INTERIM NOTES ON THE PROBLEM OF CANCELLATION: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN TO EXPLOIT STALIN'S DEATH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000300070039-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: February 26, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SE-C-R-ET
PURITY ItI' VOR ATION-
SE
INTERIH NOTES ON PROS 0
CANCELLATION
25X1A
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INTERI14 NOTES ON THE PROBJ.EM OF CANCELLATION
25X1 C
This is a report of work in progress which leads us to the following ten-
tative policy recommendations:
3.
The United States Intelligence collection and evaluation effort re
CANCELLATION should be sharply focussed on four divisive potentials,
(although others should not be excluded
a. The personal relationships among the top leadership
b. The orientation of the Russian economy
c. The power balance between the "old" and the "new" in the Politburo,
and
d. The political orientation of the Soviet military.
The U.S. should project its long-run aims vis-a-vis West Eurasia
(emphasizing their consistency with the Russian national interest) in
such a way as to minimize apprehensions of nationalists opposed to the
regime that a bid for power on their part and a consequent internal
struggle would result in foreign (i.e., Western) military intervention.
At the present time U.S. policy should avoid preparatory action re
CANCELLATION other than along the above lines, It is our judgment that
the greatest danger faced by the United States in this context is in tak-
ing action which will, by increasing the vested interest of the leadership
in the stability of the system, neutralize such divisive potentials as
may exist and hence defeat U.S. purposes. Political warfare based on
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imperfect information may serve simply to help maintain the solidarity
of the leadership; and in general, therefore, elaborate action now,
aimed to exploit the CANCELLATION situation, is judged: premature.
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I. Aim of this Paper
1. The following paper is strictly interim in character, both with ree-
pect to the information it'contains and the conclusions drawn. A more
detailed paper on this theme will form a part of the
Report on
25X1A
Soviet.Yulnerability'(target date, approximately 30 June, 1952).. The
purpose of this paper is to draw, from an appraisal of the setting of
the problem, certain tentative conclusions for U.S. policy 'and action.
These conclusions envisage action from the present forward designed to
maximize the chances of exploiting the death of Stalin in the U.S. in-
terest. Although the present paper does not include a statement of long-
run U.S. aims in Russia and Eastern Europe, it is believed that a clari-
fication of these aims and their successful projection is a key element
in the CANCELLATION problem.
II. The S.et,i of the Problem
2. It is now some 23 years since Stalin's personal dictatorship in the
Soviet Union was established, and about 13 years since the major posts
or power were turnel over to his men. Over this period has evolved a re-
markable centralization of executive decisions within the Soviet state
and a virtually complete centralization of authority over the instruments
of power: i.e., the Army, Party, Secret Police, and Bureaucracy. Since
the end of the Purges a set of fixed policies, relationships, and pro-
cedures de eloped so powerful that post-war Soviet internal policy has
consisted in an almost mechanical return to pre-1941 "normalcy"; while
Soviet policies in the satellites have largely consisted of a branch
office duplication of pre-1939 methods evolved within the Soviet Union.
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gists of:
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In envisaging Stalin's death we are envisaging the withdrawal of the,
key figure from a mature, stabilized organization built to guarantee
an unchallenged exercise of executive power by one man.
3. The instruments of internal Soviet power, when unified at the top
and supported by an almost totally monopolized propaganda and informa-
tion system, are judged capable of preventing the effective crystalli-
zation of popular opposition movements within the Soviet state and of
overwhelming such overt opposition as,may emerge. It is, thus, our
judgment that, while. popular dissatisfactions may play a part in the
unfolding of an internal crisis, such a crisis is unlikely to be sig-
nificant unless it involves a splitting apart of the instruments of
power at the top. The following appraisal of the setting of the prob-
lem Is therefore devoted primarily to a consideration of such partial
evidence as is now available to us concerning the position within the
Politburo, where Stalin has centralized his command over the state, and
concerning the Army, where certain independent political attitudes may
have evolved. The problem will be treated in a wider setting in the
finalL-Julnerability Report.
III. The Present Politburo
4a The present Politburo, in order of full membership seniority, con-
Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, (Andreev; Mikoyan, Krushchev,
There is one candidate member:
`,'
v Five full members may be fairly called "Old" Bolsheviks: Molotov,
Voroshilov, Andreev, Mikoyan, Kaganovich.' Five full members may be
Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin,
Shvernik.
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s.
fairly called "New" Bolsheviks: Khrushchev*, Beria, :Malenkov,
Bulgenin, Kosygin. v
* Krushchev, son of a poor coal miner, his education consisting of a
year or two at the Stalin Industrial Academy at the age of 35, could
be said to straddle the two groups. He had an unnamed part as a
soldier in the 1917 revolution and in the Civil War. As a member of
the Central Committee he survived the.1937-1938 purge, becoming an al-
ternate member of the Politburo Jarcaary 1938 and full member March
1939, But he did not join the Party until after the 1917, Revolution,
which disqualifies him as a genuine "old" Bolshevik. His real power
has been post purge; and his rise has been mainly within the Party
Committee and secretarial machinery in the `Ralenkov manner. Be seems
never to have shared the prestige or power of the "old" Bolsheviks
and to be at present, subordinate to Malenkov in his special field of
Party work. Therefore, on the basis of present information, we have
called him a "new" Bolshevik.
5. In examining the Politburo's position certain facts concerning
its personnel, Stalin excluded, are of interest in two contexts:
(1)
The crisis of World War II.
(a)
Five full members drafted the Constitution (1934-1938):
Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Khrushchev.
(b)
Six were full members during World War II: 'Molotov, Voroshilov,
Kaganovich, Andreev, Mikoyan, Khrushchev.
(c)
Two were candidate members during World War II and are full
members now: Beria,. Malenkov.
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(d) The greatest responsibility for policy and action during
World War II was held as follows: (State Defence Committee)
Molotov, Beria, Malenkov 1941-1945
Kaganovich, Mikoyan 1942-1945
Voroshilov 1941-1944
Bulganin 1944-1945
(2)
The Post-War Era.
(a) Four full members have been added since the war:, Beria, 14alenkov,
Bulganin, Kosygin.
(b). There is evidence of struggle over both policy and power posi-
tion from early post-war period to Zhdanov?s death.(1948) be-
tween Zhdanov and Malexikov.'`
(c) Vosnesensky (candidate member 1941, full member 1947) disap-
peared in 1949.
(d) Both Andreev and. Khrushchev suffered public rebuke (1950) for
their suggested farm policies.
(e) Three emerging figures assume importance as potential new
Politburo members: Ponomarenko, Suslov, Shkiryatovp
6. The, Politburo, as presently constituted, shows, then, an even divi-
sion of membership between what might be called "Old" and "New" Bol-
sheviks. Further, the criteria of executive skill in the state appar-
atus and technical training appeals to carry the greatest weight in the
selection of new members. The group, in general, is composed of ex-
perienced, able administrators who propose, discuss freely, and execute
policy always within'a framework of absolute obedience to and personal
loyalty to Stalin, as unquestioned supreme arbiter. Within this group,
six memburs emerge from our intelligence as distinct individuals:
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(1) Molotov stands out as unique in the degree of intimacy, con-
fidence, and respect accorded hin by Stalin at the policy level. His
is a position not even approached by any other nember of the Politburo.
(Every pertinent interview supports this view unequivocally.) /Molotov,
the "Stone Behind", the cold, rigidly conforming total Bolshevik whose
most- amiable social gestures are usually only half-successful conven-
tionalities, has unquestioned power - but power derived solely from
Stalin and their unique relationship, and not, in prevailing opinion,
from native brilliance nor from the exercise of administrative author-
ity over a major sector of the power machinery of the Soviet State.
(2) vyoroshilov is closest to Stalin on the "old comrade" level.
There is disagreement as to his native ability and real power position,
but evidence to show his skill and, sense of security in making deci-
sions as late as 1945-46.''Old soldier, a "primitive" with both the
saint and the devil in him, lover of folk music, he occupies a unique
puition in the minds of the people - the only member of the Politburo
a popular hero known to the people and referred to by them by his nick-
name, "Klim". Voroshilov has deep roots'in the army, historically and
sentimentally, and a strong sense of old-fashioned nationalism.
5
(3) "Ba,-anovich, only surviving Jew in a position of power, the
"Iron Commissar" who worships Stalin, who looks like a scholar but has
had only two years of schooling, stands out as the supremely versatile
troubleshooter and large-scale executive of all the builders of Soviet
industrial strength. Perhaps even more important, he stands out in the
popular eye as a symbol, the creator of widely publicized Soviet ac
complishments such as the Moscow subway, and, despite his ruthlessness,
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as the object of admiration on the part of the people and labor who
have worked under him - in a sense ~rery distinctly a popular hero at
least in certain areas.
(4) '-Mikoyan, a fourth "Old" Bolshevik, only one of the Balm
corn.iissars to escape execution after the occupation of Baku by the
British in 1918, is an amiable but shrewd, hard-boiled, realistic
Armenian who would trade the eyes out of his grandmother?s head if it
would be to his advantage. IV He is volatile - a colorful exception to
the Bolshevik personality pattern. Mikoyan is the only Politburo mem-
ber who has visited the United States to study American methods and
products and returned to Russia to express openly his admiration for
both - a fact of considerable interest; for he is unquestionably top
Soviet trade expert; and in a long-held strong power position which ap-
pears to be unchallenged.
(5) 14alenkov, a "New" Bolshevik, and full member only since 1946,
who has been likened.in appearance to a eunuch and to an unfrocked priest,
and who makes a universal impression of sullen lust for power, seems
to be the wonder of the new generation of Bolshevik leaders. Apparent
victor over Zhdanov, he is believek to be a special protege of Stalin
among the younger men. He served on the State Defence Committee during
its entire existence, has been recently signally honored on his 50th
birthday, and seems to be not only the most powerful figure in the
Party apparatus but also to have emerged as the most striking person-
ality in the Politburo - excepting Stalin and Molotov.
(6)" Beria, also a full member only since 1946, and a member of
the State Defence Committee during its entire existence, is a figure of
special interest if only because of his position for 13 years as
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head of the Secret Police. Deceptively mild and scholarly in manner
and appearance, actually a far-sighted and exceptionally skillful in-
triguer for power' Berl.a has reputedly an uncanny intuit'-on for iden-
tifying and.attaching to himself loyal supporters.`- As the probable
Soviet atomic chief, the administrator of the forced labor program, and
the person most singly responsible for the enormous and powerful sys-
tem of police controls, Oeria, who emerged publicly as the Anniversary
speeker N.vember 19101, is one. of the trio of most powerful Soviet
,leaders - Molotov and e4alenkov the other two.
7. Any present estimate of the Politburo must be made in relation to
the over-all power framework within which the Politburo members function
as individuals: a system of. interlocking directorates, of personal
checks and balances, shifting public prominence, control by whim or
policy of Stalin, all t1us far designed to prevent the more-tIan-momen-
tary emergence of any single member as a possible successor; the whole
system aiming to permit control over and equilibrium among the Party,
the Police, the Army,arld the state bureaucratic apparatus.
8. Certain tentative generalizations are suggested by post-war infor-
mation concerning the four power components in the Soviet structure:
(1)
(2)
(3)
The Party as a sacrosanct body has slowly but steadily lost power
as a separate entity, tending to become an administrative arm
of the state with special propaganda. Intelligence, and overseer
functions.
The power of the Police has steadily increased.
The Party and the Police are united in one Special effort: to pre-
vent any real unifying and solidifying of-an independent Army
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sentiment.
(d) The bureaucracy, recovering from the shock-effect of the Purges,
e,nerges more and more distinctly as a class with vested interests,and
privileges in the present regime, although harassed by the Party and,
especially, the Secret Police.
if. Politburo Incentives at the Death of Stalin
9. The immediate se.zure of power by one man or by a troika is a possi-
bility to be considered if Stalin's death is preceded by his decline and
loss of power over a long enough time to per:ait the effective development
of a conspiracy before his actual death. The position of chairmanship
or deputy assumed by any single man with Staliu sick but still alive
would not necessarily be one of, real power, although a chairman might be
able to co_isolidate it as such.
10. The system of personal power checks is such that it would seem im-
possible for any effective conspiracy-to be worked out except over a per-
iod of time - after what might. be called a "sorting out" of relationships
and real power alignments, a sparring and "feeling out" period.
11. At the death of Stalin the Politburo will have the most powerful
double incentive for immediate close: cooperation: the urgent need of uni-
ty to sustain the power of internal control, without which they, along
with the system, would be destroyed;'and the urgent need to present a situa-
tion of continuing strength and unity of policy vis-a-vis the West. The
uppermost thought in their minds, individually as well as collectively, will
undoubtedly be that an overt struggle for the succession might lead to a
break-up of the regime which might permit foreign intervention in Russia.
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12. Most obvious incentives to a split in the Politburo after Stalin's
death are two: individual power drives. and irreconcilable differences
on policy. It is a reasonable assumption that neither can effectually
materialize at present only because of Stalinsabsolute power to make
the ultimate decisions. A more subtle and yet perhaps deeper and older
incentive to Politburo split may lie in certain differences between the
"Old" and "New" bolsheviksL'
V. Divisive Potentials after Stalin's Death
13. Politburo members even in their freest conversations seem never to
refer to other leaders by name; and their expression of personal inter-
ests and principles never takes the form of explicit criticism of the
policies of the regime. Therefore the attempt on our part to discern
divisive potentials in Russian leadership is made largely in the realms
of conjecture and inference. The researcher does not reach positive con-
clusions but does see leads indicating the possible fruitfulness of fur-
ther and more extensive research supported by specifically aimed intel-
ligence operations.
25X1A 14.. At this stage in the limited leadership project evidence sug-
gests certain potentially divisive factors, in ascending order of impor-
tance:
a) Personal relationships in the Politburo;
b) Possible differences at the level of national economic policy;
c) The balance of power between the "Old" and "New" Bolsheviks;
d) The, special position and political orientation of the Red Army;
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A. Personal Relationships in the Politburo.
15. This is at present the most speculative area of our interest owing to
the fact that so much of the relevant information is merely rumor.
It presents perhaps the most difficult and complex problem to intel-
ligence. Nevertheless, as we increase our knowledge of the temper-
aments and characters of the Polibburo members through reported
first-hand insights arid observations, a source up to the present time
exploited to a very limited degree, definite personalities emerge, to
which considerable reality is given by confirmations and agreements
over a wide range of.expFrience and background in the sources. In
any realignment or adjustment of power, personal compatibilities,
rivalries, predilections, theories, convictions, family backgrounds,
experience, and so on play a subtle but often powerful part. it must
not be overlooked that the presence and supreme power of Stalin con-
stitutesthe single most effectively repressive force limiting the inter-
play. of Politburo personalities at the emotional level. The death of
Stalin may well release divisive potentials at this level which must
not be overlooked in estimating the possiblt courses of action to
be taken in the U.S. interest.
B. Possible Differences at the Level of National Economic Policy.,
16. These lie almost wholly in the realm of conjecture, but certain
personal factors suggest possible conflict between the major inter-
eats and convictions of a group of leaders and the present national
(Stalin) policy in international relations with its concomitant over-
balanced commitment of the national economy to the production of war
goods (as opposed to investment goods for economic development and
consumers" goods).
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.13.
17. Mikoyan, in charge of both foreign and domestic trade, has repeated-
ly expressed the belief that a fully developed U.S.S.R. foreign trade
(impossible now) is essential to successful internal Russian economic
progress. Although he has, of course, ostensibly gone along whole-
heartedly with present Soviet policy, present information indicates that
his pronouncements of admiration and respect for American methods and
products, and his desire especially for friendly U.S.S.R.- U.S. trade
relations,, although made when they were in harmony with official policy,
were also statements of Mikoyan's strong personal convictions. VMikoyan's
special interest is, in food and consumer goods. More broRdly Mikoyan and
certain others may feel that, at this stage of Soviet history, the prime
task is to develop the domestic economy, not to engage in a foreign poli-
cy that requires heavy and continuing major outlays for military end-
products.
18. Kaganovich, although pri:zari?ly a heavy industry man, and one who
will slavishly follow Stalin's line and leadership as long as Stalin
lives, is a factory worker and trade union organizer in origin, an old
Red Army man, and. has always, in a sense, built for the people and been
one of them. He has been consistently open and friendly with Americans.
,He may share the view tentatively attributed to Mikoyan in the last sen-
tence, Para. 17, above.
19. Kosy,ein, youngest and newest member of the Politburo, graduate of
the Textile Institute, Leningrad (?), apparently one of the bright "new"
Bolsheviks of growing power, is a former textile worker. As one of the
young economic experts he has been close to consumer goods production and
is now Minister of Light Industry..
20. Shvernik, who has risen from poverty and factory apprenticeship, is
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14.
without formal education and, although second in seniority in party member-
ship, wields very little power. However, nearly his entire career has
kept him in close contact with trade unions; he served in the Red Army;
and he has a reputation for accessibility to the common people. Three
factors in his personal history which suggest an awareness and interest
in the people, and, very possibly, a popular rather than a "Stalin" view
of the national economy.
21. Of the emerging figures whose closeness to Politburo membership is
still a mystery, Ponomarenko, who now probably heads the Procurement Min-
istry (farm products), is reported,as having been genuinely appreciative
of UNRRA efforts in 1946; Suslov, probably very&close to Malenkov, is
reported as having special interest in the working class and the "connec-
tion between the depressed status of workers and war policy"; Shkyriatov
is by trade a tailor, a worker in clothing factories.
22. `these clues, slight because of present intelligence limitations, are
nevertheless of some interest when considered in connection with the death
of Stalin. The apparent tendency to promote to high positions men of
worker and factory experience may broaden the baser of popular "feeling"
in the Politburo, for it implies the rise of men whose experience with and
hard knowledge of consumer economy make the economic policy of the state
a very real issue - not something subordinated emotionally and intellectually
as a figment of over-all Party Theory. Moreover, they will-know first-
hand the direct relationship between unsatisfied popular economic wants
and popular dissatisfaction with the regime, and thus may be fully aware
of the direct connection between personal economic policies and a w bid
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13.
for popular support in a power struggle. One can see at least the possi-
bility of a group within top Russian leadership who, because of their
worker origins, their personal awareness of the unsatisfied economic wants
of the people, their special technical knowledge of the production of con-
sumer goods, and their positions of power in industry, mighty in the ab-
sence of Stalin,' desire a U.S.S.R. - West relationship and its resultant
national economy emphasis directly opposed to those derived from, sey,
the Molotov intransigent anti-West attitude.
C. Zb& Balance of Power Between} the "Old" awnd "New" Bolsheviks.
23. Here we move on to firmer ground., in a sense, for Stalin's skillful
and, constant shifting of Politburo members in,positions of power and pres-
tige have been discernible from the outside for many years, and it appears
that he balances not only man against man but "Old" against "New".
24. One might cite the all powerful wartime State Defence Committee,
having (excluding Stalin) at its inception as its members two "Old" Bol-
sheviks, Molotov and Yoroshilov, and two ".New" members, Beria and :Malenkov;
then, by the addition of Hikoyan and Kaganovich, four "Old" and two "Aew",
but finally, by the replacement of Yoroshilov by hubganin, a nice balance
v
of three and three: Since the war one might say Stalin has balanced Molo-
tov, ;dikoyan, and Kaganovich (foreign -affairs, trade, heavy industry) ag-
ainst Beria, Bulganin, and Kosygin (police, army, finance, and light in-
dustry) - while dividing party control between Malenkov and Andreev.
25.. The Order of Lenin hh.s been awarded since the war to five of the
"Old" full members of the Politburo and to three "Aew" members - to
Molotov four times, to talenkov twice. Anniversary speakers (excluding
Stalin) h'kve been nicely balanced since the war; but the last two speeches
have been made by "New" men - Malenkov and Beris.
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26. Public rebukes and consequent loss of prestige have been suffered
recently (1950) by Andreev, an "Old." Bolshevik and disciple of Molotov,
and by Krushchev, technically a "New" man, both agricultural experts. The
only member who appears to have been purged since the war is Voznesenski,
distinctly a "clew" man.
27. The most significant struggle between the "Old" and the "New" Bol-
sheviks inside the Politburo that has cane to our knowledge in the last
ten years was between Zhadanov and Malenkov. It was terminated by
Zhdanov's death in 1948. LTentative conclusions are that the rising
Malenkov not only seriously threatened Zhdanov's power position but has,
since Zhdanov's death, taken his place and removed his adherents and'
proteges from important positions in the Party and State apparatus., V
28. `these statistics of'the Stalin juggling act, in themselves unim-
portant perhaps, are interesting and provocative in the context of supple-
mentary information - when one is contemplating the disappearance of the
juggler. Three brief observations are made here.
29. There are fundamental differences between the "Old" and "New" Bol-
sheviks which could conceivably affect personal and group power and policy
alignments after Stalin's death. The "Old" Bolsheviks are pre-Revolu-
tionary Party members who have been personally close to each other and
to Stalin over the entire period of the growth of Soviet power. They are
the real builders of the foundations of that power, the basic policy makers
and executors who have manipulated the evolution of Bolshevik theory and
practice into triumphant Stalinism. As such they have a conscious se-
curity, prestige, and power that set them apart. They are a clan united
by historic and conspiratorial ties, their thinking and emotions rooted in
the total history of Russian Bolshevism. They are headed by the two men
closest to Stalin. The "New" Bolsheviks, especially the four youngest,
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are not the founders but the products of the Soviet State, not builders
but managers - in a sense, inheritors. Essentially post-purge and post-
war newcomers to real power, they are not the makers but the creatures
of Stalinism. They are united by a common history of fighting and in-
triguing their way up in the dangerously competitive complex of an es-
tablished power system, in which insecurity and the fatal consequences of
failure are the moat compulsive forces. As products of the system they
must sense the contemporary pulse and mood of the people more directly and
more literally than the "old" leaders, Their thinking has real roots
neither in revolutionary theory nor in historic Bolshevism but in the exi-
gent and very real present - a present dominated by the machinery of to-
talitarian bureaucracy. They are headed by two of the outstanding
possessors of visible power in the present Politburo; i.e., Malenkov and
Beria.
30. Proceeding froin theory to fact, we see.the steacy encroachment by
the 1/New" Bolsheviks on the power preserves of the Politburo system. Bul-
gamin, strictly a "political soldier", replaced Voroahilov on the all-
powerful State Defence Committee in 194.4g was Minister of Armed Forces
1947-1949, headed the USSR Delegation to the Meeting of Defence Ministers
of Eastern Europe, Prague, 1950, and is now, although no longer Minister
of Armed Forces, unquestionably top military authority in the Politburo,
party power, indicated by membership and authority in the party Control
Commission, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat, And by prominence in policy
speeches, has been firmly held since Zhdetnov's death by t4alenkov and his
younger men: Malenkov was reportedly Stalin's political representative
in Korea in 1951. Although Molotov is evidently still the Politburo auth-
ority in foreign affairs, there is evidence of increasing penetration into
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the Soviet diplomatic organization of police power under Ber ,a, and the
belief on the part of some well informed sources that there Is direct
connection between that penetration and the rise of younger men like
Malik and Gronwko.. Since the war there has apparently been a tremendous
increase in the power of the Secret Police - as an instrumea-t of terror
to insure popular conformity in the face of a continuing war economV, as the
eradicator of all possible western thought brought home by returning sol-
diers, as the destroyer of whole tribes suspected of lukewarm loyalty, and
as the assumed custodian of the Russian atomic effort. Moreover, the
interlocking of the whole post-war economic program with the forced labor
system, sup:lied and administered by the Secret Police, suggests a new and
significant penetration of the whole state structure by police power. And
this power is directed by Beria, one of the "New" ran.
31. If Stalin dies while the Politburo is constituted as at present there
will remain in key positions of power three "Old" Bolsheviks:' Molotov,
Kaganovich, Mikoyan;-and three "New" Bolsheviks: Malenkov, Beria, Lulganin.
Of these six, Molotov,'I4alenkov, and Aleria seem to stand out strikingly
head and shoulders above all the other members as wielders of power, as per-
sonalities, as enjoying the greatest prestige, and as potential leaders -
one "Old" Bolshevik, two "New" of sharply contrasting temperaments and
histories. 'Informed opinion varies as to Molotov's native aptitude for
leadership; possibly his strength is derived from his special relationship
to Stalin and the fact that he ie~Lcknowideged head of a group presumably
closely knit by loyalty and a eo;;rmon history. Malenkov and Beria have greater
native ability than Molotiv, it would seem, but a logical inference is that
any control they exercise over personal followings is largely based on in-
security and fear upon the part of their subordinates. Beria, as head of
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the vastly increased police power. is certainly a syabol of the. dei line of
pure Party power represented by Palenkov,, and presua .bly a check o tMalenkov.
In some respects Beria seems the most sinister figure of the three, But
there is strong evidence that Malenkov is the strongest, most ambL,.ious of
all if one can judge by the sheer impact of his personality and b3+ his
steady rise to power,, in a strictly Stalinist pattern. via the Pa'ty.sp-
paratus. One can speculate endlessly? The cold facts seem to be that these
three men may decide the immediate destiny of the Soviet State af1,er Stalin's
death; that each has strong claims to and support for his accessi-n to
single supreme leadership; that no one of them can succeed to leaadership
without the support of one of the others; and that the wholesale ismer-
gency cooperation which will probably immediately follow Stalin?s death
will not change these underlying personal and group factors. '4re are two
expressions of opinion based on direct contact with Molotov. '4aleukov,
and Berta: "If it is a question of survival of one of the three, the sur-
vivor will be Malenkov"; "One thing is certain: the "Old" Bolsheviks will
never submit to leadership by the "New".
D. The Special Position and Political Orientation of the Red
32. The Soviet State would seem to offer no exception to the axiom that
the armed forces are'the key to power and survival in aMr dictatorship. This
key role for the military at a time of crisis in a dictatorship stems from
the fact that there are no accepted rules for the handling of executive
power. So long as the dictator is successful - maintaining the unity of
the instruments of force - the system is stable. At a time of crisis,
however, lacking accepted constitutional riles, raw power rules in a dic-
tatorship; and the Soviet armed forces represent the most considerable con-
centration of armed power, despite the rise of armed units within the MVD.
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25X1 A Although the
leadership project has centered on political leader-
ship. specifically the Politburo, one result of our interviews is in-
formation which strongly suggests that, despite'certain features of the
Soviet system since its beginningso designed to prevent the crystallisa-
tion.of localized or "devi'tionist" attitudes in the Soviet armed forces.
the Red Army has a special position in the. Soviet society and. possibly, a
political orientation which could bear directly on the. situation in the
U.S.S.R. following Stalin death.
33. There is evidence that the Red Armyc theoretically drafted and recruit-
ed from all classes, has a large percentage of men of peasant origin and
those who have volunteered not out of loyalty to the regime but to get
better food and more security than offered by their positions. in the civil-
ian economy. The practical requirements of military leadership compel
the promotion of officers on merit rather than political conformity prob-
ably to a larger degree than in any other part of the Soviet system."--Even
old Bolshevik army leaders like Voroshilov and Budenny are noticeably defi-
cient in political enthusiasm; and Red Army loyalties seem to have been
long rooted in devotion to B sgia - not to Communism or Party. Thus the
very texture of the Red Army would'give it a special position in Soviet
society as a potential redtvoir of political unreliability. ?4oreovere
its position in the eyes of the people since the war is that of the real
savior of the homeland; and we have been told that it is the only one of
the four power elements in the Soviet state which does not symbolize re+
pression and which. therefore, the people neither distrust nor fear.
34., '-`Every inference that can be drawn from the established and recent
military control policies of the Soviet political leadership confirms the
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special position of the Red Army and points to Politburo awareness if its
potential significance. The system of political commissars goes back to
1920. Stalin struck wholesale at the Red Army top command in the
Tukhachevsky purge in 1937. Since then the Red Army has been "loaded"
with political commissars and secret police. Beria was reportedly active
in the army during the last war. Malenkov has risen from a beginning as
an army political commissar. Bulganin,? strictly an executive and poli-
tical figure, has been made a marshal and put at the head of national
defence. Popular Red Army heroes like Zhukov, Rokossovsky, and Malinovaky
have been scattered from central and closely related positions, and
dropped from all recent public mention in celebrations of war victories.
Outside of the U.S.S.R. the Allied Command in Berlin observed first hand
the subordination of the Soviet military to political and police control
(with a resultant drastic change for the worse in p a sonal and official
Russian-American relationships). From inside the U.S.S.R. we are told of
a special army with artillery and tanks within the police system, the in-
ference being that there is official doubt of the reliability of the Red
Army if called upon in certain situations, say large scale overt popular
discontent.
35. But there is good reason to doubt that the Politburo has been wholly
successful in its methodical and systematized effort to effect "correct"
political orientation'in the Red Army. We recall the Vlasov movement.
The morale in the ranks of the Red Army in Germany at the end of the war
was, in the opinion of qualified observers, very low, with breaches of-dis-
cipline and desertions far exceeding expectancy based on all western mili-
tary experience. Insight into the real political orientation of Red Army
officers in the Berlin area was afforded by the many friendships between
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U.S. and Soviet personnel. In the considered opinion of many Americans
of lieutenant to major rank Red Army officer fraternization was not based
merely on friendly curiosity and liking for the better American food and
quarters but also on genuine-Russian interest in democratic concepts. And
in at least two instances cited by sources whose perception and judgment
are beyond question Red Army officers of high rank expressed privately a
sincere desire to see Germany united under a political system embracing
such specific democratic concepts as free schools,, free press. and free-
dom of speech in the western meaning of the terms.
36. Glimpses of Red Army sentiment obtained from recent interviews indi-
cate that the enduring Russian peasant desire for land ownership seems to
be strong among Red Army soldiers. General officers express a desire to
own property,, have servants, and live in typical bourgeois style upon re-
tirement. -The Red Army as a whole ap}.~arently has old-fashioned nationalist
sentiments, fought for Russian soil, and, not being in sympathy with Soviet
imperialist expansion, may well be disillusioned by and hostile towqrd post-
war Stalinism. Red Army lieutenant-colonels in 1947. talking in assured
privacy, gave a low estimate of the ability of Stalin's aviator son, were
scornful of Bulganin's promotion to Marshal, and expressed total disbelief
in the official line that Russia was in danger of attack by the U.S.
37. While emphasizing the very limited scope of our research into Red
Army personnel and leadership, we feel that the kind of information we
have received has direct relevance to any consideration of the situation in
Russia following Stalin's death, and that we have sampled an area in which
extensive research is advisable and urgent.
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23-
Vi, Conclusions
38. On information now available to usp and on the analytic view set
forth above. we reach the following tentative conclusions:
(1) The dictatorship created by-Stalin is the consequence of a sub-
stantial historical process, with i.yiportant consequences for the present
bureaucratic structure of the Soviet state and Soviet society in general.
The uniqueness of the position he has created, the vesting in him of abso-
lute power in executive decisions, plus the fact that his power is essen-
tially a de facto rather than de ure creation. make it exceedingly un-
likely that the succession can pass simply and easily to any one person
Nor is it likely that any small group can exercise smoothly such arbitrary
dictatorial power over any considerable period of time. Stalin's death is,
therefore, likely to confront the Politburo with the following alterna-
tives: a formulation of and agreement on a principle of succession and of
subsequent collective decision making; or a power struggle between the
strongest individuals for single control.
(2) Present Soviet propaganda, especially internal propaganda. re-
iterating the theme of a historic and increasing contemporary external
threat by the West, is.an appeal to Russian nationalism designed to unt
4 the four elements in the state structure, (Party, Police, Army, Bureau-
cracy) and strengthen popular support for the regime under Cold 4ar circum-
stances, as well as against the day of Stalin's death or of Hot War.
(3) Powerful motives of self-preservation both as individuals and as
a group in control of the system which has created their power positions
will operate at the time of Stalin's death to solidify the Politburo as a
unit..
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(4) Nevertheless, there are four identifiable divisive potentials which
might conceivably operate following Stalin's death. They are set down here
in an ascending order of importance based on our present information:
a) Personal relationships in the Politburo.
b) Possible differences at the level of national economic policy in
relation to foreign policy.
c) The Balance of Power between the "old" and the "new" Bolsheviks.
d) The special position, and political orientation of the Red Army.
(5) Should a break occur at the top of the structure one can imagine
the subsequent effects spreading from both top and bottom and ramifying
throughout the whole Soviet power structure - Party, Police, Arngy, ureau-
craey. Thus any significant divisive movements that might result from
Stalin's death are likely to cut across lines and involve the interplay and
shifting alignments of more, and at present, less obvious forces than the
four we have outlined. Such movements might bring into play the total com-
plex of tensions in Soviet society as one contending group or another reached
back into the country for popular supporto Furthermore, the lifting of the
weight of Stalin's control will probably be less likely to result in a
swift total recoil of suppressed forces than in a progressive release to
action of many separate and hesitantly meshing forces in the whole social
and political mechanism, taking place over time.
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