PRELIMINARY STAFF MEETING NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD (NPSB)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: May 8, 1951
• Content Type: LIST

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NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
NPSB
1) Procedure for finding possible candidate for office of Director.
2) Selection of staff for Board, its location, and clerical personnel.
3) Constitution of a Panel of Consultants or Advisors representing
State, Defense, JCS, CIA, etc.
1) Relation of such panel to Psychological Operations Coordinating Board
(presided over by Mr. Barrett) and Panel of Consultants for CIA.
5) Preparation of analysis of present operations in the field of covert
psychological warfare (including covert operations now being under-
taken or planned by the various departments and agencies of the
United States government.)
6) Projects in this field undertaken by outside agencies, such as the
7) Responsibility of NPSB in the field of covert economic warfare.
8) Role of NPSB in the field of deception and counter-deception, is e.,
the analysis of measures of deception practised against us.
9) Program to induce defection, etc.
10) NCFE, NCFA and similar organizations.
REGRET
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DhAFT
3 iY,ay 1951
SUBJECT: NSPD meeting, Tuesday, 8 May 1951
1100 a.m. to 1230 p.m.
Present: General W. B. Smith, General Magruder,
Admiral Stevens, Assistant Secretary 3arrett,
-Ir. Allan Dulles, Mr. Frank aisner, Mr. Philip
Davidson, Mir. Max Millikan, and 'LIr. t(. A.
Winston, rtecorder.
(The following approximate quotations are from rough long-hand notes.)
General Smith: We have some notes here for the NSC. ii'e can see
there brought out so plainly what we brought out before. Our problems
are progressively passed on. Taken collectively, they could be handled
more easily.
General Magruder: `-'hat's true. Scarcely a week goes by now but
that we have some new example. Last week I heard the story about an
organization in OSS which used to handle this sort of thing. This
functi4s missed tremendously now.
Mr. Dulles: We have something like it in our present organization.
General Smith: It is something that should be entirely independent
of an altruistic agency. I am told that this was discussed at some
length at a high level, whereupon the Signal Corp$ of the Army suddenly
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woke up to their opportunity when they were asked, "Why have you
overlooked this marvelous, wonderful opportunity, CIA, and don't
you think you had better wise up to it," and there you are.
General Magruder: You would be surprised at the number of in-
stances of that sort of thing that occur.
IVIr. Dulles: There are plenty of opportunities to get going.
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General Magruder: General, can we turn that fan off?
Mr. Barrett: Please do. I thought we would all be taking off
in a minute.
Genera-t Smith: In all this, I am reminded of the story of the
soldiers' creed: "If it moves, salute it; if it doesn't move,
pick it up; if you can't move it, paint it;"
MMIr. Dulles: General, will you tell the lie detector story that
you told us the other day?
General Smith: de had a man who refused to take the lie detector
test. They told him that his chief took it, Smith took it, Dulles
t 'A-kbP86 U-l+34Po0 4& e1%b35-,pnally
t94 p vec 4r k e 2)42
2
will get started in a few days.
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he said, "Well, if you force me to, I'll tell you why I don't want
to take it. I did a terrible thing during the war. I don't know
what I might say if I take this test." Then, after a few drinks,
someone asked him again about this, and asked, "vdas it as bad as all
that?" He said, "Yes. I'll tell you what it was. I was away for
three years during the war, and during that time I was unfaithful
to my wife, and now I am afraid that if I took this test, I would
have to tell about this."
In these cases I have only one question: that we get these
name checks. You would be surprised at the number of elderly
gentlemen who come to work for the Uovernment and whose lady visifrs
slip away from the house early in the morning. The only question
is, are there any homosexuals involved?
We had a meeting, Mr. Lovett and myself--frantic search for a
director--and we produced nothing--not even a probable. candidate.
Being the junior, I was elected chairman--two votes to one. (I am
chairman of six other committees, too.) After that, the meeting
then adjourned
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We should start on a staff level to get underway to forming
an organization. You gentlemen should sit down with me and get
an ad hoc task force to frame a working part of this psychological
strategy group. Assume: First, the director is a front. You can
get planning and operations in the absence of a director. So, you
must have some form of an organization to focus your activities.
Second, you must have some form of machinery. I believe that the
present machinery within the Government is adequate. its main job
under a director would be coordination of plans and parceling out of
tasks. Third, for oresentatio4o the Board at its next meeting,
f
those two points, plus a first shot at a program, or project one.
You will find a multiplicity of jobs--each one small, but in totality
enormous, financially and otherwise, so there has got to be an auditing
and appraising--which will necessitate an organization. That is the
beginning. (To Mr. Barrett) Mr. Secretary, what have you to con-
tribute?
Mr. Barrett: I may not have too much to contribute, but I think
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that there has been a great deal of fuzzy thinking in this.
Numerous people have been involved in this, both from the State
Department side and the NhiteyHouse side. There are some awfully
unclear opinions, and some surprising differences~athin the State
Department. I would like to see us go about by getting, if possible,
on
an egreement by this Board a3mt the director , and possibly mmmm from
there to the staff, the machinery, and the rest of it. As you have
stated, General, the machinery is there. It is a coordinating job.
My question would be, does this Board do an overall coordinating
job, or do we concentrate on doing all jobs mrcx of a non-conventional
nature that we may have; As one example, there is China, and quoting
Dean Rust(, as in NTSC 40-something-or-other, "How do we put this
together and come up with a plan for overt psychological warfare
and for covert psychological warfare?" On this we come up with a
problem: Should it be an overall policy job on a war-time basis, or
should it continue on a peace-time basis? If it is war-time, it is one
job, and if it is peace-time, it is another. What are your thoughts on this?
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General Smith: My thinking is this. Psychological warfare is
already being coordinated on a large scale---mostly covert,blt some
of it overt. The trouble is that we haven't been able to advertise what
we have been doing. There are several phases of our haork--i CFE and
others--which you cannot advertise for obvious reasons. For example,
Bill Benton thought that VOA should do a lot more than it is doing.
He bellowed like a wounded bison, now that he is on the other end
of the stick. Benton wanted us to set up a big program, but he
doesn't know what we do over here as it is. It would be nice to
satisfy the public demand if we could, but we run into this problem
of the State Department wanting to control all of a big organization
if it is set up, and the Defense Department reluctant to turn it
all over to State. (I am speaking very frankly on this.) Admiral
Souers sent his opinions to me for comment, and I said the machinery
is in existence and needs to be pulled together and coordinated.
Also, you need a small strategic planning group.
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General Smiths (Cant'ds) You do not have in government a
basic approved strategy for this kind of war. In the last war the
chiefs of staff sat down and outlined the detail. (Here he gave
several examples.) That is all right - on a framework like that
you can hang anything. But, for example, we haven't even a policy
ChiZthq~ k`at?~heck
on Ch*ng 1, ?hek and the Nationalist Government. But we have
the NSC to establish major policy, so that you don't mod a big
organization, but you need a psychological warfare executive
to deal through and with existing agencies and under them a Board
to parcel out jobs to organizations and agencies capable of per-
forming these things. This conception is accepted in part, but
they also want a front man who will be responsible -- a man whom
the Press and the public can put the ingrr on and say that he is
responsible for conducting p$ycholo ica warfare. What
g Ott I visualize
is thiss the staff or agency operating under the Director will be a
small group representing those agencies of government which are
doing or are capable of conducting psychological warfare. The
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NSPB, for all
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NSPB, for all its high-sounding title, will be a sub-committee for
translating psychological warfare objectives, and turning them
over to the Director's staff for parceling out to agencies capable
of performing these tasks* As an example, the State Department will
handle sort of these and the Services have and will develop others
even though mechanisms already exist for handling them. These will
also be coordinated by the Director and his staff. I have not, I
never have, and I do not visualize building up a big agency to do this
job. These men in State and Defense will be on a command level. That
is the only way to get the job done. Mr. Lovett and Are Webb are
overworked men and will not be able to put much time into this paper,
so you have got to insure that the personnel and facilities
of your departments are able to work on it. You will have to be com-
pletely ruthless in getting the people to do this work. We will
draft some competent juniors to assist us on an ad hoc basis. We
should specify what should be done, how it should proceed, what the
necessary mechanism:
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necessary mechanismfor getting it started, and that is my whole
thinking. I think I have talked too much already.
General Magruder: It seems to me that we have the troops and
facilities but that we completely lack somebody to do the direction .
In this we are like a group of armies without a staff. We have
one advantage in this in that the prestige of our leaders is such
we
that they speak for their departments. However, it t need manage-
'-fit Te c -Jf
went as well as planning. We have only self-initiating
at the present time -- it can't be cumulative or connected on this
basis. We must have good talent to begin with. Before that you
must have; an answer to this Board business where 18C leaves off.
The next steps are the guidance, the timing, the programming so
that the operating agencies can go from there and conduct their
own programs. I have seen a paper on East Asia and another paper
on Southeast Asia, giving the areas and the problems. This
should be supplemented by other papers. Then I saw another paper on
0
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MacArthur Is statement "there is m no alternative to my Ray eevi,
frustration". If NBC approves that paper, then this Agency could
take it and put it into action. The policy is there, and the frame-
work is there. We must not plan in a vaouum., and we should avoid
Ivory-Towered thinking. Our plans must be practical. 2kar~t#zac
There is no use to have plans if we can't carry them out. For
example, if OPC can do only a limited job in three months, we
should prescribe only that which can be done. But if something
more can be done in six months and if you knew what it was you
could do it, but as it is we have no directives and no guidance.
General Smith: It all adds up to this: while we have the
equipment and power, we are not doing the job we should. The
question of timing is very important. (Here he gave several
examples, including situation in
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the can. )
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-- an excellent paper -- to my mind this was an answer to
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Allen found that the World Bank was about to give a "No" on the
question of a loan to
I took it up with the State Depart-
meat. We wanted to get a loan of
strengthen 0. The time was short. If, when we had shot half
have lost it all. So Allen arranged for temporizing a bit. That's
psychological warfare. But, you have to coordinate all of this,
and that's where you have got to provide the mechanisanfor it.
(To Admiral Stevens) Steve, what do you think?
Admiral Stevens: With the meohanisms we have you have got to
coordinate everything. But I don't see how you can insure that some
branch of the government -which is (Involved won't stumble in carrying
it out.
Mr. Dulless That is right. You never know when some clerk
in the Treasury Department will stop something like this.
General Smiths That is
-11-
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General Smith: That is psychological warfare. You have
got to weigh the factors: you can't insure the factors, any more
than you can protect yourself from a damn fool, but whatever we
do, we must nab pyramid this into a bureaucracy.
Admiral Stevens: Here we have the most convenient mechanism
for rapid deciaions -- a decision-rendering agency is most important.
We have an agency through which new policies can be approved by the
NSC. Another difficulty is that the Presidential directive paper
does not divide this into cold war or hot war phases. We have an
agency for planning hot war decisions and we need a cold war planning
agency. There is nobody responsible for conducting the cold war.
This puts quite a light on the Board's powers. If it is in cold war
they can work independently of the JCS, but when you get into hot
war you are wrapped up in JCS hot war directives,
General Smith: Remember, you have hot war on one-half of your
periphery, and cold war on the other and when you have that situation
you don't have trouble in the organization or any quibbling. You are
quite right that we do have i sit
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if
troublesome as you go along. Therefore,/it works out properly, it
would be a staff for cold war.
General Magruder: yes, we have a cold war which started three
years ago.
General Smith: -- and which we hope may go on for another ten
years.
General Magruder: There is another thing which we are up against --
the assumption
that is,/that the cold war can't be won so that there is very little
planning on it. If the JCS will start with the assumption and decisiveness
that the cold war can be won -- a state of mind will develop which will
crake it so. -- and this wouldn't interfere with the hot war build-up.
If the Orthodox chiefs of government,diffitaitatx
Hwta such as JCS, State, and Department of Defense
adopt this state of mind then ikx it will help a great deal. I
think that we should not ehnly assume that we can win the cold war
but that we can also avoid the hot war.
General Smith. The JCS
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General Smith: The JCS decisions will have a sombd effect
the
on,/cold war psychological side, therefore, they have got to be
brought in on everything we do. Everything they do has a
terrific effdot, such as whether they call in or defer a draft
most
quota. In the cold war, the questions of timing are xmmra im-
portant.
General Magruder: Look at the confusing, contradictory
announcements that have gone out lately. This Agency should
have in charge : of it an individual important enough to take
charge, a man who can bring in the timing and do such things as
deciding when Presidential and other announcements will be given
in order to utilize them properly.
Admiral Stevens: Even in cold war, the principal function
of the Board is a deoision-rendering agency. An example of this
is the provision
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The principal questions will be what was involved -- the mechanisms
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A At present, there is no place to go for a decision.
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this. There will be many questions the JCS can give you an answer
on, but they cannot be stampeded and they are not set up to give
quick decisions. Crash meetings of the JCS are possible but they
are not routine. How will decisions get before this Board?
There must be ample machinery. In this there is no intent to
supplant other organizations, life Mr. Barrett's. But decisions
should come to you from existing agencies -- and then buck the
questions to this Board. There won't be many of those questions
and they will have only the important things. I believe that
they will fall back on the Board only in an emergency.
General Smith: The fewer the better.
Admiral Stevens: The functions of the staff are not to answer
problems and not to produce papers. The functions are to formulate
questions, not to produce the papers.
General Lis, (To Admiral Stevens) Steve, in an army, the
subordinates are in oonatant"with the commanders. We need a broad
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framework in which to operate on this staff.
Stevens: The charter puts the primary responsibility
the formulation of policies. My point is that the formulation of
policies can be gotten by telling these agencies, rather than the
staff.
General Smith: If the staff formulates this, we do not have,
definitively, the policies necessary. We don't have it sufficiently
to say that this is our objective and this is how we will do it. We
must assure that there are agencies which are doing it and that
these agencies can do it. We can't set up a ctt t*x Director
and a staff and set in all the details. -- these exists
emaAft editing and xzzmakling assembly.
Admiral Stevens: On the qu9stion of propaganda, we need an
intelligent body that will sit down and work on the problem. They
should work on the individual details. Such papers should come out
and pass on to the Board's organization. One more point I would
like to make :
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like to make: what is decided on functions and duties should be
kept out of a formal paper. In the case of Davidson's paper
there was a very violent reaction and that was enough to convince
me that if we used the same tactics we would have a charter wrangle
for months. So, it is nr reoommendation that if you prepare such
a paper, keep it to yourselves. No one will agree on it but you.
General Magruder.- It is pretty fuzzy as we said.
Admiral Stevens; I wouldn't unfuzz it. That will be in your
favor.
General Smith: Let's not unfuzz it. (Mr. Wisner can add some-
thing to this passage)
Admiral Stevens ; The function of the JCS representative is
rather important. He should function to point out wherein such
instructions will have the concurrence of the JCS.
General Smith: The Secretary of Defense can worry about that.
That is Bob Lovett's job. Once you decide, let him coordinate. Tia
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JCS member can argue, but we don't want to. Decisions taken by
the Board can be very broad. We will limit what we propose to do,
and the representatives of State, Defense, and CIA will decide
what to do and JCS can go on from there.
Mr. Dulles: Where do we go from here? What is our next
move? If there is a AkocKwkim Director, he has got to have a
staff. Will there be a panel of consultants?
General Smith: They will come up with ideas.
k, D Iles: By countries and by areas, what is being done
today by the State Department and Defense Department and others?
We need a balance sheet for the Board to look at.
General Magruders The Director must depend on the highest
class of men to be made available from each of the agencies con-
corned -- but not to bring any in cold from civil life.
General Smith: We have Dro Milikan. Now are there any con-
flicts? (To Mr. Wisner) Frank?
Mr. Wisners I am in
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Wr.Wisner: I am in practically full agreement, except for a
few details. I have a question in my mind as to the type of ran
needed: these men should be on the policy side plus some experience
on the psychological warfare side. They need both.
Admiral Stevens: You need people versed in government to formulate
questions and let OPC do the job*
a
General Smith: You must also meet icbra public demand. Without
a front, the public and Congress will be dissatisfied. You will
many
have a lot of projects, but there is no harm in a tztxz:k projects.
Perhaps one out of a hundred projects will be acceptable . We have
not even here of psychological warfare
experts present. Whoever the President Vppoints as the Director
will get thousands of ideas.
-Mr. Dulles: He will really be open to the outside breezes.
General Smiths As an example, I had a suggestion passed along
to me which contained seven pages of what CIA should do on psychological
warfare, and a lot
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warfare, and a lot of it was a lot of God damn dribble - much of
Admiral Stevens: Don't develop ideas yourselves, otherwise,
you will have the situation of a group of amateurs competing with
a lot of professionals. The staff is merely a front for the
public -- to separate the sheep# from the goats -- to take good
ideas and work on them. We could get some men like Paul Mitzer
on this.
-Mr. Dulles : Regarding Paul Mit zer, don't rob Peter to pay
General Smiths WW have the President's directive. You have
got it. There is an order. Within its terms we have got to
frame soxwthing. This must do good, not harm. It must be
effeoti'ee not destructive. You can't worry too much about the
effect. You can get plenty of good ideas. Filter and reject
the trash
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the trash. You will find a grain of wheat among a lot of chaff here and there.
aamlf , ~+ XWXG3cxx Put it into the machine. Pass it
on to the Board to people able to draw on their own agencies for
advice. Then pass it on to the NSC for approval. Then instruct
their agencies. The terms are in the Charter and it is broad in
scope. Include this: what is to be the operating procedure, and
You
how is it to function? Who will do the work? WK should get hold
of some bright young minds from the State Department, Defense, and
a
CIA. I will provide *be chairman, but you had better have somebody
Admiral Stevens s I will put someone on this.
Cdr. Barrett: I will, too.
Gene ralMagrude r : So will I.
General Smith (to General Ma ruder s You represent Defense, so
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draw up Ofts4mmd1jy the differences between cold war and hot war.
(To General Magruder) You can go to Bob Lovett and draft anyone.
You are the main agent. (To the entire group) Draw up an ad hoc
committee 1ft fa-r
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committee for the mutual study. Organize the functions and responsi-
bilities fort he staff. If you want to go into the mechanics, go
she ad.
Mr. Wisner: Will this be a formal paper to be circulated for
concurrence?
General Smith; It will be a paper not to be circulated for
concurrence. Get the representatives together and prepare a paper
for theme
General Magruder: A concept for them to consider.
General Smith: Rvd;xUx Outline how to proceed in absence of a
a Director. We represent agencies to carry out psychological war-
fare. How should we get started now?
Admiral Stevens s This study should set up a framework to see
that existing mechanisms don't get their toes stamped on.
general Smith: max atfx Make the damn thing brief.
This is what we
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This is what we needs How many," how many from each department,
where they should sit, then show which are the agencies, plus the
outside agencies; such as Treasury; ECA, Commerce, and everything
else. The President can draw on others from time to time and issue
directives a1x1 proposals from time to time.
General Magruder; It should not be in terms of a charter.
Mr. Wisner: One or two points: (To Mr. Barrett) In view
of the scope of this thing, shouldn't :0ax1 cx Doc Matthews have a
representative?
Mrs Barrett: Yes, and a top information guy, too.
Mr. Wisner: There is a vacuum in government in economic
warfare. Some agency in the government should provide guidance
in economic warfare. This excludes overt aspects of economic war-
fare but not covert.
General Magruder; NSC 10/2 sets this up. Forget that it cannot
T"WA
be set up in bra, but in place of it you have a Board set up to
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carry out covert psychological warfare.
Mr. Wisner: Let the Board consider that it can provide guidance
in that field.
Mr. Dulless For example, in the case of
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out. By the time that the study could be prepared the opportunity
might be lost. By next week we can bring up something forI 25X1
if we get together now.
General Smith: You can't get the Board together now because
Mr. Webb is away. I am the small fry, therefore, I am the chairman.
Those men, within their lines of authority, have done all they can.
We must proceed on
Admiral Steven: Tell CIA to take on
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Mr. Dulles: What about your organization? You will have
fifteen different things in three or four departments.of the
&.'641
government. They won't wait r You will have five or six in State
and five or six in MDAP and ethers in JCS.
Mr. Barrett: I agree in part. There is a danger in getting
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tied up in this study. But we have three man who work together
smoothely and who work well together. But this thing has big
possibilities: this Board will be one of the few mechanisms in
government which can move fast. I would like to get your broad
psychological objectives -- not more than two pages at the most.
Than we can single out the three, four, or five things which
need priority attention. One of these I have listed here; this
That will be State Department. Next is
is 99% OPC. This can be coordinated with the State Department.
which is almost ready. Then there
plan which is almost ready. Now, with the authority
of these three men you can start some concerted action. State
0
General Magruder: Take the question of the Board: OPC is
concerned with and there are many other divisions, including
Colonel Stilwell's
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25X1
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Colonel Stilwell's division, but it is hap-hazard, not cumulative
consecutive. Nothing would please ADPC and Stilwell more than
a broad directive to enable his people to go ahead. We need broad
instructions. The Board wcai't go into detailed planning. We need
a concept broader and more consecutive than this. What are the
internal objectives? What types of activity? The next echelon
No will have to plan in detail. The Board should keep it in practical
terms and indicate areas where we can increase our facilities as
necessary*
Mr. Barrett: (To General Smith) It is 12:30 and I have to go.
I have a formal luncheon at 12:30.
General Smith: Let's get these points thens (L) what is the
extent of my responsibility; (2) through what means, and (3) and
what am I going to do. Lovett, Webb, and myself are given this
responsibility. These are the qim stions they want answered, and
they want them at the next meeting and they want action on them.
I have a luncheon myself at 12:30.
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(At this point the meeting was adjourned)
R. A. WINSTON
SP/DCPW
(Reoorder)
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NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
NPSB
1) Procedure for finding possible candidate for office of Director.
2) Selection of staff for Board, its location, and clerical personnel.
3) Constitution of a panel of consultants or advisors representing
State, Defense, JCS, CIA, etc.
)4) Relation of such panel to Psychological Operations Coordinating
Board(presided over by Mr. Barrett) and panel of consultants for
CIA,,
5) Preparation of analysis of present operations in the field of
covert psychological warfare (including covert operations) now being
undertaken or planned by the various departments and agencies of
the United States government,.
6) Projects in this field undertaken by outside agencies, such as
25X1 the
D
7) Responsibility of NPSB in the field of covert economic warfare.
$) Role of NPSB in the field of deception and counter-deception,
i.e., the analysis of measures of deception practised against
us.
9) Program to induce defection, etc.
10) NCFE, NCFA and similar organizations.
SECRET
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