NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE 'COLD WAR' OF THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000100170068-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2000
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: May 8, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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rip .!c
TOI
SUB.Ta
to our
of the United States
paper offers a very pr stimulating approach
strater problem; namely, how to terminate the present cold
either provoking a general war or without a*ffsrtug defeat
in the "cold Me itself.
nation's strategy must bear same ralatiOn to a nation1e funde-
mental 1 e Although US pollen if it is anything, ta to maintain the
progressed to the point that it now roe guises that it I*
wiser to run the risk of war than to seek peace by avoiding all risks.
The US has recognised that the Soviet leaders eannotl, deterred from
their path of action by sty concessions we may make. .t the same time,
there isno way of knowing whether or not the Soviets will initiate a
hot war' or prefer to continue eith the "cold wars
Notai h.tandtng U.S. National Strategy appears to be based on the
asspt n that a general war is almost inevitable The unprecedented
00040 FY 19$2 Defense budget is a straw in the wind. istory
records fw inetsnees when * progressive mobilisation of the relative mar
A tude of the current U.S. effort has not been terainated in war. Although
the inevitability of war may be argued, there is universal agreement that
U.S. mobilisation is the prerequisite to the eontinued maintenanoe of the
present "pp
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The subject paper states that very apt to be con-
fronted for many, many years with the same sort of dangerous unaellY
world in which we now ltve.11 Once our mobilisation is achieved, the
prospect of maintaining a constant war economy will not be very inviting
to the American people. The cost of our maintaining the military build-
up of the Western world is likely to be prohibitive after a certain point
in time. They may press for action to settle the stale-mate and bring
bout the very war which our mobilisation is designed to prevent. The
paper postulate. that war may be the only genuine way of putting an end
to the "cold war" within any considerable period of time. Although the
proponents of preventive war will always be vocal, it will be impossible
for any administration to start one.
There is another factor, however, which the paper neglects to
discuss, and that is the possibility that the Soviet Union may achieve
some sort of atomic equality prior to the time that the US and its allies
achieve an adequate military posture in land and tactical air forces.
Because this possibility exists, the deterrent value of the A-Bmab may
be lost before the conventional rearmament becomes adequate, the "cold
war" may come to an unfortunate end for us rather than dragging on in-
definitely.
To surmise these proceeding points, (1) a "cold be ended
by the US initiating a "hot war" during the period of its atomic ascendancy,
or (2) the Soviet Union may end the "cold war" by initiating a "hot war"
after it attains atomic equality and before the US achievee adequate
strength and conventional for64.
ApprAosveidtFoiraReleaskeelialOtreaFS130t06$601061Inta action,
it faces a catastrophic s Arm., t can prevent the.45oviets' taking
hIPLur ..,rar 1 -Mt r OV tal '
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This Malysie adds all the more stpdfioanc. to the conoluion
reached in the paper that, *the only weapon short of war or the ,nuine
threat of war whit& ha e eny real chance of being decisive in the d*
war within a reasonable length of time is that of the underground and
resistance movement,' in Communist countries**
The existenoe of large number* of diacouteted people d,
therefore, of potential re istance is certainly funde.mentsl to the eucoes
of any efforts to overthrow the present Soviet regime* Passiv. rests
even on an unorganised basis, coupled with, for example, a split of t
Army from the Party, or a split in the slit* whether geared to Stalin's
death or not ... might bring about the result we want* The diffioulties that
lie in the path of activating otive resistance on a particular D-Dey
are pointed out in the paper and they are of such a magnitude that
alternatives of the sort suggested should be fully explored and tried
before widespread resistance per 410 is wholly relied upon
The paper emphasises the fact that almost no coordinated pleontog
has been plished in the CS government to terminate the lt" war
e,
by upset
01
he Soviet -regime. It expresses in different, words the
analysts ludo in eenjunotion with the goope and Magnitude papers that
almost all of our conventional governmental departments and agencies
(Primarily the State tepartment and ICA) are either 1) combatting
continuing energetic i lee (2).making preparations on the assumption
t there will be
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d for
The OSnt
in for a medo
on which an in
the paper's po
of the re
d a 1 at the government
OPC is a suttebleng vehiele for doing
ed major d war effort.
d in the paper is the idea that our
though de
old" war effort must be related to some single
ted cold" war offeneive would take place.
n that a fixed point of departure in time
would permit these charged with any old* war activities to separate
operation. from plane and preparatio $ and to prat coordinated "colds
r op.ratiozts to unfold according to plan. The acceptance of a D.Day
for m3or dinated actions in the ?old? war would give coherence
and tion of concept to our planning.
The proffered era "cold" war D-DAY is en extremely useful one.
he Plane bivis ion has already marked out for itself the task of
generating three general types of planet (1) The emergency plan covering
the period required for OPC to reach its mobilisation platform (approx-
imately
December 31 1952) (2) The mid-range plan the period from
December 31, 1952 until the US and its allies reach an adequate miii-
tazy posture sometime in 1965-54) (3) The long-range glen
after the US has achieved adequate military posture and before the
ovtets ad neutralised our atomic superiority.
Our long-range plan should be developed in accO no. with the
opt established in the subeot paper. D-ay in this connection
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b* considered as the date
bly be undertaken. The exact is
ing-00ud
be set
in advance. The time or lunching must depend, to a largo extent, on
evente outside the control of the U.S. The seleetion of the right moment
is he most difficult task of all. No one can foresee what might be
of a full-soale te0034 mar offensive against the Soviet
t of such an offensive upon the Soviet leaders would
quentl to 4 degree unpredietable.
The
the $ovtet mechanism of control as to bring about a collapse from rithin.
An inferiorbut desirable result might be to produce such a general
deter/ors in the Soviet situation as to render impotent for a long
time to come the Soviet military threat to the free -world
A, rt.* inherent in an all-out 'eold' war offensive is the
b ty that the Soviet regime, fighting for its life, might consider
se
The
rtly psychoiotasl ands o
benefit might be to create such ft serious dislocation in
Poe
war 0.4
*cold".
ly possible means of assuring its survival. Therefore, the
e iv* must be very earefully eoordinated with military plans
to counter any Soviet military action thus induced. Con equently the
plea must comprise time major parts*
(I) The initialuprising aimed at
disloestin
power1 and
The immediate exploitation of this dialocati
whether it be by direct assistance to forces
aroused by the uprising or by direct cotton
against the Soviet military forces.
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an inesoapable trap oom
OP SECRET
uld spring from plaotng the Soviet
do on the one hand, of their
revolting subjects; and, on the other, by a containing mall of Allied
military foro.,
BOOMISO of the greet potentis3. valueof this approach
re amend that the idea itself an
sutleet paper be very 410144 bald,
arid that the Plans Division develop, at the earliest possible date, a
plans for the orderly developsent of the type plan required to Implement
the coneept established in this layer.
If this task is given to the Plans 1)ivision the neoessit
of obtaining some top-flight planners beoomes all the more imperative.
AST
CPO
? CPL
Registry
PIARIE/mtd
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