CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001100300001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 6, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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6 August 1952
OCI No. 6456
Copy No.
286
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
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DIA, DOS AND USAF?`PVVW5IIF W? - 46AO01100300001-7
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
SOVIET UNION
1. US Naval Attache treated discourteously in Leningrad:
Sovie authorities granted a request of the ava ache
to visit Leningrad 27 July to observe Navy Day but neglected
to inform him that the date of that celebration had been
changed. The Attache was ordered off a street car in a part
of the city not defined as out of bounds. He was also pre-,
vented from approaching a public beach Which he had arranged
with Intourist to visit.
Ambassador Kennan views these incidents as "particularly
offensive" because of the deliberate evasiveness and studied
rudeness involved. He considers that cancellation of permis-
sion for Soviet officials in Washington and New York to visit
nearby beaches would be appropriate retaliatory action. 25X1
EASTERN EUROPE
2. Ultimatum sent to Bulgarian troops on Greek territory:
According to the Gree Minister o National Defenses a reek
Government delivered a 48-hour ultimatum on 4 August to the
Bulgarian troops remaining on Gamma Island in the Evros River
to vacate the island. The Greeks will shell the island if the
Bulgarians refuse to com 1
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Comment: The Greek ultimatum follows a series of border
clash-es-75-n-76 and 27 July following the landing of Bulgarian
patrol forces on Gamma Island. The Greek Minister of National
Defense anticipates that the Bulgarians will vacate the island
without further incident.
3. Czech Minister of Heavy Engineering replaced to asEu
me
pus v~-t~,v ni~.men L was rei.easea Xrom his post on 2 August at
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his own request in order to assume the duties of chairman of
the Central Trade Union Council, to which he was elected two
weeks ago. Former Deputy Minister of Heav Engineering Julius
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Maurer was appointed to replace Kliment.
Comment; Kliment held the-post of Minister of Industry in
the first cabinet following the Communist coup in February 1948.
.His area of jurisdiction has gradually been reduced as the number
of economic ministries has increased.
He has been a member of the presidium of the Communist
Party at least since early 1949 and with Zapotocky is one of
the only. two remaining presidium members closely associated
with the Czech trade union movement. Kliment's election to
the post of chairman of the Trade Union Council confirms the
high priority placed on labor problems and the increasingly
close affinity between labor, heavy industry and party in govern-
ment policy.
4. New Ministry of Railroads set up by Czech Government: A
new Ministry of Railroads was established by the Czech Govern-
ment on 1 August. The Ministry of Transport will maintain
responsibility for road, air and water transport.
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Comment: This move attests the importance being placed on
the Czech railroad transportation system. Primary emphasis
since 1950 has been placed on increasing the carrying capacity
of the east-west rail line linking Bohemia with Eastern Slovakia
and the USSR.
Recent attempts to build up a merchant marine indicate the
possibility that a Ministry of Sea Transport may be established
in the near future.
5. Hungarian crop prospects dimmed by drought: The persis-
tence of the drought in Hungary, according to the US Legation
in. Budapest, is accentuating the damage to corn, potatoes and
sugar beets.
Comment: The Legation estimated this spring that un-
seasoab e`weather damaged at least 15 percent of the corn
crop. The present drought extends into Yugoslavia, where it
has been estimated that a 20 percent loss will occur unless
rain comes immediately. Rumors of a return to rationing,
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already current in Hungary in June, may prove to be valid, and
the government's corn export program may suffer. Possibly more
important, the much-stressed production of industrial crops
appears to be threatened, while damage to the hay crop endangers
the livestock production program.
Damage to the corn and potato crops in southeastern Hungary
might provoke significant peasant resistance and force the
government to suspend its indicated intention of stepping up
collectivization this fall. Peasant resistance to grain col-
lections at the threshing machines already has been apparent,
especially in southeastern Hungary. The government has branded
all reports of low crop yields as hostile propaganda.
6. Hungarian pig iron production lag continues: A conference
of metallurgists, party members and union o c_als recently
held at Diosgyor revealed that there has been a lag in the
production of pig iron during the first seven months of 1952.
Bad planning and irregular suppl f iron ore and scrap metal
were blamed for the situation. 25X1
Comment: Hungarian pig iron production is approximately
450,000 tons a year, requiring about one million tons of ore.
Domestic production accounted for about 350,000 tons of ore in
1951, but the remainder comes mainly from the Krivoi Rog
mines in the USSR. Although the ore is good, it is difficult to
secure a regular and dependable supply for Hungary.
Hungary has made determined efforts to secure scrap metal
from all world sources and has claimed success in its campaign
for the collection of scrap at home. Obviously, however, scrap
is in seriously short supply, as it is throughout the Orbit.
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FAR EAST
7. South Koreans force Japanese boats from "territorial
waters : South Korean Navy order of July established
patrols in waters south of Korea to stop smuggling and foreign
fishing within the "Rhee line," established by the President
on 18 January. These patrols captured two Japanese fishing
'boats on 26 July, but their immediate release was ordered by
the ROK Chief of Naval Operations, Since that seizure, instruc-
tions have been issued directing patrol boats to force alien
vessels beyond the "Rhee line" without actually taking
possession,
Comment: Both Japan and the United States have refused
to recognize President Rhee's unilateral declaration defining
Korean territorial waters. The question of Japanese fishing
operations off the Korean coast is one of the items which
,caused the disruption of the Korean-Japanese negotiations.
This order may be an attempt to coerce the Japanese into a
Settlement favorable to the Koreans.
8, Chinese Communists deepening Pearl River channel: Hong
Kong officials state a vessels with a 22;-foot draft can
now negotiate the Pearl River to the port of Whampoa. This is
31 feet deeper than in 1949, but the average ocean-going
vessel still must reduce its draft by discharging part of
its cargo onto barges in the Pearl River estuary. The Commu-
nists will reportedly continue dredging until the channel is
97 feat deep to accommodate most China-trade vessels.
Comment: Whampoa is the largest Communist port south of
Shanghai, few ocean vessels called there before the spring
of 1951. Hong Kong officials have expressed alarm at the
prospect of losing a large part of the colony's transit trade
as a result of Communist channel and harbor improvements at
nearby Whampoa and Canton.
9. Thai military leaders reported planning to replace Premier
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Phibun: Police Director Genera ao an Army-Commander neral
PT3 n are planning to remove Premier Phibun from office by
engineering the resignation of the cabinet and forming a new
one under a figurehead, according to reports received by the
American Embassy in Bangkok. Phao would then succeed to the
premiership within a few months.
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The Embassy comments that recent reports of Phibun's
intention to resign may reflect his desire to foil Phao's
plan byprecipitating a conflict over the succession between
Phao and General Sarit, the Bangkok garrison commander. The
Embassy believes a crisis may be reached this month.
Comment: Information from other sources indicates an
Impen nTi g governmental crisis in Thailand. Phao's accession
to the premiership would endanger the present stability.
10. Burmese to prevent return of Communist-indoctrinated
Chinese: The American massy In Rangoon reports that-Me
urn mese Government is taking action to refuse re-entry permits
to Burma-born Chinese students who have gone to China for
indoctrination. The Embassy comments that the government
recognized these returning students as a subversive threat and
is taking this strong action despite reported protests of the
Chinese Communist Embassy.
110 Chinese Communists reportedly oppose action against
Nationa s s n urma: The Burmese press quo es a mem er of
e urmese a ega on who attended the preparatory Asian
Peace Conference in Peiping to the effect that Chinese leaders
oppose active steps against the Chinese Nationalist forces
in Burma. The Chinese Communists reportedly believe that the
Burmese Government can handle the problem, and are against
placing the matter before the United Nations.
The American Embassy in Rangoon comments that the
Nationalists best serve Chinese Communist purposes by remaining
where they are.
12, Karen Minister may resign from Burmese Government: The
Minister for area Affairs n e rmese a ne as told the
American Embassy in Rangoon that she has become disillusioned
with Burman leaders in the government and that she doubted
their sincerity in expressing a desire for peace with the
Ka:rens< She has informed Premier Nu that she would resign if
he persists in his plan to deprive the Karens of minority
rights, and she has requested that Defense Minister Ba Swe stop
the Socialist Party from undermining her political following.
The Embassy comments that her attitudeis a marked change
from the'optimism she expressed last May and that it has
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probably resulted from fear of impending government attempts.
to Burmanize Karens and of Ba Swe's maneuverings.
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Comment: The Karen Minister has apparently arrived at
the same conclusion as most other Karens that under the present
Burmese Government they are doomed to become "hewers of wood
and carriers of water."
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13. Karen contacts with Chinese Nationalists reported: The
leader of the Burma Democratic Party, a minor political group,
.has informed the American Embassy in Rangoon that one of his
followers had visited the Chinese Nationalist base in northeast
Burma in an attempt to get arms for the Karens. Three Karen
leaders arrived at about the same time in search of arms, but
were told that the Chinese had insufficient stocks of their
own. The Karens were assured, however, that when World War III
commences will be plenty of arms for all. 25X1
Comment: Other sources have reported Karen efforts to
obtain arms from the Chinese Nationalists.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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15. Changes in the Iranian Army command: Six major changes
in the Iranian Arm command-were a raced on 4 August. Accord-
ing to the a shift of two other
generals may be imminent.
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Most of the officers relieved of duty have not been
:reassigned. Several of them are known to be anti-Communist
or to have pro-Western sympathies. Their removal suggests
that they are not in sympathy with the National Front. Govern-
ment control of the army will be strengthened and the possi-
bility of any army attempt to seize power will be decreased, 25X1
While Shah's the position is further weakened.
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16. Allayar Saleh may be appointed Iranian Ambassador to US:
The Em assy in Tehran reports tat agar a a , a National
Front leader, has been proposed as the next Iranian Ambassador
to the United States.
The Shah favored Saleh as Mossadeq s successor prior to
the latter's resignation on 16 July. The proposal to send
Saleh to Washington may be due to Mossadeq's desir to remove
a, possible rival from the Tehran political scene. 25X1
17, Egyptian Ambassadors in London and Rome to be recalled:
Prime Minister Maher has informed the British Ambassador in
.Cairo that he has been unable to resist an army demand that
the Egyptian Ambassadors in London and Rome be recalled, 25X1
.Comment: Abdul Amr, Egyptian Ambassador in London, is
considered able, and friendly to the British. Both he and
B,adr, Ambassador in Rome, have been closely associated with
the Palace. Their removal may be due to this connection
rather than to their pro-Western predilections.
18, French Communists arrested in Morocco: Two French
members of theoroccan Communist Party were apprehended in
the act of distributing anti-French tracts. The propaganda,
written in Arabic, called upon the Moroccan people to unite
in the struggle to throw off the French yoke. ReFiden,cy
officials informed the American Consul in Rabat that because
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they were caught in the act, they will be rapidly brought
to trial, sentenced, and, upon conclusion of their o t. expel ed from Morocco. 25X1
Comment: Communist activity in Morocco has been limited
to sporadic distribution of leaflets. During the past eight
months, authorities have conducted a concerted campaign against
Communism and all the important leaders have been either
imprisoned or, if not bona fide Moroccan subjects, expelled,
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19, US representatives doubt Berlin autobahn will be completely
closer: American representatives in Berlin now cons er It un-
likely that the USSR would completely close the Berlin autobahn
except as a blockade measure. They believe that the necessary
repairs to the Elbe River bridge can be made
lane open for traffic at all times.
Comment: If the autobahn were to be closed, alternate
routes now used only by Germans could be made available to the
Allies.
Although traffic over the autobahn continues at a constant
volume, Soviet authorities have inaugurated a slowdown in truck
inspections at border-crossing points with the backlog running
as high as 100 trucks on 4-August.
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20, French Communists uneasy over continued arrests in Toulon:
The American Embassy in Paris considers that the French om-
munist Party fears the government's campaign more in the Toulon
area than elsewhere, as indicated by a 4 August editorial in the
party's daily Humanite. The paper accuses the government of plot-
ting Fascist repress on at the "dictate of American masters" and
concentrates its attack on the Examining Magistrate at Toulon.
Comment: Court inquiries into Communist activities continue
in Toulo ,-ww here evidence was seized in June implicating the Com-
munists in a conspiracy to overthrow the government.
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this evidence is strong enough to permit the government to out-
law the party. It is probable, however, that the government is
primarily concerned with its counterpropaganda campaign and
believes that outlawing the party would play into the Communists'
hands.
The French Government has just decreed civilian representation
on military courts in Paris and Toulon, presumably in preparation
to prosecute civilians implicated in crimes involving military
security.
21. Italy unlikely to meet defense and economic goals in next
two fiscal years: Italy's de ense program-Will- al , 00
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short of plans in 1953 and such expenditures will actually decrease
in fiscal year 1954, according to MSA officials in Rome. Attain-
ment of defense goals would require more rapid utilization of
existing appropriations, greater provision for hard goods produc-
tion, and larger appropriations for fiscal year 1954.
The American officials also believe that unless Italy makes 25X1
economic expansion the primary objective of economic policy, the
OEEC goal of a 5 percent increase in h cross national
will probably not be achieved.
Comment: Italian Treasury Minister Pella has steadfastly op-
posed tie policy of considerable economic expansion. His present
program is to utilize more effectively funds already available for
defense and investments, to give priority to civilian investments,
and eventually balance the budget. The failure so far to attain
these objectives is due to administrative inefficiency as well as
to a deliberate "holding back" to obtain greater American assist-
ance.
Italian alarm over the $55,000,000 decline in reserves since
February is discounted by American experts because of the net
increase of $83,000,000 in reserves from fiscal year 1951 to 1952.
In addition, substantial earnings are expected from American
military expenditures in the present fiscal year.
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F-111,P E RET
6 August 1952
CIA No. 49764
Copy No.
4
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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TOP SECRET
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
1. Invasion of Albania by Yugoslav-supported Albanian
refugees reportedly planned ' : Details o a Yugoslav plan for
an early Invasion of Albania by some 6,000 Yugoslav-controlled
Albanian refugees have been received in Albanian emigree circles
in Rome, The plan, 25X1
which has been passed on to the refugee comman ers, calls for
the "liberation" of the entire country, with the exiles organized
into six groups, each with an assigned sector of operation,
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Comment: Although the Yugoslavs have organized and trained
numerous anians for subversive work in Albania and have
sought the support of an Albanian exile group in Rome, there is
no firm evidence of increased Yugoslav activity which would pre-
cede a campaign of this type. Western observers in Yugoslavia
believe that the estimated 4,000 Albanian refugees in Yugoslavia
have not been organized into tactical units or given military
training.
Without an internal coup or rebellion, which is always
possible, the refugees would require direct Yugoslav military
support if a successful operation is to be launched against
Hoxha's 45,000 men.
2. Denmark seen opposed to USAF units on Bornholm: The
American Embassy at Copenhagen believes that the Danish Govern-
ment will refuse the use of the island of Bornholm for United
States Air Force SHORAN sites, The present situation concern-
ing the whole base question makes it most undesirable to propose
Filip- stationing of US air personnel on Bornholm at this time,
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Comment: Projected Danish-Norwegian-British naval
maneuvers Ti the Baltic Sea in the vicinity of Bornholm have
aroused the suspicions of the Russians, who have castigated
the-Danes for their permitting the establishment of NATO bases
in Denmark. Danish officials are particularly anxious to
avoid an exchange of notes with the USSR on the base question.
3. Non-deliver of American tanks may have serious reper-
cussions' n Venezuela: Ambassador Warren believes that the
contemplated delay n delivering promised M-18 tanks would be
"disastrous" for US-Venezuelan relations, and would be es-
pecially unfortunate now in view of the recent publicity on MSA
shipments to other Latin American countries. He points out
that the recent improvement in the-Venezuelan Government's
attitude toward the United States hinged on convincing the Junta
that everytoina possible was being don to obtain military
equipment.
Comment: Until March of this year, when the US offered
to supply' he M-18's, Junta strong-man Perez Jimenez and Chief
of Staff Moreno had been extremely resentful of what they con-
sidered virtually wilful neglect of Venezuela's military require-
ments, and of US delay in fulfilling prepaid contracts.
Furthermore, the Junta reportedly has felt that it must obtain
late-model equipment to maintain its prestige within the army.
In signing the contract for M-18's instead of the desired
heavier, newer tanks, Venezuela apparently made some.conces-
sions to the "realities" of the military supply situation, but
had counted on quick delivery,
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