TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060015-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 11, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
11 APRIL 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 15)
875R000300060015-3
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FRIS without coordination wi'h other U.S. Government
components
STATSPEC
NATIONAL, SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFO(1ATJ( SERVICE
12 April 1973
CORRECTION
TO FBIS TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA, 11 APRIL 1973
In the Indochina section, page 7, final paragraph, the first
two lines should read: Without mentioning the President, VNA
indicated by the use of internal quotation marks that it was
quoting from him X X X (correcting typographical error)
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
11 APRIL 1973
C0iITLATS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Sihanouk Visits Hanoi After Reported Trip to Cambodia . . . . . .
1
Thieu's U.S. Visit Prompts DRV Analyr3es of Nixon Policies . . . .
5
PRG Presses Role as "Sole" True Representative, USSR Demurs . . .
8
Czechoslovak Assembly Delegation Pays Friendship Visit tL, DRV . .
1.0
PRG Spokesman Denics Communists Downed ICCS Helicopt'.r. . . . . .
12
KOREA
Pyongyang Offers Troop Reduction if U.S. Withdraws. . . . . . . .
13
MANIFESTO ANNIVERSARY
Communist Conference Notes Moscow's "Vanguard" Role . . . . . . .
17
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
rB.IS TRENDS
11. APRIL 1973
Moscow (3319 items)
Podgornyy in Finland
(--)
[Podgornyy Speeches (--)
Kosygin in Sweden (--)
[ 1Cosygin Speeches (--)
Vietnam (1l.%)
[Madame Binh in USSR (3%)
Hungarian National. Day (--)
China (6%)
Anniversary of 24th (9%)
CPSU Congress
Peking (1000 items)
15% Domestic Issues (43%) 49%
7%] Vietnam (10%) 11%
8% UN Seabed Meetings, (3%) 9%
6%] Superpower
8% "Maritime Hegemony"
3%] Cambodia (7%) 5%
5% [Sihanouk in DRV (--) 2%]
3% Cameroon President in (18%) 5%
3% PRC
Soviet Economic (--) 3%
Exploitation of
Czechoslovakia
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention In terms of volume are not always
discussed In the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
11 APRIL 1.973
INDOCHINA
Sihanouk resurfaced for the first ime since mid-February when
he arrived in Hanoi on the 6th after a visit to "the liberated
zone of Cambodia." His reported consultations with the
in-country FUNK leaders underscored a differentiation of roles
in which Sihanouk represents the FUNK on the international plane
while acknowledging the insurgents' own leadership in conducting
operations in Cambodia. His visit also reaffirmed the FUNK's
rejection of an accommodation or cease-fire with the Phnom Penh
regime. Hanoi and Peking have hailed his trip as a demonstration
of the FUNK's unity.
Speeches by Pham Van Dong, hosting Sihanouk, and Truong Chinh,
hosting a visiting Czechoslovak delegation, reiterated Hanoi's
line that the completion of U.S. troop withdrawal on 29 March was
a great victory for the Vietnamese people. Both DRV leaders
charged the United States and Saigon with "gross and systematic"
violation of the peace accord, and Truong Chinh scored the U.S.
Administration for "hurling slanders and threats" at the
Vietnamese people.
Hanoi press comment on GVN President Nguyen Van Thieu's 2-7 April
visit to the United States contained more direct reaction to the
recent Administration statements warning of U.S. measures to
counter communist violations of the peace accord. Citing such
statements by the President and by Defense Secretary Richardson,
a NHAN DAN editorial pegged to the Nixon-Thieu communique argued
that it is not the U.S. role to enforce the peace agreement.
The Hanoi press comment viewed the joint communique as evidence
of U.S. intent to pursue the Nixon Doctrine and thus impose
"neocolonialist domination," and a Commentator article injected
a polemical note when it revived the charge that the doctrine
aims at dividing socialist countries.
SIHANOUK VISITS HANOI AFTER REPORTED TRIP TO CAMBODIA
Prince Sihanouk arrived in Hanoi on 6 April after what he said was
a visit to "the liberated zone of Cambodia" that has produced a
show of unity between Sihanouk's exile wing of the FUNK and the
in-country insurgent leaders identified with the Khmer Rouge.
Sihanouk's pilgrimage appears to have achieved an understanding
based on a differentiation of roles within the FUNK, with the
prince representing the movement on the international plane while
acknowledging the insurgents' own leadership of operations inside
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11 APRIL 1973
Cambodia. His consultations with the insurgent leaders also
reconfirmed their rejection of an accommodation or cease-fire
with the Phnom Penh regime. Earlier, Sihanouk had drawn back
from the more forthcoming approach to a Cambodian settlement
that he had taken in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam
agreement.
Speaking at an official reception in his honor in Hanoi on the
9th, Sihanouk frankly acknowledged that for three years the
FUNK has been afflicted with "a serious handicap" arising from
his exile status, which has made the FUNK politically vulnerable
to charges that it did not have a genuine domestic base, that
the in-country insurgents did not recognize his authority,
and that these insurgents were dominated by their Vietnamese
allies. Declaring that the time has come for his movement to
demonstrate "its existence, its unity, its autonomy, and its
legitimacy," Sihanouk insisted that the three Khmer Rouge
"ministers in the interior"--Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Hou
Youn*--are alive and well and that they recognize him as chief
of state. He explained that the RGNU was not a government in
exile because it is embodied in the three insurgent leaders and
has established "the people's power" in 90 percent of Cambodia.
In his insistent stress on the unity of the FUNK, especially
between the royalist and the communist elements, Sihanouk
indicated that there was an arrangement according to which he
represented the continuity and legitimacy of the resistance
movement on the international level while the insurgent leaders
provided "a veritable national leadership in the liberated zones"
of the country. He explained, in an exercise of semantic
gymnastics, that the RGNU will always call itself a royal govern-
ment--"even if it is composed of a majority" of Khmer Rouge--but
that as a regime it will always be "a pure people's democracy."
He added that the monarchy has become purely symbolic, a
conce:;sion that makes clear the effective control to be enjoyed
by the communist elements should they oust the Lon Nol regime.
On 8 April the FUNK radio began carrying a series of special
programs of recorded reportage on Sihanouk's visit, including
* Sihanouk said he had gathered photographs, film, and record-
ings of speeches by the three ministers as well as by Son Sen,
the insurgent army's chief of staff. Current references to the
latter further reflect the deference being shown in recent
months to the fighters on the front line.
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11 APRIL 1973
speeches by the prince and purportedly by the insurgent leaders.*
As in his remarks in Hanoi, Sihancouk's speeches showed
sensitivity to what he called "the degrading brand" of a govern-
ment in exile, and his tributes to the leaders of the insurgent
forces reflected the trend in recent months toward enhancing
their authority. He also took frank note of views that the FUNK
is divided into four factions--the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese-
dominated Khmer Rumdoh, pro-Sihanouk elements, and outright
bandits--and that the three shadowy ministers in the interior
had been murdered long before at Sihanouk's orders. He expressed
confidence that his visit and the evidence he collected will
demonstrate to doubting Cambodians and to the world that the
FUNK is united and that the insurgent leaders are alive and
heading the struggle at home. VNA has transmitted radiophotos
with captions saying that they show Sihanouk with other FUNK
leaders in the "liberated zone," including one purportedly in
front of the Angkor Wat temple.
REJECTION OF COMPROMISE In his recorded speeches and in his
9 April address in Hanoi, Sihanouk
underscored the FUNK's adamant opposition to a compromise
settlement. Addressing would-be "Indochina peacemakers," he
said in Hanoi that the insurgent leaders had asked him to tell
the world that they would not accept any compromise or "any
cease-fire whatsoever" with the Phnom Penh regime. In a
recorded speech broadcast by the FUNK radio on the 10th,
Sihanouk declared that "we resolutely refuse to negotiate or
compromise" and will continue the war until complete liberation
of the country.
On the question of aid from the Chinese and the North Vietnamese,
Sihanouk said in Hanoi that they had provided a stock of supplies
prior to 27 .January sufficient to carry on the fight until 1975
and that large quantities of American arms are captured from
Lon Nol's army. He appealed to foreign governments seeking to
bring peace to Cambodia to urge President Nixon to stop the T.S.
air attacks. Sihanouk indicated that the FUNK forces will not
attempt to take Phnom Penh by force but will use "political and
diplomatic means" to isolate the Lon Nol regime and cause its
internal collapse.
* The first installment carried a recorded speech attributed to
Hu Nim and the second a speech by Khieu Samphan.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
11 APRIL 1973
SUPPORT FROM DRV Hanoi took the occasion of Sihanouk's visit
to reaffirm its support for his leadership
while hailing his reported trip into Cambodia as demonstrating
the unity of the resistance forces. As in his previous visit in
late January and early February, Sihanouk was hosted by Premier
Pham Van Dong and Defense Minister Giap. Unlike that visit,
this time he met with party chief Le Duan, who along with Truong
Chinh paid separate calls on Sihanouk and RGNU Premier Penn Nouth
on 8 April. (Penn Nouth had flown to the DRV from Peking on
the 5th to join Sihanouk and his Khmer Rouge shadow, "special
envoy of the interior" Ieng Sary.) North Vietnamese comment,
including editorials in the party and army dailies, reconfirmed
Hanoi's backing of Sihanouk as the "representative of the
legality, genuineness, and continuity of the Cambodian state."
Speaking at the reception on the 9ch, Dong hailed Sihanouk's
trip as "a new and still more moving and vivid manifestation
of the militant solidarity" of the Cambodians and Vietnamese,
who "are ready to give mutual wholehearted support and assistance."
He said Sihanouk's visit to the liberated zone coincided with
battlefield successes, "especially on the strategic communicatic .
lines," which have tightened the siege on Phnom Penh and driven
"the reactionary clique of Lon Noll' to the point of collapse.
Dong reaffirmed Hanoi's support for Sihanouk's March 1970
five-point declaration but did not directly address the question of
a Cambodian settlement.
RETURN TO CHINA Sihanouk's party arrived from Hanoi in Peking
on the 11th and was greeted by more than
5,000 people headed by Chou En-lai and his wife, Yeh Chien-ying,
Li Hsien-nien, and PRG Foreign Minister Binh, stopping over in
Peking en route to North Korea from Mongolia. A PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial trumpeted that Sihanouk's "inspection tour of the
liberated zone of Cambodia" is having "a great impact" both inside
and outside Cambodia by demonstrating anew his status as legitimate
head of state and "the unbreakable unity" of the FUNK forces.
Echoing Sihanouk's remarks, the editorial claimed that the trip
has "shattered to smithereens" the objection that the RGNU is a
gouk:rnment in exile. The editorial heaped all the glory on Peking's
client, Sihanouk, neglecting to mention by name the insurgent
leaders to whom Sihanouk had paid repeated tributes.
Observing that the Lon Nol regime is being isolated and that the
flames of war are spreading, PEOPLE'S DAILY asserted that the days
of "this handful of national scum" are numbered. The editorial
said Sihanouk's five-point declaration advanced "reasonable
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
11 APRIL 1973
proposals" that are widely supported in the world, but it did
not claim that these proposals provide the only basis for a
settlement. It also sidestepped the question of a cease-fire
settlement while taking the occasion to condemn the U.S. air
strikes in Cambodia as a violation of the Paris agreement on
Vietnam as well as a futile attempt to "drag on the solution"
of the Cambodian question. The editorial concluded with a routine
pledge that the Chinese will always "firmly support the Just
struggle" of the Cambodians and other Indochinese people.
Moscow, as the outside party in Sihanouk's dealings with the
Asian communists, has not mentioned the prince's travels.
THIEU'S UPS. VISIT PROMPTS DRV ANALYSES OF NIXON POLICIES
In the wake of President Thieu's U.S. visit, a spate of authorita-
tive comment in Hanoi's party paper NHAN DAN shows some variations,
if not contradictions, in analyzing U.S. policies. An editorial
in the paper on 6 April is straightforward in citing the Nixon-
Thieu communique as evidence of U.S. intent to continue its
involvement in Vietnam and Indochina. But a NHAN DAN Commentator
article on the 7th and an editorial in the paper on the 9th
take different tacks toward the United States, with the Commentator
article carrying polemical overtones regarding U.S. intentions and
great power detente and the editorial assuming a more sanguine
stance regarding the President's professions of a desire to
move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation.
DRV PRESS ON Analyzing the 3 April Nixon-Thieu communique in
U.S. THREATS some detail, the NHAN DAN editorial of the 6th
charged that the document provided further
evidence of continuing U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Indochina
and of Thieu's willingness to continue "serving as a U.S. lackey."
The editorial focused particular attention on the communique's
"slanderous" reference to North Vietnamese infiltration and its
assertion that appropriate vigorous reactions would be necessary
to meet any actions which threaten the basis of the peace agreement.
Interpreting this passage as a warning that the United States
would intervene, the editorial charged that Defense Secretary
Richardson had indicated that U.S. action might include a resumption
of the U.S. bombing of the DRV and even the reintroduction of
American forces into South Vietnam. Not surprisingly, Vietnamese
communist media have ignorcd statement:; by Thieu--including those
at the National Press Club on the 5th and in his Face the Nation TV
interview on the 8th--that South Vietnam will not require the
reintroduction of U.S. troops or U.S. air support.
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11 APRIL 1973
In contrast to its previous stress on alleged U.S. responsibility
for insuring Saigon's compliance with the peace accord, Hanoi
now argues that the United States has no supervisory authority.
Thus, the NHAN DAN editorial on the 6th said: "Nobody has given
the United States the right to set itself up as a judge and act
whenever there are violations of the agreement." An article
in the 4 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN had made a similar point in
commenting on Secretary Richardson's 1 April Meet the Press TV
interview. The article paraphrased an editorial in the 1 April
New York TIMES holding that President Nixon has no right to use
force to ensure the implementation of the accord, that the peace
agreement provides for the ICCS to deal with violations, and
that the United States has acknowledged this control machinery
and cannot now demand unlimited free action. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
excised the TIMES' additional observations cl.' acterizing the
peace-keeping mechanism as unrealistic and ineffectual.)
DIFFERING LINES IN The NHAN DAN Commentator article on 7 April
ARTICLE, EDITORIAL levelled an unusually argumentative attack
against the Nixon Doctrine. Commentator
blasted the Nixon-T;.ieu communique as a "concentrated expression"
of U.S. intent to pursue the Nixon Doctrine in Vietnam and
Indochina, and he went on to say: "It is not that this scheme
was divulged only now." To buttress his point, Commentator cited
a French press article, written before Thieu's trip, which
maintained that the Nixon Doctrine remains unchanged and "is not
a question of concessions."
The likelihood that Commentator was directing his argument at
Hanoi's detente-seeking communist allies is bolstered by the
fact that in the course of attacking the Nixon Doctrine he
revived the charge that the doctrine is aimed, among other things,
at creating divisions in the communist world. This charge, first
voiced by Hanoi in connection with the July 1971 announcement of
the President's planned trip to Peking, has not been pressed since
it appeared in an unusually polemical 17 August 1972 NHAN DAN
editorial.* The current Commentator article claimed that
* The 17 August NHAN DAN editorial is discussed in the 23 August
1972 TRENDS, pages 1-5. A particularly vituperative article in
the December 1972 issue of the party journal HOC TAP had also
accused President Nixon of attempting to cause communist disunity
but had not claimed that this was part of the Nixon Doctrine.
The article, by party Central Committee member Hoang Quoc Viet,
is discussed in the 17 January 1973 TRENDS, page 6.
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the doctrine advocates strengthening U.S power to "intimidate
or purchase" other countries, to "provoke war," to force others
to share U.S. responsibilities and oppose revolutionary
movements, and "on this basis, to be ready to negotiate with
an intention of dividing and provoking the socialist countries
and other revolutionary forces in the world."
The Commentator article seem3 the more noteworthy in that it
marks the first appearance of this previously regular byline
in NHAN DAN since 9 January--prior to the signing of the peace
accord. Over the years, KHAN DAN Commentator articles have been
the consistent vehicle for Hanoi's comment on U.S. policy and
mn major Presidential pronouncements.*
Just two days after the Commentator article appeared, a 9 April
NHAN DAN editorial paralleled it in reviewing U.S. strategies and
in charging that Washingtcn has attempted to take advantage of
"differences and dissensions among the revolutionary forces."
However, the editorial was much more optimistic than Commentator
about the prospects for future U.S. actions. It maintained that
the "complete defeat" of the Unite-!j States in Vietnam has created
a new international balance of forces and a clear possibility for
world peace to be maintained and consolidated.
Without mentioning the President, VNA indicated by''internal c(t.LOt tL"`.
qy marks that it was quoting from him in the course of the
statement that U.S. losses have forced the United States to "change
its policy, 'from the era of confrontation to the era of
negotiation."' The editorial expressed a standard line when it
said: "It is common knowledge that the nature of imperialism
remains unchanged and the imperialists would launch the most
frenzied counterattack wherever there is a relaxation of vigilance."
But it went on to bolster the notion that the President could be
expected to pursue his professed desire to shift from confrontation
to negotiation: "At the same time, the important fact must be
recognized that nowadays the world's situation has changed"
and the "imperialists" cannot "rule the roost."
* Three articles attributed to Commentator were published in NHAN
DAN last December and articles with this byline appeared in the
paper every month in 1972 except October.
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PRG PRESSES ROLE AS "SOLE" TRUE REPRESENTATIVE; USSR DEMURS
PRG media have stepped up criticism of claims that the GVN is
the only legitimate government in South Vietnam, and Joint
communiques on PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh's recent
afficial visits to the Soviet Union and Mongolia--as transmitted
in Front media--have contained the counterclaim that the PRG is
the "sole" genuine representative of the South Vietnamese
people. The timing suggests that this may be, at least in part,
an ecfort to ::ounterbalance GVN President Thieu's visit to the
U.iited States and other countries.
The 2RG's sensitivity about its status was underlined in its
1 Apr_,. government statement marking the completion of U.S.
troop withdrawals.* The statement denounced the GVN's claims
to be the only legitimate government and charged that Saigon
has denied the existence of the PRG and the role of the third
force in South Vietnam. And a 7 April LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY
editorial on Thleu's visit took issue with the United States
for considering the GVN the only legitimate representative of
South Vietnam.
The argument was also aired on 4 April in a Liberation Radio
interv-ew with PRG Vice Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son, said to
have just returned from Paris after participating as deputy head
of the delegation to the Paris International Conference on
Vietnam. He said the United States and Saigon had been thwarte'
in their efforts at the conference to gain recognition for the
GVN as the only legal government. He also repeated the '1aim
made at the time of the conference that UN Secretary Gent:-1
Waldheim had invited the PRG "to appoint an observer and ~b .offish
a liaison office" at the United Nations. However, the media have
not mentioned a letter from Mme. Binh to Waldehim announcing the
appointment of the PRG "observer."**
* Other aspects of the PRG statement are noted in the 4 April 1973
TRENDS, pages 1-2.
** On its Paris-to-Hanoi service channel on 7 April, VNA transmitted--
for PRG Vice Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son's attention--a 27 March
letter from Foreign Minister Binh to Secretary General Waldheim
informing him that Nguyen Van Tien had been named "permanent observer"
to the United Nations. Tien had served as deputy chief of the PRG
delegation to the four-party Paris conference.
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CONFIUEN'CI.Al, PB[S TRENDS
1.1. APRT.L .1.973
DIFFERING PRG, USSR The communique Issued at the conclusion
VERSIONS Of COMMUNIQUE of Foreign Minister Binh's official
visit to the Soviet Union (26 March-
2 April) bore the usual label "Joint" and thus would have been
expected to reflect agreed positions. However, there is one
striking discrepancy between the texts carried by Soviet and
Front media regarding the status of the PRG. The texts transmitted
by Liberation Radio and LPA refer to the PRG as the "sole
legitimate representat've of the aspirations of the South Vietnamese
peoples"; the text as carried by Soviet media omits the modifier
"sole" and calls the PRG "the true spokesman of the aspirations
of the South Vietnamese population"--a formulation consistent with
other Soviet propaganda. Such a discrepancy in versions of a
communique labeled "Joint" is highly unusual, and the publicity
surrouna'ng Binh's visit sheds no light on how it may have come
about.
That the PRG's concern to stress the importance of its role in the
South may have been intensified by such recent developments as
Thieu's trip is suggested by the past pattern of its propaganda.
Thus, between the signing of the peace agreement at the end of
January and the release of the communique in Moscow on 2 April,
PRG media had on only two out of 10 occasions added the modifier
"sole" to references to the PRG as the genuine representative.*
Notably, since the peace accord joint communiques signed by Binh
in Iraq, Syria, and Algeria have not referred to the PRG's
"sole" legitimacy.
Moscow's rendering of the formulation in the communique accords
with Podgornyy's remarks when he awarded the Order of Friendship
to Mme. Binh on 28 March; on. that occasion he referred to the PRG
as the "lawful spokesman of the interests of all the South
Vietnamese people." Although Moscow has not gone as far as the
PRG presumably would wish, Soviet commentators have shown some
concern to demonstrate support for the PRG while stressing that,
as the peace accord notes, there are two administrations in the South.
For example, Mayevskiy ir an 8 April Moscow radio roundtable
discussion assailed the United States for opposing and obstructing
the idea of a PRG "observer" at the United Nations. He argued
that since there is a Saigon observer at the United Nations, the
United States' stand in opposing a PRG observer is inconsistent with
its having signed the peace accord.
* On the other hand, Hanoi had inserted "sole" in more than half of
some 25 references to the PRG as the genuine representative since
the peace agreement was signed.
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1.1 APRIL 1.973
CZEChOSLOVAK ASSEMBLY DELEGATION PAYS FRIENDSHIP VISIT TO DRV
Like an Laot German delegation's visit last month,* the official
friendship visit of a Czechoslovak Federal Assembly delegation
to North Vietnam from 4 to 11 April seemed designed chiefly as a
show of solidarity and support in the wake of the peace agreement.
A recent meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
in Hanoi had seemed calculated to su-?:e a similar purpose.**
Headed by the Czechoslovak assernbly's chairman, Presidium member
Alois Indra, the delegation was hosted by Truong Chinh, Politburo
member and chairman of the DRV National Assembly Standing
Committee, and was received on the 5th by First Secretary Le Duan,
Premier Pham Van Dong, and President Ton Duc Thang. Truong Chinh
and India spoke at banquets on thi 5th and 10th which were
attended by Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Hoan, Le Thanh Nghi, and
other Han-.::f officials. And a 9 April mass rally heard speeches
by India, Truong Chinh, and Tran Duy Hung, administrative committee
chairman of the DRV National Assembly.
A joint !)RV-Czechoslovak communique, issued on 11 April, duly
affirmed "the fraternal friendship and militant solidarity"
between the two peoples and supported "strict respect and
scrupulous implementation of the Paris agreement." The communique
also registered both parties' "severe" c-)ndemnation of the U.S.
Government and the Saigcn administration for "deliberate, serious,
and systematic violations." The GDR-DRV joint communique on
19 March had also placed some of the responsibility for alleged
violations on the United States. It has been Moscow's practice,
by contrast, to focus its criticism on Saigon, and in apparent
deference to the Soviets the PRG-USSR joint communique of 2 April
limited its criticism to the GVN.
The DRV-Czechoslovak communique put Prague on record with a pledge
to "give all-out assistance to the Vietnamese people in solving
the aftermaths of war, rehabilitating the economy, and building
socialism." But like the communique on the East German visit, it
did not mention any new aid agreement.
* Discussed in the TRENDS of 21 March 1973, pages 5-6.
** The WFTU Bureau held its 7th session in the DRV on 29-30 March,
attended by many foreign delegations, including E. Soviet delegation
led by P. Piminov, secretary of the General Council of soviet trade
unions.
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(.)NF II)IrN'I'IAI, 101118 TRENDS
11 APRIL 1971
Both the Czuehos.lovak and GD14 delegations appear to havu huwud
to Moscow's line on the question of the PRG's position. Both
communiques referred to the PRG no the "authuntLc r.eprr+sonta-
tive of the South Vietnamese people," while Pham Van Dong in
hosting the East Germans and Truong Chinh in hosting the
Czechoslovaks called the PRG the "only" true reeprenentative
of the southern people.
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11 APRIL 101
PRG SPOKESMAN DENIES COR4JNISTS DOWNED ICCS HELICOPTER
VletnumUNe communIat react ton to the he.lteop ter downing on 7 Apr II
In which I our members of the ICCS, two 1'RG off is tal.s, and three
crewmen were killed,. progressed from initial stralghtfor.ward
reports of the crash to statements seemingly designed to just .11'.y
the communist nrtion in shooting down the helicopter, and finally
to a statrmant by the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 11th
denytng U.S. charges that the crash resulted from an attack.
Thus VNA's initial report on 7 April noted that the ICCS
helicopter, one of two scheduled to fly from Gio Linh to Lao Bao
and back, had "crashed at Lao Bao" and that search-and-rescue
operations had been ordered. The effort to exculpate the communists
began on the 8th, when Hanoi and PRG media publicized a statement
by the Quang Tri Provincial People's Revolutionary Committee
alleging that the two aircraft had deviated from the assigned flight
corridor along Highway 9 and penetrated an area where the Saigon
forces had "regularly carried out aerial reconnaissance and
commando activities" and near an area where ARVN military operations
have been conducted. Documenting its charge that the helicopters
strayed off course, the statement claimed that the crash site was
25 kilometers from the assigned flight path and 50 kilometers from
Lao Bao--not at Lao Bao as had originally been reported. The
statement went on to place the blame for the "regrettable mishap"
squarely on the two aircraft's unannounced deviation from their
flight plan, and subsequent reports repeated this version of the
events.
The U.S. and GVN statements blaming the crash on an attack were
acknowledged for the first time in the PRG Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement of the 11th, which specifically rejected a
9 April White House statement to that effect and complained that
a State Department spokesman had "grossly offended the PRG by
stating that this accident was an extremely brutal mockery of the
cease-fire agreement." Insisting again that the "mishap" was
caused by the helicopter's deviation from ccu rse, and noting in
passing that the aircraft was piloted by Americans, the statement
charged Washington and Saigon with spreading their "false
accusations and slandering arguments" in an effort to capitalize
on the incident to stir up public opinion. The ICCS, it concluded,
should issue strict instructions to its pilots to "avoid similar
accidents."
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(;UNI I II;-,NT I Al, 1011111 T1141,,NIIII
11 A1114 11, IV I
K 0 R L A
PYONGYANG OFFLRS TROOP REDUCTION IF U.S, WITHDRAWS
confronted with an impasse In the current North-South Kunsan
talky,* 1'yottgyang Itnw takt'n in cnar to the Intt'rnat lonnl
community lit an effort to gc'nerato renewed mutnentum on the!
Koro.nn gcteat Ion wit I Iv f IxIng resln,nulbI I Ity on the tin It Vol States
SIN rite clIIII obatit(, IV to Kort,nn rc'uit if Icctt Ion. AN part of Its
effort. t.o put t he Korean quest Ion In an fit t..t+rnnI.Ion iI coat ext
Pyongyang for tlt,_' fl rat time hna offered to reduce Its army
strength to 200,000 or Isms without it cotIra upondIng South Korean
reduction If the United Stales wfLltdraws its forces. All past
North Korean troop reduction proposals had been linked to mutual
cuts In the ROK armed forces to a strength of 100,000 men or
less. In a hl.ghly unusual move In parallel, with the new offer,
Pyongyang has addressed an appeal to the U.S. Congress aimed at
tapping sentiment favoring a reduction of Americnn troops overseas.
At the same time, In n move looking toward support in the next UN
General Assembly session, Pyongyang released an appeal to all
parliaments and governments that calls tor a removal of the UN
mantle from the U.S. presence in Korea.
Pyongyang's new troop reduction offer was first contained in a
report dellver.d by Premier Kim 11 at the opening day on 5 April
of a session of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA). Kim's report,
broadcast by Radio Pyongyang on the same day, consisted largely
of a review of the DPRK's steps and proposals on opening contacts
with the South. Kim made a point, however, of identifying the
United States as the main obstacle to the North-South dialogue and
charging it with "taking advantage of its dominant position in
South Korea" to "obstruct in every way possible the progress of
dialogue between North and South Korea," It was in the context of
expressing Pyongyang's readiness "for opening wider the door of
dialogue that was first opened by our own initiative" that Kim made
the offer to "voluntarily reduce the strength of our army to 200,000
men or less if the U.S. forces withdraw from South Korea."
* Neither the political-level discussions nor the Red Cross discus-
sions that took place in Pyongyang last month appear to have made any
progress. Apparently deadlocked over matters of substance, both
meetings failed to produce even the standard joint statements that
had marked all previous full-dress meetings in the series.
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CONY It) Ni'IAl. 111, 18 'I'HIMUH
II A1111 11, 19/7
KIut ttwaarta I that "the t idle has come for U.N. authorities to tnkv
Nt wp$ ((1 rhautga I ha f r papt; poll cy under the prapant changed
wit fun and fi,r sham to withdraw their troops from South Koreu."
lip alao urged that "the UN Commissl.on for the Unification and
Hehnhliltation of Korea (UNCURK) be dissolved In order to rvmovo
tits', ohNI.,rie$ In the way of the pencaful rounift.cation of Koren."
lip called upon governments of all countries to ha.1.p put tin and
to "Ilia Interference of the United States in the tntarnal. affnf.rn
of the Korean people" and to "actively cooperate with us to Nee the
Korean quaptIon dIscummed at the UN General Assembly session this
year without I"ell n&td some just. steps taken for Korea."
Klm'N nppenl to other countries was also formulated in an SPA letter
t-) nil foreign governments adopted on 6 April. Reflecting Pyongyang's
tnvtlral move toward spotlighting U.S. responsibility, the letter
nvofded sharp criticism of the ROK in asserting that none of the
DPRK'N reunification proposals "has yet been realized because the
United Stated, still occupying South Korea, eggs the South Korean
authorities on to make a military showdown by dint of its dominant
position and obstruct the progress of the dialogue." Sharpening
the paint, the letter claimed that "the South Korean authorities
say good words when they it face to face with us for talks but,
after going back, break them and reject our realistic proposals
for putting the points of agreement between the two sides into
concrete practice as 'premature."' The letter reiterated the new
troop reduction offer and stressed that if U.S. troops are with-
drawn from South Korea "the dialogue will make fast progress, North-
South relations will be radically improved, and the question of
the country's reunification will be smoothly solved in a peaceful
way on the principle of national self -dete ..ination."
Another letter, adopted by the SPA on the same day and addressed
only to the U.S. Congress, failed to mention the troop reduction
offer but argued that if the United States truly wants peace in
the Far East "there will be no need for it to keep its army in
South Korea any longer and artificially maintain the state of
military confrontation." The notably temperate letter, which
contained no attacks on President Nixon personally or on the Nixon
Doctrine, or even the stock references to "U.S. imperialist
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONIO I I)I!,N'I' I AI. 101118 'I'It10.NUS
AI'U I I, 1971
aggruwworw,"* asked Cnngrwws to and ar.mw whIpmunt:M to Broth Koran
and wo "ruIrain from InitlgatIng tha South Korean authorft.RN to
mike Koruanw fight Korunnw by wupporiing them with arms."
After expruwuing support for the troop reduction offer ndoptod
at Lila Sl'A session, a NODONG SINMUN editorial on 8 April wont
beyond the wording of the SPA proposal. and assumed an even more
forthcoming posture on reunification by dec.lar.i.ng that "we are
ready to take any bold step .ti it is for a peaceful sol.utlon of
the reunification question." Without further defining what such
a step might be, NODONG SINMUN called upon the UN to take steps
to correct its past resolutions on Korea and to contribute to
the peaceful reunification of Korea by "taking the cap of the
'UN forces' from the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, making
them withdraw from there, and dissolving UNCURK."
TREATMENT OF PAK In a rather genli.e warning to the South
Koreans, Pyongyang has breached its
abstinence from direct personal criticism of ROK President
Pak Chong-hui for the first time in six months. But there has
been no return to the malicious personal vilification of the
past, as in the brief period last September and October when
the North Koreans renewed the personal attacks, on Pak that had
been suspended since the 4 July 1972 joint statement. The attacks
last fall ended on 8 October--two days before the announcement
that the first meeting of the North-South Coordination Committee
would be held on 12 October.
The recent reference to Pak by name was contained in an 8 April
NODONG SINMUN commentary mildly chiding him for recent speeches
calling for military strength. According to the commentary,
Pak had revealed "the true nature of the South Korean authorities
who want the maintenance of tension, not its relaxation, and dream
of 'unification by prevailing over communism,' instead of peaceful
reunification." The commentary admonished Pak to "behave properly"
and "affirmatively respond to the fair and aboveboard proposals
of our side for national reunification."
* By contrast, a 30 January NODONG SINMUN editorial on the Vietnam
peace agreement harshly attacked the United States in arguing that
the settlement would not lead to a reduction of tension in Asia
and in charging the United States with obstructing Korean reunifica-
tion. The editorial called President Nixon an ."imperialist war
chieftain" and charged that "the U.S. imperialist murderers" had
surpassed Hitler's war crimes.
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CONF1I)LINT1AL VB1.H TRENDS
11 APRIL 1973
MOSCOW, PEKING In keeping, with Its past treatment of
REACTION Pyongyang's initiatives on Korean reunifica-
tion, Moscow has carried only low-level
commentaries expresoing support for the SPA's letter to all
governments cal.ling for help in ending foreign interference in
Koroa. Moscow has not commented on the letter addressed to
the U.S. Congress. The only available specific comment on
the troop reduction offer came in a foreign-language commentary
broadcast on 9 April. which said that "it is hard to overestimate
the significance of this action" in view of the fact that South
Korea has a "well-equipped army of 600,000." Moscow pointed to
the offer as showing the DPRK's br.aic "peacefulness" and argued
that the time has come for the United States to "pull its troops
out of South Korea."
Peking, on the other hand, has again offered authoritative
support for the North Korean moves. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
on 11 April expressed Chinese support for Kim's report and the
two SPA letters, but it failed to take specific note of the
troop reduction offer. In a similar show of reluctance to
publicize the offer, an NCNA account of the 8 April NODONG
SINMUN editorial omitted the latter's reference to the offer as
well as the expressed readiness to take "any bold step" toward
reunification. In view of Peking's change toward countenancing
if not indeed approving a continued U.S. military presence in
Asia and elsewhere to counterbalance the Soviets, the Chinese
may find it discreet to sidestep a proposal calling for a U.S.
troop withdrawal.
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CONFIDENTIAL Fills TRENDS
I.J. APRIL .1973
MANIFESTO ANNIVERSARY
C01MUNIST CONFERENCE NOTES MOSCOW'S "VANGUARD" ROLE
One of the features of the recently concluded 125th anniversary
conference on the Communist Manifesto was the resurrection of
the old formula--ignored at the la3t world communist conference
in 1969--that Moscow plays the "vanguard" role in the world
communist movement. Although obviously relevant to the issue of
Moscow's relations with its East European allies, the reiteration
of the formula was probably intended to symbolize the distinction
between the Moscow-oriented and Peking-oriented wings of the
communist movement. As such, it served to portray the Soviet
party as the prime embodiment of the ideals of the Manifesto, but
did not necessarily imply that Moscow wished to reassert a claim
to be the model and leader of all other communist parties.
Speaking for the host party at the 15 March opening of the East
Berlin international conference, SED secretary Kurt Hager
characterized the Soviet Union as "the center" of the socialist
camp. He declared that "the Soviet Union is and remains the
center and main force of the socialist community," adding that
history has shown that "in Lenin's party the Soviet Union
possesses the most experienced and battle-tested party of the
international workers class." The Soviet Union, he said, is
the revolutionary "vanguard" and heads the implementation of
the Communist Manifesto principles, adding that a communist's
attitude toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU is "the decisive
touchstone" of his loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism. He went on to score "the Maoists" as the
arch-transgressors of proletarian internationalism.
This phraseology was absent from the main document of the 1969
world communist conference, presumably because of Moscow's
desire to avoid stirring memories of the Czechoslovak episode
and because of the attitudes of the Romanians and other
independent-minded delegations. Thus the document took the
position that "there is no leading center of the international
communist movement," and that the parties should coordinate
their activities voluntarily. In now identifying the Soviet
Union as the center of the socialist camp, Hager in effect
reverted to the phraseology of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow
international party conference documents.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
11 APRIL 1973
The declaration of the 1957 conference, attended by Mao Tse-tung,
had identified the Soviet Union as the "head" of the invincible
camp of socialist countries." It also stressed the need for
international working class unity to defend "the historic
political and social gains effected in the Soviet Union--the
first and mightiest socialist power--as well as in the Chinese
People's Republic, and in all the socialist countries."
The 1960 conference statement, registering a compromise in the
bourgeoning Sino-Soviet rivalry for leadership, adopted a diluted
formula saying that'bommunist and workers parties unanimously announce
that the generally acknowledged vanguard of the world communist movement
has been and will continue to be the CPSU, as the most experienced
and tempered unit of the international communist movement."
Discrepancies between the formulations of the two earlier Moscow
documents and the 1969 one were ignored by Hager in his remark that
the SED would continue to be guided by "the general line of the
international communist movement collectively worked out and
adopted at the international conferences of 1957, 1960, and
1969."
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