ESTIMATE OF WORLD REACTIONS TO KOREAN CEASE-FIRE DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010122-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 122
• Publication Date: August 22, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

Approved For Relea2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000010122-8
(A)
ESTIMATE .~l' :'URLfl FiACTIOPaS TO
Kur'1 AN Ct AS1- FIFE. D VET 7u -? TITS
AN INTET, ,IGE;NCL STIM,%TE
Prepared by
The Lstimate Croup
Office of Intelligence research
This is an Intelligence Report;
nothing in it is to be construed
as a statement of UQ3,, or Depart-
mental policy or a recommendation
of any j-iv+en. policy
t,?:cusp 22, 1.951
T':-L D ARTMth'T 0:7' STATE
3T,,Tun :T OF Tf:E PROBLEM
To estimate the extent of free world acceptance of the Communist propaganda
line in the event (a) of a breakdown of the Korean cease-fire talks or (b). of a
prolongation of the talks.
DiSC.lJ53ION
An examination of official and unofficial expressions of opinion in the
non-Communist world since the beginning of the cease-fire discussions in Korea
reveals a progressive falling off in world interest in the Kaesong talks from
the high point reached immediately after Malik's statement of June 23.
This is understandable enough. tfter the initial round of excitement at
the prospect for an end to the Korean war, governments and peoples alike turned
quickly to the consideration of issues and problems on the various local scenes.
In some countries where press and Lovernme=ntal comment on international affairs
normai'y cca'rr s in volume.,..~India. for E:xamp3g--,pi occupy Lori wi'Li nearer issues
has cut drastir!a' _y into the amount of n-u-' rr? n and car'
r-{!'I., time P0 =a)
7ur of t ere Ln ;.rarca, liven WI.-ere no unusually dramatic local events
have sup,3rv'ened, the. passage of time, the somewhat technical nature of the cease-
fire talks, and the prolonged bargaining character they have now a>^eluired, have
together dulled public and, apparently, official concern with events in Korea.
Nowhere in the non-Communist '.:orld, certainly., does there seem to be any present
and general disposition to view the Korean negotiations as a possible prelude
to Armageddon On the contrary, the prevailing a
settled down for the time being to something not very ufarlfrom eindfree world ifference,las
This very lack of interest undoubtedly has been a factor blunting the edge
of the Communist propaganda campaign0 For all. the effort of Communist organs
and Communist "peace" organizers, the party line on Korea appears to have been
smothered, for the most part, by the apathy or preoccupation of the groups to
whom the Communist appeal has been directed. It is possible only to speculate
about other explanations for the failure of the Communist propagandists to
obtain a favorable response to their claim that US imperialism alone stands in
the way of a peaceful settlement in Korea.. Ir: some degree, it seems likely.
that the demonstration of US readiness to discuss peace and that US leadership
had every desire to limit the Korean war, coming immediately upon the spectacular
evidence of the MacArthur incident, nas had a favorable effect on many groups
previously ready to believe the worst about US intentions. Beyond this, there
may be reason to hope that the Kremlin's cynical appeal to the nearly universal
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desire for peace is now beginning to be received with a matching cynicism
of the free world toward Kremlin protestations. :t all event, the Communist
version of the specific issues raised -at Kaesong seems to have rained ,ery
little currency; it is almost as thoul#i the world looked on the detailed
is~;ies as being largely irrelevant to the major point: that is, whether or
n,t the Communist work: now wishes peace in Korea.
If these reasons for the Communist nrop:ig:tnda failure are broadly correct,,
then a prolongation of the Kaesong talks is not alone likely to make the free
world any more receptive to the Communist anneal. The Communist propaganda
line, in the event of continuing nE?Lotiations, is predictable. It will continue
along carrot-and-stick lines, holdint, out the carrot of peace while at the say!,,
time implying broadly that if t:,e U") "warmongers" refuse the carrot, then the
alternative will be the stick of continuing bloodshed,, -t every point during
tt e cease-fire discussions, stress will be nlaced on JS intransigence and US
unwillingness to seek realistically for peace. By way of contrast, great weight
will be placed on the exclusive Communist natent on peaceful intentions. Atrocity
themes, built around the alleged effects of US air action, will be emphasized.
The threat that the war may be renewed on a grander scale will be subtly but
persistently introduced.
Z~dnce this propaganda -pproach has gained little free world acceptance
thus far, it is most unlikely that its appeal will be enhanced by further
dragging out of the Aaesong discussions. Lather, apathy toward the Korean
talks is likely to deepen as time roes ono
It must be noted, however, that the world Communist propaganda campaign
would assuredly -ain in popular attention from any Soviet action directly or
indirectly related to the Korean negotiations. A startling conciliatory
move--say, a Soviet signature to the Japanese peace treaty or, eiually, an
overt warlike act in Korea or elsewhere--would necessarily give new life to
the Communist peace or war campaign, either raising world h:pes or arousing
latent fears,
A breakdown of the Kaesong talks woul< , alter the Communist propaganda
campaign only in monor detail. There would be a major effort to pinpoint
US responsibility for the failure of negotiations, chiefly by seizing upon
the simplest and most dramatic issues--most probably the location of the
cease-fire line and the buffer zone but perhaps repeated "violation" of the
neutral zone--and asserting and reasserting that it was US stubbornness and
bad faith in rejecting the 38th parallel (after indicating an intention to
accept it) that had dashed the world?s hope for peace. Otherwise, the main
lines of Communist propaganda would remain unchanged except, nerhaps that
even greater emphasis would be given to the war moth`.
There is little doubt that the fact of a breakdown of t e Korean negotiations
would alarm most of the free world. In some areas, notably the FFhilippines,
Turkey, and most of Latin America, where public and official, opinion is condi-
tioned to a belief in the unchangeable malevolence of the Soviet world,
alarm would be mixed with an ILtold-'you-so reaction. '.estern zuropean opinion.
would be apprehensive at the prospect that the US would adopt the elements of
the MacArthur program and thus bring World War III a long step nearer. In most
of Asia and the Near EEaast, fear of an approaching World ',Jar III would be height-
ened and some credence would be riven to the Communist argument that US unwill-
ingness to compromise was to blame for the ending- of negotiations.
in practical terms, the direct and immed+_ate consequence of a breakdown
of the talks at Kaesong would be limited. None of the states now contributing
rersonnel to the Korean war would substantially increase its contribution; the
nations that have thus far refused to take an active part in the UN action
would continue to refuse. The group of states tending most strongly to
neutralism=India and its followers in Asia and the Near East--would become
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hardened in their neutralist tendencies; many of the nations in this group
would look upon events in Korea as confirmation of their view that the UN
is an inadequate instrument for peace. Pressure from this group for a big
power conference would increase. The pace of rearmament in %estern Europe,
would not slacken but neither would it be likely to accelerate. The UK and
the English speaking members of the British Commonwealth would draw nearer
to the US point of view on Far Eastern policies as regards China and Japan,
Japan, if its hopes for a peace treaty had been realized, would be spurred
to build its military forces rapidly, unless.,, that is, a Soviet-Chinese attack
appeared to be an imminent possibility. Overall, the present military and
political lineup in the world, would remain for the short period unchanged.
However, the relationship of developments at Kaesong to the pending
Japanese peace treaty conference at San Francisco is indeterminate and might
be significant. If talks at Kaesong ' are continuing when the San Francisco
conference is convened, the Kremlin may (a) condition agreement to a Korean
armistice on Western acceptance of Soviet proposals regarding Japan; (b)
soften Communist terms at Kaesong in order to obtain an agreement and thus
to create in dramatic fashion an atmosphere favorable to a general discus-
sion, on Soviet terms, of outstanding Far Eastern issues; of (c) raise the
prospect that both the Korean and Japanese impasses could be broken by a
big power conference covering all Par Eastern issues. Any one of these
tactics might well find a responsible attitude in India, Burma, and
Indonesia, among the signatory nations, and in Iran and the Arab Near East
as well, A breakdown of the Kaesong talks prior to the conference would
give the Soviets the club of a threatened and imminent extension of the
Korean war, Once again, the response, so far as signatories to the peace
treaty are. concerned, would be limited mainly to the three,Asian nations,
India, Burma, and Indonesia. These countries at least would be likely to be
disposed to endorse Soviet proposals for big power negotiations covering
the entire range of Far eastern issues and, more than likely, would refrain
from signing the US draft of a Japanese peace treaty.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Communist propaganda campaign, built upon the Kaesong talks, has
thus far met with indifference and skepticism throughout the free world,
2. Prolongation of the discussions at Kaesong would be likely to in-
crease non-Communist indifference and skepticism toward the Communist appeal,
3a A breakdown of the Kaesong talks would give rise to alarm in most
of Asia and ?Western Europe. Communist propaganda, which would attempt to
put the entire onus of the failure of negotiations on US intransigence,
would find some acceptance in south and Southeast Asia and the Near East.
Neutralist tendencies in these areas would become more confirmed,. No
significant change would occur as regards troop contributions to Korea or
Western European r+earmament*
4s So far as the Japanese peace treaty conference is concerned, develop-
ments in Kaesong are likely to have a significant effect only upon India,
Burma, and Indonesia, states whose attitudes toward signing the treaty are
already in doubts
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