MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PLAN: GOALS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000400060003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 11, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Executive and Planning Division
SUBJECT : Management Improvement Plan: Goals
and Accomplishments
REFERENCE : Memo to Deputy Directors and Staff
Chiefs dated 24 May 1971, Subject:
Annual OMB Management Improvement
Plans/Report, from Chief, Executive
and Planning Division
1. This Staff has carefully reviewed the management
effectiveness and cost reduction goals which it established last
December upon initiation of the Agency-wide Management Improve-
ment Program to determine if those goals have been either fully
or partially attained. In addition, by this review, we have at-
tempted to evaluate the full or partial accomplishments of those
goals in an effort to establish realistic goals for the future. This
report summarizes our findings.
Each Branch and Staff member was tasked to conduct
the following items of review and to report to me those specific
items which I believe essential to a reasonable and accurate man-
agement review program:
a. Review existing programs and activities defined at
the establishment of the management improvement program.
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b. Review the basis and/or authority for each such
program or activity.
c. Reevaluate the activity program to determine its
priority in relation to other requirements levied upon this Staff.
d. Determine which of the activities so defined are
of lesser priority in relation to the over-all Staff effort, those
which present continuing problems as a result of current manpower
and budgetary constraints, and those which present a high degree
of potential embarrassment to the Agency should they become a
matter of public knowledge.
e. Assess the foregoing findings to determine which
of the programs and activities can be eliminated or relegated to a
lower priority of consideration without seriously impairing the
effectiveness of the Staff in accomplishing its counterintelligence
mission. Consideration was also to be given to counterintelligence
risks to the Agency and the U. S. Government which would result
from first, a selective reduction in current counterintelligence
activities, and second, blanket reduction spread somewhat equally
over all the existing activities.
f. Advise what success has resulted from goals
previously established and present new or renewed goals wherever
possible.
3. GENERAL
The resultant review of the foregoing presents rather
ominous findings vis-a-vis our counterintelligence program. Over-
all we have not been able to accomplish the goals which we estab-
lished with some expectation last December. Whereas we have
accomplished some cost savings, the resultant savings have, of
operational necessity, been redirected to vital functions. Similarly,
where some degree of success has been achieved in approaching the
goals established earlier, input has exceeded predictions and any
manpower savings achieved have not been equal to or significantly
close to the equal mark to compensate for increased counterintel-
ligence demands. A recent reduction of one Staff secretary and a
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threatened reduction of a Staff professional has further aggravated
the situation. In sum, this Staff is rapidly approaching an extreme-
ly critical situation which could so disperse our efforts and so
extremely limit our counterintelligence exploitation as to effectively
neutralize our defensive counterintelligence mechanisms in a period
of rapidly rising counterintelligence threats. We have attempted to
address our efforts for the future to averting this critical stage as
long as possible, reluctantly accepting greater risks and becoming
more arbitrary in initial assessments of counterintelligence threats
brought to our attention.
The initial assessment is, of course, the most critical
which we face. To remain flexible, varying the amount of effort
devoted to each counterintelligence situation, we must make arbi-
trary decisions on a continuing basis as to which activities are the
less essential or present the lesser hazard to Agency sources and
methods if confirmed to be hostile efforts of opposition services.
With present limited manpower and resources and an increasing
input, we must become more rigid in making this arbitrary decision,
and thus opt for a higher degree of risk to the security of this Agency
and the national interest. It is not a pleasant prospect.
4. MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS ACCOMPLISHMENTS
In our projected goals in this area, we singled out
certain activities conducive to quantitative analysis. These, of
course, did not reflect the totality of this Staff's operations, but
will be mentioned first as a guide to where we have gone (rather
than what we have attained) in the specified areas.
a. Cover Counterintelligence Assets Program (CCAP)
and Special Resources Activity (SRA): We have indicated that we
hoped to increase the total number of CI sources by approximately
10% during the forthcoming year (December 1970 to December 1971).
This was to be accomplished with full knowledge as to the hazards
our method would impose. We had determined that with current
manpower the only way to increase source contact and reporting
would be to decrease the number of contacts with existing sources
and utilize the time-gap so earned for contact with additional sources
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in those areas where we have for some time recognized the existence
of dangerous gaps in our coverage. We are only somewhat satisfied
to report that during the intervening six months we have exceeded
the goal established last December, in that source contacts have
increased in excess of the 5% which we projected. This has not been
without risk, but we have been forced to accept it. In one phase of
the activity we have been fortunate in that requirements have been
lessened because of operational security demands, the threat of
embarrassment to the Agency being a major factor. This has al-
lowed redirection of case officer activity to another phase where
the operational security demands are outweighed to a greater degree
by the counterintelligence threat which must be met.
b. All-Source Intelligence Review Activity (AIRA) /
Covert and Compartmented Source Program: We noted that input
in this activity had been increasing at a rate of about 20% a year,
and that by tightening our preliminary review procedures we hoped
to compensate for this increase without increase in manpower. We
were wrong in our projection of increased input. In less than six
months the increases in input have far exceeded anything earlier
anticipated, as new sources of compartmented information have
been opened to us. We had realized that a danger existed in ex-
clusion of certain information from consideration because of its
lesser priority at the time of preliminary review. We were pre-
pared to cope with the problem. However, the increased output of
compartmented information negated our somewhat wishful planning.
The full exploitation of these new sources of information cannot be
modified; the risk to this Agency and the national interest precludes
it. We were not only unable to approach the goal we established in
December, we have fallen hopelessly behind. Even though we plan
to be more rigid in preliminary review, at this point it would appear
that without additional manpower, either new or diverted from other
activities of the Staff, we will continue to fall progressively behind.
For this reason, this area--though capable of quantitative measure-
ment--will be discontinued for reporting under the management
improvement program.
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not conducive to quantitative measurement. Since the real costs
of operating this Staff consist almost entirely of salaries, supplies
and space, it is considered that little can be cut monetarily in order
to pragmatically establish goals of this nature. The only real cost
reduction in this regard is, in effect, the application of management
principles in obtaining more work from each professional.
Inasmuch as 100% efficiency in work performance can
only be carried on for a very short period without breakdown, it
is considered inappropriate to request this Staff's professionals,
who are already operating at an over-all average of between 85 and
90%, to increase productivity much further. Too much pressure at
one point gives way to exceedingly diminished returns. My manage-
ment approach to this problem has been to stress "professionalism"
and the accomplishment of the required tasks with minimum repetition,
duplication and paper production. With the recent required loss of
one secretary, this task has become even greater. Nine profession-
als in this Staff have been issued typewriters, for example, to allow
their preparation of final drafts, enhancement of clarity and reduc-
tion of verbiage, prior to transmittal to secretarial personnel for
final typing. This is not the desirable option in securing maximum
research output from these professionals, yet it is the only option
available to us in view of a severe shortage of secretarial and
clerical personnel. Similarly, we have attempted over the pa st
several years to resort to computerized research, often condensing
in excess of one or two man years of research into one week of
computer exploitation. Budgetary restrictions, however, have
prevented expansion of this effort, limiting such research to those
occasions where it can be performed at no cost to this Staff through
the courtesy of Agency ADP elements which are willing to absorb
such short-range costs.
The solution to the problems presented is, of course,
increased manpower and budgetary allocations. We are aware
that, at least for the present, this is out of the question. It re-
mains, therefore, a management effectiveness problem, varying
daily, even hourly, to meet requirements within current strictures.
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In our projections of last December, we noted that our
management attempts to "make do" with existing manpower and
budgetary assets was closely related to our cost effectiveness.
I noted our use of "in-house" repair for out-of-service equipment
to save costs of external repairs; this has not been the success we
had hoped, but we continue our efforts in this regard. I noted also
our conservation of operational supplies, through a "short supply"
system, which continues to be effective. All of these steps have
effected modest savings which can be redirected into other high-
priority approved programs and activities. Dollar savings goals
are neither honest nor realistic. Our efforts have been directed
not to saving "dollars, " but to giving the Agency more for "dollars"
spent. One example comes to mind. Some time ago this Staff
acquired a specific safehouse facility which was furnished with
rented furniture. We noted that the furniture alone was costing
the Agency $600 a year in rental fees, and resolved to remove
what we could project as a $6000 expenditure over the projected
life of the safehouse facility. Surplus furniture, definitely not
"first line, " was procured from a terminated activity, and a case
officer used his personal hours to shop "bargains" for the re-
mainder of the safehouse needs. As a result of this effort, I am
pleased to say that we have had the rental furniture removed and
approach the new Fiscal Year assured that the $600 savings can
be diverted to other aspects of our program or, if need be, to
the rising rental costs of safehouse facilities. We have already
reduced our safehouse facilities to the minimum necessary for
operational exploitation, and have reduced safehouse space from
bedroom apartments to efficiencies as another means of con-
serving Staff funds. It might appear at first glance to be a great
deal of "running around" and presuming upon personal time of a
case officer to effect only a $600 annual saving. Unfortunately,
we must resort to such "running around" just as we have had to
resort to professionals personally typing draft reports rather than
dictating them--the latter, of course, being the most effective
method--to accomplish our tasks with existing assets.
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6. COST AND MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS GOALS
For the coming year, we find it difficult to project
management effectiveness goals which can be subject to quantitative
measurement. We had projected that we could "keep up" by
implementing certain management reforms, albeit sacrifices to
our programs. This, plainly, has not worked. We will continue
to innovate and adapt on a daily basis to "keep our heads above
the water, " but even this must be considered a short-range man-
agement goal, since the "water" is rising much too rapidly. We
would hope, in our assets program, to continue perhaps for this
year and possibly the next, to increase assets within existing man-
power and budget, but even this cannot continue indefinitely. We
could, for example, increase our assets by 100% within manpower
capabilities, but would require a 50% increase in assets program
budget, which, of course, is not forthcoming in the foreseeable
future. We must, therefore, strike a compromise. This we will
continue to do in the assets program, just as we are forced to
take calculated risks and strike compromises in our other counter-
intelligence activities.
25X1
Chief, Security Research a f
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