PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION IN IRAN* (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500130021-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: February 14, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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Prospects for Soviet Intervention in Iran* (U)
Recent indications that the Soviets are raising the
combat readiness of some military units on the border
with Iran and the precedent of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan have raised the specter of a possible Soviet
military move against Iran. A number of possible motiva-
tions for military intervention can be advanced including:
a reaction to any earlier US intervention; a desire to
seize control of the oilfields; and the installation of a
pro-Soviet government in Tehran. (C)
The Soviets will carefully weigh the serious risks of
such an intervention. They would run the clear danger of
confrontation with the United States, which. has announced
that this area is of vital interest to it, and they would
further damage their relations with a host of countries
worldwide, most importantly in Europe and the Middle East.
They also would face the long-term prospect of trying to
maintain a military presence in a large country with a
well-armed population that would certainly be hostile to
the Soviet presence. (C)
The USSR's decision to upgrade its forces certainly
reflects concern about potential instability in Iran and
conveys a determination to be ready for any contingency.
The apparent increase in combat preparedness will, at a
minimum, put the USSR in a better position to put pressure
on Iran and will act as a disincentive to intervention by
the United States. But the USSR's increased preparedness
in the area also puts it in a stronger position to pursue
broader objectives. Possible Soviet motivations to take
military action in pursuit of those objectives, as well
as the risks involved, are examined below. (C)
*This article is a contribution to a planned Intelligence Assess-
ment of the same title that is being drafted by the Office of Stra-
tegic Research. (U)
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History of Soviet Interventions in Iran
The Soviets-and their Czarist predecessors have a
long history of intervention in northern Iran. In this
century, the Soviets occupied parts of the area twice
in response to what they perceived as threats to Soviet
security. In May 1920 Soviet forces occupied Gilan--the
most northern province of Persia--in an attempt to drive
out British forces that had been supporting resistance to
the new Soviet regime. An independent Soviet Republic of
Gilan was proclaimed. In early 1921, however, Soviet pol-
icy toward Asia evolved from the active promotion of revo-
lution to collaboration with the national governments. As
a result, the Soviets withdrew their forces in September
1921, and the Republic of Gilan collapsed the following
month when Persian forces moved in. (U)
In the early stages of World War II, Iran attempted
to maintain its neutrality. By 1941, however, the Allies
were seriously concerned with increasing German influence,
and in August British and Soviet forces occupied southern
and northern Iran respectively, thus securing a corridor
to the Persian Gulf as an important supply line to the
USSR. (U)
An Anglo-Soviet agreement in 1942 set the terms for
the Soviet and British presence in Iran during the war
and called for a mutual withdrawal six months after the
war ended. The British left on schedule (by 1 March
1946), but Soviet troops remained and were subsequently
reinforced. (U)
With Soviet support, the Azarbayjan Democratic Re-
public (ADR)' was formed in late 1945. Heavy pressure by
the United States and the United Kingdom applied through
the United Nations compelled the Soviet troops to with-
draw in May 1946. The ADR collapsed completely in Decem-
ber of that year when Iranian troops reentered Azarbayjan
on the pretext of supervising national elections. (U)
The 1921 Treaty
The Soviets invoked the 1921 Russian-Persian Treaty
to justify their World War II occupation of Iran, and they
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would undoubtedly cite it again if they elected to inter-
vene militarily. Article six of that agreement gives the
USSR the right to introduce troops into Iran under a broad
set of circumstances that Moscow would interpret to its ad-
vantage as the situation evolved. It states that, should
a third party try to carry out a policy of usurpation
through armed intervention in Persia or should it seek to
use Persian territory as a base of operations against
Russia--and if the Persian Government is not able to stop
such action after having once been called upon by Russia
to do so--Russia has the right to move troops into Persia
to carry out military operations. The article provides,
however, that Russia will withdraw such troops when the
danger is removed. Article five of the treaty commits
both sides to prevent the presence on their territory of
forces or organizations that might be regarded as a men-
ace to the other contracting party. (U)
In early November 1979, immediately after the seiz-
ure of the US Embassy in Tehran, the Bazargan government
announced Iran's unilateral abrogation of articles five
and six. Although Bazargan's government fell the next
day, other Iranian officials subsequently endorsed the
abrogation. The Soviets have not formally responded to
the Iranian action, but they have insisted in private
that they do not accept Iran's unilateral abrogation and
that the treaty remains valid. (C)
The Soviets' refusal to recognize Iran's abrogation of
the operative articles of the 1921 treaty gives them a
rationale should they choose to intervene militarily in
Iran. Any US military action in Iran could obviously be
cited by the Soviets as justification for their own in-
tervention under the terms of the treaty. A less clear
cut justification would involve invoking the treaty
provision concerning the use of Persian territory by a
third party as a base of operations against Russia or
even Afghanistan. Some current Soviet propaganda could
be viewed as laying the groundwork for such an invocation.
A 25 January Izvestiya article, for example, charged the
United States with encouraging separatist movements in
Iran with the clear objective of weakening the central
authority and sowing disunity in order to promote a US
comeback in the region. Should the USSR decide it needed
such justification, it is only a short step from the
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above assertions to the charge that separatist movements,
backed by the United States, pose a threat to the USSR's
security. (U)
The 1921 treaty, while providing the Soviets a frame-
work for intervention, is also explicit in stating that
any such intervention will be temporary. The Soviets
do not claim any Iranian territory as their own, and the
two historical precedents include eventual, if grudging,
withdrawals. (U)
Possible Soviet Motivations for Military Intervention
The following scenarios examining possible motiva-
tions for a Soviet military intervention in Iran range
from reaction to US military action to a unilateral
Soviet operation designed to seize some or all of Iran.
The discussion is not intended to suggest that the So-
viets are seriously contemplating any of these actions;
indeed we believe that, at this time, the Soviets prob-
ably think the political costs and military risks of
military intervention in Iran outweigh the possible
gains. This is particularly true at a time when the fu-
ture political orientation of Iran still could turn in
their favor. (C)
Reaction to US Military Action
The most compelling motivation for Soviet military
intervention would be prior US military action against
Iran. The Soviets are anxious to prevent the United
States from regaining a position of dominance in Iran
and would be particularly sensitive to the establishment
of a US military presence on their border. With the
seizure of the US Embassy in early November, the US mili-
tary buildup in the Indian Ocean, and the US effort to
establish a rapid deployment force in the region, Soviet
concern about possible US intervention mounted in Novem-
ber and early December. While this concern has subse-
quently decreased, it has not completely disappeared. (C)
The Soviets' inclination to react to US military
action would be lessened if they believed that such ac-
tion was a limited operation designed solely to secure
release of the hostages. Nonetheless, any US operation
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probably would prompt a Soviet response, possibly involv-
ing fleet movements and increased readiness activities
designed to deter the United States from further steps.
(C)
If the Soviets concluded that a US action had broad
and permanent implications--such as occupation of south-
ern Iran, seizure of the oilfields in Khuzestan, or es-
tablishment of a pro-US government--they would probably
perceive that their own interests dictated a military re-
action designed to prevent Iran from falling completely
under US influence. (C)
Under such circumstances, the USSR's most likely
response would be a move into northern Iran with the pur-
pose of creating both a buffer zone and a basis to nego-
tiate withdrawal of all foreign forces. Such a move could
be justified under the terms of the 1921 treaty and is
within current Soviet capabilities. In addition, by lim-
iting the military objective to northern Iran, the Soviets
would minimize the danger of direct confrontation with the
United States. This is a danger that they undoubtedly
take very seriously in the wake of the US declaration that
the Persian Gulf is within the sphere of US vital inter-
ests. (C)
Internal Iranian Developments
Possible Fragmentation
The Soviets might persuade themselves of the need
to take military action against Iran if the country ap-
peared to be fragmenting. We know from Afghanistan that
the specter of instability on its borders is deeply
troubling to Moscow. Furthermore the Soviets are well
aware that the symbolic leader of much of Azarbayjani
dissidence, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, is anti-Soviet and
that an Iranian Azarbayjan under his aegis would not be
friendly to the USSR. Moscow undoubtedly has grave reser-
vations about an unfriendly Azarbayjan regime, possibly
with proselytizing inclinations, on its border. On the
other hand, Moscow thinks Iran's possible disintegration
could be exploited in its favor. For example, some left-
ist, pro-Soviet groups have been active in Azarbayjan,
and the Soviets undoubtedly hope that in the longer term
such elements will dominate the region. (C)
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Should the Soviets decide that the level of insta-
bility in Iran warranted military intervention, they
would have to determine the geographical confines of their
operation and the nature of the anticipated US response.
Once again, a move into northern Iran would be the most
logical response since it would involve the lowest mili-
tary effort and carry the lowest risk of a US military
reaction. (C)
The Soviets would have to take into account the pos-
sibility of a US military response to any military move
into Iran on their part--even a move limited to northern
Iran. Certainly a Soviet decision to undertake such an
operation would be far more likely if Soviet planners
perceived a US disinclination to react. Their estimate
of the likelihood of a US response, however, has probably
increased in the wake of recent US assertions with respect
to the Persian Gulf. If they felt a US countermove--either
into southern Iran or Khuzestan--was a reasonable possibil-
ity, they would then have to decide if such a scenario in-
volved a net gain or loss for them. It seems likely that
they would conclude that it was undesirable in effect to
invite the United States to establish a military presence
in Iran, either in the south or in Khuzestan. Their own
occupation of the north for the purpose of restoring order
would not be sufficient gain to offset a US presence and
would lead to tensions as Soviet and US forces faced each
other. (C)
The Soviets might decide that their best option was
a quick strike into Iran designed not only to occupy north-
ern Iran but to seize as much of the country as possible,
including Khuzestan. Such action would present the United
States with a fait accompli and preempt an effective counter-
move. Such action would, of course, involve a major mili-
tary effort, face probable Iranian resistance, entail
grave risk of confrontation with the United States, and
be perceived as a serious threat by Iraq, which has siza-
ble military forces in the area. (C)
An Anti-Soviet Government
Soviet dissatisfaction with the central Iranian Gov-
ernment has been growing in recent weeks. The Soviets
were stung by Iran's vote in the United Nations against
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and were upset by
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Iran's attendance at the Islamabad Conference. They
have been displeased with past statements by both Presi-
dent Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh expressing
concern about Soviet intentions toward Iran, and they
must have been extremely dissatisfied with Bani-Sadr's
landslide victory in the presidential elections. Finally,
the Soviets have recently started to complain about
Iranian support for the Afghan insurgents. The Soviet-
supported National Voice of Iran, broadcasting from Baku
on 28 January, charged that a number of training camps for
Afghan insurgents had been established in Iran and accused
some Iranian officials of siding with the "imperialists"
against Afghanistan. The broadcast called on Iranian of-
ficials to reciprocate Afghan leader Babrak Karmal's
pledge that he would never allow Afghanistan to become a
base of activities against Iran. (C)
A Soviet intervention designed to replace a hostile
regime in Tehran would require broader action than a move
into northern Iran. Indeed, Soviet occupation of north-
ern Iran or occupation of the Khuzestan oilfields would
serve only to fuel anti-Soviet sentiment within the re-
mainder of Iran. The Soviets would also have to assume a
strong US counterresponse. Should the Soviets neverthe-
less decide on intervention under this scenario, their
most viable military option would be a large-scale move
into Iran designed to take control of the whole country.
(C)
Request for Help From Pro-Soviet Government
If Iran's internal situation seriously deteriorates
in the months ahead, a leftist, pro-Soviet government
could come to power; it is then possible that it would
request Soviet military support. In such a case, a large-
scale Soviet operation would be the most appropriate ac-
tion; a limited move might only serve to generate opposi-
tion to--rather then strengthen--the leftist government.
Once again, Soviet estimates of the probable US response
would be a key element in determining policy. (C)
Over the longer term, a viable leftist government in
Tehran might seek a gradually increasing Soviet advisory
presence. Such a development could produce an Afghan-
type scenario in which the Soviets, already involved,
face a deteriorating security situation that leads them
to intervene on a large scale. (C)
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Unilateral Acquisitive Soviet Action
An argument can be made that the Soviets are ulti-
mately motivated by their need for oil and that their
goal is expansionist. There is little doubt that the
USSR faces serious energy problems which will severely
restrict its own and Eastern Europe's economic growth in
the 1980s. Although they may not be convinced that these
problems are as serious as we believe and although they
probably have confidence in the USSR's long-term ability
to cope with the situation, Soviet leaders are undoubt-
edly aware that they face energy problems in the 1980s. (C)
The USSR will be looking for new means to ensure the
flow of energy to support its own economy and those of
Eastern Europe, but the-outlook is not encouraging. The
spiraling price of oil will strongly motivate the USSR
to seek oil at concessionary prices through arms sales,
barter deals, and development assistance; with the excep-
tion of Libya, however, most countries belonging to the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries appear dis-
interested in this type of arrangement. (C)
While Moscow's Middle East strategy does not at this
time appear to be driven by its energy problems, it is
conceivable that an increasing dependence on OPEC sources
for their oil supply will push the Soviets to adopt a
stronger policy in the area. Soviet leaders certainly
recognize that Iran's oil would go a long way toward al-
leviating economic problems facing the Soviet Union and
its allies in the mid-1980s and late 1980s. (C)
A unilateral Soviet military thrust into Iran, de-
signed primarily to occupy the Khuzestan oilfields is,
therefore, conceivable. The Soviets, in taking such
action, would do so despite their recognition of US in-
terests in the Persian Gulf and the West's continued reli-
ance on Iranian oil. They would thus be aware that they
were running a high risk of confrontation with the United
States. They certainly also know that Iraq itself has
claims with respect to Khuzestan and would view such ac-
tion as a threat to itself. Finally, they would have to
anticipate Iranian nationalist insurgency against the
vulnerable oilfields. It seems unlikely, therefore, that,
the Soviets are now seriously planning such a venture. (C)
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The Soviets might believe that occupation of northern
Iran, the occupation that is most feasible militarily and
involves the lowest risk of confrontation with the United
States, would provide a stepping stone toward the oilfields.
Once established there they could await another opportunity
to move against Khuzestan. It is possible that Moscow might
think the time is ripe for such a first-stage move, since
the USSR is already bearing the onus for its invasion of
Afghanistan and the United States is only beginning the
process of improving its capability to respond. On the
other hand,. the Soviets may,believe that they have their
hands full at present in Afghanistan and that the US
psychological willingness to respond is now unusually
high. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL)
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