(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000300070049-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 49
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A0003p0070049-5
For the past thirty years America has hK>d little opportunity indeed
to influence Soviet policy. We were in a position at the time of recognition
in 1933 and at several of the wartime conferences with Soviet :Leaders to ask
for and get information not usually made available, and in some cases to
make suggestions on Soviet policy. But such opportunities have arisen
only at crucial times when the fabric of the Soviet internal political
system had been torn by cataclysmic events, or, when overwhelming need on
the part of the Russians for something we were in a position to give them
made them amendable to unusual approaches. Usually we are lucky to keep
our selves informed as to what Soviet policy is.
alin's death would, in my opinion, tear the fabric of Soviet
administrative machinery and perpetrate situations which will make it
possible for us to influence Soviet policy, if we go about it right. The
news, when it comes, will probably be sudden as it is unlikely that the
world will be told that he is critically ill; indeed the news may not be
released until some time after his death. So that whatever we are going
to do about it must be planned in advance.
The major considerations are these:
There is no precedent for the legal succession of power in the Soviet
Union. After Lenin's death there was I fight in which the political testa-
ment of Lenin was seized by one of the heirs apparent who suppressed it and
consolidated power by the systematic and often physical destruction of
competitors. T,:ere was a strong politburo in 1923 - it contained probably
more first rate minds than it does today. Lenin was perfectly conscious
of the danger of the struggle for power and tried in every way to avoid it.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIW .0-01065A000300070049-5
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 Approved For Relea;,.e 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200070049-5
Nevertheless the struggle came, and it shook the Soviet government to
its foundations, Stalin is supposed like Lenin to have prepared a political
testament. (He is reported to have told Roosevelt as much in Teheran over
martinis). Yet it seems unlikely that a coalition, trimvirate or quadrium-
virate could long remain in power in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death.
There will almost certainly be a struggle for power. Off hand I should
say the main contestants would be Malenkov, Molotov, Beria.
This struggle for power has almost certainly already begun and pro-
bably is reflected in altercations like that which is now known to have
raged between Nalenkov and Zhdanov a couple of years ago. After Stalin's
death the chances of more open conflict increase.
On the other hand, the politburo knows that its unity is its major
asset, that if it allows quarrels to shake the basis of its authority they
will all lose their heads.
Thus on Stalin's death two conflicting considerations will influence
the activities of members of the politburo and others in the Soviet hier-
archy: (a) To maintain unity (b) To survive personally, i.e., to grab
more power, or at-least be on the winning side in the struggle.
American interests require the destruction of unity in the politburo,
the fostering of suspicions, animosities or conflicts for power among Stalin's
successors, and finally the support of the least dangerous of the competitors
in order to aid him to liquidate the others. We must drive the members of
the politburo to fight for power by leading them:to believe others are
doing so and are plotting their downfall. To accomplish these aims a
campaign plan is necessary. The campaign plan must', in the first instance,
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A00300070049-5
be based on information. 2 SECREt
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000300070049-5
I am convinced, on the basis of considerable wandering around the
O.P. camps of Germany and Austria and fairly consistent perusal of
appropriate publications, that there are at large in the Western world
today a number of people who know where the potential animosities in the
politburo lie. This information should be gathered into one place for the
use of whoever is planning the campaign under discussion.
Next, preparatory work should be carried on:
1. Soviet population should be told repeatedly that Stalin, an old
and ailing man, may soon die and that his various lieutenants are already
beginning to struggle for his mantle of power. This function can well be
carried out by the Voice of America.
2. Provocative misinformation should be allowed to fall into the
hands of Soviet authorities revealing intrigues on the part of various Soviet
officials with Foreign indiviw_uals and organizations bargaining for help in
the coming struggle for power after Stalin's death. Such information must
be carefully planned out in order to be plausible, and in order that the
allegations should not be imiediately disprovable.
Overt offers, directly or through third powers, for cooperation
in a post-war struggle for power should be made to Soviet officials deemed
most likely to be interested.
In cases of rejection these stories might then be broadcast, over the
Voice of America or other agencies as simple pieces of information, e.g.
"It has been learned on good authority that representatives of the "X"
party in Turkey approached the Soviet ambassador with offers of aid in the
struggle which is expected to develop in Moscow on Stalin's death. The
offers were said to have been rejected although the Ambassador himself
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA- P$0- 65A000300070049-5
3 LF(V?'k
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000300070049-5
refuses to affirm or decay, the story." Such items if repeated month
after month would, in my- opinion, create a very definite nervousness
in both official and unofficial circles in the Soviet Union. Besides,
there is always the possibility that some of the officials approached
might accept the offer of aid. This would open possibilities for pene-
trating the Soviet apparatus.
In these and other activities Soviet refugees now in Western Europe
and the Middle East can be extremely useful. Preparations should now be
made for small but highly trained and competent units of Russian or other
Soviet refugees, perhaps under American leadership, to proceed by plane or
other means of transportation to vulnerable points in the Soviet Union
at the time of Stalin's death or a crisis ii :ediately following it to
lend support to one or another of the competitors for power. While such
operations would be of negligible military sigr4ficance they might be of
tremendous political importance particularly if they were publicized both
by outside agencies like the Voice of America and by their own radio
stations or publications.
(An operation of this kind was planned by a small group of officers
of the R.C.A. in Dobbendorf near Berlin in 1943 and 1944. The Gestapo
became suspicious of the unit, most of whom were shot, but at least one
survivor I think is to be found in the Munich area and might be able to
comment interestingly on plans made at that time. These plans Ibelieve
involved a parachute descent in the prison camp area near Murmansk,.)
If appropriate preparations are made well in advance, and planning
is well done it is conceivable that we might be able to provoke an often
fight for power among Stalin's successors,at his death. If successful.`
this oration For Release 2002, 8T c , 3 i ,o 3 #o7 gn policy;
 Approved For Releae:e 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000 60070049-5
at best it :night bring down the whole structure of the Soviet Adminis-
trative machine in a series of violent conflicts which would render it
impotent.
I am quite aware that campaigns such as the one just referred to
are quite beyond the authority of the Voice of America. At the same
tire someone has to take the initiative in starting such projects and
the Voice of America would have a very considerable part in the development
of such a campaign.
I realize further that a cardinal function of the Voice is to sell
America,, by telling the truth about it, a subject which I have not men-
tioned,not because I don't recognize its importance, but because one can't
write everything in a few pages.
I am likewise aware that the possibilities of open conflict between
ourselves and the Soviet Union in 1951 for example are at least as great
as Stalin's death during this year. This obviously involves the necessity
of planning for a vastly different situations. I wrote in more detail
about the latter circumstance because I believe the issue is lees well
recognized and because it emphasizes the pith of all our psychological war-
fare planning and operations - to drive wedges between the government of
the Soviet Union and its people, between the USSR and its satellites and
their peoples, and to destroy their unity while preserving our awn.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000300070049-5
 25X1A
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