CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SENIOR RESEARCH STAFF ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100290001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL- INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Comrnunisrn
Transmitted herewith are summary notes on a sym-
posiurn on Sino-Soviet relations, held in Washington 26 March
1959. The symposium was intended t4 bring..-together a small
group of government and academic experts. for a free and in-
formal discussion of the topic. It was. not-originally intended
that the discussion be reported, but in view of _the variety of
opinions and interest which it developed, it was decided to
transcribe the notes which one of the participants had taken.
These may not be strictly accurate at all points, but in general
they reflect the tenor of the discussion,
10 April 1959
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CON AL
~1ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ,AGENCY
Senior Research. Staff on International Communism
Symposium on Sino-Soviet Relations - 26 March 1959
List of Participants:
Guests -Government
25X1A9a
1. The present status of Sino-Soviet relations:
a. What frictions exist? How serious are they?
b. Specifically, are there territorial difficul-
ties, differences of apinion on ideological interpreta-
tion, Communist methodology, and foreign-policy?
c. Can we assume that ideological bonds and
community of interests are keeping the Sino-Soviet
alliance firm. or is there any reason to believe that
the two F~:ed Giants. are moving apart?
C ONFI
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opened the discussion with the proposition
that the frictions which exist in Sina-Soviet relations are less
serious than. the ties of ideology and common interests which
bind the two leading Communist powers. He stressed the
general rationality which governs. the -actions and decisions
of the Communist leadership on both. sides .and the firm deter-
mination to prevent any sources of friction from disrupting
e s s e nt~g~~Y 15~1r.
felt that November 1952 xr.~arked the end of
""polycentrism`" in International Communism .and the return
to the r'monolith. r" In part, this was the result of the Soviet
technological. breakthrough symbolized in the. first Sputnik.
.A_s a result, the Communists became more than ever as-
sertive on the theme of a "decisive-shift" in the world power
balance. The Chinese Communists appear to have been par
ocularly convinced of the reality of this shift and have emerged
as the primary spokesmen of the monolith. The question for
the Communists was how to operate from this altered balance
of strength. The Chicam position stresses: the use of aggres-
sive means, but this tataic has not been fully acceptable to the
Soviet Union and the atellites. The Yugoslavs have expressed
doubt as to the reala.ty of the power shift and have advocated a
policy of prudent conciliation. It is possible that there has
recently been some diminution in the general Communist con-
viction of the completeness of the shift, which is now regard-
ed as still in process. The resulting conclusion seems to be
that Communist strategy should combine aggressive and can
ciliato~x~tl~~~.,~s in some measure of balance.
pointed out that frictions. always bulk large
in relations among allied or closely affiliated .nations. He
noted, however, that the forces uniting China and. the- Soviet
Union. outweigh the elements of discord. China is not in a
position to dispense with Soviet aid at this time, although this
situation might change in the future. In the meantime, Tito
may be a blessing in disguise to the Orbit by forcing the Soviet
Union to try to prevent China. from following his example too
closely.
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25X1A9a
dissented from the Tito analogy, suggesting
that.. Yugos av a is penned in geographically .and -could not
expand, whereas China obviously could expand and therefore
has va25X1A5a1 ter flexibility of policy.
stresse-d -the relative
weakness. of China compared with the 5aviet j,Jnian and sug-
gested that further.technalogical breakthrough. on the part of
the lat~~Xr1A~~lht-wider the power gap. between the two.
reverted to his thesis that both sides must
play down.-their differences and- try hard to avoid. friction.
He raised the question whether recognition. of Communist
China. by the tJS might hasre a divisive effect. He doubted
that this was the case, since he felt that the US h.ad nothing
to offer China comparable to-the buildup which the Soviet
Union is providing. Thus, we could-give sornethin.g of value
to China only on the basis of actual concessi.an, whereas the
USSR can be o~5~x1~~'la.ssistance while following its own natur-
al interests. -said that the USSR would back up China
if it were attacked, but raised the question what Soviet policy
would be if China became involved in hostilities. aver a country
in its sphere of pximary influence such as Taos.
25X1A9a
-pointed out that friction would exist as a re=
cult of the superior international status of the Soviet Union;
thus in the eYent of a summit parley China would be excluded
from basic decisions such as cessation of nucleax testing
and disarmament, He raised the question whether the Chinese
Communists have subscribed to the XX Forty Congress doc-
trine of the non-inevitability of war. -said that China
still recognizes the weakness- of its. position and is willing to
let the Soviet Union play the dominant role in international
affairs for the time being.
25X1A9a
sugge.ste el that it is possible to ove r-
emphasize- the influence of one Communist state on another
and cited the role of Ho Chi-minh, who. has been rather mare
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belligerent than .thee Chicoms., The fact that .fallout fry-m
Soviet nuclear tests has d~;gcended on China may not be with-
out future- significance. ~hrushchev has only endorsed the
Chicom posa.tion on Taiwan. twice and has not shcawn signs. of
going along on all points, .including the obvious Chinese desire
far nuclear weapons. There may also- be ten:sioxis of a more
intangible nature growing out of differences .of ideological
pattern. Chinese Communism has shown signs of depreciat-
ing technology and even. an ''anti-eggheadt' dispasi.tion. (con-
ducting vast projects v~ith "millions of teaspoons"~. The
early stage of the "communeF' movement clearly carried an
implicit claim that China was "building Gommunismr' and it
vas not until Ambassador Yudin's speech in November that
the Ch~~~5~v,~ere forced to back down somewhat.
suggested that the role of i~l,eolo ical clashes
within nternational Qommunism is confu-sing_an~~~~~.r and
mayt~~~ the cover for factional infighting.
and -repeated that the. divisive impact off:"Friction was
probably not serious and in any case the efforts- of the leaders
were concentrated. on re~.ucing .t. These tensions. are not
''forces of nature"which-are bound by their inner nature to
increase, In any case the preponderant weight still remains
on the ~~Xv~~~a ide.
felt that the Chinese fanfare- on the communes
and the c aims of ''vanguard'' action must have- been. displeas~
ing to the Soviet leadership.. Both sides. have united in sup
pre s-sing rivalry, although there may have been an emotional
trauma of wounded Chinese pride exacerbated by the Quemoy
setback.
25X1A5a1
-;agan_ stresseel .t#~e a~ationality of-.the Chinese
Communist leaders and insisted that pride was a minor factor
in their behavior.
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CC?1V
TIAL
~.
The nature of r:elatic~ns between leaders. and
parties.;
-Mao?
a..
b.
How- firm is the control of Khrush.ehev and
What would be .the effects on the alliance of
a change of guard: in either Moscow .ox- Peking?
c. What is .the nature of reLat3ons between the
CPSLT-and the CCP, and how close are the channels
of communication? Would Peking take part in an inter-
national .Communist organization. of formal or informal
character
d. What is the outlook for.-the Soviet -and the
Chinese 'rmodelr' in influencing the development of
non-Communist Asian countries.? How much will the
Eastern. European. satellites. be influenced by a strong
2lA~a~ ~
felt that Mp.o's control was. firmer than. that
of Khrushchev. Since .the elites. on both sides must be regard-
ed as rational, a change of guard would not affect basic co~
operation. With respect to the role of the-tom .C~rmmunist
parties, he felt that the Chinese was probably-more .meaning-
ful. as a "model''- in Asia. In the case of -the Japanese CP,
strategy is still determined by the CPSU, but. China. is play-
ing an~rA~s~ing role.
was of the opinion that the satellites: in vary-
ing degree have been impressed by China'y~ economic boldness
in experimentation, and by the rates. of growth which have been
achieved and projected. Although .the CPSU h.as adopted a luke-
warm. attitude toward some of Cha:na's extreme claims, it may
have been needled by them into the sharply .advanced goals
proclaimed at the .XXI Congress. The Bloc may also have
been impressed by a novel Chicom thesis: :that the ''social
awareness" of the people can generate a quantitative change
in production, At any rate Khrushchev has declared
that "Communist constructions' has entered a third ~?expanded"
:stage .
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T
.l ~w.+lY' ~~~~
referred to a human factor in the impact of
China. on the satellites: The creation of an image of a big
orthodox Communist powe2r`~1~ cannot be pushed around
-even by the. Soviet Union. -also noted that the Chinese
deviation from the Soviet model was influential in the satel-
lites and was perhaps helpful in relieving them. from direct
S~oyiet.pressures. Thus China provided a so~~~~~al-
id:eological support against the Soviet Union. - quer~
i:ed whether this impact might lie in a contrast of Chicorn
extremist solutions. with Soviet gradualism.
25X1A5a1
turning to the ''model" .influence in Asia,
sugge-seed .that no.n-Communist state. governments- of that area
may find the Chinese example more feasible anal suitable to
their conditions, especially in the labor intensive approach.
to economic development. India. has. a different ideology and
is perhaps xno.re_ attracted to the Soviet example . In the case
of Indonesia, the perio:zl of Moscow influence, especially
from 1945 t? 1948, had been disastrous.. Since the ~liadiun
fiasco Chinese CP influence- has been strong an the PKt, al-
though remaining in the background. Thus- .the Indonesian
cadres avoid direct reference to China. and -stress the Soviet
Union in their more open utterances but in the higher echelons
and behind the scenes. Chinese influence is probably stranger.
The Chinese have taught the virtue of isolating smaller social
elements and forces in order to concentrate their vs,~rk against
the enemy. Maoism has taught the PKI the virtues of patienbe
and .long-term. action.
25X1A9a
distinguished between. the influence of a
"model" on parties- and on countries .n general. There are
both inside and outside. channels through which influence is
transmitted and there is a strong irrational element among
the new countries. xeaching out for the beat and more advanced
forms which in this case 'vuould be provided by the Soviet model.
PAUKER contrasted this latter tendency with the practical
attempt to reach for that which is accessible- and meaningful
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in local terms - in this case the Chinese model. He felt that
the explosive development of the communes may have created
an element of terror by its sheer magnitude and by the strong
211derance of military factors in their development.
added that in any case the Asian CP's were car e-
ful to emphasize, as was done in the USSR, that the communes
are app~rA~te only to specific Chine se..conditions.
- turning to the problem of international organ
iz-anon for the Communist movement, suggested that lUloscow
may be uneasy on this score. It is possible that the Chinese
are more eager to set u ~~r~ainstitutional form-to coordin~
ate or control the Bloc. mentioned-the role of the
Commonwealth or sodruzhestvo concept as a framework for
a loose organization of the socialist system and
pointed out that the Chinese had played a consid o e m
developing it, especially from the end of 1956. -felt
that the USSR might prefer to stress bilateral relations and
give up centralizing institutions somewhat as we gave up
U1VRF2.A5X1A5a1
raised a number of questions concerning the
role o CEMA: L?oes the USSR. really control it tightly and is
it pushing it vigorously at this time? Why does Communi~~X1A9a
China not play a closer role in the organization?
suggested that CEI~iA has. in fact grown firmer since 1957.
thought that Khrushchev 1~~~noving-to increase
e integration of the movement bu quoted Moore-
stene (RANI? Corporation) to the effect that- the Soviet Union
is not ~~.1#~~'ka.shing economic integration seriously in the
Bloc. - suggested a broader term to the discussion
of Soviet-Chinese relationships by referring therm to the con-
sequence of possible Free World actions- and it was agreed
that this topic would be brought up and discussed more fully
(see below, Question 4).
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C TIA L
3. The future status of Sino-Soviet relations:
a. Which of the above mentioned possible points.
of friction could produce long-range. "antagonistic
contradictions "?
b. How will Sino-Soviet relations. be-.affected if
and when China becomes sufficiently industrialized to
dispense with Soviet aid and if the communes turn out
to be a success?
c. Will there be a serious competition between
the two Communist countries over Asia, specifically
Japan, .South and Southeast Asian countries? Is a
division into- spheres of interest likely, with, for
example, the USSR remaining "interested" in Europe
and the Middle East and Communist China in the Asian
areas? Could there be a clash over such countries in
India or Indonesia?
d. How seriously is the USSR likely to. be con-
cerned with China's expanding population and could. a
population "explosion'' lead to serious friction along
the Chinese fringe areas?
e. Generally, what are the indications of either
deteriorating, static ar improving Sino-Soviet rela-
tions? Could there develop, in some decades, a veri~
tablq,'merger of the two countries, forming one gigantic
Communist area. embracing nationalities rather than
nation states
25X1A5a1
opened the diacussian of Question 3 on the
subject (d) of the poppulation "explosion. ~' He cited numerous.
statements by the Soviets indicating that they are not afraid
of population increase er se but he questioned whether they
are sincere on this point and whether they would not be in-
clined to recommend birth control for China,
add- 25X1A9a
ed that Khrushchev, when he is needled an the subject of Mal.-
thusianism, comes out in favor of the orthodox Marxist view.
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-broadened the point in discussion to consider
whether' the areas of possible expansion fox~both the Soviet
T,7nion and China are climatically suitable. ~1s abroad ~?sner~
alization he .stated that industrialized countries can out balance
agricultural and non technological soc~e.ties. The decisive
point- may be weapons superiority and, since the USSR holds
this, a population 'explosion'' in Ghina would not Mead to danger
ous f ri~~~1A`5a1
- suggested that there might. be joint. Sino-Soviet
approaches to thin or unsettled areas in which .China. might pro-
vide the manpowex for extensive b~.~~. H.e cited the Arnur
Valley project in -this connection, -stated that China
in any case could .absorb a large population incxease within its
present borders. believed that the. Chinese are rnoti~
vated by the desire to seta a the entire Manchu em ire, some
of which had been seized under the Czars, referred 25X1A9a
to the insufficiency of our knowledge- concerning the basis of
demographic fluctuations and suggested that just as we had.
under-estimated the future of world pop~~iiai~n the 1930's,
so we may be over-estimating it today, was con
vinc~:d that in any case Khrushchev was not a rax of the pop-
ulation. r'expplosiori'' in China f?r the near future.
25X1A9a
-raised the broader question how fast China
will move in its. attempt to catch up with the more advanced
countries and suggested that this process might be very rapid.
Even Kh~rushchev admits that China may eventually catch up
with the Soviet Union, though without indicating how soon. A
decisive point will be whether the Chinese can obtain or manu-
facture~~~~ac~wn nuclear weapons.
discussing the role of faml.ly tradition in
China, suggested that one consequence of the communes may
be to cut. down. on the number of children. He referred to
lvlao's "covert'` continuation of the process of emancipating
women, Turning to the question where Chin. could expand
under population pressure, he cited the relative openness of
Burma and Thailand.
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25X1A5a1 the broader topics suggested under Question 3,
queried whether our policies need to be restricted
to a opposites of conciliation or hostility. I3e suggested it
might be possible to create situations of strength. in which
lever ~~~.~, be applied to bath parties of the Sino-Soviet
--
u.uu. riLLGL1IC-r ~~~ I.a.cL we can
manlathe policy of the Soviet Univn at all. In this connec-
25X1A9a
future of the traditional nation states in the eyes~of the~Com-
munists. -was skeptical of any potential for creating a
common brotherhood of man under Communism or any other
25X1A9a system. countered thaw while these are long range
thoughts, we must try to liberate ourselves from the pattern
of nineteenth century thinking in terms of power politics and
national self-interest if we wish to acquire a correct view of
Communist political reasoning. We must deepen, our study of
Marxist-Leninist ideology and its impact on Communist poli-
cies and intentions; only if we do this can we produce sound
analys~~da~easonably accurate forecasts.
repeated his view :that .the effort of the two
Communist partners to minimize. their areas. of friction had
been fairly successful -witness the issues of a. summit meet-
25X1A9a ing' the communes and Quemoy in 1958. However it cannot
be denied that there remain considerable areas of potential
friction for the future. -felt that no reall severe test
on the stability of th.e axis had occurred sa far. add
ed ~h.at progressive curtailment of Soviet freedom o action as
Chinese power grows. may ind,zxce increasing frustration on the
part of the farmer. The ultimate result may be some .sort of
balance of power within the orbit itself.
25X1A9a
save no direct way -to weaken the solidarity of
the axis. an e t that. it was necessary to try to frustrate
Chinese expansion by a policy of containment, emphasizing
. Southeast ..Asia.
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suggested that as the Soviet Union develops
further in. strength it may be increasingly unwilling to share
the risks which Communist China incurs. He felt-that rather
than any merger or integration of the two .nations. within. the
Bloc there .might be same. new organizational. structure bring=~
ing the Gl'Ps closer together. There might also develop seri-
ous. power struggles within the: parties. -added that 25X1A9a
Khrushchev's personality may trouble. the Chinese Communists
as much as us,. He might be willing to conclude. agreements at
a summit conference which it would be feasible fox us to accept
and which might have a divisive effect. an his relations with Mao.
2~~i1~a~~: to other possibilities for positive action on our
part, ~sugges_ted that we Yn.1, ht o .along-v4rith a de~
nuclearization with the Far East, added that it might 25X1A9a
be possible to influence trade patterns. ~.n such a way as to
25X1A9a syphon. from the Soviet Union economic goads which the Chinese
require. suggested that a general regional program
of containment o# China in Southeast Asia was urgently required.
(At thin point it was agreed. that the tenor of the discus
sign required a fourth .question not originally placed on
the Agenda, namely what the US and the West can da
wit~~~~~~.Ft to ,Sing-Soviet relations.
4. -.felt it essential that we consider very big
possibilities in this field. As an example, he suggested that
we xz~:ight agree to concede the 1JSSR a. ma,~ar sphere of influ-
ence in the Diddle East as a price- fo.r assistance in the con-
tainment of China. He cited the continuing influence of World
-War Ir strategy on US policy, namely the primacy of the Euro-
pean theater of war -aver Asia. We might find it necessary to
reverse this. priority now- anal. put Asia. first. It might indeed
be possible to break up the Chinese-Soviet alliance if we were
willing to make massive sacrifices in. Europe and the Middle
East .
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- raised the query how such massive actions
could be possible within. a democratic framewo.rle? The prob-
lem. of Communism aftex all is .not one of power politics. but
of. ideology. S1V~e are confronted by a pow~~~~~~ianding
religion .and the. outlook i:s very sornber? -,speculated
-that 9f the Sov3.et L7nion were to enter fully .the ranks. of the
'~rhave'' nations their attitude toward China might change sub~~
stanti~~'1?A5a 1
returned to his contention that even ''fantastic'
schemes shcauld not be dismissed. We must do something to
pxomote a deterioration of Sing-Soviet relations. I3e suggested
the problem be broken. down: (1) domestic situations of the
individual countries, e, g. the communes, in China; (2) foreign.
policy interests peculiar to one of the two.countries but. not to
both, e. g. Berlin or Quemoy; (3) issues of interest to both
countries. He suggested that the foreign policy curves under
th,.ese two categories. -would not run parallel and would ]:cad to
differ~,~rlses of action.
addre-sled himself to the question how we
could speed up an ideological weakening of Communist ties
and suggested .that in broad terms we must concentrate on
~~~ the dis.crepaney between ideology and. reality.
queried whethe-r time would in fact weaken this
religion, especially in the case of Ghina which he feels is
.still in a stage of first .generatio~i5~1Ai~~~lution, whereas: the
USSR has gone on to the second. repeated his. con=
viction that. ideological change can be brought about by policy
processes and t~i.~.~ai~.iust make every effort to find out how
to speed them, felt, however,. that :such change
could. be brought about only by some form. of economic dis-
aster:.
25X1A9a
thought that if Khrushchev were successful in
the pending negotiations at .Geneva in consolidating his Euro-
pean empire his dependence on Chinese support might u~+eaken.
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