SPECIAL REPORT ON THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003000040002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 14, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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DATE `?`Iy -=
COPY NO.
OPERATIONS COORDINATING. BOARD
NSG,REVIEW
COMPLETED,
10/3t/03
Washington, D.
SPEQAL REPORT ON THAILAND
REFERENCE; M8 J4,? an
cta.on o 1106e
OCB FILE NO. 41
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This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 28, Sec-
tions 793 and 794. U.S.C., the transmission or revelations of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
September 29, 1954
MEMORANDUM TO THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
SUBJECT: Special Report on Thailand (NSC 5405)
and the International Volunteer Air Group
(MC Action No, 1106e)
The attached Operations Coordinating Board "Special Report
on Thailand" dated July 15, 1954 was circulated to the National
Security Council by memorandum dated July 19, 1954 from the Astir;
Executive Secretary, NSC, This report was used by the NSC as a
basis for discussion in connection with Council consideration of
the "Review of U.S. Policy in the Par East" (now NSC 5429/2) on
August 12 and August 18, 1954, Action Nos. 1204 and 1206 respectively.
The NSC at the August 18 1954 meeting adopted the recommendations
of the Operations Coordinating Board contained in the attached report,
and agreed that the plan for an International Volunteer` Air Group
be held for possible future use not only in Southeast Asia but in any
part of the world where required (NSC Action No. 1206g).
The previous draft of this report dated July 12, 1954, is
obsolete and may be destroyed in accordance with the security regula-
tions of your agency.
Amer B. Staats
Executive Officer
1, Memo to Executive Secretary, NSC,
from Executive Officer, OCB, dated
July 15, 1954, Subject "Special
Report on Thailand" with Tabs 1, 2,
and. 3.
OCB File No. 41
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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD.
Washington 25,~ D. C.
iu]y 15, 1954
MEMORANDUM FORt Mr. James S: Lay, Jr1
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
SUBJECT t Special Report oz! Thailand'
REF'ERENCEt NSC 5405 (approved by the President and referred to 0CB
as coordinating agency on January 16, 1954), especially
paragraphs 44, 45 and l6. NSC Action Nos. 1011, 1019a.,
1066, and 11+06..
1. NSC 5105 includes a statement of U.S. policy "to conduct
military, economic and technical asst tance programs streigther:
cultural and propaganda programs in South-
east Asia* The policy also req a e e whatever
measures, including increased aid to Thailand, may be determiner) as
feasible to forestall an invasion of Thailand or a seizure of power
by local Thai Communists", "it a serious deterioration of the situa-
tion in either Indochina or Burma appears imminent",
2. In response to this policy requirement, the U.S. Government
has now committed or is considering military and economic aid to
the Thais designed to effect the following:
.A. The construction of the Saraburi-Ban That highway,.
kb The improvement of certain air navigation facilities
in Thailand and the improvement and construction of air base
facilities therein.
c. The inclusion of substantially the entire present
Thai army strength under MAP for the purpose of creating a
reinforced corps of three divisions plus an additional
independent division and support arms.
Aid and training in the development of an improved.
Vo1tui eer Defense Corps.
29 Certain assistance to the operating costs and improve-
ment of the Thai Navy.
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3r, In addition to the above programs, the Thai military clef
gation has indicated its desire for increased economic assistance
on the basis that Thailand's economy cannot support a substantial
enlargement of the armed forces without such assistance, particularly
in the absence of expanded markets for Thai exports..
4. These actions clearly fall within the existing policy as
stated in NSC 5405 and may be expected to have a salutary psycho-
logical effect in Thailand. Certainly they will contribute to the
belief of the Thais that their future lies in orientation with the
free world.
5. From a strategic point of view, however, these actions do
not and cannot produce an effective military force in Thailand
capable of withstanding the pressures which might be imposed by
Chinese Communist intervention or by Chinese Communist support of
Southeast Asian Communist aggressors in the Associated States.
69 Furthermore, the present limits on the program are derived
not only from the military infeasibility of developing Thailand as
a bastion in Southeast Asia by the foregoing means, but are also
limited by other U.S. world-wide commitments which under present
policy limit the diversion of more substantial funds or allied
military forces to the area.
7. It should also be noted that Thailand's budgetary and
foreign exchange position has continued to deteriorate as a result
of the decline in the value and volume of Thai exports, partioulsr%y
rice,. Although effective implementation of remedial measures by
the Thai Government could significantly improve Thailand's financial
position, the likelihood of the need for budgetary support from the
U,S, must be considered in connection with any programs which would
require large additional expenditures by the Thai Government in
the current years.
8,. The OCB, therefore, recommends that the Natioaial Security
Council review the existing policy with respect to NSC 5405 with
particular reference to Thailand in light of these considerations:
as Presently feasible programs consistent with existing
policy will not serve to "guaranteeft the defensibility of
Thailand or the remainder of Southeast Asia in the event that
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a political partition of Viet Nam and the effective
neutralization of Laos and Cambodia become a fact.
I. Within existing: policy even the diversion of
supplementary assistance beyond that presently contemplated
would appear to require a policy affirmation of the priority
which is to be assigned to Thailand as distinguished from
other U.S. world-wide strategic commitments.
;g. Policy affirmation would appear to be required to the
entent of a U.S. or U.S.-allied effort to hold Thailand against
every threat, recognizing that this effort may require the
direct utilization of forces other than those which can be
generated in Thailand alone.
9. 0 The ttefltion of Ohl a NSC is, also. jnited to the problem of
an International Volunteer Air Group, whi'dh is somewhat separate
from, but related to the questions raised above. In response to
the NSC requirement formulated in connedtion with IVAG at its 195th
Meeting on )'t 6, 1954 (NSC Action No. 11068), the OCB submits the
plan attached as Tab 3 and recommends:
?; That the plan be held for possible future use not only
in Southeast Asia but in any part of the world where required-.
b. That the National Security Council consider the formation
of an International Volunteer Air Group for utilization in
Southeast Asia in light of the requirements therefor which might
emerge from the context of the overall policy requirements in
the area when formulated.
10. A more detailed treatment of the problems outlined abdlr. is
contained in the attachments consisting aft
Tab 1. Spec Renort to the. N ti oral Security. Ccuncii
Tab 2. AnneZ to Sneoi r, to the Nation Security ..Coe 'x i1
Tab 3. DRAFT - Memorandum for the Operations Coordinating
Board, An International Volunteer Air Group, dated
7 July 1954, attaching Appendix - Detailed Organize--
tionend Cost Estimate of NAG.
"-Elmer B. Staats
Executive ( !`-ficer
Attachments :
As listed above in para. 10.
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SPECIAL REPORT TO THE 44I SECURITY CC
i~EC-.5hO5~ paragraphs 44 and 45 read:
"Continue to assist the Government of Thailand in creating eondtti.or
of internal security, in becoming a stablizing force in Southeast Asia,
in better withstanding communist pressures in the area, and in maintain-
ing its alignment with the free world; and, as appropriate to support
these ends, conduct military, economic and technical assistance programs,
and strengthen cultural and propaganda programs
Ulf a serious deterioration of the situation in either Indochina or
Burma appears imminent, take whatever measures, including increased aid
to Thailand, may be determined as. feasible to forestall an invasion "f
Thailand or a seizure of power by local Thai Communists."
Under the foregoing policy directive a number of diverse projeo's
involving military and economic assistance, as described in PSB D-23
(Thailand) were either carried out or initiated. In addition, certain
projects initiated by Ambassador Donovan, which were in conformity with
the above policy, were launched.. The MAAG was strengthened and trans-
formed into JUSMAAG, The scale and nature of the assistance was planned
in relation to the problem of enabling the Thai Government and people to
maintain internal peace and security in the midst of nations disturbed
by Communism, Thailand not yet being under direct attack and the adjacent
areas not yet lost to the forces of Communism.
Among the projects recently launched or'approved were the enlarge-
ment of the training facilities for the military, the provision of air
operational equipment and the construction of the Saraburi-Ban Phai High-
way connecting the central plains highway system with that of the north-
eastern plateau..
Military developments in the Indochina area and negotiations at
Geneva have punctuated the transition from Phase I of PSB-23 to one
approaching Phase II ih ich visualized the loss of Indochina to the Cem-
munists,.
A twelve-man military mission headed by the Commanding General of
the Thai Armies, General Srisdi, assisted by the Thai Chief of Defense
Staff General Jira Vichit, arrived in Washington July 1 for discussions
with.the Department of Defense. The Chief of JUSMAAG, General Gilbrore,
accompanied the mission. Shortly before the mission departed from
Bangkok the Thai Goverment presented far reaching requests for the ex-
pansion and diversification of the Thai military services which would
involve very substantial sums of money, the totals of which have not yet
been ascertained. The Thai Ambassador,.Pote Sarasin,.has mentioned a
round sum of $100 million. Some indication of the extent of the requests
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TAB i
is Shown by the following items which were under discussion before the
arrival of the Thai Military missions
1. The development of an air base in northeastern Thailand at Kort,
at the terminus of the proposed Saraburi-Ban Phai higrs and possibly
the deploying of a U. S? fighter wing on a TD! basis. The development f
such an air base and the presence of a U. S. fighter wing would be both
an element in the containment of Communism and a threat of massive retali-
ation if Communist Chinese forces moved south.
2. The effective development of present MDAP forces in Thailand,
together with certain non-MDAP units to an approximate equivalent of foar
U.. S. divisions,, should be carried out. The total cost of this program is
estimated at $52.3 million of which about $1.6 million would be used in
the first year for expanded officer training.
3. The augmentation of the Thai armed forces by seven additional
light infantry divisions with a minimum of motor transport and electronic
equipment and a maximum of automatic weapons and mortars should be planned
and carried out. There is no estimated total cost available but it woi1d
be much cheaper per division than equivalent 17. S. divisions.
4. The development and training of a militia or volunteer Henn Ckrd
force is desirable. These would be village forces aimed to cope with
small roving bands of Communist guerrillas or propaganda agents. Their
equipment would be of a li ht police nature 25X6
NSC
In a discussion between the Thai military mission and the Depirtnetit
of Defense on July 3, 1954, the Thai Commander-yin-Chief, General Srisdg',a
sketched out a broad three-year program for developing an amplified milli-
tary, program for Thailand. As described by General Srisdi these were 1xi
summary as follows t
1. Arnvy - Reorganization of existing units into one complete Ami;
corps (inc u ing three infantry divisions, corps artillery and other
corps troops),, one separate infantry division, and four horse cavalry
squadrons. The divisions to be about 3/4 U.S. strength and otherwise
patterned along U. S.. lines except lighter in tar+ks and motor vehicles.
2. Na~v - Re-establishment of naval forces of'66 ships of variouL:
types, an76 Marine battalions (including 2 infantry-type battalions;
2 AA battalions,, MP security elements,. and 1 amph-trac company).
3. Air Force - 12 Fighter-Bomber squadrons,. several transport ant.
training squa ons, 12 helicopters, and security forces consisting of
8 infantry-type battalions, 2 AAA battalions.. The Air Force now has a
security force but it is not organized into battalions and not at the
strength desired. The Thai Air Force is also concerned with acquiring
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radar egpipnerat and with creating an air defense. system, :
TAB I
c. Thailand desires that all existing and projected Thai forces. Les
placed under U. S,-1,W support..
d. Thailand ceeires to -establish with .U.._S.. assistance, a small
arms ammunition factory,..
During the lengthy discussion General Srisdj emphasized a number
of times that the main problem is financing;, that Thailand's budget is
already overburdened and that Thailand would like to have direct U. So
financial. assistance. He implied that the amount would be substantial.
The proposed program had been developed by the Thai in view of the
deteriorating situation in Indochina and the expectation that if the si-:-.,
ation deteriorates further Thailand would be attacked by Communist foree.s
from China either by armed force or by subversive activities.
NSC 5405, paragraph 46 statess
nlt, the event of overt Chinese or other Communist major aggression
against Thailand:
"as Support an appeal. to the UN by the Thai Government,
nb. Consistent with world-ride U.S. commitments take appropriate
military action against Communist China as part of a UN collective acticr
or in conjwi tion with France and the United Kingdom and any other
friendly governments.
no. Employ as desirable and feasible anti-communist Chinese forces,
includThg Chinese Nationalist forces, in military operations in Southeast
Asia, Korea, or Chinn, proper."
The foregoing coursesof action (MC 5405), (paragraphs 44? 452 46).
are not regarded by the Department of Defense as adequate authority for
the build-up of Thailand's military strength along the lines currently
under discussion between the Thai and U. S. Governments.
Rec cmnehdation r
That the National Security council examine the courses of action it
NBC 5405 with a view to relating them to current U. S. objectives in the
area..
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TAB II
ANNEX TQ SPEC L PO TO ^ NATIONAL SECURI C0UNC L
Discussions with General Gillmore and members of the Thai )litar
Mission brought out the follwing additional informations
1. The proposed augmentation of the Thai Armed Forces by seven
additional light infantry divisions, mentioned in the first paragraph
page 3, was an idea developed by General Gillmore and not by the Thai.
The idea was that such additional, divisions should be developed in casa of
emergency if Thailand were actually threatened with military attack. This
item,- therefore, has no substantial status although it is on the recor3s
of the Department of Defense as a possible additional course of action.
Z. The present Thai request? as indicated in the summary of
General Srisdits remarks at the bottom of page 3 and the top of page .4t.
coincides in general and in pattern with. General Giimorets reeormend-:ions
under items 1 and 2 on page 2, with the essential difference that in the
Thai request the personnel strength listed in the full scheme seems to
be out of proportion with the numbers of Divisions involved.. Further
discussion with General Gillmore and with the Thai indicated that the
Thai have a three-year program in mind; that the preliminary preparat-"gin
of fnrces'in the pattern outlined should be achieved. by July 1,. 1955 aid
that the Thai would not expect to achieve full strength, which would
roughly double their Armed'?Forces, until the end of the three-year progrm..
On page 3 of the Thai proposal the statement is made: "Neither an
increase in the yearly revenue nor a greater allntment than at present
from the revenue for military purposes can be foreseen",
The Thai have made it abundantly clear that any increase in their
Armed Forces must be made possible by United States subsidy of the
additional budget required. In order to emphasize their point in conv#iesa-
tion the Thai military have argued that their financial position has
deteriorated so that they are actually unable to carry even their pre gat
military program., It is believed,however, that this is an argume:_nt to
strengthen their position in requesting financial assistance for the
increase in the Armed Forces and that the Thai Government will continue
to allocate present allotments for military purposes.
It is understood that the Department of Defense will inform the
Thai that the U.S. Government will:.
Finance the construction of the Saraburi-Ban Phai Highway;
Enable the Thai Government to develop three suitable airbasee
at Korat, Tha-Pli and Snngkhla;
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TAB II
,2. Undertake the development of the reinforced military carps, .1?-.1
the pattern described as recommended by Gene-al Gillmore, The m-)st
important if these three items is the last, as it is the most expens .v3
and far-reaching in its implications. It is understood, however, that
agreement to develop the reinforced corps does not envisage the nnain--
power build-up for the three-year Thai program which would involve a
grand total for all three Services of 181,728 men, which would include
rmy 148,654 Navy 1'),662, and Air Force 22,4122. In other words, the
present com4tment is to carry out only the first year of the three re 3.r
program, which is comparable to the recommendations of General Gillmore,
the cost being about $52.3 million of which about $1.6 million would
be used in the first year for expanded officer training. The Departiaent
of Defense apparently feels that the larger program of doubling the
Armed Forces should await more specific instructions, perhaps through
NSC channels.
7-9-54
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I, Meteorological section.
h
e Air Control Parties,
00.
TAB III
SECT t0 y III COST ES Tnr,ATF
1, A broad estimate of the cost, in millions, of organizing,
equipping, and operating the proposed IVAG is $261.1 for the initial
outlay of material, equipment and construction, plus $59+t4 per year for
peacetime operations, or $121,7 per year for wartime operations. This
estimat
w
e
as developed for planning purposes only and should not be us
for budgetary purposes since phasing
build u
s le
d ti
,
p
a
me, and other
factors influencing budget estimates were,not considered in the canputa.
tions. For a detailed breakdown pertaining to above cost see the attach,d
table. The cost esti
t
ma
es were developed on the information and aissump
ions contained in the subsequent paragraphs.
5. Aircraft organisation cost estimat
s
b
"
e
were
ased on
Cost of
'lying Organizations" studys dated 21 July 1953. AC&W cost was based an
"Estimated Initial and Annual Operation Cost of Fixed AC&W Site", dated
12 February 1951. Both of the above studies were prepared by the Direct
orate of Management Analysis, Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, U. S.
Air Force,
6. The annual operational cost estimates were based on "Revised
U. S. Air Force War Time Planning Data (Budget)", dated December 1953,
compiled by Director of Plans, U. S. Air Force, and experience gained
from the Korean War.
7. Construction cost estimate represents a minimum approximation
for a 2O' year life peacetime base built in the United States ? A similar
facility to accommodate the IVAG overseas is dependent upon local con-
ditions,, urgency, and time of year, and cost could easily double. Shou3.r_
an existing base be utilized, a minimum improvement program to accom-
modate the IVAG according to U. S. Air Force standards would be not less
than $10,000,000,
8. POL estimates are based on the use of drum fuel. If bulk storage
is available and bulk fuel is used POL costs will be cut by 50 per cent.
9. Payroll costs are based on U. S. standards and does wt take
into consideration bonuses or incentive pay of any type,
10. Costs not included in computations because of insufficient
available information area
a. Base and depot stocks of POL, supplies, st m munitions
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TAB III
b0 War reserves and pipeline supplies.
O Depot support equipment.
d. Cost of Command headquarters and support echelon.
ztED COST
ons
initial Cost
Yearly Operating Cost
3 Sqdn. F-?86F (75 A/C & Equip)
2 Sgdnr at-219 (32 A/C & Equip)
1 Sqdn. B?-26 (25 A/C & Equip)
1 Composite (12 I-.80 A/C & Equip
Sqdnt 6 RB