EXTENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RAPPROCHEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030016-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 16, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
16 August 1957
STAFF MEMO: 40-51
SUBJECT Extent and Implications of the Soviet-Yugoslav Rappchaiit
1. The Khrushchev Tito meeting in Rumania on 1 and 2 August
may hav resulted in B re f a rapprochement than either of the
p rticipante is as yet Waling to admit. Yhgeslav officials have
repeatedly asserted that Tito has in no way conceded any of Yugoslavia's
indepen nce or ideological convictions and Belgrade ha a encouraged
the prasion that the new ecord has again been accomplished only
en the basin of an "agreement to disagree." Nevertheless. a compromise
&ming ment. one that does not involve any major conc ssiens on either
si but which is still one step beyond the 1956 understanding. may
have been worked out in secret.
2. Such a compromise might involve, on the Soviet side a
renewed pledge to recognise genuine Yugoslav ind ['cadence. This would
not moan endorsement of Yugoslav eovereignt3. ideological concepts
ammompopmmUSCUMENTINO
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er economic practices, but would imply that, while scarcely admissable
elseuhere in the Bloc, Yugoslav "deviations" will be tolerated for
Yugoslavia (Khreshchev, speaking extemporaneously in Prague last
months told the Yugoslays to keep their precious workers councils if
they wanted to, but not to expe t applause from the Bloc). In
eddition, the Soviet Union may have committed itself to "encourage"
the Satellites -- particularly Albania and Bulgaria -- to mind their
manners and "make up" with Yugoslavia (there are some indication..
that this process is already underway).,
The Yugoslays, for their part, could have agreed at least
temporarily to recognise (not endorse) the Bloc ac it is -- i.e as
a Bloc. This in turn, would imply a Yugoslav willingness to end
missionary activities in the Satellites* and a promise to cease
,"
specific pressures against individual Satellite lea s Belgrade
presumably would not aeree to either of these "concessions," however
unless it was ensured as it probably was -- that the Bloc is
evolving in the direction desired by Yugeelavia, i.e. toward Satellite
As engaged in last summer and fall, particularly in Poland
and Hungary.
** As once exerted against Rakosi. A Yugoslav promise to accept
unpalatable Satellite leaders is not without precedent e-
Belgesde apparently agreed to accept Hungarian leader Erne Gera
just prier to last Fall's revolution.
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'equalitT" with the 'IniarA,, ;A l'ilgoslav spokespa-, recently
told th. Amer:eon ambassador in zalarade that his government im
cotimtAio but. the future of relations wlthin the l;-loc and
fmrovments tn the neer futore5'
Ygi;.:01314.**15 nay alma have-*Teen tocon-,-,der ftlaratAy the
na:mttoo of me.T,torF;hip in some I:gee or "international' ...,ommunigt
al-ganiastIchs, Blierade'e pos tion on. thin is not as inflexia ov
morsatmes maintains; it is oven arixios, to partoiatt
P-kAoon orca.nizatiabs If It roars tencerning domlnatIoA .'an boo
Aled, It 1411M already become a C.Mi observer and recent p.rt4
tr it may rn-join the 'Aerld Federation of Trade `!niona
(fror4 vtitti it was ousted in 19.50* The Yugo& ve OtoutlY maihts.lai
that thil? will never enter inte a revival .:airriltiform, but their
Attttude tuwari an international ..;armlniet or "soetalist" organiv.,
Orasj. membership and loose structure mighl devote itsblr
nn te the publication of jeurnal 7lay not be 4utte so nileativeo'
1,1.though the rapprochement may thus have gone boyend te
0,?:repent, .or iast year4 the natives for tne accord aDcear 'Lc rnt.'ne
Vrte 4.:,,t'imate :Soviet ala ntly inuetc be rtInavad
"f-..t wan TIto, after all. who C;xist suggested to
ttte tonnlin of an internatinnAl. -,ommunist organisation to
laice the defunct Cori_ntern.,
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Yugoslav membership in the Bloc? Moscow presumably foresees various
stages in the gradual attainment of this aim, with each stege perhaps
representing a specific Soviet accomplishment -- such as a Yugeslav
agreement to participate in a loose revival of the Cordnform. The
timing of such a procedure and the extent to which the Yugoslays are
expected to surrender their independence when back in the Bloc would
presumably depend largely on Yugoslav reactions; Moscow might
ultimately settle for a Yugoslav status roughly similar to that of
either present-day Poland or even Communist China.
60 'Why the USSR feels that this is the most desirable course
of action (instead of merely i olating Yugoslavia from the Blocs as
Stalin did) is presumably related to the change in the evereall
Soviet outlook and reflects, among other things, de-Stalinisatione
peaceful coexistence, and the general campaign against the West,
MoscoW's apparent urgency since the Soviet Presidium shakeup in
restoring good relations with Yugoolavia, however, may have merely
been the result of Khruehchev's specific desire to achieve success
in a personal policy that was highly controversial.
7. Yugoelav motives for seeking accord with the USSR are only
in part practical (e.g0 desire for Soviet economic aid). Probably
more important are less tangible considerations. Belgrade, for
4 -
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example, does not enjoy its spiritual isolation from most ?1 the
socialist woad. Its Communist missionary fervor cannot operate in
a vacuum it must develop some measure of legitimate prestige
and party contacts within as well as outside the Bloc if its influence
is tep be felt. Perhaps temporarily able to curb its desire to
propagate its own brand of Marxism, it, nevertheless, probably hopes
in the ling tun to become a powerful source of enlightenment tor the
entire Socialist camp, It may also feel that its power and global
prestige (something of which /ageslavs are apparently very
conscious) will in the long run be enhanced by good relations with
the USSR and by the emergence of fteslavia as an indispensable
bridge between the two worlds*
8* If a sort of tactical quid pro quo has, in fact, been
worked eut between Tagealavia and the USSR, the stability of the
present rapprochement will presumably rest on firmer foundations than
the 1956 accord. Discussion apparently has been on a relatively
frank basis and Molotov is no longer in a position to hinder good
relations, But the current mood in both countries rests to a large
extent on unrealistic optimism a general belief in each country
that its own tenets will ultimately -- and perhaps dialectically
triumph. Further, because major obstacles admittedly remain unaltered,
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because Khrushchev is impulsive and Tito is something of a crusader
and because any number of imponderables could threaten the accord
the success of the current rapprochement is by no means assured.
9. Skepticism in both capitals is undoubtedly strong. Tho
Yugoslays still fear Stalinist influence in Moscow, the Soviet loadera--
legitimately -. still fear Yugoslav influence in the Satellites -
Thus Belgrade is continuing its public emphasis on "equality,"
Moscow is maintaining its heavy pitch ccneerning Bloc unity. A
feeling in Moscow that its recognition of Yugoslav independence is
again having major repercussions in the other Satellites (regardlees
of what the Yugoslavs do), or a Yugoslav feeling that the USSR is
net satisfactorily veleping Satellite equality, would stirnlate
renewed discord. "Outside" events or agencies -- another Hungary,
some Polish action or major changes on the world scene -. could
also prove too much for the agreement. Unless further compromises
can be worked out the long-run prospects for genuine rapproche nt
are Alm. Violent discord need not arise, but relations may never
go beyond the present fairly flimsy.- and uneasy rapprochement.
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IO. Thereforer our most recent estimate* that the Yugoslays
"will seek opportunities to expand economic and political contacte
with the Sino-Sivist !floc" -- without, however, compromising their
"independent foreign policy" ...Appears to zrnain essentially sound.
25X1 A9a
* NIE 31$79 "YUgoslevies Policies and Prospects," 11 June 1957
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