DRAFT OF SPEECH BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 23, 1947
• Content Type: SPEECH

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DRAIT (F SPEHCR I THE DIRSCTOR OF CENTRAL
INTO=GE CS MORE TIM NAVAL WAR COIF,
Zps wads Island. 2 z ft ~l90
I thank you for the privilege accorded me of being here
this morning to discuss some aspeata of intelligence an 1,
particularly, the organization of the Central Intelligence
#ssncy and its relation to other agencies and departments of the
Goverment. With the, cuts in appropriations for all branches
of the armed forces, this year, the subject of intelligence
becomes increasingly vital. From present indication,, the"
condtti. n ll c o n t i n u e to exist, certainly, or t n t f
years. It is t omeatic that the more the actual eoi bat forces
are rr=ducee, the greater the role that must be plve:': by
inte=genee if the national security is to be maintained.
I understand that this pest week has been given over to
intelligence, particularly from the departmental vier, Today,
I shell endeavor to discuss intelligence on the national scale.
comim U NO. --,-
#0 CUANOE 0 CLASS.
?.) C-E6L&SS1i1EA -
UASS. Ci4A1C'FD re: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE.; _. A-4r,
ATh 111E 10.2
14 APR 25X1
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In discussing with you the subject of national
intelligence, I want to c ence by recalling to mind the
chaotic condition of our intelligence before World War No.
is a result of this,, President Truman, by executive Order,
dated 22 $anua y 1944, established the Central Intelligence
Group. This, in turn, is being succeeded by the Central
Intelligence Agency, established under the National Security
'kii
Act of 1947. The functions of the Ag I wish to
in scams detail, so that you may understand it as a vibrant,
goixg concern, rather than another group of Washington letters.
Before discussing our task with you,, however, there are certain
things I wish to say as background.
think it can be said without successful challenge
that before Pearl Harbor we did not have an intelligence
service in this country comparable to that of Great Britain,
or Frame, or Russia, or Germany, or J`atpan. We did not hays
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on because the people of the United States would not accept
it. It was felt that there was something un-American about
espionage and even about intelligence generally.
A32 intelligence is not sinister, nor is it an
invidious type of work. There are many ways of illustrating
just at intelligence is -- beyond the cold definition of the
word. A eanuer which I have found particularly helpful is to
consider the intelligence estimate of a nation as a kind of
super jigsaw pa,7sle. When first seen, the pieces of th.3 picture
are all confused; the analysts start working and eventually
there emerges a partial solution, about 75% of the puzzle. This
part is the pieces that are available from overt sourw, books,
charts, periodicals, radio broadcasts, technical sums, photo-
graphs, commercial s eys, general information, etc. Now,
we have 75% of a picture, showing that much of the capabilities
and potentials of our target country. There are still tape
and omissions and to fill, these we mist resort to clapdestine
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and covert methods. By use of such means we can get perhaps
15% more, thus making our picture 90% complete. At this
point,. by deduction we can get perhaps 5% more. * * # * * * ~r
The final 5% is most probably unattainable as it consists of
ideas and policies not even formulated, existing only in the
minds of the leaders of our target country. However, tht- 95%
we do have should give, within narrow limits, the potential,
the capabilities, and the probable and possible intentions of
our target.
The Joint Congressional Committee to investigate the
Pearl Harbor attack reached many pertinent conclusions
regarding the short-comings of our intelligence system and
made some very sound recommendations for its improvement.
No are incorporating many of these into our presen
The Committee showed that some very significant information
been correctly evaluated. It mound that some of the
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evaluated in 'orw.tion was not passed on to the field
Tiers . But, over and above these failures were o
perhaps more serious, which went to the very structure of
our intelligence orgardzatione. I an talking now of the
failure to exploit obvious sources; the failure to
coordinate the collection and dissemination of intelligence;
the failure to centralize intelligence
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of +t eoee to X12,
could ss
cant
ieient
c fir ,iz+atla i of t rity eioar-cut
row .bi it t' . It fomd
fault with the
dis do than is use --
disneirtmtion of intelligswe to those
It states that *the seaur tt ' of
an be insured on thgh
amd the failure
ee:viCea
e am attractive and Inportaot officer
is ation of r"V ib li I
with bnnffi,ing irate ence ? it fmW- that there
is no substitute for i ination and rem
jutelligame pers 1, as- that
in this respect "the failure to accord to
igmee work the : rtent and aigntf c
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which it deserves." The Committee declared that
"efficient intelligence servioea are just as essential
time of peace as in war."
In the Central Intelligence Group, and in its
successor Agency now created, must be found the answer
to the prevention of another Pearl Harbor.
As the United States found itself ddenly , ro jeatted
into a global war, immense gape in our 1mowledge bee me
readily apparent. The word "intelligence" quickly tor:''
on a fashionable connotation. Each new war-tine agency
--- as well as ma of the older departments -- soon bloesome
out with intelligence staffa of their own, each Prcrduci
a ,sass of largely uncoordinated information. T'he resultant
oompotitifunds and specialized personnel was a
aonusentsl. example of waste. The War and Navy Departments
developed ful.1 political and economic intelligence staffs,
as did the Research and Analysis
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eusor, the 8orei 00CM14
27 into *Us of os in s c ,-.
tit t staff $ in tss l t -, they establie
4uring the war, for
2WOrt on t steed. 3z&wtrY In Japan or
c
0.3-30. The Board of
G2
tho reports of
Board of . Mamie Wucwv
the Q.L.. . tr, ubj0h, to +c ee, su e
t esssxy for eacgi of them to ba4k up its ezp.
that its psrular reports more the best
SW that the ethers sit ise be di .
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established the 'ice or
for the puspoee of of rt together
?e taut, the work of the o.s.. was
and its known failures =wt. be w*ISW
the field of tat
ability who *=.d
rather than ft ''t-
cue should remember - t it a tat Unto t
X t a atop-> r>ght, it was given a
f ti . to perfoa n that the British, for i ,, 4hed
t its successes. Moreover, it sarlod a arm.
t
Imig point in the 'elapa t of United 3tatos
. We are now attea pti to profit by their
kri es ani mistakes.
M*dmg att&Uwd its present
ort+ a amd power in an
not, in opinion,, find itself spin
."opt since the a of Qwm :3izabeth.
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confronted with the necessity of developing its pla a
policies on the basis of intelligence collected, compiled,
and interpreted by some foreign government. it is aoemn
knowledge that we found ourselves in just that position, as
regarded; the European Theater, at the beginning of World! War
Two, For months we had to r?17 blindly end trustingly on the
superior intelligence system of the British. Our successes
prove that this trust was ei'ei Von placed. However, in
matters so vital to a nation having the responsibilities of a
world power, the United States should never again have to go
hat in hand, begging any foreign government for the eyes --
the foreign intelligence -- with which to see. We should be
self-sufficient. The interests of others may not be our
interests.
The need for our own coordinated intelligence program
has been recognized in most quarters. The Pearl Harbor.
disaster dramatised that need and stop-gap
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As t dr,
is close,
directed the Joint .efs of Staff to
problem w d draft r time for the
The solutica offered the Joint Chiefs of
to the 5a? tees of State, War~,
Xsq. The px rwi iftich they a lved vaulted
ti11e Directive fa? President Tr-,
19k6.
establi
lthority. . It Qmmaists o
HBtiaelB&l
craturies of State, War and the Navy
rep
Feet Mdx . L *447. A fifth
...~ without a vote -- is the motor of Central
The )ati+ . iutelli a Authority was
to plan, develop m d coordinate all Pedo
ivities, so as *to ass
Live s oce tsls t of the inteUig ce ad.ssi
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related tom natia . s ari ."
Px4$i ieflt's DlreOtive a 1eo provided for a
tnteUi a Group an t operat
ati . Ixnt, ellig .+ f rt
atellige a vas urged in the r etive --
mod its now wed by UN -- th ee
ab&U describe to you in mom de trail, w that
have a clearer picture Of Our 40tivitt. The"
a assi a to us under the provie f om of
02 of the tip. Seaurity t of 15-47 ~...
area servioei tnif icatict. bill -- "Ash vms
taof
aim session:
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this background, I .would like to disc
th you the pertinent provisions of the Natia
# .ty Act of 17, insofar as they affect the
Intelligence picture. .This Act establishes - for
the first time on a legal basis.--- a National 3ectxity
+ uMcil, the function of which 1.3-to advise the
President on the integration of foreign, domestic
ta' policies relat1 g to the national security.
The Council is to be presided over by the President
himself, or by any member be may desig te. Its
membership is composed of the President, the Secretaries.
Defense, the AraW, the Navy, the Air Force,
mod the Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board, together with certain others who may be
meted at the option of the President.
Central Intelligence Agency- is as
it. To an intents and purposes
therefore,, the National Security Council will take the
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place of the National Intelligce Authority,,, witch
apecilically' abolished by the Act. The law does
not met forth the powers of the mil as they relate
icy, in the saner in which the President4ss
OX g l 11 cuti" Order" delineated the powers if the
Intelligence Authority in relation to the
tray. Intelligence Group. However, the fact that
Agency is placed under the Council would appear
to give the Council the saw general aut orities for
directing the planning, development,, and coordination
all Federal foreign intelligence activities which
the National Intelligence Authority had before it.
The Act specifically provides for a Director of
Central Intelligence, io is to be appointed by t
by and with the advice and consent of the
mate, fx t either civilian or =111.tar7 life. Certain
safeguards are then Included,, so that the
Director shall not be subject to the usual supervision;
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time and prohibitions which apply to mewbe
azued services. It further states that he is
not to possess or exercise supervision., control.,
pa" or functions other than those he would exercise
.tor -- over a' component of the armed :services.
Wiese clauses were Included in order to
the
satisfaction of the Congress that the Director mould
from undue service politics and influ
Interests of the United States. It can be readily
ueratood that, in an. Agency such as ours, here
seawity is paint, this right is amang the most
it appears that such te~3ation is neceasazq
alt of any employee of the Agency, vtwnever
vests in the Director the right to term note
One of the suet important provisions of the Act
t we could have. Under normal Civil 'Service
s, it is
person for inefficiency, or for those borderline loyalty
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cases ere the sensitivity of an Agency such 3 ours
would nr rms3ly require termination. On the other hid,
this places a very heavy responsibility on us, in regard
iee, which cannot be Lightly a rcised.
Xiess, it is vital to the successful and secure
of our duties.
law specifically provides that our Agcy
] have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers,
or Internal security functions . This. provision %us
also in the old ecutive Order, and it is o
happy to ha re included in the 1w.
Wr-.
have consistently urged that Central Intelligence
have nothing whatsoever to do with police powers or
function c ted with the Internal security of the
. The internal security functions are
p.
properly a part of the work of the , .2. and we have
no ire whatsoever to interfere with ;its. It is a
burden t ch we do not wish to assume.
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the (kagreeW coal ~.p
trgl In 11.g $
as LU fsSt,
ea.6tnea in me
shed out tim sr
JAI
in the field of fore1 1nt I
Therefore, I have said, we volt c* this provisim in
srq fti :ttive
ixtsll.gs with the Po3.iss PowrP
law reiati7 to the specific duties of
sue. L tel
031 dates r possibility that {. r
tuts
um I wi h to dim a with you
*for t purpose of eourdimt
t
of the severs3 ftivelft No
8@111111341 " in t Est of xeti
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in other words, -- bearing in mind the great powers to
and the integration of foreign, dstic and
kitaz7 policies of this Govex n.t which have been
Igmed to the National Security Council. -- it berme
ert that the Central Intelligence icy is to
eex'e as the intelligence advisor to the Coil on
tters respecting naticl intelligence.
The next duty imposed upon us by the At is to
recommendations to the Council for the coordimatic*i
of the intelligence activities of the Govern t insofar
as they relate to the naticuzl security. Jnder the
President'-a cutive Order,, the Director of Central
Intelligence s assisted by what was 1cno the
Intelligence Advisor, Board. This Board consists of
Assistant to the secretary of State fox,
of Intelligence of the War
the
t Coral
to
the Chief of Naval Intelilge n
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there is no specific 3tatut ry
pr vision for the t of the Intelligence
thelfim permits the Vpoin t of
this Board end continue to lea, an it for advice in all
Phases of our activities. It enables us to p in
*lose and intimate ccantact with the de tmenttl
Intelligence &&a= 03 of the Oiovert. In dition,
provision is made to invite the heeds of other mall. a
sg4ncies of the Covert than those meuti. above, to
sit as members of the Advisory Boatd on all matters vfttah
would affect their dies. In this manner, the Beer
serves to furnish the Director with the ba2etit3 of
the knowledges advice, experience, viewpoints,,
1 require its of the departments with ors
Theme reocnamdatio=&
can serve as the basis of mew of the iiirectos
rs .tivns to the Council for the ooordi aatiQu
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of our Govornaent's intelligence activities.
This ply coordination is of particular
i rtet a In deter 1Tg primary fields of intelli .
1il of the various departments and agencies.
We are -- in tie fields of collection, production, and
dissemination -- working to prevent overlapping functions,,-
to
that is,;Aelitrtinate duplicate roles and missions, xA to
elite duplicate services in carrying out these fttie.
The next paragraph of the law provides for the
-correlation and evaluation within the Government of
intelligence relating to the nationaa security, This
f a successful. Central intelligence
is a major component o
the
envy, coming udder broad general heading of
production, and including the evaluation, correlation
and interpretation of the foreign intelligence information
gathered for the production of intelligence. It involves
so of systematic and critical exam ne ion
of intelligence information for the purpose of
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Yes the s tnthesis of the pa tioular
nee, infor atin with all available related
It involves the process of deterssin1mg the
e signi 'icauce of evaluated intelligence.
Information gat red in the field is sent to the
department responsible for its collection. This material,
ssarry to that department, in the course of its
day-to-day operations. Fach department must have
personnel available to digest this information and
put it to such use as is necessary within that department.
The heads of Govern amt departments and a enci.es must
be cons tautly informed of the situation within their
aom fields to discharge their obligations to this country.
departmental necessity, Central Intelligncc
interfere. Each department must evaluate and
correlate and interpret that intelligence information
ich is within its anan exclusive cr etenoe and Wb1ch
is needed for its ova departmental uses
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lWortance of research to the Central
. a Agency beams evident wbon we stilt to
deal with Intelligence as a pia al as diatirVui;
level. The research provides.
the central agency mast be turned to the prod tion of
estimates in the field of 1a ona in igenewf. a oa
#.e Mae to that c 3osite 3ntell , i-ita apart-
r, a ich is required by the President
mdE other hig*i officials and staffs to assist them in
W&WA-AUA a policies with respect to national p1 ag
in peace and in mr, and for the cdvane t
of broad national policy. Waatimoual intelligence Is in
acmem to more than one
It must be objective,
one department. Such an estimate as I have Just described
and it t transcend the ezolusive amVetence of
an the situati a. in TUAW v,t the
tto President expounded the doctrine of aE
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estimates. Piously
ired an Deer- . estimte of a gisi:
e Agency lea is the prep
handbook for our mission in Turkay.
One of the greatest ec tributions it3ich . Central
sidamt
eall,, for ale) upon the War spa rt t, which
ww4A ash him With the military and air picture;
potentialities and capWAlities;
Late Dnartment, Mich would cover the
sociological picture. But ire would there
oar-a. estimate.
cessity,
PT
y Dap t, > ich would present an es'- to of
an estimate slanted to its p ticiAar field.
Jkm it falls to the C tral ' Intelligence Ageno to present
picture in a baled, national jztelligence
e te,,, including all pertinent data. Prom the
P i+ it and appropriate officials can draw a well-ro=ded
ApP Mr 1e 00-U "aim #& OQA-'J 1 ft obvL1d
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sir
clearly borne in mind that the Central Intelligence
AS=W do" not
rnMrirm+ R~}} R~ .
T he estimates furnished in the form of strategic
policy Intelligence by the Central
igae 1fiU a most serious sep in our pre t
i tad iganae et to . These estates ~ represent
most c ive, Clete and precise
--. _ available to the @e t. Wiouia a
tral research staff producing this material., arl
1genoe a7stem mould merely resas ble a costl
group of factories, each ~ nufaeturing c plat parts,
without a tral assembly line for the finisbad product.
us with the appropriate
as tiort of n,atic l inte3l. within the
Indeed, dissemination is alters a major
a,ownumt of a successful intelligence operate. You
one of the great faults found, by the -14
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i riate disae 4 , scs of the rA
W
intelligence tea had av'ei fable to us.
purpose in collecting intelligence infcriastian mess
it is equently analyzed and worked into a final
pmt, so theme is no sae in developing a f cu .
pr*dwt if it is not diasate! to those who have
need of it. The dis tion of intelligence :1s
to those officials of the Eve- t who
to =Wm their decisions.
0entral Intelligence Agency, properly cog.t
of the intelligence requirements of the various demote
ageMies,, is best equipped to handle the disaeMnation
nat
these requirements. The oceplexities
tte~l cue, the amities of information available
or the as g, are so great that th a
reach a central spot for riy t
effielemit, disse ton to possible users within the
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ial asrmtiou is a in the 1zi ficatio.
wt of the fact that the depat nts other agencies
of the ve t shell cc tintte to collect, evaluate,
c late and disc .te do artaaa tt intelli enc : .
A little earlier i mentioned to you the distia Lion
Via..: d tmental intelligence on the one h . and
national intelligence on the other. We have n, as
bwm previously stated, how two of the major comments
3teice -- .. .;.Y, production a dissemination
hvnMed f n central Intellige . I now wish to
tuft for a few minutes to the third major coMonent,
0021ection.
role of the Oiontral Tntelligewe Mr=4 is to
this collection of foreign intelligence
inforlaatio and to avoid wasteful duplication. The
eta 2t should collect political, econ e and
s icldgi i; in its basic field. Tho,
ApptgrerlOt d'1 00 should
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*son. for simple, for the military attache to
. q tL& Arm
aUed pol.itl Ca L .
pol,itiao - ona 1c , e3yses. This material should be
eolect : by the State Department. If a military attache
ebm1d receive political information he should hand it
rl&t acs the desk in the embassy to the appropriate
mob wr of the Foreign Service, a vice versa.
engaged in continual surveys of all
=amnt agencies to as ertain their requi to in
arelga intelligmce. When t or more agencies have
or identical req nts, t s collection effort
additional action necessary is the additional dissemination.
In, determining,, apportioning and allocating the
pr's field of responsibility as c ng the various agencies
for one can be mode to satisfy all otrs.
rert, it is useful to note one edition
After this mass of material has been studied
and evaluated, certain We in the over-an picture will
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be readily apparent. A centralized intelligence agcy,
Intent of ccaletir g the nationaa intelligence Pictures,
e the power to ski out collection directives
at further material to fill these gaps=. Once
the initial field of collection is delineated, the
rorrspts3.b31ity for securing the addition. inforation
opt be properly eh*nneled and apportioned. Centre..
i igcuce, homer,, needs the authority gren
by the President4s Directive, a now by
legislation, to coordinate all t bin foreign
ae coUaetion.
eel it ip safe to say that in peace tiw
i
aw oXXmatsly AN per cent of the foreign intellig+
fo3 ation necessary to suceessful operation can ? nd
s ui4 be collected by o rt mans. By overt a I
those obvious, open methods which require, basically,
a tborougft sifting and analysis of the masses of readily
available material of all types and descriptions .
VIM
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Into the United States there is funnelled so vast an
amount of information from so many varied sources that it is
virtually staggering. It encompasses eTery field of endeavor
.... military, political, economic, co mercial, financial,
agricultural,, mineral, labor, scientific, technical, amoug
others -- an endless and inexhaustible supply.
If we fail to take advantage of these vast masses
of material, we are deliberately using the American people
to the consequences of a policy dictated by a lack of
information. We must realize also that we are competing
with other nations who have been building up their
intelligence systems for centuries to keep their loaders
informed of international intentions - to inform them long
before intentions have materialized into action.
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prjAW'y Qafeet dies in
uIpma are the mi -1.tsry,
;des or the de " 4 estab1iskIMOnt, aed the
& "Vice officers of the state The
(( -Ca 4 C,/
Ir I e G tae WM
e. fta do moat va
. As =UOMI
an. needs in this fts'.
we established, their value w M be ixusit it ly
This be particularly true as bo da .es of t o Uesti.m '!come tthe
iry
iii., and wasteful duplii oati a. and e r
province of the
'i eld
te';.9.e t take over departmmtal
oellootim activities. This is the type of col.' .e cti
Ibl'ob $an best dome by the experts of the
to In their various fields.
SEC REI
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 -3a-
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to collect certain lute Mw e
quote this wwtim
elx#alc
pszfo for the bee3efit d e NIMOUB
.age of am oes
prov dss caw motion i lah establishes
'ftY Ca =&U dote z i e can
be jare
tr124. " This
*"tun in
ow t e r to
itios .- to "
, for the first tom, the espianage s ste It a ah
,or
tte , a necessar ssanditians in the
in addition, it allows us to perform
the rest. Nowsver, n these fujacti .
the savinge m d services
ar .ved axv acleleider le. As a result,, Ifte various
A F Ol F010-4
a?h .ae del to be dow individually by each of t
irk aceatian s other f=oti
tirl . ,
0 agencies of the Qovernt -- Mesta, Wes,'
(
S
 Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CtA6P80R01731R001400150010-4
t .t aettan wid no 2.c r wish to perfom these
f t lse . s. I will Oita you two MUMPION,
se do
joint aervia; Venture
_ eftstacaLly 4ad effioi+rnntly performed by a ealatral
formerly operated the ' a, .
this type of f ti i *an be moei
sod the disuuWatim fcmc tia .
+r i
su& as ours,, for it
16610- 7-
001nmticm
have tam over the t raw Dort
have assuned responsibility for
1r dr s spprc ate
tamign bz'oadc at a a .
Rtia
e oitati
.i words of
c e rested with
the war, and
STATINTL
was subeegttiell .t ` transferred to the War De~t O t
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 z-
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aat 'rie1,,
Itat a ps t is p :gip
t three, Tbsrefor1-, this f`'unation was an
to centralize t operation : in
iteUige ee G as vtdAh old best
ce tr&Uy. Thus ; ies of the
eer .ao.
of forei broadcasts In becoming
bring in valuable i`orsation a great deal.
iortant source of infoxlaxtion.
attache die. Moreover, a
stu of a oo1 tz7 is broadcasts over a
of tie brings fur Hr intelligence
secured by no other mom=.
give an *zwviee of the worth of
alto the feet that idban. the B"retary of 3
rr t to Moscow t March,, he requested
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wished his tth a da . of 500 1 s
t hr ta x 1ng
When the P
,ent, eho
annmoiatea the
1 r tom., and we a 1m'
b i m 1 to c o r d s a + '-
-tomy returned he e, AmbexWor
re
a s 'ills mat he :u.
STATINTL
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&Med m rig: x rte of foreign
Austrian
t2win ,e to our d. "mft for the rem In
STATINTL
I
 - 3 L1
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is
crffi a rtatn tit'
AA ad',?okto bids
c3,eeft' AA services of the .te $ta
bell . assign to by the Natiawl
Dire Authority 9
ice.ecti *t of
tied, &id 0 ttsnateeii over-pu.,
;o we a fr a
idc t some of UU
*dAft can obtainad amly by a1. eetita met ds.
only follows 33to by '' 70am
every Vicar ft i PP.
sag pis this. The GOMM
Italians s d the
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"tax a nstais'L, those o:titt
P
ruts for tbmseelves .
 -3y
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oo entries, have uhma eonelusive r
are separate services, the result is
for as productim of iforsevtio a is coo erred.
el J atic ? Stu of maw i to ligenc a system
tba world, talks with those vbo have operated
An the field of secret intoUig a for laeg period* of
Failure al s mats a s .ti .ieity of
4
t:Ullle, emd post-war interrogatio of bigh inter oo
Zte=&I bickering, with t sniping,, develops
the ,various services. The" were too w=W
SW orge allatiaresI each of theft jealous of the
polici of secrecy, so that
be the =e to present srsse juicy tidbit of
into! aticn to the, leaders. Co ordination t out the
ratter a r ed,
ms sbou3A be c trelised in
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to avoid the mistakes indicated, and we should follow the.
experience of the intelligence organizations of other
ee~ chi c have proven successful in this field.
conclusion, I would point out that what we have
done since January 19146 is an attempt to bring order out of
the chaotic conditions in which intelligence found itself
before and during the war. In ny opinion, the field of
intelligence has at last reached the stage where it offers
to the graduates of this College and to members of a of
the armed forces a service career second to none in importance.
If sqr remarks today have helped in any way to focus your
attention upon that fact, I will have accomplished my
purpose.
To those officers of the armed services who turn their
thoughts to intelligence as a career, I can only say thr-t their
decision will be of maximum service to this countrY. 'we of
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VF FT
 SECPFT
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entral Intelligence are looking forward not only to
conti't&ng our work, but to developing and improving it,
now that we have been established by Congress as a
ant agency.
In con on? I understs that I shall,-be allowed
a few ad tes /rest. Followlj~t that,
heir sq eelf on your nerdy for the questions I an told you
" have in attire for no.
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SECPFT