THE ARGENTINE SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030036-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: April 11, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
1 April 19!57
STAFF MEMORANDUM No. 22-57
SUBJECT: The Argentine Situation
1 Thus far the Provisional Government of the armed fcxr:esp headed
by General A~ramburu5, has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to survive
periodic crises during the 17 months of its existence. However, as the
regime approaches the last year of its temporary receivership and prepares
to transfer power to a duly elected government, it is likely to become
increasingly vulnerable to overthrow, particularly as the critical
23 February 1958 election date approaches, The regimes & ri principal
with regard to elections
problem/is to head off Radical Party leader Arturo Frondizig sUll the
chief contender for the Presidency. Unless the regime is able to reduce
Frondizi?s chances of election by tactical maneuvers in the Constituent
Assembly and unless there emerges by the end of 1957 a strong party or
coalition with which the incumbents are in closer sympathy, there is a
better than even chance that anti-election army slensents will depose
General .Aramburu and forestall elections 4 In this event, Argentina
would then be ruled by an increasingly authoritarian regime, which would
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eventually have to give way to ore commanding mass support, On the
other hand, antagonism among civilian and military elements to the
regime's efforts to head off Frondizi, might precipitate Arainburu1s
overthrow by pro election military forces, which, if successful, would
probably result in a regime headed by a pro-=election military Junta.
2, The Aramburu regime, which inherited a prostrate economy from
Peron, has thus far been unable either to increase agricultural produc-
tion for export, to attract foreign capital, or to halt Argentina "s de-
teriorating financial situation. Largely for political reasons, it
recently abandoned a proposed austerity program in favor of minimal,
remedial actions designed merely to stall off the impending financial
crisis until after the presidential elections. Assuming these economic
policies continue and that elections are actually held, any new government
will almost certainly be faced immediately with a seriously weakened
financial position and a balance of payments crisis.
Discussion
3, -Since it assumed power in November 1955, the stability of the
Provisional Oavernment has been threatened by interaervice rivalry* fac-
tionalism within the army, subversive 'eronist activities, and labor
discontent. However, the regime has shown a remarkable capacity for
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survival, chiefly due to two factors: (1) Aramburues role as that of
compromiser among and spokesman for the military junta which exercises
the real political pawer; (2) a general fear among the military supporting
the regime of the capabilities of the leftist forces ? The regime, in
its battle for selfpreservation, has attempted to reduce factionalism
within the military. It has undertaken periodic purges of dissident
=:C in order to achieve a greater measure of unity within the
regimen tnuw providing the younger officers originally behind Peron?s
ouster with increased opportunity and influence. at the same time it
has thwarted the ambitions of over-zealous younger officers by sending
them abroad to attache posts d Recently the regime survived crises preci-
pitated by attempts, first on the part of the Under Secretary of the
Navy,, and then on the part of the Air Minister, to dictate government
policies,
t Moreover,, the regime has not flinched from dealing firmly with
the subversive opposition, It has summarily arrested Peronist, Cca to iat,,
and nationalist elements whom it has believed to be intent on precipitating
its overthrow through sabotages, strikes, and subversion, Although the
regime has attempted to placate labor with wage increases and social
legislation, it has not succeeded in gaining broad popular support,
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5- ?Ths aramburu government is committed to the reestablishment
of a democracy and a free economys but it has thus far been generally
unable to implement broadly its basic program. The government has recently
announced its election timetable. Elections for a Constituent Assembly
are to be held 28 July 1957 with revision of the Constitution of 1853
to be undertaken in September. General elections are scheduled for
{3 February 1958 with. the transfer of power to be effected on 1 May 1958.
However, no party or coalition of moderate-conservative orientation has
yet appeared which might be able to contest the candidacy of Arturo
rondizis leader of the dominant leftist faction of the Radical Partyp and std
the chief contender for the Presidency.
/ Army anti.-election elements within the regime are strongly opposed to
Frondizi,s who they believe would head a nationalistic.. labor-oriented
government.
6 Should the regime be unable to reduce Frondizi us capabilities
for winning the election by tactical maneuvers at the time of the
Constituent Assembly,,, and should there not emerge a party or coalition
with which the incumbent regime is in closer sympathy, there is a better
army
than even chance that anti-election/elements will depose Aramburu and
forestall elections. On the other hand: pro-election civilian and
military elements opposed to the regime's effort to head off Frondizi, might
attempt to overthrow Aramburu in an effort to guarantee free elections,,
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7, Implementation of the regime's economic program has been hindered
by political considerations, particularly by political leaders, who, although
initially united by their anti 'eronist orientation, continue to disagree
regarding the solutions to Argentina's basic economic problems0 The
economic situation has shown virtually no improvement since the Aramburu
regime came to power. The regime has failed to raise production for
export and to attract foreign private investment. Its financial position
is precarious. A $2I.O million balance of payments deficit is anticipated
in 19570 Official gold and dollar reserves at the end of February 1957
totaled $225 million, compared to $1138 million at the time of Peron gs
ouster0 In order to "stave off national bankruptcy", former Vinance
Minister Verrier recently proposed an austerity program designed to free
the economy; however, the strong opposition of civilian cabinet and
political leaders, probably with some military support, caused the regime
to set aside this program in favor of tapping the IMF and other credit
sources in Western Europe in order to stall off the impending financial
crisis until after elections.
Validity of NIE
80 -e believe that NIE 91--56 is still basically valid0 Self-pre-
servation is still the immediate problem of the present government0
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. !iou 11 the Aramburu regime x ecent .. 'ily with navy and air
force attempts to dictate its policies, serious armed forces dissension
till persists. The regime continues to be unable to implement broadly
its basic program. It still has not resolved the dilemma of satisfying
1,,-* aspirations of the laboring classes, while at the same time attacking
;z?gentinaVs pressing economic problems. Virtually no progress has been
as eiMtn - an c rci.eri y " Xanster of pavicer to a duly electad oi-
f.;ove ruaenat with which the incumbent regime is in sympathy. Nit 91-5b
t:19:mated that the -rov.siona1 L2overnmentgs chances for effecting an
_r er:t. transfer of power to a duly elected civilian government were
lightly better than even1T We believe that this estimate should now
he revised to "slightly less than even"?
25X1A9a
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