JPRS ID: 10635 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080009-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORTS

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,~PRS L/10635
6 Ju~Y 1982
V1/~s~ E~ ro e R e o rt
p p
(~DUO 41/8~~
FBIS F'OREIGN BROADCAST II~FORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10635
A
6 July 1982
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 41/82) .
CONTEN TS
ENERGY ECUNOM~CS
SPAIN
Nuclear Power Is Essential to Energy-Poor, Industrial North
(CAMBIO 16, 24 May 82) 1
ECONOMIC
~ ~rnt,~~
Stages of USSR, Italy Economic Cooperatiori
(Vladimir Medvedovsky; FOREIGN TRADE, May 82) 4
4
SPI\iN
I'
Factors Responsible for Currency Devaluation Listed
~ (CAMBIO 16, 17 May 82) 13
, MILITARY
IiGI..GT UM
S: BrieEs
I~ess Air Force Flying 16
1~ R/1KCC
'rouluuse S~ace Training Center to Open in 1983
(Regis Noye; AIR ET CO~MOS, 15 May 82) 17
' `i'hort~son-CSF Introdt:cces NeGi Radar, Improved CROTALE Missile
(Pierre Lang~~reux; AIR ET COSMOS, 15 Ma3? 82) 20
1 ~
~
;
~
- a - [IYI - ~ - 150 FOUO]
; ~'rlA ffti k'~rf A~ i'cr ilATi v
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Computer-Assisted Design Adapted for Tank, Weapons Planning
(AIR ET COSMOS, 24 Apr 82) 25
~ Experi?~ental Applic~tion For Tanks, by Pierre I.angereux
Uses At Military Installations
Military Transport Routes Held in War-Ready Status
(Guy Hardy; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, May 82) 28
New SNECMA Engine to Allow Planes Lower Altitude
(AIR ET COSMOS, 8 May 82) 31
Briefs
' Mirage IV Crashes 32
GENERAL
ERANCE
Aerospatiale Conducts R&D on Carbon Composites tor Space Use
(AIR ET COSMOS, 8 May 82) 33
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t'.IVf,CtGY ECUNOMICS . SP.AIN
l
f .
f
' NUCLEAR POWER IS ESSEIVTIAL TO ENERGY-POOR, INDUSTRIAL NORTH
~
i
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 24 May 82 pp 67-6y
' [Passages enclosed in slantli.nes printed in italics] '
[Text~ The Basque Country is stifled because of energy. Ii' the energy problem
is serious throughout Spain due to increased foreign dependency on expensive
� and scarce oil, the situation is even more serious in ~,l.iskadi. This is true, .
~ Cirst, because it consumes a great deal of energy due to its high industirial
~ and demo~raphic concentration. Secondly, it does not have energy reseurces of
iLs own. Within this context, th~e 11.6 billion kilowatts that Lemoniz should
contrib~~te in 1990 are absolutely indispensable. That is 70 percent of the
; electricity that the three Basque provinces will consume then.
'1'he consumption of primarS~ energy in ~ZSkadi totaled about 9.6 million TCE
~ (eyuivalent tons of coal) in 1979 and its production was 150,000 TCE. This
i ~r~eans its /degree of self-supply is 1.57 I~rcent/, one of the lowest in the
! worlci. On the other hand, the degree of self-supply for the entire country
i was 32.3 percent that year and now is more than 34 percent.
I
~ 'I'he Dasque Country does not produce coal, much less oil. It only has a mini-
; ~nal ~r.aunt of natural gas and a little electricity from its waterfal.ls. In
~ 1~~(~), Euslme (Ma!-ch, 1981) Petrochemical; textile; food and
~na~lc Is, aviati~n ~9u~P' A~ the 12th sessi~n of the Joint
,,,~:i,~ .inc1 navigatiun anci radio S~viet-]talian Commission the 5~- ~
i ~�unimunication facilities, aircraft viet side pointed out that the
~ I~~~~Is and lubricants, a number ~p~rative quantitative restric-
; uf rlumicals, etc. tions on imports of certain So-
Quantitativc restrictions of So- viet goods to Italy formed a
~rrc,rts to Italy also con- h~n~rance to their expanded de-
~ ii~uc tu he a serious hindrance. ~iveries, and emphasized the need
' (;n May 6, 1976, the Italian ~~r further liberalization of im-
MinisU�~~ uf T'orci~n Trade t~- pw~ts trom the 5oviet Union.
~~�~~~~r with the Ministrv of
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AI tcr I tal}~ inh�oduced the economic cooperation between
unilc~rm EEt: customs tariffs the such advanced industrial nations
as the S~viet Union and Italy.
Juty levied on industrial prod- ~~th sides expressed the opinion
ucts imported Erom the Soviet that it was necessary to expedite
Uniun and uther sc~cialist coun- ~he studies already underway oE
~~.~~s ~uny ~~~-~m 5 to 20 per cent, specific possibilities for exp~?nd-
nut a favourable condition rela- ~n~ t}~~ ~,~~~rt ~E Soviet machines
tivc t~~ the duty-free imports oF ~ind cyuipmcnl lu Italy.
tiimilar ~;~ods allowed in From the T~~~ S~viet market is oE interest
t;urn?nun N[at'ket countries. t~ italy. Italian business secti~ns
Of late ttaly has very often ~ncreasin~ly Favuur continued de- ~
mactc usc uf protectionist plays tentc, the broadening of traditio-
su~h ;.ls special monetary and n~il tradc and economic relations
~~.~~~t policies (restricted cur- ~vitll tlie Suvict Union based un
r~ncy remiltances and paym~nts mutual bcnc(it an~i goad pros-
ahroucl; a special tax on transEer ~"~y. Thcir vicwp~int was clear-
- ~~f mune,y abroad) which has ad- ~y ~utlined in G. Agnetli's (Presi-
vcrscly alTected purchases oE So- ~lent of FIAT) article in Euro-
vi~t ~c~ucls, sp~cifically, machines,
~;quipmcnt and manuEactures, bY ;~co, in which he arrives at the
ltalian (irms. unambiguous conclusions that
P~crticular ~ttention should be i�esorting to economic ~anctions
~*ivcn tc, clcl~vcries of Soviet equip- a~ainst the Soviet Uni~n is a
mcnt and machines to Italy. ~reat error. N~orec~ver, it is a
- 5~vc,�a? ~xamp.es uF good pro- threat to world ~eace, and, vice
~*ress e~n the lucal market can be versa, development of trade re-
~�itccl. li~ 1972 lw~ YAK�40 planes lations can facilitate a return to
~v~re sc~IJ fc~r the first time to detente =
Italy. in 1971-1973 seven Kornera The 26th CPSU Congress em-
I~vclr~~l~cril .shi~~s were delivered to nhasized that ihe line of the So-
I ~alv. ~'hcy are l- ~ used for ~~iet Union for br~ader interna-
~,~~ti~~ii~cr c~~rria~e, specifically, tional economic cooperation re-
Iuuritits, ne~ir the coasts oE Sicily mained invariable as a principl-
~ii~~~ C'~~~~ri. Also won rr;cognition .,d cuurse in international eco-
Suvicl-maclc UAZ. cross-country nomic refations retlecting the
minil~~iscs which tht Italian team purposefulness of the Soviet for-
~isccl in auto-rally on African eizn p~licy for the maintenance
~�c,acis. On tli~: wh~l~, however, it ~F peace and the development of
i~~~~clti ,aying that Suviet ae- cietente and mutual understand-
~iy~�ri~s ~~I' rna~hines and equ~p- ~n~ among nations.
ic, Italv arc far from being The Soviet state regards coop-
~�xhauslivc uf thc cxport puten- eration with industrial capitalist
ti:ili~icti ~~f thc: S~vict cngincering ~QUntries as a factor stabilizing
in~.l~istrv, ancl ul~ th~ nc:eds of thc
I tali~u~ crc~nc~my. 'Tht p?�~blem
~ was discuss~cl al all mcclings oC
thc Jc~int C~mmission. It was
~li�csscd that the existing situa-
tiuii was nut c~nsistent with the ~ f:~~rupru. Nu. 26, 24 ~iugnu, 19R0.
i~i�~~~ii~_clay Icvel and character oE
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,
~ ;i,I~rnaticmal relatiuns. There-
~ I~,r~, it stands for lhe develop-
! nic.nt c,f thcsc r~latiuns on the
; ha>,i~ uf ~qu~?lity and mutual be-
; ui~i i l . '
~ Itcrrnti,y a b~~k, Levnid Ilych
~ hr~,;l~irc.~,, ~ct~c~s of Li/c~ has been
nuhiitihccl in Italy. Addressing the
~ 1,i~i;?n rcader L.l. Brezhnev says:
I hclicvc that the Soviet Union
ancl I ~aiV can go far along the road
' c,l~ cuup: i aliun-p~litical, econo-
- mir and cultural. Much has been . .
~ cl~,nc 1,~~ hc,th sides towards ~
acl~icvin~ this aim.... Following ,
il,~~ ~,c,lic�~~ u(' detente and raising
~h~,ir rcu~pcration higher from
' ~?nc sta~c tc~ another our coun-
t,�ics can make ar. important ~
cuntrihutiun tu a healthier poli-
; ~i~al climatc in the Mediterra-
_i
- nc-an, c,n thc Eur~pean continent
~ ,incl thrc~u~hout the world.
~ "'1'hc Suviet Union comes out
ii,cri~ ~clinitclv Co; such a rela- ~
~ ic,nship with the Republic of
I~~ilv.� `
Thcrc arc all prerequisites for
~�csntinu~~cl fruitful economic and
in~luslrial cu~peration between
tl,r tiu~~ict Union and Italy in the
~~Icv~r~th (ivc-year-plan period.
' ~ I'r~~~~cln. M.u�ch 28, 1981.
GOPYRIGIIT: "Vneshnyaya torgovlya" 1982, English translation "Foreign Trade", 1982
CSO: 3120/66
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~ I:CI)NUM.[C SPAIN
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~ E'AC'PURS RESPONSIBLE FOR CURRENCY DEVALUATION LISTED
~ Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17 May 82 pP 56-59
~ [Text] You do not hava to be one of the oldest in the place to remember when
~ you could get a dollar for a duro. The last civil war began with this ex-
change rate. Since then, theirs has proliferated and the poor peseta which
~ inflation has left at less than half its value in 5 years has given up ground
~ in its international value. Today you have to pay a duro and 100 pesetas for
each dollar.
! '1'he drop in the peseta, although slowed in recent days, is a one-way street.
'I'he present rate cannot be su.stained for long. In recent w~eeks, there has
been unmerciful speculation on the peseta, aided by a plethoric strong dollar.
~ If tourism and the Warld Games do not remedy i~, in a matter of months the
~ fi~;ure of 120 pesetas per dollar might be reached.
"Tf w~e consider the lack. of productivity, in the Spanish economy, the most fair
exchan~;e rate would be around 120 peSetas," indicated EY~riq4ze Kaibel, chair-
man of the Foreign 'IY~ade Cot~ai.ttee of the CEOE ~.Spanish Confederation of Business
' Ur~;anizations].. Sources in the ship construction sector., one of the productive
; ~~ctivities most involved abroad; agree with this figure.
~
i ln his opinion, the artificial exchange rate fcr our currency~cannot be sus-
Lained ~nuch la~;er. "Not only is it desirable.that it go down but it is per-
~ t'ectly predictable in view of the real situation,of the Spanish econany."
ts'nriyue Kaibel added: "If there were no type of control like in the United
States where y.ou can fill a briefcase with dollars and leave freely, the pe-
seta wnuld go doHm to at least 150 per dollar." ~
' 'I't~e widespread nature of opinions like this have led to speculation on the.
pf~seta which is almQSt impossible to avoid. In the first 4 months of 1982,
i ~ t;t~e ['oreign currency reserves lost about $1.4 billion alone. Coclcretely, in
' March ~800 million went out.
i
; ln December 1981., there was a decision to stop the stubbarn fall in reserves,
:~aluin~ bold ab market prices although its sale is unthinkable. In this way,
~ t:t,~e :~~11.878 billion that were a~ccounted for in Nwember rose to $15.337 bi1-
~ li~>n a cnonth later. In April, w~e are again at $13.730 billion. .
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11t. t.k~; I~~,nk :;N:~.in, movements concPrnir~; the peseta are planned without any
ccxx;ern. 13ank saarces indicated: "TY~ balance of payments is one of the most
~~o~itive aspects of the Spanish econany. The deficit is much better than we
exE~ected, exports have pleasantly surprised us, imports continue in modera-
ticm, tourism is ~oing stupendously well and expectatians are even better. We
are n~t at all concerned."
~cc~~r~ding to these sources, the surprise in March and the fall in reserves have
thei.r origin in the bi.g drop in foreign credits recorded that month. Spanish
enter~rises have gone faithfully to the international markets in search of
I'ir~ancin~; but, in the first few months of 1982, they preferred to stay at home
because credits are in liquidation here due to high foreign interests rates
~ ~nd, especially, the risk of having to repay the ~~~lar credits with pesetas
whicYi are continually devalued. This business retreat was iurnediately made
~a~ for by the state which has comnitted itself to go out at its ot~a1 risk in
search of the foreign capital that the enterprises consider too o~erous. In-
Lernational credit to the Kingdan of Spain totalin~ $450 m~llion is part of
t;his n~w policy.
Wt1at hurts the present exchange rate of the peseta? Spanish exporters them-
~~~lves, interested in the situation continuing to deteriorate, are the first
t.c> contribute their little grain of sand. The traditional mechanism is to
" r~etain paynnent for their exports abroad. If the peseta devaluates, the longer
Lhey wait Lo repatriate the dollars, the more pesetas they will receive in
exc h~.u~;e .
'I'hia ~~ra~:tice was faithfully reflected in 1978. When the exchange rate of
Lhe peseta "normalized" after Flxentes Quintana's devaluation, entrance of
c.apital totaled 130 billion pesetas. In 1981, in spite of the strong in-
crease in foreign trade, revenue only reached 40 billion. In the opinion of
the experts, this deinonstrates the strong retention carried out by Spanish ex-
porters at this time. According to some estimates, the amount awaiting the
collapse of the peseta in order to return to Spain is about 200 billion.
I~;rir~ i qu~ Kaibel stated: "I think this fi.gure is low." He added: "It is ne-
c:essary to keep in m~nd that Spanish exports appi^oach 2 trillion pesetas
which would mean only 10 percent is pending return to Spain."
A~~ ~iuttiorized spokesman of the Bank of Spain was skeptical and stated that, if
Lr~ue, wc wvuld be in good shape. "I would be very satisfied if it were in our
ti.u~~is to recover these 2 billion whenever we wanted."
tlc~ said: "If we had this figure pending return to Spain, it would mean that
w~� c.iu noL have aciy problein with the balance of payments. It would be only a
~~robl.em of speculation. If only this were true, I would sign right now."
I;uL the peseta is not only affected by the speculatiai of the exporters. The
icnE~orters, the most harmed by the devaluation of the peseta, also contribute
t.heir~ ~;rain of sand by anticipating their purchases and paying as soon as
~ ~o:~si ble . ~
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` I~ol.itical uncertainty also supports speculation. The deterioration of the
~ i~na;e of the l1CU [Democratic Center Union] and the possibility of its decom-
i~~ it i un as a re:;ult of the caning elections to ths Andalusian Parliament
. .a1~c~ ccxitribute to the fragility of the peseta at a time when it is bei.ng
de~nonstrated with sta~istics that it can compete in all the markets.
; F;x(~c~rLirlt; "Boom~~
! 'i'hi.s ability Lo compete in spite of the groans of the exporters is an unques-
~ t.i.onablc: reality. Exports in Felruary surpassed those in January by 40 per-
c~;rit and those in February 1981 by 57 percent. Luis Linde, technical secre-
~ Lary ~;eneral of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce, indicated: "Foreign
; 1.rade: is~;rowinf; about 13 percent a year in real terms, precisely at a time
i ~~f' :~cant g~owth in wcrld trade. This ~rowth is so strong that it is impos-
{ .sible to maintain it."
~ f~:nrique Kaibel, forei.~n trade official in the CEOE, recognized that it is still
' E~~ssible to canpete today with the dollar at 105 pesetas but he said that the
~ s.ituation is unsustainable. "We have an inflatian rate of 7 or 8 points more
+ thar~ our competitors; the peseta will have to be devaluated. Also if we want
t,o l~.beralize the economy, we would have to begin by libe,ralizi.ng the exchange
r. ~te of the peseta."
,
~ In c.he Uen~ral conspiracy on the peseta--in which the interests of the export-
~ ers, the political situation, tY~ internal economic deterioration, the
~ :~trer~;th of tt~e dollar and inflation play a part--the behavior of the FY~ench
' l'r~~nc also participates. The collapse qf the ~ench currency will have a
I c~c~ta~ious effect an the peseta for two reasans: historically the peseta has
lxen s~alxnissive to the franc; and the problems that afflict the franc today
; shc~w what could happen with a socialist gwexnemnt in Spai.n.
In the ~nidst of the storm, the gavernment and tt:e Bank of Spain remain calm.
' l t is a~;ood indica'tion althaugh perhaps the situztion has just werwhelmed
Lhetn. Not even the fact that Spain's forei.gn debt-�-$25 billion--doubles the
( rc~erves seems to upset them. They said at the Bank of Spain: "We do not
~ h~.~ve nor will we have any clifficulty getting financing in the international
~ ~nr.~rket in the comin~ years. We are not the United States or Switzerland but
~ wc