too much emphasis
crs and intellectuals. Although the struggles and can be placed on the accident of geography. It is the
purges of the last decade have eliminated many of the kinship factor, the dependence on family and clan
party's early members, new members seem still to be loyalty, and party affiliation which influence political
drawn from similar backgrounds. A 1972 estimate set relationships and appointments.
party membership at 5,000-9,000 active members. We Broadened recruitment procedures, then, do not
have no way of judging the accuracy of these figures.
Membership data for the party and its Commands are indicate any democratization of the party. The Baath
not available; even the membership of the RCC is not Party today remains
publicized. 4 an w h i c h a
We know more of the BPI Regional Command, premium on isolation and secrecy. The structure
composed of Bakr, Saddam Husayn and a dozen remains highly centralized and authoritarian. Uncom-
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Iraq
?Ash Stiaykh
'Tell Kayf
Rawii
.Irbil
Euphra, -roan
'Aneh
Hadithelr
Al
Nit
Aj amd I
ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION
Sunni Arab
Sunni Kurd
Shia Arab
"Political center of gravity"
Sulayn nTyah
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promising, determined, often ruthless, its leaders have
not hesitated to use violence to suppress any suspicion
of opposition.
The National Front in 1976 is a vehicle by which
the fiction of unity and participatory government is
maintained by the Baath. There is no national
assembly. Power is still exercised by the few with the
business of government determined by personalities,
not by institutions and not by constitutional proce-
dures, Both the RCC and the Cabinet are Baath
dominated and reflect the views of the President and
the Deputy. While the actual work of the government
is conducted through the committee and bureau
structures, neither these nor any other group in the
National Front has the ability to influence or alter
government policy decisions.
The Kurds have posed a consistent threat to the
internal security and stability of several governments
of Iraq. The Baath government warned the Kurds in
the National Action Charter of 1970 that the
"peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish
national issue" was "tied to the preservation of the
existing revolutionary regime." It is not within the
scope of this paper to trace the many Kurdish revolts
or to analyze the various factions dominating Kurdish
tribal life. It is important, however, to consider the
Baathist approach to the Kurdish problem and to
place the issue in the context of Iraq's relations with
Iran and the US.
On 11 March 1970 a 10 year period of revolt ended
with the signing of an armistice agreement between
the Kurds led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani and the
Iraqi Government represented by Saddam Husayn.
The agreement recognized the national rights of the
Kurdish people and granted regional autonomy.
Kurdish was to be an official language in the Kurdish
autonomous region and educational institutions,
including a university at Sulaymaniyah, were to be
established. Kurds would be appointed to posts in the
government, the military, the police and the universi-
ties in proportion to their number. The KDP was
reformed and the Baath government promised to
appoint a Kurd vice president of the Republic. Areas
having a Kurdish majority were to be administered by
the Ministry for Northern Affairs. Barzani retained his
heavy arms and a radio station, while the government
Saddam Husayn and Mullah Mustafa Barzani after the
1970 Kurdish Agreement
promised to pay his Pish Mirga troops (12,000-15,000
men) to act as a frontier force.
This agreement marked a high point in Iraqi-
Kurdish relations. Barzani had control of more
territory than he had ever held, with an officially
recognized KDP, a newspaper, a radio station, and the
promise of participation in the government of the
country. His Pish Mirga force was armed and intact.
He had yielded nothing. On 29 March, five Kurds, all
supporters of Barzani, were appointed to the Cabinet.
Ten days later Barzani denied he had ever intended to
establish an independent Kurdistan: "I only defend
my people's rights within Iraq," he claimed. "From
now on we, as people attached to the policy of the
Iraqi Government, will do our best to improve
relations established between Iraq and Turkey and
other countries."
What soured the idyll? Essentially, two issues
emerged: power and oil. Kurdish officials may have
been appointed to the Cabinet but no Kurds were
appointed to the RCC, and the Baath rejected the
KDP nominee for vice president. A census was to be
taken to determine the boundaries of the Kurdish
autonomous province; where the Kurds were not in a
majority, the territory was to revert to the administra-
tion of the central government. The census was not
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taken and the Kurds accused the government of
"Arabizing" traditional Kurdish areas, e. g., Kirkuk
and Sinjar, and of "weakening" the policy of
decentralization in the autonomous provinces of Irbil,
Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah.
Initially, the Kurds had not sought to administer
the oil installation in Kirkuk; they had asked for a
proportionate share of the oil revenues and they
insisted that Kirkuk city, center of the Iraq Petroleum
Company, become the new capital of the Kurdish
autonomous province. The city, despite its location in
a Kurdish region, had a mixed Arab, Kurd, Assyrian
and Turkman population. To influence a planned
plebiscite, the government brought back Assyrian
families who had fled Kirkuk during the revolt to
counterbalance Kurds moving in for voting purposes.
The plebiscite was not held and the dispute. escalated.
Did the right to profit from the mineral and natural
resources of the autonomous region belong to the
central government or to the Kurds? Did the Kurds
have, in effect, control of their province and its
resources? The Kurds refused to sign the National
Action Charter; they refused to join the National
Front or to nominate another vice president. Nor
would they agree to a constitution or to a definition of
their relations with Iran. They demanded increased
budget allocations for development to be controlled
by a Kurdish development committee. The govern-
ment continued to reject Kurdish demands for Kirkuk.
Then the BPI attempted to assassinate Barzani and his
son Idris. A stalemate ensued until February 1974
when fighting broke out.
On 11 March 1974, four years after the initial
agreement had been signed and the date by which it
was to have been implemented, the RCC announced
the granting of self-rule to the region in which the
majority of residents were Kurds. Irbil would be the
capital city of the autonomous province which would
have a legislature, an executive council and a special
budget with revenues derived from property taxes.
The KDP rejected this unilateral declaration of
autonomy and more clashes were reported by mid-
March. The Kurds of Kurdistan, announced the KDP,
would become part of a voluntary federation with the
Arabs of Iraq and Mullah Mustafa Barzani, by virtue
of his position as chairman of the Kurdish Executive
Council, would become Vice President of the Repub-
lic. This the Baath rejected and major fighting ensued.
Thus the issues emerged as the Kurdization of the
North versus the Arabization of Kurdistan, depending
on one's perspective. In April the government
replaced the Barzani Kurds in the Cabinet with Kurds
loyal to the administration,* and it was announced
that the Kurdish movement would soon join the BPI
and the CPI in the National Front. The following
autumn, in the midst of war with the Kurds, the
government established an executive council and a
legislative assembly for the autonomous region.
Why war again? The timing may have been a result
of the Baath refusal to carry out the census while
insisting on the four-year time table for implementa-
tion of the 1970 agreement. Or, it may have been a
direct result of worsening relations with Iran and
encouragement given Barzani by the Shah. In a
speech made that April Saddam Husayn noted
somewhat cryptically that:
Those who sell themselves to foreigners will
never become our allies as long as we live and as
long as this revolution exists. To people who
imagine that with US help they can obstruct the
march of the revolution, and with US help they
can divide this people, we tell them without
hesitation, with high confidence and without
delusion, with accurate calculations, and with a
clear vision of the present and future aims-we
tell them: You will only meet failure.
Barzani sought aiq from many sources-American
as well as Iranian. With Soviet support and military
assistance now flowing to the Baath government and
with the CPI fighting on the side of the government,
Barzani told the Christian Science Monitor that his
group stood in the way of Soviet influence in Iraq.
Mullah Mustafa now envisioned a Kurdish state
within a state which would represent all Kurds, those
physically present in the autonomous region as well as
those living outside the region, in Baghdad, Basra or
even outside Iraq. He disavowed, however, any
ambitions to expand his demands to include the
sizeable Kurdish populations in Turkey and Iran.
Barzani received assistance from Saudi Arabia, Iran,
* The "house" Kurds appointed on 7 April 1974 were Aziz
Rashid Aqrawi, Minister of State; Hashim Hasan Aqrawi, Minister
of Municipalities; Ubaydallah Mustafa Barzani, son of Mullah
Mustafa Barzani, Minister of State; Abd al-Sattar Tahir Sharif,
Minister of Public Works and Housing; and Abdullah Ismail
Ahmad, Minister of State. All support the government's self-rule
law.
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Israel and the US.* The issue, however, is not whether
the promise of foreign assistance permitted the Kurds
to revolt in 1974. The revolt most probably would
have occurred at some point, given the nature of
Kurdish demands and the reluctance of any Iraqi
Government, he it Baathist or not, to accede to those
demands.
The revolt created several internal dilemmas for the
Baath leadership. Differences on the conduct of the
war, the planning of offensives, and a negotiated
peace threatened to divide both government and
party in Iraq. The military had opposed the 1970
Kurdish agreement as a "profound humiliation,"
feeling that the Kurds had been militarily defeated.
They disapproved Saddam's conducting negotiations
in 1970 with the Kurds and his 1974 stand opposing
negotiations and favoring war.** There may have
been disagreement between Bakr and the Deputy, too,
over the wisdom of continuing the military campaign.
Conditions in 1974, however, clearly differed from
those influencing the 1970 decision to negotiate with
Barzani. The Baath was in firmer control of both the
political and military scene than it had been
previously. The Iraqi army of 1974 was larger, better
equipped, and better trained than the 1970 force
which had fought the Kurds. Soviet military and
technical assistance was available in a steady flow
without the caveats of 1970 (then the Soviets had
stipulated that war materiel supplied by them was not
to be used against the Kurds), important, too, was the
decision made by Saddam Husayn to commit both
the country's resources and his personal prestige to
seek a military solution to the latest Kurdish revolt,
The recurring Kurdish conflict had the potential to
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* "Kurds say CIA betrayed them," The Washington Post, 13
November 1975. Such support has been hinted at by Barzani's son
Ubaydallah; he revealed that his father had received "funds,
weapons and equipment, experts and all kinds of assistance from
the Zionist enemy, America and Iran." FBIS, 31 July 1974;
interview in al-Watan (Kuwait), published in FBIS, 18 October
1974. Al-Thawrah noted that Nixon had "furnished secretly
weapons" to Barzani and had "ordered the CIA to execute the
mission without any explanation." The emphasis here was on
Nixon's role, not on the involvement of the US Government.
4 November 1975, and The
Washington Post, 1 November 1975, pages 1-2.
** Military discontent on the leadership's conduct of the war led
to purges of the military in September 1974. Following a defeat of
the army by the Kurds, the Commander of the Baghdad Garrison,
the Commander of the Air Force and several high-ranking officers
were demoted.
disrupt the Baath regime just as it had disrupted
previous governments. The stability of the regime as
well as the prestige of the Deputy were at stake in
resolving the Kurdish revolt.
The death knell for the latest Kurdish revolt was
sounded not by the Baathists but by Iran. Iran had
long encouraged Kurdish rebellions in Iraq; in fact the
Shah's moral support and military assistance enabled
Barzani to conduct extensive warfare against several
Iraqi governments. The Shah's support for the Kurds
until the last war was gratuitous at best-a means to
contain a pro-Soviet Arab socialist state. Helping the
Kurds had become an expensive risk for the Shah by
late 1974, however. Iranian planes and troops were
increasingly involved in border incidents with Iraqi
troops and were close to fighting directly with Iraqi
forces. More important, though, it is doubtful that the
Shah really wanted a Kurdish victory-Iraq's Kurds,
if granted provincial autonomy or if successful in
winning independent status, would represent a far
greater threat to the unity and security of Iran than
would an Iraqi Government victory.
For reasons strategic and political, then, Iraq and
Iran chose to resolve their differences and seek a more
pacific solution to the escalating conflict. The solution
was framed in the Algiers Accord of March 1975
which called for demarcation of territorial and
maritime borders and "the establishment of mutual
Saddam Husayn (R) shaking hands with the Shah of Iran
(L) on the signing of the March 1975 Algiers Accord.
(Algerian President Boumediene in Center.)
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security and confidence along their joint borders to
put a final end to all subversive infiltration from
either side." In the agreements following the Algiers
Accord, Iraq made several concessions, both territorial
and political, to Iran. Iraq had long encouraged Arab
and Baluchi resistance to the Shah and had laid claim
to the province of Khuzistan in Iran as part of the
Arab homeland. The Baath government now con-
ceded all claims to Khuzistan, and agreed to a
boundary along the center of the Shatt al-Arab. It also
acceded to other territorial border arrangements long
sought by Iran. Iran, in turn, stopped aiding the
Kurds. Iraq gained much in return for its concessions.
Instead of making yet another agreement with the
Kurds to end yet another war, the government signed
an accord with Iran which both stopped the fighting
and ended the threat of foreign intervention.
In the wake of the Algiers Accord, the Kurdish front
collapsed and between 90,000 and 250,000 refugees
fled to Iran. * By the end of 1975 the majority of Iraqi
Kurdish refugees in Iran had taken advantage of the
amnesty offered to return to Iraq. The policy of the
Baath government toward the question of Kurdish
autonomy has taken a predictable tack. References to
Kurdistan or to the Kurdish region have been dropped
in favor of references to the "autonomous" or
"northern" province. Many returning Kurds are being
resettled in small groups in agricultural farms in
southern Iraq while the government is encouraging
the "Arabization" of the north, i.e., it encourages
Arab settlement in the north and intermarriage of
Arab and Kurd. * * The government is also extending
its control in the region through the establishment of
state-owned agricultural cooperatives, land redistribu-
tion, the funding of development projects, and the
construction of new cities. New schools, new indus-
tries, new hospitals, extended social benefits-the
* Estimates on the number of refugees vary from 90,000 (The
Economist, 18 October 1975) to 140,000 (DIA Weekly Intelligence
Summary, 26 September 1975, p. 22,1 to 250,000
** Bakr Mahmud Pishdari, chairman of the legislative council for
the autonomous region, estimated that 50,000 refugees who had
returned from Iran were being kept in the south working on
agricultural projects, (London Times, 28 November 1975.) Non-
refugee Kurds have been moved from border areas to the south as
well but there are no estimates as to their numbers.
north, then, is to be transformed and unified with the
south. Centralization, not autonomy, will be the key
to any future northern policy with the emphasis on
the unity of Iraq, not the national rights of the Kurds.
Prospects for a large-scale renewal of hostilities
between the Kurds and the Iraqi Government are
unlikely at present. Kurdish acquiescence to Baath
appeals for unity and cooperation will depend very
much on the extent of the resettlement program in the
south, the scope of Arabization in the north and the
benefits to be realized from development programs in
the autonomous region. While the Algiers Accord
removed Iran as a major source of assistance and
encouragement, the Kurds could now become pawns
in the Syrian-Iraqi rivalry. Syria has offered shelter,
training and supplies to Jalal Talabani, rival of
Mullah Mustafa, and his Kurdish revolutionary
movement in their guerrilla operations against Iraq.
This support would escalate if the level of animosities
between the two Baath states were to escalate.
Similarly, any increase in Iraqi influence which might
create a shift in the balance of power as perceived in
Tehran could renew the Shah's interest in the Kurds of
Iraq.
3. The CPI and the National Front
Relations between the CPI and BPI prior to the
establishment of the National Front in 1973 were
tenuous at best. A semblance of cooperation had been
maintained for several years before the 1958 revolu-
tion, but Qasim's policy of balancing off domestic
forces had seen the CPI encouraged at the expense of
other factions. The CPI was henceforth perceived as
"the enemy" by the Baathists and a contest for power
between the two factions began. It rapidly developed
into a blood feud, during which the Communists
sought and found opportunities to eliminate Baathists.
Wholesale killings in Mosul in 1959 laid the
foundations of a pervasive hatred by Iraqi Baathists of
Iraqi Communists.
The time for revenge came in 1963. The brief
period of Baath rule was marked by rigid anti-
Communist policies and a brutal suppression of the
CPI, with many party members killed, arrested or
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exiled. The Communists managed to survive, how-
ever, and to reorganize despite internal splits. A 1972
estimate put party membership at 2,000; by 1974
membership was estimated at 4,000, not enough to
pose a threat to the Baath government.* Tradi-
tionally, the CPI has been stronger in the Kurdish and
Shiah areas of the country; unlike the BPI, the CPI
has always been more successful in attracting peasant
and worker adherents although it no longer has the
support from the trade unions that it had decades ago.
After the 1968 revolution, as a gesture of recon-
ciliation to the pro-Moscow Central Committee of the
CPI,** Iraqi citizenship was restored to Communists
in exile. This raised once again the issue of coopera-
tion with the BPI, an issue which still threatens to
divide the CPI today. Initially, Aziz Muhammad,
First Secretary of the Central Committee, opposed
cooperation with the BPI while Amir Abdullah, also
an influential member of the Central Committee,
favored joining the BPI in a progressive nationalist
** To the best of our knowledge, there is no pro-Chinese
Communist Party or faction in Iraq; Iraq has had relations with the
PRC since 1971 but trade and cooperation have been limited. The
PRC consider the Baath to be "bourgeois/fascist" and Bakr and
Saddam Husayn to be "Soviet lackeys." There is some indication
front so long as it opposed imperialism.* A third
faction within the Central Committee opposed any
and all cooperation with the BPI, fearing the ultimate
intention of the Baath regime was the destruction of
the CPI.
Where Aziz Muhammad feared Baath dominance
of and control over the CPI, Amir Abdullah believed a
policy of cooperation would inevitably make the
Baath government dependent on the Communists.
Amir Abdullah's position was upheld by Soviet policy
at this time. As part of a growing rapprochement with
Iraq and the Arab world, Soviet officials began in
1972 to pressure the CPI to sign the National Action
Charter and join the National Front. Then, in June
1972, during a visit by Kosygin to Baghdad, the USSR
and Iraq signed a 15 year Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation. Aziz Muhammad, convinced the Soviets
would not support a divergent CPI policy, revised his
position and in July 1973 signed the pact that
established the National Front in Iraq. The CPI
seemed to have won a major victory-it was now a
legal party with the opportunity to rebuild its
organization as well as the hope of influencing
government policy.
Soviet insistence on CPI participation in the
government influenced the Baath as well as the
Communists. From the Baath point of view, however,
domestic needs were a paramount consideration. The
Baath hoped to solve problems of domestic disunity,
i.e., a possible renewal of Kurdish hostilities, and
economic development, i.e., assistance in developing
the oil industry. In 1971-1973 a political alliance with
the CPI seemed necessary, given Soviet and CPI
support for the Kurdish movement and Iraqi depen-
dence on Soviet military aid and technological
assistance. Yet the Soviets could not eliminate the
distrust of Iraqi Communists for the BPI and could
not enhance the position of the CPI in the govern-
ment. Although Amir Abdullah's views prevailed and
the CPI joined the Front, Aziz Muhammad's suspi-
cions have proved to be correct. The Baath is not
interested in sharing power with either the Commu-
nists or the Kurds and cooperation between the CPI
and the BPI remains limited at best.
* Aziz Muhammad, a Kurd, was elected first secretary in 1964
and again in 1970. Amir Abdullah, also a Kurd, was born in 1926
and served as secretary-general of the CPI in the early 1950s; he
conducted the 1972 negotiations between Saddam Husayn and the
KDP over Kurdish participation in the National Front.
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Although the USSR and the CPI dropped their
support for the Kurdish movement and although the
latter fought in the north in 1974 against Barzani, the
Baath rejected Aziz Muhammad's suggestion that a
joint military command be formed and rejected the
Communist recommendations that CPI units be
integrated with regular Iraqi army units. Communist
units fighting in the north on the side of the
government were allegedly kept short of arms and
equipment. The CPI was not allowed to establish
branches in captured Kurdish areas and, following the
March 1975 Accord with Iran, Iraqi military com-
manders were ordered to prohibit heavy concentra-
tions of CPI forces and to keep CPI units out of
populated areas in the north. Of the 60 members
appointed to the Committee for Northern Affairs in
1974, only five were CPI members.
Other dissatisfactions arose: despite the appoint-
ment of several Communists to the Cabinet and the
promise of cooperation on affairs of state, there has
been virtually no policy consultation between the
Baath government and the CPI. (Of its known
leaders-Aziz Muhammad, Amir Abdullah, Aziz
Sharif and Mukarram al-Talabani-only two now
serve in the Cabinet: Amir Abdullah as Minister of
State and Mukarram al-Talahani as Minister of
Irrigation.) A proposal by the CPI in fall 1974 to
establish a joint higher committee on economic
problems was rejected by the Baath. Nor did the CPI
approve of the initiatives made by the Baath
government to "right wing" Arab governments, i.e.,
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, begun in 1974 Such
relations, it was claimed, risked Iraq's relations with
the Soviet Union.
Although the fiction of government by National
Front is being maintained, the policy of cooperation
did not survive the end of the Kurdish war. By spring
1975 CPI members in ranking civil service positions
and in universities were being replaced by BPI
members and the party is closely watched for signs of
opposition. The CPI is no real threat to the Baath
government and can easily be held in check by it and
by the Peoples Army. Although the CPI recently held
its Third National Congress, there is little information
available on the party's sources of support or
organizational structure. Fearing a recurrence of
repression, the CPI will maintain a clandestine
organization even while it functions as a legitimate
member of the National Front.
C. The Question of Succession: Who Will
Follow Bakr?
There has not y ,t been a complete transfer of power
in Iraq from the makers of the July 1968 revolution to
a new political constellation. What has occurred thus
far have been piece-meal replacements and rearrange-
ments in both the government and the party. Ahmad
Hasan al-Bakr, President of the Republic, Prime
Minister, Field Marshal and Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces, Minister of Defense, Chairman of
the Revolutionary Command Council and Secretary
General of the BPI Regional Command, provides
continuity but he has been ill for several years.
Since 1971 Saddam Husayn has exercised an
increasing amount of control over decision-making in
both the government and the party, albeit under the
aegis of Bakr. He has been careful not to upstage the
President nor does he appear publicly to challenge
Bakr's authority. Bakr seems voluntarily to have
relinquished much of the routine exercise of power
although he participates in ceremonial functions and
is probably still a force in major political decisions.
Although the reasons for this retreat are not clear,
health is most probably the determining factor.
Speculation has been high on Bakr's relations with
his nephew and Deputy and on the actual sources,
distribution and exercise of power in Iraq. Bakr and
Saddam differ in both the sources of their support and
in certain of their approaches to policy. Where the
President's strength is with the senior military officers,
Arab nationalists and nonparty members, the
Deputy's support has come from the junior military
ranks and party rank-and-file members. Saddam
derives his power from his control of the party
apparatus, the security and intelligence bureaus, and
the government bureaucracy. He is not popular with
the military hierarchy but through periodic purges of
the government and the Regional Command he has
elevated his own supporters to important positions.
Bakr and Saddam have had their differences, e.g.,
their possible disagreement on the Kurdish war in
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1974 has already been noted. They have disagreed, as
well, on personnel appointments and on the degree of
support to be extended to other Arab countries and for
the Palestinian fedayeen. These differences, however,
are more than offset by the basic agreement between
the President and the Deputy on Iraq's goals and
priorities. While they advocate the Baath slogans of
"unity, independence and socialism," these terms
must be understood within the Iraqi context. Indepen-
dence of action and ideology is crucial in the ongoing
conflict with Syria yet unity is a favorite theme in the
confrontation with Israel. However, it is solidarity
within the vaguely defined Arab cause and unity in
regional development which the Iraqis are stressing,
not union in a political sense. Both Bakr and Saddam
are pursuing a policy of "Iraq First--a policy which
places the unity of the country, the stability of the
regime, and economic independence above other
considerations. It is not a new theme in Iraqi history
or politics. Its origins lie with Nuri al-Said and with
Qasim. What is different are the means employed to
attain those ends, and the different approach the
Baath government has taken to ensure that indepen-
dence. Where Nuri and Qasim talked of Arab
solidarity, and stressed friendly relations with Turkey
and Iran and neutrality in East/West conflicts, the
Baath at first turned inward, away from alliances and
contacts with other states; they were deeply suspicious
of Arab neighbors in particular. However, Bakr and
Saddam Husayn have redefined Iraq's foreign rela-
tions and together have charted a new course for Iraq
domestically and internationally. Given their control
of the internal political structure, they have been
willing to attempt new modes of political behavior,
i.e., a temporary cooperation with the CPI, alliances
with Arab and non-Arab regimes previously shunned.
The defeat of the Kurds, the successful treaty with
Iran, the nationalization of the country's major
resource, oil, even the National Front-these successes
have strengthened the regime in general and the
Deputy in particular.
Barring coup or assassination, then, Saddam Hu-
sayn will be the successor to Bakr. The Deputy at 40 is
essentially an opportunist, not an ideologue. He has a
reputation for courage, ruthlessness and shrewdness.
He pays lip-service to an ideology of Arabism but
realizes that, given the substantial non-Sunni Arab
population, Iraqi nationalism and Arab unity are not
necessarily one and the same thing. Again, Saddam's
first concern is Iraq, not Arabism, not Palestine, not
even Baathism per se. In his world-view Iraq is
independent, socialist, nonaligned and anti-imperial-
ist. The Deputy is ambitious, both nationally and
personally. He would see Iraq become one of the Arab
world's largest oil producers and he would see himself
leader of that development. He would have Iraq, too,
resume its place as a maker of Arab policy, a
participant in the shaping of Arab and Gulf affairs.
The question is not whether Saddam will be able to
retain the power he currently holds; rather, the
question becomes will he be able to maintain it
without the facade of Bakr's "guidance." Until
recently, it appeared that the Deputy would not seek
power overtly in the event of Bakr's death or
retirement but in order to insure acceptance and a
peaceful transition would probably rule jointly with a
figure representing the military. However, in January
1976 Saddam was given the military rank of general
by Bakr. This appointment may have been intended
as a prelude to making Saddam Minister of Defense;
the Deputy at present holds no Cabinet or govern-
ment position other than as Deputy Chairman of the
RCC. It may have been intended as a means of
guaranteeing his ultimate and solo accession to power.
But Bakr has not relinquished the Defense Ministry
and Saddam is no more palatable to the military as a
general than he is as the Deputy.
The Baath Party, then, appears to be firmly in
control of the country and Bakr and Saddam Husayn
are in control of the party. Policies established by
them are not likely to be drastically affected by an
alteration within the Baath government. Despite
recent turnings to the West for arms and technology,
close ties will be maintained with the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. Iraq will no longer deal
exclusively, however, with the East; large oil revenues
now permit the government to shop East and West, to
encourage commercial contacts and contracts with
Japan, France, Italy, and the US as well as Poland,
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In addition,
Iraq has reopened diplomatic and trade negotiations
with its Middle Eastern neighbors, with Turkey, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait. These trends are
likely to continue and will be pursued by the Baath
and by Saddam as long as they provide results. The
one area of major alteration of present policy is that of
relations with Syria; a coup against the BPI or one
from within the party could bring to power men
disposed toward radically revising the current state of
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tension. (These themes are traced in subsequent
sections.)
In addition to Bakr and Saddam Husayn, there are
two groups having the potential to exercise power and
influence the succession of Saddam Husayn-an inner
circle of RCC members and a second-level group of
Baath bureaucrats who hold multiple positions in the
government and the party. The first includes ministers
and RCC members Izzat Mustafa, Izzat al-Duri and
Sadun Ghaydan al-Ani. Dr. Izzat Mustafa served as
Minister of Health from July 1968 until his appoint-
ment as Minister of Labor and Social Affairs in May
1976; he has been. on the RCC since November 1969
and is a member of the BPI Regional Command. A
Baathist since the 1950s, Mustafa has been a staunch
supporter of Bakr but has the respect apparently of the
Deputy as well. Izzat al-Duri, Minister of the Interior,
chairman of the military bureau of the BPI Regional
Command and a member of the RCC since 1969, is
one of the strongest figures in government. Duri is a
leader of the civilian wing of the party and has been
critical of leadership decisions in the past. His recent
promotion from Minister of Agrarian Reform to
Minister of Interior-he is the first civilian to be
appointed to that post-reflects his status in the party
as well as the support of both Bakr and Saddam.
Sadun Ghaydan al-Ani, currently Minister of Com-
munications and a member of the RCC, was
commander of the Baghdad Garrison and one of the
senior military officers taking part in the July 1968
coups. He is the only member of the RCC who is not
also a member of the Regional Command. Ani may
not be a member of the party; he does have
considerable support from the military although he no
longer holds military rank.
Mustafa, Duri and Ani owe their positions to
influential sources of support and are probably too
powerful for Saddam Husayn or anyone else to
challenge at present. However, the position of the
Deputy has been strengthened in recent years by the
emergence of a new class of party bureaucrats. Young
Baathists with some education and experience in
government and with proven loyalty to the party have
risen to new and sudden prominence, frequently
holding positions in the Cabinet, the RCC and the
Regional Command simultaneously. This multiplicity
of positions, however, suggests more power and
independence of action than they actually possess.
The career thus far of Taha al-Jazrawi, Minister of
Housing and Public Works, reflects this new class
well. Jazrawi, a Kurd, was active in Baath under-
ground activities in the 1960s and has been a member
of the Regional Command since 1966. In November
1969 he was appointed to the RCC. He has held
several posts in the Cabinet since then-Minister of
Industry, Acting Minister of Planning, chief of the
party's military bureau. In October 1975 he was
named Commander of the Peoples Army (described
above). This promotion, made at the same time he
held important party and government posts, was soon
followed by a demotion of sorts, a shift from Minister
of Industry to his current post. Although Jazrawi is
considered to be a strong supporter of Saddam
Husayn, his recent "demotion" plus his party offices
indicate he is a strong rival for power in the party and
the government.
There are others like Jazrawi in the government. *
They are active in Baath Party affairs, are members of
the Regional Command, and some may be members
of the RCC as well. These individuals, through their
positions, their party affiliations, their alliances with
the leadership, function as executive supports for the
regime. However, the extent of their influence, the
degree of their independence of action, can only be
estimated. That they have survived purges and coups
indicates some base of support and strength. Their
ability to effect administration decisions would seem
to be limited at best. Real decision-making still
appears to be controlled by Bakr and Saddam
Husayn, with the Deputy in firm control of both the
party and the government.
This apparent absence of rivals to the Baath Party
in Iraq and to Saddam Husayn demonstrates the
leadership's ability to isolate and eliminate dissident
persons and factions. The only potential source of
organized opposition remaining outside the govern-
ment and the party is the military. The army has
* Other representatives of this "new class" include Muhammad
Mahjub, Minister of Education and member of the BPI Regional
Command; Ahmad Abd al-Sattar al-Juwari, Minister of State for
Presidential Affairs and Minister of Religious Affairs; Sadun
Hammadi, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Anwar Abd al-Qadir al-
Hadithi, Minister of Municipalities; Hikmat al-Azzawi, Minister of
Foreign Trade, Acting Minister of Internal Trade (briefly) and
member of the BPI Regional Command; Tayih Abd al-Karim, Oil
Minister and member of the BPI Regional Command; and Ghanim
Abd al-Jalil, Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research
and member of the BPI Regional Command. In addition, Mahjub,
Juwari, Hammadi, anc Hadithi have been reported to be members
of the RCC.
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Izzat Mustafa, Minister of Labor and Social
Affairs
Sadun Ghaydan al-Ani, Minister of
Communications
Taha al-Jazrawi, Minister of Housing
and Public Works and Head of
the Peoples Army
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played a major role in Iraqi politics since 1936. At the
time of the 1968 coups, the military was at the height
of its political influence and prestige; all five members
of the ruling RCC were military men. Beginning in
1969, however, the role of the military in the politics
of the Republic was severely curtailed with the
introduction of civilian Baathists to the RCC and the
government and by the ascendance of Saddam
Husayn.
There are several explanations for this shift. Politics
in the military is closely controlled. A decree of the
RCC in 1971 banned all non-Baath political activity
and organizations within the Iraqi armed forces. That
same year a large number of party members were
added to military units and to the police and security
apparatus. The party has since tried to extend its
influence in and control over the military in other
ways. Recently, to reduce opposition and increase
party membership in the armed forces, the BPI offered
a 50 percent salary increase to all Iraqi military
personnel and a substantial allowance to students if
they joined the party. However, the success of these
recruitment drives and the extent of politicization in
the military is not known. We have no information on
the impact of political indoctrination or monetary
inducements on military personnel.
Moreover, frequent purges of the military have
resulted in the transfer, arrest or exile of many high-
ranking officers. Those purged have included pan-
Arab nationalists and disaffected Baathists as well as
nonparty members or suspected CPI sympathizers;
(:PI members in the army have been executed. Yet,
despite its distrust of the regime and dislike of Saddam
Husayn and the party's militia and military bureau,
the military supported the government during the
1973 coup attempt and fought, taking heavy losses, in
the recent Kurdish war. The major areas of contention
between the military and the government remain the
influence of the party on military advancement and
decision-making and dissatisfaction with Soviet arms
and training. Especially resented are the party's
attempts to dominate military units and their com-
manders, the "supervision" of upper-ranking officers
by lower-ranking party members, the emphasis on
political indoctrination and the enforced early retire-
ments. Resentment has been voiced, as well, about the
dependence on Soviet arms and advisers. The fact that
Soviet military assistance is contingent on political as
well as military necessity has not eased this tension
between government and military.
Today, unlike Baathist Syria, the military in Iraq is
no longer able to control events or influence the
leadership in policy decisions. Baath Party members
who are in the military and the new Peoples Army
may serve as effective restraints on the military's
traditional independence of action. Surveillance,
infiltration and purges may allow the government to
feel it has sufficient control over the armed forces.
But, the regime cannot be sure of the absolute loyalty
of the generals and colonels. We cannot determine the
extent of military dissatisfaction with the regime. That
such dissatisfaction is minimal at present we can only
assume, given the successful conclusion of the Kurdish
war, the continued flow of arms and materiel from the
USSR and Eastern Europe, and the elimination of
several dissident commanders and officers. There were
indications of military unrest in January and through
the spring of 1976 but, again, no hard information is
available on military attitudes toward the regime.
Our best assessment, then, is that the Baath are
securely in political control of Iraq and that Saddam
Husayn will retain his position in the event of Bakr's
death or retirement. Neither the Communists, the
Kurds, Arab nationalists or the military appear able at
present to mount an effective challenge or alter the
present political balance. Will the loyalties of the
military and the allegiances of the BPI's military
faction be transferred from Field Marshal Bakr to
Staff General Saddam Husayn? Probably, although
reluctantly; information is too scarce to warrant a
more certain estimate.
Ill. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION
Iraq is a rich country-rich in its mineral and
natural resources, its fertile soil, its people. Yet, when
the Baath came to power in 1968 Iraq's economic
development lagged behind that of neighboring
states. Oil revenues had been declining, there were
critical manpower shortages, little capital was being
reinvested to the industrial development of the
country, the annual growth rate averaged 3-4 percent,
per capita income was $295 and the illiteracy rate was
80 percent. The trend toward urbanization was
increasing; between 1965 and 1972 the urban
population rose 45 percent. By the latter year 60
percent of the people were concentrated in urban
centers.
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If achieving the unity and stability of Iraq has been and government dependence on oil revenues increased
)
ble 1
T
S
d
*
.
a
ee
.
(
the ultimate political goal of the Baath Party, during this perio
economic independence and self-sufficiency have had
no less a priority. Political instability and the lack of
internal social cohesion in the early years of the Baath
regime delayed decision-making in areas critical to
economic development. The establishment of political
control by the civilian BPI, the settlement with Iran,
and the oil crisis of 1973-1974 with its attendant rise
in prices have given the Baath government the
opportunity and the resources to implement more
ambitious economic and social goals; they have also
given Bakr and Saddam Husayn successes on the
economic front which have bolstered their political
prestige and provided an added measure of growth
and stability. The primary objectives of their new
economic and social policies are rapid growth, full
employment, equal educational opportunities and an
equitable distribution of income. To realize these
objectives, the government has instituted economic
planning, nationalization of industry, diversification
in industrial development and agrarian reform.
A. On the Economic Front
The five year plans reflect party philosophy as well
as government priorities. Couched in Baathist
codewords of economic and social justice, they stress
the economic and social integration of the country as
well as nationwide and regional (pan-Arab) planning
aimed at establishing self-sufficiency in certain areas,
e.g., banking, agriculture, shipping. As in politics,
then, so too in economics; "unity, independence and
socialism" are the Baath themes for the transforma-
tion of the country.
The two plans produced by the Iraqi Baath
government-there was a previous plan in the early
chemicals
1960s-have centered on increasing the standard of
living by increasing the rate of economic growth and
by securing economic stability; and on reducing the
dependence on oil revenues by controlling production
and diversifying industry. Their first five year plan
(1970-1975) focused on stimulating agricultural and
industrial exports while reducing imports. Meant to
minimize the reliance on oil royalties, the reverse
happened with the rapid rise in oil revenues in 1973
The scope and investment projected for the second
five year plan, to run from 1976 through 1980, are far
more ambitious. In 1975 with oil revenues treble the
previous year's, the government indicated that it
would invest 10 billion dinars ($34 billion) in the
development of the country. This would be triple the
amount invested during the 1970-1975 period. In the
new plan highest priority will be given to those
industries where the production cycle from raw to
finished goods can be completed within the coun-
try-oil, petro-chemicals, chemicals, food and agricul-
tural produce. The plan also advocates the develop-
ment of projects in coordination with other Arab
countries and in cooperation with joint Arab compan-
ies. To implement this cooperation Iraq has entered
into several cooperative banking, shipping and trad-
ing ventures with its Arab and Gulf neighbors.
The projects outlined in the new development plan
include highways, industrial plants, railroads, port
facilities, new towns-all to be constructed as rapidly
as possible. But the new plan is running into trouble.
There have been delays in setting the specific amounts
to be invested and in establishing priorities. Inflation
plus uncertain oil prices could affect the ability of the
government to fund its projects, although this is
unlikely. Iraq has had to arrange several loans to cover
expenditures and oil liftings have been adversely
affected by the political breach with Syria. These
factors, as well as inadequate transportation and
communication facilities, will delay the implementa-
tion of Iraq's development projects. They are not,
however, long-term obstacles.
2. Nationalization and Industry
Basic to Baath economic policies is government
ownership and/or direct control of industrial and
agricultural production. The government aims at
nationalization of all basic industries, from oil, petro-
, fertilizers, to food and textiles. Partial
* Republic of Iraq, Planning Board and Ministry of Planning,
The National Development Plan, 1970-1974 (Baghdad, 1971), pp.
90-91. The annual compound growth rate projected was 9.4
percent, the industrial sector annual rate 12 percent, construction 8
percent, agriculture 7.5 percent, electricity 20 percent, transport and
communications 6 percent, trade 5.7 percent, services 8.3 percent,
finance 10 percent, public administration and defense 8 percent,
ownership of dwellings 2.5 percent. Oil revenues as percent of
government revenue increased during this period.
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Iraq
Oil Developments
Oifield
Oil pipeline
Gas pipeline
Oil refinery
Tanker fermi nal
Under cans-o- or planned
~^ ?l~arcrlanshah?
NAFT KHANEN
h
Boundary nepmeonrar,nn it
not neaeaaar.q ap,mor tat
nationalization of industries less vital to the economy
is also planned. At present, 50 percent of the industrial
sector and 40 percent of the transportation sector are
nationalized. Thus far, the government has been
pragmatic in taking a gradual approach to industrial
nationalization. The exception to this approach, and
the example of the government's intentions, is the oil
industry.
Iraq is the fifth largest producer of petroleum in the
Middle East and among the 10 largest producers in
the world. In the 1960s oil exploration and production
declined, with Iraq's share of Middle East oil
production dropping from 18 percent to 8 percent
while other oil producers were expanding production.
Oil exploration in Iraq had been the province of the
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and its affiliates, the
Mosul Petroleum Company (MPC) and the Basra
Petroleum Company (BPC). In 1961 the government
I '' R`AN
thous , bad a '.
c.5,~ m` h \ `mac
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Basra
Uas,
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SOUTH RUMAYLAH
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',,Kho I-Arose
GULF
KUWAIT
cancelled IPC concessions in nonproducing areas and
the next year established the state-owned Iraq
National Oil Company (INOC). Following a long
period of negotiations with IPC, the Baath govern-
ment announced nationalization of the company on 1
June 1972; the MPC was nationalized the following
March. The process was completed in December 1975
when Iraq assumed the remaining foreign-held shares
of the BPC.
Iraq's dependence on oil cannot be minimized.
Before nationalization, in the period 1966-1973, oil
provided 58 percent of all government revenues; in
1973-1974, one year after nationalization, oil provided
74 percent of the total revenues of the government
and in 1974-1975, 89.9 percent. Petroleum exports in
1971 represented 25 percent of all export revenues; in
1972 this increased to 56 percent and in 1973, 85
percent. Oil revenues by 1974 had reached $6.6
KUWAITL
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1700
1600
1500
1400
1300
1200
1100 -
billion, five times the 1972 level; revenues for 1975 are
estimated at $8.2 billion.*
Nationalization has not had the dire impact the oil
companies predicted in 1972. Lack of technicians
skilled in managing and developing the oil industry
independent of the oil companies was a major
problem and accounted for a brief decline in oil
production following nationalization. This is being
solved, however, with improved vocational training,
the expansion of secondary and higher education, and
the return of skilled technicians from abroad. Accord-
ing to a World Bank study in 1974 the number of
* The Economist Intelligence Unit projected profits of $5.4
billion for 1975. (Quarterly Economic Review: Iraq, No. 4-1975.)
See also OER, Intelligence Memorandum, "Iraqi Oil Gives Wider
Economic Options," ER IM 73-50,
technically qualified staff employed by government
and state enterprises has grown rapidly, with virtually
all major oil fields and factories being run by Iraqi
technicians, In 1972, on the eve of nationalization,
Iraq's crude oil production averaged 1.5 million
barrels per day (b/d). By March 1973, under Iraqi
control, production had risen to two million b/d, of
which 1.2 million b/d came from the Kirkuk fields.
Nor has Iraq had trouble in marketing its oil. By mid-
1973 Iraq's oil production through 1976 had been sold
via long-term contracts to the Soviet Union, Great
Britain, Italy, Brazil, Spain, India, Turkey, Austria
and the US. The fact that Iraq is the only OPEC
country to market the bulk of its oil directly has not
hampered sales, Poor management and prices higher
than the OPEC scale caused a temporary drop in early
1975. These lost markets were regained the following
year by lowering prices below OPEC levels. In 1975
Iraq was the only OPEC member to show a sizeable
gain in oil revenues ($1.3 billion).*
Current oil policy in Iraq is based on several factors:
the financial needs of the country for development
purposes, the extent of oil reserves, and world market
conditions. The aim of oil policy is to fund the
industrialization and modernization of the country, to
make Iraq economically self-sufficient and indepen-
dent. Soviet aid in developing the North Rumaylah
fields and in constructing port facilities at the head of
the Persian Gulf have helped Iraq realize the goal of
control of exploration and exploitation. Turkish
assistance in construction of the 610-mile pipeline to
Iskanderun on the Mediterranean and Italian aid in
completing a 400-mile reversible-flow pipeline con-
necting Kirkuk and Rumaylah with the Gulf or the
Mediterranean give Iraq the freedom to negotiate
alternative oil export arrangements independent of the
Syrian pipelines.
Iraq's policy of independence has not always been
compatible with its allegiance to Arab unity or its
membership in OPEC/OAPEC. While the Baath
government urged use of the oil weapon in linking
sales to support of the Arabs against Israel, it did not
adhere to the cutbacks in production OAPEC ordered
nor did it cooperate fully in the 1973 oil embargo.
Instead, the government chose to sell or boycott
* Saudi Arabia and Kuwait boosted their production by
"official" cuts in price, claiming to be in line with OPEC decisions.
Iraq denounced these cuts but boosted its production by continuing
its own more covert price cuts. "OPEC Countries: Current Account
Trends, 1975-76."
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TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT REVENUE
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according to what it considered beneficial to Iraqi
interests. Iraq will continue to seek larger oil revenues.
It will do so in conjunction with OPEC and OAPEC
where profitable but it is prepared, too, to take an
independent line if necessary.
Baghdad may very well be "floating on a sea of oil"
as the INOC chairman announced in February 1975.
Iraq's proved and probable oil reserves are currently
estimated at 35 billion barrels of crude oil; this is in
comparison to Saudi Arabia at 170 billion barrels,
Kuwait at 71 billion barrels and Iran at 64 billion
barrels. Latest crude oil production capacity is 2.25
million b/d although 3 million b/d could be
produced. * These estimates do not include the
reserves that may lie under Baghdad itself. They do,
however, indicate the long-range potential of Iraqi oil.
If these estimates are correct and if Baghdad is sitting
on one of the largest oil reserves in the middle East,
then Saddam Husayn's hope-" that one of the last
two barrels produced in the world should be
Iraqi"-may be fulfilled.
The oil industry will continue to receive top
developmental priority and oil revenues will continue
to provide more than sufficient revenues to fund new
projects. However, the stated goal of the government
is "self-sufficiency"; this implies not just control of the
oil industry from exploration through marketing. It
implies as well investment in the nonoil sectors of the
economy-in textile factories, cement and chemical
plants, agriculture and food processing-projects that
could ultimately lessen, if not eliminate, dependence
on either oil or foreign investment and assistance. And
this is the real intention of ",self-sufficiency."
3. The Other Side of the Economy: Agriculture
While the oil industry provides 80 percent of the
state's GDP, it is agriculture which traditionally has
occupied most of the people of Iraq, employing in
1974 over 55 percent of the labor force. Development
here has been hampered by insufficient irrigation
* Estimated crude oil productive capacity: (million b/d)
1975 1980
Iraq ....................... 3.0
Iran ....................... 6.8
Saudi Arabia ............... 11.5
6.0
8,2
160
facilities, an inefficient marketing system, lack of
transportation and storage facilities, shortages of spare
parts for agricultural machinery and of raw materials,
and a shortage of skilled technicians. Although one-
fourth of Iraq's total land area-12 million hec-
tares-is potentially cultivable, only 7.5 million hec-
tares are actually cultivated.
Between the Agrarian Reform Law of 1958, which
expropriated the holdings of feudal landowners, and
the modification of that law in 1970, little was done in
Iraq regarding agrarian reform or land tenure. The
Baath would like to nationalize agriculture as it has
the oil industry but so far it has had limited success.
Under the 1970 law, membership in a cooperative was
made compulsory for recipients of lands requisitioned
and redistributed by the state. The intention of the
government was to create cooperatives under collec-
tive management with the state providing capital and
technological assistance to the peasants. By the early
1970s, the government had established more than a
thousand agricultural cooperatives (Table 2). Their
reasons for a nationalized agriculture are not only
ideological; state-run cooperatives and experimental
farms are being used now to introduce more efficient
and productive agricultural methods. Although the
concept of collectivized agriculture may not be
gaining wide acceptance among a peasantry accus-
tomed to share-cropping and tenant-farming, new
techniques, improved seed and new planting methods
are being taught by example. The response to the
government's agrarian reform program remained slow,
Number of Agricultural Cooperative
Societies
Year
Number of
Cooperatives
Number of
Members
Total Area*
of Cooperatives
1964
225
29,496
197,800
1965
298
39,244
238,700
1966
367
47,725
256,300
1967
410
54,750
282,900
1968
473
62,976
329,700
1969
608
76,171
361,200
1970
786
107,797
518,100
1971
831
126,968
676,600
1972
992
146,630
995,500
1973
1,275
201.490
1,345,400
*In hectares (1 hectare = 2.47 acres)
Source: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Annual
Abstract of Statistics 1973 (Baghdad, n.d. ), p, 132.
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although the government claimed by 1973 that 18
percent of the land cultivated had been "cooper-
ativized."
In January 1974 Law Number 12 amended land
redistribution procedures to permit lands sequestered
under the Agrarian Reform Laws to be leased for
cultivation by individual farmers as well as coopera-
tives. The amendment had two objectives: the rapid
and legal redistribution of land to peasants already
living illegally on the land, thereby giving security of
tenure to peasants; and the reduction of migration
from rural agricultural lands to urban centers by
encouraging land holding.
In January 1975 the government announced a five
year plan (1976-1980) for agricultural development to
be funded by 3.1 billion dinar ($10 billion) invest-
ment. The goal is to make Iraq self-sufficient in
agricultural production, raise the standard of living
for the peasant, expand the mechanization of agricul-
ture, and adopt modern scientific methods "to
achieve the revolution's ambitions to build a devel-
oped and prosperous socialist countryside,"* In
addition to projects for dam construction, irrigation,
drainage and land reclamation, the development plan
calls for covering the agrarian reform lands "100
percent" with agricultural cooperatives-450 new co-
ops are to be established on these lands while 50
percent of the lands outside the agrarian reform area
would be "cooperativised," i.e., 335 new co-ops
planned. Cooperatives will receive two-thirds of all
agricultural loans. Government planners envision the
total and voluntary collectivization of agriculture
within 15 years.
While the goal of a completely collectivized
agricultural society may not be attainable for social
reasons, the improvements projected in land reclama-
tion and irrigation are feasible but are also dependent
on available water supply-and this is dependent, in
turn, on political relations with Syria. Neither Iraq,
Syria nor Turkey have agreed on the amounts of water
to be released for the dams on the Euphrates. Water
from the Tabaqah Dam on the Euphrates in Syria
could make Iraqi projects workable. It is not yet clear
if the supply will be sufficient to meet both Syrian and
Iraqi demands. In the past Syria has not been
disposed to accommodate Iraqi needs.
* Speech by Hasan Fahmi Jumah, Minister of Agriculture and
Agrarian Reform, in FBIS, 11 April 1974. Jumah has an earned
American Ph.D. in agriculture.
Inherent in the agricultural five year plan, as in the
industrial five year plan, is the attempt by the
government to establish centralized, regional planning
to ensure balanced growth in the agricultural integra-
tion with other Arab countries. To implement these
policies the government has established controls on
prices, marketing and distribution. Trained agricultur-
alists are being sent to the state-owned cooperatives
and, recently, the government invited Egyptian
peasants to settle in the southern provinces. The
possibility of success of any state policy aimed at the
establishment of collective farms and agricultural
cooperatives is uncertain. It must be noted that land
reform is not a panacea for Iraq's problems. What is
crucial is that someone-the state being the most
logical-has to supply the seed and fertilizer, repair
the pumps, organize canal work, settle disputes
among cultivators, run the irrigation system, provide
qualified technicians and managers if there is to be a
more productive and efficient agriculture and an
increased standard of living for the peasant. One
further comment must be made regarding agrarian
reform. Much of the discussion in this section has
emphasized the government's role in adapting effi-
cient and viable reforms in agriculture. Acceptance of
these changes by a traditionally conservative peas-
antry in a culture which has always regarded change
as "sinful innovation," will compel the Baath to
proceed cautiously.
B. Towards a Social Policy
Although "social" concerns were not a priority of
the new regime in 1968, a social policy based on
Baath prescriptions for economic and social justice is
emerging gradually in Iraq. For a regime whose goals
are unity and stability, some policy designed to gain
popular support, to integrate the country's diverse
ethnic and religious groups, to raise the standard of
living and educate a population which is still 65
percent illiterate and heavily dependent on agricul-
ture is essential.
Oil money has enabled the Baath government to
implement programs for the economic and social
transformation of Iraq-to build factories, farms,
schools, to raise the average per capita income for
Iraq's 11 million people to exceed $900 (more than
double the 1973 level). Recently, the wage rate for
unskilled labor in the public sector was raised 18
percent and salary increases and special allowances
were granted to government employees. In 1974-1975
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further measures were taken: the exemption level of
personal income tax was increased from ID400 to
ID600 and of property tax from ID300 to ID400; rates
on taxable incomes were reduced as was the property
tax. The defense tax introduced in 1967 was partially
rescinded and cost-of-living allowances were increased
for workers, civil servants and retirees. The dependents
allowance was increased and the government decided
to provide education at all levels and some medical
services free of charge.
Here, again, we do not know the extent of the
success or the acceptability of the government's
proposals and programs by "the people." The
government uses subsidies to maintain basic food
prices, but there have been shortages of consumer
goods and food staples and there are controls on both
prices and profit margins in the private sector of the
economy. There are no recent statistics available on
crop production, general consumer demand, employ-
ment levels or prevailing wage rates. The IMF in 1974
estimated a total labor force of three million with a 7
percent (200,000) rate of unemployment and Iraqi
Government figures appear to agree with this estimate.
(See Table 3). However, these estimates may not allow
for seasonal variation in the agricultural sector and
little is known of the actual scale of industrial
development and employment.
There are reports of a gap between the standard of
living of workers and of officials of the Baath Party.
That party members are accorded special "perqs" not
available to the rest of society is axiomatic in a one-
party system; but the extent of the perquisites-and
the degree to which they are resented by non-
Baathists-are again unknown. In the event of
Sectoral Composition of Employment
(as percentage of labor force)
1963
1966
1969
1972
1973
Total labor force
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
1. Employed
92.1
93.6
93.8
93.7
93.2
a. Agriculture
45.0
49.0
51.0
52.0
52.0
h. Industry
9.6
9.9
9.0
8.9
n. a.
c. Services
37.5
34.7
33.8
32.8
n. a.
2. Unemployed
7.9
6.4
6.2
6.3
6.8
Source: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Annual Abstract
of Statistics 1972 and 1973.
political instability, this kind of economic inequality
could encourage opposition to the party leadership.
The success of any social policy, be it to assure land
tenure rights, to improve the standard of living of
worker and peasant, to modernize society, does not
depend solely on the will of the government. It
depends, too, on the acceptance by the people of the
goals and sacrifices necessary to attain the new
society. Iraq is a state with one-party rule, directed
economic planning and a socialist ideology; it is also a
multi-ethnic and religious society with no real sense of
shared traditions, common history, or national iden-
tity. Changes in the land tenure system meant to
assure peasants their rights to the land are probably
popular if not successful. Enlightened tax laws and
wage incentives are also popular if not done at the
expense of a group. However, certain other issues
continue to confront the regime. How conservative
and traditional have the Shiahs of the south remained,
how recalcitrant the Kurds of the north? Has
government by the revolution become palatable to
religious and ethnic minorities which historically have
rejected any form of central government, be it
Ottoman or Hashimite, monarchy or republic.
For example, there has long been much distrust of
Sunni Arab leadership and great wariness of schemes
for Arab nationalism and unity on the part of the
more numerous Shiah. In 1920, 1936 and 1964 Shiah
religious leaders "authorized" revolts or unrest against
the regime in power. Yet the Shiahs of Iraq today do
not represent a unified movement nor even a focus of
opposition to the Baath regime. Their capacity for
political action is limited and even constrained by
recent government ventures.
Several recent foreign policy moves have created a
greater feeling of community between the Sunni rulers
and the mass of the Shiah. The dispute with Syria over
the allocation of water from the Euphrates River
attracts the support of the many Shiah cultivators
south of Baghdad who depend on the river for
irrigation. The rapprochement with Iran, a Shiah
state, is highly popular because it will enable Iranian
pilgrims to visit the shrines in Najaf, Karbala,
Samarra, and Kadhimayn, thus bringing both eco-
nomic and spiritual benefits to Iraqi Shiahs. Shiahs
from Iraq can now again visit the holy cities of Iran.
(On his visit to Iran in 1975 Saddam Husayn made a
special donation to the shrine at Mashhad.) Thus,
Shiah opposition to Baath nationalism and fears of
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religious persecution (60,000 Shiahs were deported to
[ran only months before the accord between Baghdad
and Tehran) seem to be mollified.
Any plan for the modernization of Iraq has to deal
with the shortage of skilled manpower. There are two
approaches: reliance on foreign technicians and/or
creation of an Iraqi manpower base. Iraq has offered
incentives to trained Iraqis living abroad to return
with no penalties. It has also asked Egypt to supply
workers and technicians to aid in the implementation
of development programs and to offset the acute
shortage of skilled personnel. Iraq's labor law gives the
same rights and duties as Iraqi citizens to Arabs
residing in Iraq, Palestinians excepted.*
The second approach to developing "manpower" in
Iraq brings the government to grips with the realities
of a backward society in which attitudes towards
literacy and the role of women can be changed only
by massive effort. "Manpower" is a loaded term in a
country with an extremely high illiteracy rate nation-
ally (65 percent), a rate which is probably higher
among women. * * While the government has opened
some positions to women and educational opportuni-
ties are more available, rural women are still victims
of ignorance, superstition, poverty and illiteracy.
None have reached the power of Adalah Khan, the
Kurdish woman who was accorded the title of "khan"
because she was the head of her tribe. Only a few
women have attained senior positions, e.g., a woman
was appointed to work with the National Front in
1974. .* * *
Iraq is a young country-59 percent of its 11
million people are under 19 years of age. Investment
in education and vocational training, then, must have
a high priority if Iraq is to realize its goals of
independence and self-sufficiency. The Baath govern-
* This is the practice of all Arab states in order to protect the
Palestinian identity." See Abd al-Qadir al-Hadithi, Minister of
Labor and Social Affairs, in FBIS, 25 February 1975. -
** An article on "Fertility Characteristics and Family Planning
Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices in Baghdad, Iraq" found that
of the 1,095 women interviewed, two-thirds were illiterate even
though 62 percent came from an urban background and 37 percent
reported that their husbands were illiterate, There is no official
government policy regarding family planning.
*** Dr. Nazihat Jawdat al-Dulaymi, a gynecologist and a
member of the CPI, was appointed Minister of Municipalities and
Minister of State in the Qasim government. She was the first
woman in modern Iraq to be appointed to a Cabinet post. The
Baath restored her citizenship in November 1968 and in July 1974
she was appointed to full-time work for the National Front.
ment has continued to support the boom in education
which began in the 1960s. Since the 1968 revolution
there has been a steady growth in both attendance
and graduation figures.* Iraq had a "brain drain"
problem, some Iraqis leaving for political reasons,
others for better employment opportunities. The
government is attempting to lure back its professionals
from abroad and recently decided to offer positions in
the public sector to all unemployed graduates of
universities and institutions of higher education. The
civil service already employs as much as one-half the
urban working population in the country.
In accordance with its Baathist principles, the
regime in Iraq is investing heavily in efforts to educate
and modernize its population and to do so on a
national scale, for women as well as men, for Shiahs
and Kurds as well as Sunnis. The government has the
money and the economic incentive to push in this
direction on a massive scale. Such policies have their
political benefits; they can be used to attract youth,
workers and peasants, intellectuals and potentially
dissident tribesmen previously ignored by the system
to the support of the Bakr-Saddam Husayn regime.
But such a program inevitably creates some seeds of
dissidence too. Better-educated, more prosperous
groups are not unquestioningly loyal; they are likely
to make new demands on the government and to feel
little gratitude for their "benefactors." Groups cur-
rently enjoying the advantages of the system may not
want to share them with the newly advantaged.
However, these types of developments do not emerge
overnight. The government in Baghdad is quick to
perceive signs of trouble and will continue to resort to
tactics of repression if it feels political dissidence
threatens its stability and control.
IV. INTERNAL NECESSITY AND FOREIGN
RELATIONS
In foreign policy, as in domestic politics, "Iraq
First" is the basic priority of the Baath government.
Again, it is not a new theme; in the five decades since
independence it has been the goal of Nuri al-Said and
Abd al-Karim Qasim, of Abd al-Salam Arif and, now
of Bakr and Saddam Husayn. Before the 1958
revolution Nuri advocated cooperation with the West
* At the time of the 1968 revolution 285,000 students were
enrolled in secondary schools and 37,300 in institutions of higher
education; by 1973, the latest year for which statistics are available,
353,000 students were enrolled in secondary schools and 49,200 in
higher education.
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and membership in the Baghdad Pact despite the
growing unpopularity of such policies in the Arab
world. Then 80 percent of Iraq's foreign trade imports
came from Great Britain, Western Europe and the US;
these same countries bought 59 percent of the
country's exports.
Since the 1958 revolution the governments of Iraq
have pursued several courses of action. Qasim and the
brothers Arif chose nonalignment, establishing rela-
tions with Eastern Europe while maintaining relations
with the West. Foreign trade statistics for the decade
of the 1960s reveal an equal degree of trade East and
West.* After 1968 the Baath shifted foreign policy to
one of realignment, preferring to develop relations
with the East and those considered ideologically
sympathetic. Internally the shifts in foreign policy
reflected Baath concentration on domestic politics, on
the need to establish legitimacy and maintain control.
Externally the shifts resulted in a deepening isolation
from the West and the Arab world.
Beginning in 1.974 a more flexible approach in the
conduct of foreign relations, if not in the language of
foreign policy could be discerned. The shift reflected
Iraq's new oil wealth and the Baath government's new
self-confidence. Now the government of Iraq is
beginning to seek recognition and influence through
ties with its Arab and non-Arab neighbors as well as
with the West. Iraq under Bakr and Saddam Husayn
is re-emerging as a participant in the affairs of the
Arab world, the Gulf and the West. Instead of
isolation, participation; instead of confrontation,
cooperation.
Despite the changes in government and politics in
Iraq in the past several decades, a continuum can be
noted. Relations with the outside world are deter-
mined by internal necessity, by the need for political
stability, economic development, military defense.
Where Nuri relied on Western alliances to strengthen
and maintain Iraq's independence, the Baath have
depended on Soviet assistance for the same purpose.
A. Relations East . . .
Since 1959 the Soviet Union has supplied Iraq with
military equipment and training, loans and techno-
* From 1960 through 1970 the average share of Iraq's exports to
the US was 6.7 percent and to the Soviet Union 6.7 percent.
Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning. Statistical Pocketbook 1960-
1970 (Baghdad 1972), pp. 156-157.
logical assistance. By 1963 Iraq was completely
dependent on the Soviets for military equipment.
Relations had cooled by 1968, however, and the
Soviets greeted the Baath coup of that year with
mixed emotions, remembering the 1963 repression of
the CPI.
Rapprochement with the East began in 1969. Aid
and trade agreements were signed with the Soviet
Union, East Germany was recognized, and a series of
high-level visits were begun-the most notable being
Saddam Husayn's trip to Moscow in 1970 and 1972
and Kosygin's to Baghdad in 1972 (the first visit to
Iraq by a high-ranking Soviet official). The Kosygin
visit produced a major step in Soviet-Iraqi rela-
tions-the 15 year Treaty of Friendship and Coopera-
tion. The treaty provides for political, economic,
cultural and military cooperation with regular consul-
tations to be held on international issues affecting
mutual interests. A 1974 trip to Moscow by Saddam
Husayn resulted in an agreement on cooperation in
the development of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes. Other agreements for weapons, develop-
ment credits, land reclamation projects, railway
construction and industrial development have been
signed with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.
Aid, trade and oil had created dependence by the
mid-1970s. Soviet assistance in the development of the
North Rumaylah oilfields and construction of the
pipeline to Fao were to be repaid in Iraqi crude oil.
The plants and goods supplied by Eastern Europe
were repayable in crude. Iraq had become the
principal foreign supplier of crude oil to the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. Given Iraq's isolation
from its Arab neighbors and doctrinaire treatment of
Western imperialism, this was the only course open if
defense and development needs were to be met.* Iraq
also invested in the East-it is the only OPEC
member to have a major portion of its foreign assets in
Communist countries. A recent study estimated that
60 percent of Iraq's foreign exchange holdings of
$3,900 millions were deposited in Soviet, Hungarian,
East German, Polish and Chinese banks with 40
* From 1959 to 1967 Soviet aid to Iraq totalled $188.1 million.
From 1968 through 1973 the amount of aid extended by the Soviet
Union to Iraq equalled $382.5 million. Of the latter stem, $330
million was for oil exploration and development and $22.5 million
25X1
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percent located in the West (including 5 percent in
New York).*
Iraq thus has benefitted greatly from its relations
with the Soviet Union. However, it should not be
written off as a "client" state. The Soviet Union has
modernized Iraq's military, providing up-to-date
weapons and training and there are Soviet advisors
present in the country. In addition, the Soviets built
the port of Umm Qasr at the head of the Gulf and
expanded al-Habbaniyah airfield. Yet they have not
been permitted military use of either facility. And it is
not likely that Iraq would permit extensive use of port
and airfield facilities by the Soviets other than for aid
and arms delivery. Arming Iraq may serve Soviet
political purposes, but Iraq supports Soviet foreign
policy goals only where they suit Iraq's policies and
purposes. For example, for the Soviets Iraq becomes a
link in an Asian "zone of peace," part of an
encirclement of China and an entry to the Persian
Gulf.** Clearly, this coincides with certain Iraqi
strategic goals, including balancing a pro-American
Iran; the Baath government talks of the Gulf and the
Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace" to be free of great
power domination, i.e., no new American bases.
However, Iraq also advocates equal access to the Gulf
by all powers, Iranian and Iraqi, Soviet and Ameri-
can. If this implies putting the US on an equal footing
with the USSR, the Soviets may not be happy with
Iraqi policy on Gulf security.
There are other areas of disagreement between the
Soviet Union and Baathist Iraq. The Baath has not
appreciated Moscow's professed sympathy for Barzani
and Kurdish autonomy and has refused to increase the
role of the CPI in a broadened National Front. Iraq
has not approved UN Security Council resolutions 242
and 338 on the Arab-Israeli conflict nor does the
government support the reconvening of the Geneva
Conference, measures the Soviet Union has urged on
the confrontation states. The Soviets, in turn, were not
enthusiastic about the Algiers Accord and have failed
in attempts to mediate the disputes between Iraq and
Syria, both recipients of Soviet aid. A greater
dissatisfaction in Soviet-Iraqi relations, however, is the
Iraq s
foreign assets have increased from $1,560 million in 1973 to $3,855
million as of 30 June 1975,
** A decline in Soviet-Iraqi relations would produce only a
symbolic improvement in Sino-Iraqi relations.
issue of financing future development and repayment
for aid. The barter arrangements of the early 1970s no
longer work to Iraq's advantage. The price the Soviet
Union "pays" for Iraqi crude oil was set by
agreements pre-dating the 1973-1974 oil crisis; at the
same time the Soviets have been reselling Iraqi crude
to Eastern and Western Europe for hard currency and
at much higher prices. Clearly, Iraq would prefer a
different arrangement, the direct sale of its oil to
Europe and for hard currency as well.
Oil revenues have relieved Iraq of the need to
depend economically on the Soviet Union as the only
available source of military or financial assistance. In
1974-1975 Iraq spent as much for French and British
military hardware as it spent on Soviet arms.* While
this hardly constitutes a trend, the Baath would like to
be more independent of the USSR. Relations, both
economic and diplomatic, with Western Europe and
the US could serve as the means the Baath will use to
encourage and strengthen this independence. How-
ever, the government is not about to upset relations
with the Soviets. In a visit to France in September
1975, Saddam Husayn noted that "the replacement of
Soviet arms is not an objective of Iraqi policy, which is
founded on the protection of national and Arab
interests. Our international relations are determined
by this principle." Relations between the Soviet
Union and Iraq will continue to reflect both
cooperation and contradiction. The Soviets in future
will have less leverage on Baath political behavior or
foreign relations. They will not come to any clearer
understanding of the Syrian-Iraqi estrangement nor
will they be able to orchestrate a solution there. It is
the independence which Iraq insists on maintaining
that will alternately warm and cool the relationship
with the Soviet Union.
B. . . . and West
Saddam Husayn in an April 1974 speech:
. . , we do not have any sensitivity or
complex against dealing with any company
in the world providing that this is on a basis
that would preserve our sovereignty and
guarantee legitimate neutral benefit by
domestic, national and international criteria.
* In 1974-1975, of a total $1,468 million spent in arms orders, 43
percent (636 million) were in Soviet arms, 31 percent ($462 million)
to France, and 9 percent ($128 million) to Great Britain. II
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Secure in its political control, confident of internal
unity with the defeat of the Kurds, anxious for rapid
economic development, Iraq has turned a tentative
eye to the West. Interest in encouraging Western
sources of trade, investment capital and technological
expertise dates back to mid-1973 and coincides with
the rapid rise in government revenues as well as with
the Baath desire to end its international isolation and
dependence on a single source of assistance. It has led
to contacts and contracts with Western European and
Japanese companies for projects ranging from natural
gas liquification, chemical fertilizer and cement plants
to agreements on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
The results can be measured both in terms of contracts
awarded and the increased flow of trade and
investment credits.
In recognition of France's "neutrality" in the 1973
Arab-Israeli war and her correct stance on the
Palestinian issue, Saddam Husayn signed an agree-
ment in September 1975 with the French Government
pledging nuclear cooperation, oil and trade conces-
sions. France pledged to build and equip a nuclear
reactor and power plant and to train Iraqi technicians
in its use and maintenance. Iraq in turn agreed to
provide 15 percent of France's petroleum needs at
preferential rates and to award 80 percent of its
development projects to French companies. The terms
of the agreement are a bit unrealistic and France has
yet to implement its part. Moreover, considering
France's past difficulties in completing its contracts
and the reluctance of French companies to fulfill Iraqi
requests, it is unlikely Iraq will award France 80
percent of its development contracts. In a similar
exchange for oil, Japan modified its Arab-Israeli
policy and extended credits to finance several major
projects in Iraq. An agreement with Italy on atomic
energy was concluded in January 1976 and contracts
were awarded recently to Swiss and West German
companies for subway construction.
much a question of politics. On the ideological level,
an anti-American stance is popular domestically,
especially given Iraq's perception of America's ability
to influence events in the Middle East through its
relations with Israel. This logic extends not just to
Israel. The Baath leadership also sees American
collusion in Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil
war.
Yet the rhetoric of Arab liberation has not kept the
Iraqis from buying US goods. The value of American
exports to Iraq has increased from a 1965 level of $20
million to a 1975 level of $309.7 million (See Table 4).
American-Iraqi Trade 1972-1975
(in $ Million)
Value of US Exports
to Iraq
Value US Imports
From Iraq 9 15.8 1 22.6
Source: Department of State, Annual Economic Trends Report
for Iraq. UNCLASSIFIED, 18 March 1976.
Bakr and Saddam Husayn see some advantage in
bettering relations with the US. The government is
encouraging open bidding on contracts and would
like American assistance in acquiring computer
technology, military equipment and grain. Closer
economic ties with the US could also be used to
counter Soviet influence, but this is not a major
element in determining either Iraqi-Soviet or Iraqi-
American relations. The Baath are not eager, at this
point, to re-establish official links with the US. As
long as the absence of diplomatic recognition does not
exclude Iraq from American commercial investment,
there would seem to be little incentive to renew those
ties.
Of the Arab countries which broke relations with
the US in 1967, only Iraq has not resumed diplomatic
relations. When questioned recently on the possibility
of resuming relations with the US, Saddam Husayn
responded, "This will happen when suitable condi-
tions are created." When asked if he believed that
such conditions were to be created in the near or
distant future, the Deputy replied, "Such a question is
not asked in politics." But the issue of reestablishing
formal diplomatic recognition with the US is very
C. Rethinking Arab Unity
Baath policy towards its Arab and non-Arab
neighbors has shifted significantly since 1973. For the
first several years of their rule, the Baathists in Iraq
were more interested in subverting their neighbors
than in cooperating with them. Iraq has sponsored
Arab and Baluchi opposition to the Shah in Iran,
tribal opposition to the Saudis and guerrilla activities
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in Kuwait, Oman, Yemen and Jordan. Iraq's deepest
enmity, however, is reserved for the "impure"
Baathists of Syria. It is a measure of their new sense of
stability that the Iraqi Baathists now want to
participate in Arab affairs. They seek recognition and
prestige through policies which stress cooperation in
Arab affairs and unity in alliances with the established
states of the Middle East.
1. Relations with Syria
As early as 1920, before either was a recognized
state, Syria and Iraq attempted to establish a political
and economic union under the Hashimites-Faysal as
King in Syria, his brother `Abdullah King in Iraq. This
dream of union persisted beyond the 1920s. Nuri al-
Said advocated Arab union through the Arab League
of the 1940s and through a hoped-for Hashimite
federation in 1958 with the Kingdom of Jordan. As
late as the 1960s the brothers Arif talked of a pan-
Arab unity. In 1963 schemes for union came closest to
realization when Baathist revolutions occurred in
Syria and Iraq within one month of each other.
Events since then however-the coups of 1966 and
1970 in Syria and intraparty purges-have brought to
power in both countries Baathist regimes concerned
more with maintaining their own ideological purity
and subverting the other than with union.
Today the disputes with Syria range from water
control to support for the Palestinian fedayeen in
Lebanon, It is not the issues which are important so
much as it is the dialogue in which they are cast. In
the Euphrates Dam issue, Iraq accused Syria of
withholding water for political purposes, thereby
causing crop failure and ruin for Iraq's cultivators.
Iraq is currently withholding oil from Syria while the
two dispute the transit fees Syria charges and the price
Syria pays for the high quality Iraqi crude, Syria has
supported and encouraged the Kurds to rebel against
the Iraqi Government.
The recent round of civil war in Lebanon has
highlighted the rivalry between the Syrian-supported
Saiqa and the Iraqi-supported Palestinian Rejection
Front. The Iraqi Baath opposes Syrian intervention in
Lebanon and Syrian attempts to impose a solution on
the political crisis there. Iraq would prefer a coordi-
nated rejection front of Algeria, Libya, Syria and Iraq;
this would maintain an Iraqi presence in Lebanon
and ostensibly limit Syrian action against Iraqi-
backed fedayeen. Iraq continues to urge Syria and the
other confrontation states to join in a northern front
against Israel. If Syria will reject Security Council
resolutions 242 and 338, and renounce both the Golan
peace-keeping force and the reconvening of the
Geneva Conference, then Iraq will join with Syria in
the establishment of a northern military front and
send troops to the border. However, barring the
outbreak of a new war with Israel, Syrian President
Asad will not want Iraqi troops present in his
country-troops which could support a coup or
challenge Syrian control of fedayeen activities.
Underlying these issues, then, are deeper con-
flicts-the rivalry between Damascus and Baghdad,
each claiming to be the legitimate center of the pan-
Arab Baath organizational structure, and the rivalry
between Hafiz al-Asad and Saddam Husayn, each
seeking prestige in Arab affairs. Continued attempts
by the BPI to subvert the "illegitimate" Syrian regime
and to replace it with one congenial to Iraq cannot
improve the situation. Nor can the fact that Iraq still
shelters Syrian leaders ousted by the Damascus regime
calm the situation.
2. Towards an Arab Policy?
Although relations with the Syrian Arab Republic
would seem to belie the point, Arab unity has been a
constant and recurrent theme in Iraqi politics and
policy. In the early years of the regime, the Baathist
concept of an Arab policy was to confront and oppose
all forms of imperialism, Zionism and reaction
wherever perceived while pledging support to all
liberation movements. While not disavowing this
interest, Iraq recently shifted its Arab policy to a more
positive stance. Instead of pledging the usual "firm
and comprehensive struggle" against the "agent
reactionary" Arab states, the Baath leadership now
believes
... that it is in the interests of the movement
of unity and development and the Arab
citizen in every part of the Arab world that
ideological and political differences and
disputes among Arab regimes should not
obstruct, under any circumstances, the ex-
tension of the bridges of cooperation on a
wider scale among all of these regimes and
states.
From refusal to treat with the conservative Arab
states, then, Iraq is looking now to establish normal,
legitimate relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan
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and the Arab states on the Gulf. These shifts are
reflected in Iraq's relations with Egypt and Jordan. In
November 1974 Iraq and Egypt signed a protocol
pledging economic and technical cooperation. While
Syria was severely criticized for agreeing to a UNEF
extension on the Golan, Egypt was not chastized by
the Iraqi Government for Sinai II. Rather, Syria was
accused of "letting Egypt run interference" for
Damascus. Iraq noted the "objective circumstances"
which produced for Cairo "a direct and frank and
consequently complex" approach whereas Syria was
guilty of "apostasy," of "hostility to Arab interests"
and of "pretense" in pursuing a defeatist settlement.
Egypt was offered oil, economic assistance, the
settlement of Egyptian farmers on Iraqi land and a
pledge of noninterference in its relations with the US.
What had been "reactionary, fascist, defeatist"
Jordan in 1970 became "sisterly" Jordan in 1975.
Jordan was now included in the invitation to join the
northern front and given a $23 million loan to finance
construction of the port of Aqaba. Jordan's relations
with Syria may make it suspect in Iraqi eyes but so far
this has not affected Amman-Baghdad relations.
What has been affected is Iraq's position towards the
Palestinian fedayeen. There were indications prior to
the latest round in the Lebanon civil war that Iraq
was reconsidering its total support for the Rejection
Front and its tactics. However, events in Lebanon
have provided the catalyst for increasing Iraqi support
and financial assistance to the pro-BPI fedayeen as
well as to the PLO and Yasir Arafat where they are in
opposition to Saiqa and other pro-Syrian elements.
Iraq, as noted, would prefer a concerted Arab solution
for Lebanon and a shift back to concentration on "the
Zionist entity." In the event of a new Arab-Israeli war,
Iraqi forces would be sent to the front but their
effectiveness would depend on the extent and
duration of hostilities. The longer the war, the more
effective Iraqi participation would be, given the
political and logistical problems involved in transport-
ing soldiers and equipment.
Baathist Iraq then is evolving an Arab policy based
on conciliation and unity in matters diplomatic and
economic. Through this approach, Iraq hopes to end
its isolation from the Arab world and to play a role in
the politics of the Middle East. It is a careful and
calculated policy in pursuit of prestige and legitimacy.
Its success and any implications for the future must be
measured in light of one other major area of potential
Arab conflict-the Gulf.
Iraq would like to apply its new reasonableness to
establishing relations with the Gulf States and
agreement on Gulf security arrangements. The policy
is receiving its major test in relations with Iran. The
Shah of Iran and the Baath leadership in Iraq view
each other with mutual distrust and suspicion;
relations have been marked by fears of military
aggression, expansionism and the export of ideology.
The disputes have varied from the territorial to the
religious. Iran for years supported the Kurdish
rebellions in Iraq while the Baath have encouraged
resistance to the Shah. Both countries have large Shiah
populations and both have restricted pilgrimages to
shrines and centers of learning. Iran's occupation of
several islands in the Gulf and her control of the
Straits of Hormuz further heightened Baath fears for
exporting its oil or its politics through the Gulf.
It is in this context that the Algiers Accord of 6
March 1975 must be placed. Certain aspects of the
Accord have been noted already. The Shah and the
Deputy agreed on the demarcation of land and
maritime borders and on the restoration of security
and mutual confidence by controlling the borders and
ending all acts of subversion. In subsequent negotia-
tions the land boundaries were determined according
to 1914 treaties while navigation rights and bound-
aries of the Shatt al-Arab were settled to Iran's
satisfaction, the thalweg line. The border settlements,
as well as Iraq's concession of all claims to Arab
Khuzistan, were in Iran's favor. But Iraq gained much
in exchange; it gained a large measure of political
stability as well as secure oil lanes through the Gulf.
With the Accord, Iraq seems to recognize that Iran
and Oman control the Straits through which tankers
carrying Iraqi crude must pass. It is an admission that
Iraq cannot militarily challenge Iran's presence in
either the Gulf or Oman.
"Peaceful coexistence among the Arab States
situated in the Arab Gulf" is the avowed policy of
Baathist Iraq. Whether it will bring Iraq into conflict
with the other Gulf States or into "sincere cooperation
and solidarity" is not clear. Despite differences
between the Saudis and the Iraqis, Saddam Husayn
noted recently that "we are 100 percent with Saudi
Arabia in every effort and in every stand it takes to
preserve the Arabism of the Gulf and to protect the
Gulf States." As part of its policy of Arab cooperation,
Iraq and Saudi Arabia have agreed on demarcation of
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the Neutral Zone, construction of a road between
Najaf and Medina (to facilitate pilgrimage traffic)
and an end to anti-Saudi propaganda. Saudi Arabia,
in turn, has loaned Iraq $200 million and is
sponsoring Iraq's inclusion in Arab organizations, e.g.,
the Arab Health Organization.
Cooperation and participation in Arab affairs are
very much in style in Baghdad. In January 1976 Iraq
joined with Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar
and the UAE in establishing an Arab shipping
company and signed an agreement to participate in
the establishment of the Gulf International Bank and
an Arab monetary fund.* Earlier, in November 1975,
Iraq and Bahrain signed a three year trade and
economic agreement calling for formation of a joint
committee to implement trade agreements on agricul-
tural and industrial products, raw materials, tourism,
investment and manpower.
Iraq's new policies have not erased memories of past
actions. The Baath do not have a pacific history in the
Gulf region and several areas of conflict remain to be
settled before their Arab policy can be realized. Iraq
has long argued for the liberation of the Persian Gulf,
and has supported guerrilla movements and political
organizations in Kuwait, Oman, South Yemen and
Bahrain. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have been wary
of Baath motives and continue to fear the spread of
communism and revolutionary ideology by Baath-
supported groups. Kuwait, the object of an "incur-
sion" in 1973, became in 1975 "a fraternal and dear
country . . . There will never be any problem of any
sort between us and Kuwait and we will not ask
Kuwait to do anything we would not ask ourselves to
do." However, the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait
over possession of the Bubiyan and Warbah Islands
and control of the Kuwaiti right bank of Khawr
Zubayr is not likely to be settled soon.
The larger issue, however, is that of Gulf security.
Iraq has defined Gulf security in terms of freedom of
navigation, a zone of peace, and Saddam Husayn has
offered "to discuss the establishment of a joint defense
plan with Saudi Arabia as well as a joint naval fleet
Iraq is a member of four joint-venture companies established on
the recommendation of the Arab Economic Unity Council: the
Arab Investment Company headquartered in Riyadh, the Arab
Company for Mining in Amman, the Arab Company for Livestock
Resources in Damascus, and the Arab Company for Agriculture and
Food Production in Cairo. Iraq is also a major contributor to the
Arab Monetary Fund, set up in May 1976.
without jeopardizing Iran's rights in its territory.
What matters most," he continues to emphasize, "is
the Arab nature of the Gulf." Iran is promoting
regional security in terms of defense pacts and control
of any foreign vessels in the region. Would Iran
preclude all non-Gulf, i.e., Soviet and American, ships
from the Gulf while Iraq would allow both? The Shah
has stated that "Iran is determined to become strong
enough to defend the region all by itself, although
obviously, we would prefer to cooperate with all the
states in the region on an equal footing." Given Iran's
ambitious naval program, and the suspicions it raises
in both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, agreement on any
Gulf security arrangement may not be possible.
For several reasons-stability at home, secure oil
lanes, an end to isolation, a need for prestige in the
Arab world-Iraq has made peace, at least temporar-
ily, with the states on the Gulf. This does not mean
that Iraq accepts the status quo in the region or that
the Baath accept the "Persianization" of the Gulf
from the Shatt al-Arab to the Straits of Hormuz. Iraq
will continue to stress and support "every effort and
every stand aimed at preserving the Arab nature of the
Gulf." And Iraq will continue to pursue a policy of
cooperation, of conciliation, of Arab unity as long as it
benefits her. Relations between Imperial Iran and
Republican Iraq could stalemate over these issues,
however, and relations between Iraq and the other
Arab states of the Gulf will remain tenuous at best.
Until the BPI disavows support for Gulf radicals the
Gulf States will not trust Baath motives or intentions.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
Although Iraq and the US recently reaffirmed a
1938 treaty on commerce and navigation, prospects
for the renewal of diplomatic relations between the
two countries are not good for the near future. Current
Iraqi policies hold few direct implications for US
interests. Iraq does not require foreign financial
assistance nor does it seek secure, long-range invest-
ments in foreign countries for its petro-dollars. The
country does need help from the more technologically
and scientifically advanced nations to implement
development projects and training programs. The
Baath government would like to obtain such assis-
tance from the US and acquire as well computer
technology, military hardware, communications
equipment, and grain in a bad harvest year. Would
diplomatic recognition make a substantive difference
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in US-Iraqi relations? Not really; lack of diplomatic
recognition is not a barrier to aid and trade per se. Nor
would recognition necessarily bring Iraq the items or
the alterations in American policies it would like.
Nonrecognition also allows the Iraqi Government to
use its ideological rhetoric against any friend of Israel.
(However, Iraq will continue to probe the US to see
what can be obtained without making any conces-
sions of its own.
Despite the recent decrease in Soviet leverage in
Iraq-the USSR is unable to influence either domestic
politics or foreign policies toward Syria or Egypt-and
despite the also recent increase in volume of trade
with the US, Iraq will continue to depend on the
USSR for the hulk of its arms supplies. Although the
Baath government might like to limit its dependence
on the USSR, a further decrease in Soviet leverage or
influence on Iraq will not produce a corresponding
increase or improvement in American-Iraqi relations.
There is no reason to assume that Iraq will use its
increased contacts with the West and the US to
counter Soviet influence in the country.
If there are to he changes in US-Iraqi relations,
then, other more indirect factors must he considered.
-Iraq views the Gulf as a "zone of peace,"
implying oppositon to any militarization of the region
and to the establishment of any foreign military bases.
This could mean recognition of both an American and
Soviet presence in the Gulf for peaceful and commer-
cial purposes. It does mean opposition to any
American military presence, and means, by extension,
opposition to American military presence in the
Indian Ocean.
-If the US were to assist Iran in establishing a
nuclear capability or in any further build-tip of Iran's
Gulf fleet, this would impair US-Iraqi relations
because of the heightened fears of Iranian and
American intentions in the region.
-If Iraq's current policy of cooperation in Arab
economic affairs and of establishing routine and
legitimate relations with other Arab states succeeds,
then Iraq may look more favorably on establishing
broad ties with the US, especially in regard to trade,
development and other areas of mutual interest which
it would then he willing to define.
-If snags develop in discussions between Iraq and
Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Jordan, then Iraq might not
look as favorably at the US but would, once again,
question its motives and intentions.
-In Iraq's view, the US exerts great influence on
Israeli actions. If the US were to alter its position
regarding Israeli-Palestinian affairs, pressure Israel to
withdraw from occupied territories and recognize the
PLO (but not the pro-Syrian Saiqa), then Iraq might
confer diplomatic recognition as a reward. The
problem here is two-fold: first, Iraq has not so much
spelled out its terms for an acceptable Palestine
solution short of total war as it has spelled out what
Syria must do to win the war and Iraqi cooperation.
Second, Iraq claims that the US is in collusion with
Syria in the Lebanese civil war in order to effect a pro-
Syrian-and hence anti-Iraqi-settlement. The ques-
tion is whether this, too, is propaganda for public
consumption in the ideological war with Syria or a
genuine article of faith.
-Before the current phase of the Lebanese war,
there were indications that Iraq was toning down its
support for the radical fedayeen and for Arab
terrorists. Iraq is seeking prestige, respectability,
influence, especially among the nonaligned nations. If
the Lebanese-Syrian conflict could be subtracted from
the equation, then a more subdued Iraqi policy
regarding terrorism and the fedayeen might be
possible and consequently might provide a further
base to touch with the US.
There is little likelihood of change in US-Iraqi
relations, given the current regime's perception of US
policies and given American support for its allies in
the region-Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel. In sum, Iraq
remains outside the periphery of American interests in
the Middle East. The prevailing Iraqi attitude
towards the US-cool, slightly suspicious but not
overtly hostile-is perhaps the best that can be
expected, again given the fundamental divergence of
interest. So long as Iraq finds it advantageous to bar
Soviet military use of its facilities and to seek stability
in the Gulf, it contributes, albeit inadvertently, to
overall US goals in the Middle East.
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Secret
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